3. Ms Deirdre Hargey
MS DEIRDRE HARGEY (affirmed).
Ms Treanor: MS CARÁL NÍ CHUILÍN (sworn)
Questions From Counsel to the Inquiry
Lady Hallett: I hope we haven’t kept you hanging around for too long.
The Witness: No, you’re okay.
Ms Treanor: Good afternoon, both of you, and thank you both for attending this afternoon and for your assistance to the Inquiry.
As you give your evidence, could I remind you just to keep your voices up and to try and speak into the microphone, and if we could all do our best not to talk over each other as well for the benefit of the stenographer.
Now, you have each provided Module 2C with a witness statement. Ms Hargey, your statement is at INQ000446235, and if we turn to page 51, you signed that statement on 12 March 2024.
Ms Hargey: I did.
Ms Treanor: Are the contents of that statement true to the best of your knowledge and belief?
Ms Hargey: It is.
Ms Treanor: Ms Ní Chuilín, your statement is at INQ000436131, and turning to page 45, please. You signed that statement on 12 March 24. MS NÍ CHUILÍN: I did.
Ms Treanor: And are the contents of your statement true to the best of your knowledge and belief? MS NÍ CHUILÍN: They are.
Ms Treanor: Thank you.
You’re both here this afternoon because you both held the position of communities minister at different points during the pandemic, and in terms of how I propose approach your evidence today, I plan to take the issues chronologically. So Ms Hargey, I’ll begin with you, and once I’ve concluded your evidence, Ms Ní Chuilín, I’ll turn to you. MS NÍ CHUILÍN: Okay.
Ms Treanor: I’d like to just start at the outset with your political careers by way of introduction.
Ms Hargey, immediately prior to the pandemic, you spent just over nine years as a councillor for Belfast City Council, and for a year of that period, you were the mayor of Belfast.
Ms Hargey: That’s right. From December 2010, I was co-opted on to the council, until then January 2020, and I was the mayor between the period of June 2018 to June 2019.
Ms Treanor: And then in January 2020, you were then elected to the Northern Ireland Assembly for the first time.
Ms Hargey: I was co-opted. I was elected then in the following election but co-opted in January and then became, yes, minister for the Department for Communities.
Ms Treanor: And that happened pretty much straight away –
Ms Hargey: Within – less than a week, yes.
Ms Treanor: And so, just at the time of the beginning of the pandemic, becoming a global health emergency, you were simultaneously getting to grips with a level of responsibility you perhaps hadn’t previously experienced; is that fair?
Ms Hargey: Yeah, I think we came into the department obviously with an absence with the Executive not running for the previous few years. There were huge portfolios, certainly within the department of communities, and I suppose coming from the New Decade, New Approach agreement, there was also expectations in terms of a programme of work that we would have to deliver. One of the big areas were welfare, social security mitigations which was a priority in an incoming new Executive.
Ms Treanor: Thank you, and we’ll come to touch on the work of your department in just a moment, but in your statement, you explain that Ms Ní Chuilín stepped in temporarily to replace you on 15 June until 16 December 2020 because you were on a leave of absence due to illness; is that –
Ms Hargey: Yes, I took ill health in June and had to have open surgery, and returned to duties then in December .
Ms Treanor: Ms Ní Chuilín, you have been an MLA since 2007, and you were recently appointed as Principal Deputy Speaker – MS NÍ CHUILÍN: That’s correct.
Ms Treanor: You explain in your statement that you have previous ministerial experience, having held what was then the office of Minister of Culture, Arts and Leisure – MS NÍ CHUILÍN: That’s correct.
Ms Treanor: – between 2011 and 2016. MS NÍ CHUILÍN: Yes.
Ms Treanor: And you also explain that from January 2020 until June 2020, you sat on the committee for communities. MS NÍ CHUILÍN: That’s correct.
Ms Treanor: Is that right? And therefore you would have been familiar, you say, with the work of Ms Hargey’s department throughout the early stage of the pandemic. MS NÍ CHUILÍN: That’s correct, yes.
Ms Treanor: Ms Hargey, just to complete the chronology before we get into your evidence, you then returned to office on 16 December and remained in the office until the conclusion of the period with which Module 2C is concerned.
Ms Hargey: Yes, that was correct.
Ms Treanor: Now, just picking up with the role of the Department for Communities and areas that you just touched on a moment ago, the department has strategic responsibility for quite a broad range of areas, and through its strategic policy and professional services group, the department leads on a number of social inclusion policy areas, and to name some of those, poverty, gender equality, LGBTQ+ policy, active ageing, and disability; is that –
Ms Hargey: Yes, these were set out in the New Decade, New Approach agreement which seen the restoration of the Assembly in 2020, and I had policy lead responsibility to develop those new strategies which hadn’t been there before.
Ms Treanor: In your statement, you characterise the department’s overall aim as tackling disadvantage and building sustainable communities. Presumably, the department’s efforts in tackling disadvantage are primarily directed towards those groups that I’ve just mentioned; is that correct?
Ms Hargey: Yes, they would be, and also with the addition of class, which often isn’t picked up in section 75 groups in terms of social class and the impact of deprivation on those communities.
Ms Treanor: Thank you.
I’d like to turn now to look at your department’s response in the early stages of the pandemic. And in your statement you explain that in the earlier part of 2020, whilst the Northern Ireland central crisis management arrangements, which I’ll refer to as NICCMA for short, whilst those arrangements hadn’t been activated, you say that a cross-departmental approach had nevertheless commenced and that your department had commenced preparatory work; is that correct?
Ms Hargey: Yes. Well, there would have been – in terms of obviously early indications of Covid, there would have been discussions at the Executive in January, end of February that would have been under “any other business” as part of that Executive meeting. And then obviously as we stepped into the March period then, that was put as a standalone item on the Executive. And I know behind the scenes, there were obviously mechanisms being put in place across the Civil Service to ensure that departments were talking to each other but also within each of their departments that we were making plans in terms of mitigating and responding to, I suppose, the unknowns in some regards of what was going to lie ahead of us.
Ms Treanor: In terms of the preparatory work that had happened within the Department for Communities in that early stage between January and March, what did that look like in practice?
Ms Hargey: Well, I think initially it would have been going into probably more of the February into the March period where there would have been engagements with I suppose the permanent secretary within the department, also with the senior management team within the department as well, by way of making sure that we were ready.
I think the first big issue was to ensure obviously staff – and as the issue of self-isolating started to come as a feature in late February going into early March, we obviously had to ensure that our essential services, such as paying social security benefits and all of that, that those services could continue unhindered, because obviously they would impact on some of the other vulnerable groupings within our society and, there was a focus to ensure that within our staff teams within the department that we did have arrangements in place to ensure that benefits could be paid but also to ensure that we give flexibility. For example I know we moved early in March to make plans for the community and voluntary sector in particular, that we would give flexibility in any of the funding that the department had without said organisations and bodies, that we would allow flexibility in those funding arrangements to allow them to respond to the pandemic.
Ms Treanor: Okay, and we’ll come on in just a moment to look at some of the more specific measures that you’ve touched on.
But sticking with this early point in the pandemic, in a text message to Chris Stewart on 11 March 2020, and I don’t think I need to bring it up, Sir David Sterling, who was the head of the Civil Service, said:
“I spoke to Tracy earlier. She’s briefing her minister (who has shown no interest in Covid up to now) tomorrow.”
Now, the permanent secretary to your department was Tracy Meharg, and this would therefore appear to be a reference to you, Ms Hargey. Is that a fair characterisation of your attitude towards Covid-19 up to that point?
Ms Hargey: Well, that certainly is not my reflection of what happened, and indeed I’m disappointed to have seen the text message and the contents that are contained within it, because if you look at the Executive meeting the day before that message was sent on 10 March, I reported to the Executive at that meeting that my own department were working on plans and contingencies by way of looking at Covid. I have also set out in my statement on 10 March that I was preparing a public statement, in terms of how we would support key sectors within the department, and particularly those that we would work with to respond to the pandemic as it started to fold.
Also within my statement, it sets out a number of actions that were taken around the emergence of the Covid Community Helpline later in March and also the emergency leadership group. That would have took a couple of weeks of planning to put resources in place. They took place in the third week of March, so we would have been planning at the start of March, late February, for that to happen. So I am disappointed at that text message. I don’t think it reflects in terms of where we were or indeed the conversations that I had with Tracy Meharg as my permanent secretary.
My focus from early on when we were aware that there could have been a pandemic was: how will this impact on sections of our population? I knew that obviously we were coming out of a three-year period of no Assembly. I could see the devastating impact that a decade of austerity had had, particularly on certain sections of our community, and even on the back of the financial crash in 2008 as well. And what I talked about, even within my statement, that when you get societal shocks like that, it impacts on certain sections of our population more than others, and a global pandemic would be no different in that regard.
Lady Hallett: Can I ask you to speak more slowly?
Ms Hargey: Oh, sorry.
Lady Hallett: No, I’ve got the same failing, so I do understand it’s very difficult to change your speech patterns, but if you just – otherwise the stenographer will have my –
Ms Hargey: Apologies.
Ms Treanor: I’ll try to remember to do the same, my Lady.
Ms Hargey, perhaps if we could bring up on screen a document that perhaps demonstrates some of the planning that you had been doing at that early stage. Thank you. This is, just for the record, INQ000086935.
Now, this is an extract from a non-health sectoral resilience return, and we can see that it’s dated 13 March 2020. Now, this is one section relating to your department which is taken from a wider return which contains returns from each department.
If we just look – if we could perhaps scroll on to the next page. So the return from the Department of Communities spans two pages, and we can see that three key areas of concern are listed for your department, and those are welfare and financial services to the public, the advice sector, and social housing.
We can see that there is some passing reference, for example, to vulnerable citizens being disproportionately impacted, but it doesn’t necessarily tell us who they are or what those impacts might be. The RAG rating column isn’t completed, and really it doesn’t tell us very much.
And I wanted to ask you: does this return adequately capture the key areas of concern for your department at that time?
Ms Hargey: It wouldn’t, in terms of the scope of the department, and also in terms of, I suppose, the conversations we were having around the potential impacts. Particularly as you were moving into the March period, you were looking at the potential of lockdowns or closures of schools and events, for example. And I know again, even on the Executive meeting, I think it was on 10 March, I highlighted issues around even childcare provision, again, looking at the voluntary and community sector, looking at communications and messaging. And I know certainly in the work that we were doing, it broadened beyond those three key areas.
I mean, obviously in terms of the advice sector, the paying of social security benefits was vital that we continued those services that we had. The staff teams housing was also a critical area, particularly those that were homeless, and vulnerabilities around the spread of a virus, they were critical.
But I know also quickly on 23 March, for example, we had worked with the Community Foundation for Northern Ireland in launching a community fund, and part of the criteria and area of that fund was to work with older people, and that was a reflection I suppose that the older age group, those with disabilities, young people, working-class communities and minority ethnic communities would be more susceptible or vulnerable. That’s why we did in the early days –
Ms Treanor: I’m sorry to interrupt you, but we will come to look at those. I would just like to focus on this return just for now –
Ms Hargey: Okay.
Ms Treanor: – in terms of capturing what your department was doing at this time.
I wanted to ask you why, in the context of what had by then been declared a global pandemic, is there no specific mention of tackling disadvantage as a key area of concern, and we know that that is a particular aim or core strategic responsibility for the Department of Communities.
Ms Hargey: I don’t know why that specific – I mean, I wouldn’t have been responsible for giving that return, but certainly what I can say is that the conversations, the work programmes that we were looking at went well beyond that. And, again, that was one of the reasons why I established the emergency leadership group on 20 March which included representation from some of those key sectors to ensure that whatever interventions we were designing, that we were doing that in partnership with the organisations and those impacted on the ground. So I don’t know why the return doesn’t reflect all of that work. And, as I say, even at that point, there was planning with the advice sector, for example, to establish the Covid Community Helpline which launched on 27 March, so planning for that would have been before 13 March. And one of the key reasons we set the helpline up was for those vulnerable categories, those who would have been shielding, was to ensure that they did have a point of contact in which we could give advice and information and importantly signpost people to support.
So I don’t know why it wasn’t reflected in that return. I think we probably could have filled hundreds of pages of a return, in terms of some of the work that the department could be doing, but I can’t answer why that wasn’t sent back in. I don’t know.
Ms Treanor: Okay.
I’d like to just explore with you your knowledge of the development of the pandemic in the early stages as well. And at paragraph 19 of your statement, and this is at INQ000446235, you indicate that the Executive held its first substantive discussion about Covid-19 on 2 March, and this is what you say about that meeting, and we can see that you say that the CMO observed that most people would have a minor illness like a cold. 98% would get better. He said that the fatality rate could be 2 to 3%, the peak could last for 15 weeks, and 50% or more of the population could be affected, but lots of minor cases very mild.
I think if we just look down towards the bottom of that paragraph, you say that you were concerned that there was an inconsistency between the medical and scientific advice that you were receiving and that being given to other countries.
Very briefly, Ms Hargey, what was the nature of your concern about the advice that you were receiving at that time?
Ms Hargey: Well, I think at the start, I mean, from, I suppose, January right through, Health were kind of taking the lead because it was a health pandemic. That said, there were updates that were given to the Executive I think as we approached into the March period. I mean, with the role of social media now, with press statements from the World Health Organisations, you could just see on, as I say, social media platforms how the virus was developing in other countries.
Obviously, the approach and the advice here was to take a steady approach, we’re in a containment phase, and I suppose at that point from that Executive meeting and as we progressed through March, there were concerns raised: are we moving quickly enough? Are we taking a proactive approach as much as we could? And I think, you know, that’s where the discussions were.
And particularly as you move into the second week and into March, the issue around school closures, the public advice and information, you know, that the public were getting, even in terms of the island, because the South had moved in terms of introducing measures. And people living here don’t see a border in that regards; they see one part of the island moving and the other part not, you know. So we were concerned. Were we having – was the pace, in terms of our response to the pandemic, was it enough? Was it appropriate? And what more could be done?
And I suppose in all of this, I mean, you were looking at best practice wherever you could get it, obviously from the health professionals here. I believe people were trying to do their best at that moment in time. But, of course, you wanted to look north and south, you wanted to look east and west, and you also wanted to look internationally in terms of, you know, what is the advice? What is the best practice? What’s working well and what’s not?
Ms Treanor: Just to clarify, Ms Hargey, it’s not the case then that you had access to scientific advice beyond that that you were getting from the CMO and CSA? It was really that sort of what you were perceiving in the media, essentially?
Ms Hargey: Well, it’s what you were getting from statements from the likes of the World Health Organisation, yes. It’s was what you were picking up in terms of other jurisdictions; what they were moving on. It’s not that you were contradicting the advice that you were getting because we were taking the advice from the medical officers and from the Department of Health. But we had a responsibility also to query that advice to ensure, you know, that we did fully understand it, and of course, that you were, as I say, looking north, south, east, west, and then more broadly beyond the islands as well.
Ms Treanor: I’d just like to bring up the notes of the Executive meeting on 19 March.
This is at INQ000065737.
Here we can see Minister Swann advising the Executive essentially of the worst-case scenario for Covid-19, and he refers to 32,000 cases per day with 9,500 deaths, and he describes those as “scary numbers”.
Now, in your statement you characterise this as a significant shift in the medical and scientific advice being given to ministers, and you say that the information now being provided was alarming and the potential consequences were frightening. Do you suggest that this was really the point at which you began to appreciate the gravity of the pandemic?
Ms Hargey: Well, I think it was before that, because I think I was in a meeting – I may get it wrong, it was around 16 March –
Ms Treanor: Correct.
Ms Hargey: – where I was noted as saying, you know, that people were terrified, words to that effect, and I think it was also noted – I think it might have been Conor Murphy, as the minister, saying, you know, that people were taking their own actions as well with what seemed to be the lack of action or at least the pace of action within the Executive, particularly around school closures and larger events. And we believe that that should have moved quicker. You know, so there were those tensions as such in terms of the pace.
And I think that that would even been before that advice that the health minister had gave. We had been raising concerns around the pace around school closures. The fact that, you know, Belfast City Council cancelled their St Patrick’s Day event, I think that was a big marker. And also what you were seeing from the ground was that people were actually, you know, making decisions themselves within their own families and within the home, for example of not sending their children to school, of isolating and taking those practical steps.
Ms Treanor: Yes, and with that in mind, just coming back to what you’ve said in your statement, characterising this as a significant shift, would it therefore not be fair or accurate to say that that actually was a significant shift, given that you were already concerned and on 2 March you had been told that the fatality rate could be 2 to 3%, the peak could last for 15 weeks, and over 50% of the population could be affected –
Ms Hargey: I think it was a significant shift in that in early March it was a gradual steady response and it was a containment phase, and then as you moved towards that meeting obviously it was – everything was being scaled up and things got more serious. So yes, there is no doubt that there was a shift but I suppose some were articulating before that meeting in the previous Executive meeting, you know, that that would have been the time to move, or at least even before that again. And I suppose that was part of the discussions and the deliberations at the Executive meetings during that period.
Ms Treanor: Okay, thank you.
I would like to just move on very briefly to come back to the activation of the NICCMA arrangements, and we know that the Executive agreed to activate those arrangements –
Ms Hargey: Which arrangements, sorry?
Ms Treanor: The Northern Ireland Central Crisis Management –
Ms Hargey: Oh, sorry.
Ms Treanor: – Arrangements. I’m abbreviating to NICCMA to save myself from getting tongue tied.
In your statement you suggest that setting up those arrangements earlier would have assisted the Executive, as ministers could have stepped in and provided the necessary leadership at an earlier stage in the pandemic, and I think you’ve already suggested that perhaps the Department of Health was taking the lead at that time prior to the activation of these arrangements. But what, if anything, did you see as the benefits of standing up those arrangements at an earlier stage, in light of your answers that your department had already begun preparatory work?
Ms Hargey: I think it probably could have been the cross-departmental nature. And looking at the intersectionality across each of the departments, you maybe could have highlighted things a lot earlier.
I think obviously – I mean, in hindsight we can now see that if we had have done things earlier that would have been a better outcome, you know, than what – when you were going through it at that point in time. And I think it shows now, you know, if you were doing it again that you would ensure that those contingency arrangements, that the planning would have been done sooner, and to ensure that it wasn’t maybe – you know, whilst one department may take the lead as such, that all departments around the Executive table, that there is that intersectionality in terms of issues, and that we could have been engaging and planning around those issues much earlier.
Ms Treanor: Would that have assisted your department, in terms of having that source of information from Health? Might it have assisted your –
Ms Hargey: I think it definitely would have assisted all departments, but we potentially could have hit the ground running a lot sooner, so instead of, for example, the community helpline being set up later in March, we could have maybe had that set up in February or early March. You know, where there is room for improvements or things that we could have done sooner, you know, as I say, with the benefit of hindsight now, that should have been done, yes.
Ms Treanor: Now, Ms Hargey, we’ve already touched on some of the initiatives that your department has set up, and you’ve mentioned the Voluntary and Community Sector Emergency Leadership Group, and as I understand it that was really a mechanism for your department to gather information directly from community and grassroots organisations; have I got that right?
Ms Hargey: I think it was to do it. There was an emergency leadership group within the department that was there before I had even come into the department, but it would have been large regional organisations like the Red Cross.
When I came into the department and we were being hit with the Covid pandemic, I thought it was important that of course those organisations remain but that we also had input and voices from the grassroots, from direct, lived experience on the ground, and I broadened the emergency leadership group to make sure we were taking in as much of that input, also including local councils, for example, that – we have 11 public authorities across the North, and it was important that if we were going to plan interventions it just wasn’t taking a sounding.
We also worked with the emergency leadership group as we moved into the pandemic in designing what the mitigations and responses would look like, and in some regards we co-designed some of those interventions as we started to move forward.
Lady Hallett: Slower, please.
Ms Hargey: Sorry, apologies.
Ms Treanor: Just on that point, Ms Hargey, are you able to offer us an example of how information or co-production, as you’ve put it, with those groups fed back up the chain and really informed any mitigations that your department put in place?
Ms Hargey: Well, I think one was the Covid Community Helpline. We worked – I mean, one of the partners that we have within the department is Advice NI, that we would work with on benefits advice across the board. They had already operated a helpline in terms of those issues around benefits and support, and through the work of the emergency leadership group and through the connections that we had, we had decided, rather than recreating the wheel or creating something new which would have taken longer time, we partnered up and twinned with Advice NI to then develop the Covid Community Helpline to ensure that we could establish it sooner rather than later.
We recognised and respected that they had a plethora of knowledge of other organisations on the ground, that if someone did phone in, no matter what their issue or concern was, that they had that knowledge that they could signpost people to support.
So there were interventions like that.
I think also early on in terms of the heating payments that we brought forward in terms of financial hardship for people. I think also the food delivery, so again access to food, not just in terms of priority supermarket slots but also that – particularly for low income families that maybe don’t fit within the benefit system.
You know, there was early indications coming from communities on the ground that they were being impacted in terms of being out of work, in terms of maybe having to come out of work for caring responsibilities, particularly when the schools closed, and we worked, through the emergency leadership group, on things – even what should be contained in the food boxes, how do we distribute those. And through that collaboration it was agreed that we would set up 11 regional hubs, using the local councils; because, again, they’re closer to the ground than what the department is, they know the communities in which they’re operating in, and they have a network of community organisations, then, that that could distribute that food. And over the course of the food distribution, just as one example, over 200,000 food parcels were delivered to communities across the North.
Ms Treanor: I’d just like to look a little more closely at a couple of those interventions that you’ve mentioned.
Perhaps we could have on-screen, please, INQ000065829.
Now, this is an extract interest a TEO daily sit rep on 4 April.
If we can go to page 3 of that, please.
Item 1 says:
“Complaints [were received] on calls to the Covid 19 Community Helpline by vulnerable people going unanswered – risk that needs will be unmet.”
And it says that your department was:
“… working with Advice NI and Council Chief [Executives] to address the issue.”
At that stage, Ms Hargey, that helpline had been operational for about one week.
Ms Hargey: Yep.
Ms Treanor: What had gone wrong, if anything, and how long did it take to resolve that issue?
Ms Hargey: Well, I think, clearly, because I was very directly involved, I would have been involved in those meetings within that first week of the helpline being established. It was oversubscribed in terms of the demand and I think that was an early indication of the demand that was out there, the confusion around information, people who were out on the ground who genuinely wanted – so I think on the one hand it showed that the helpline was working, in that people had found out about it and they were phoning, we just didn’t have the people power there to sustain the amount of calls.
We urgently then reviewed the situation. I was directly involved in meetings with Advice NI and within the department as well, and we brought about additional funding for that service to ensure that Advice NI could bring forward more personnel in order to oversee the phones.
We looked at interim arrangements, actually, where members of staff were also redirected within the social security and within the Department for Communities system. So there was a real effort to try and make sure that we mitigated against that risk, with the huge swelling of numbers.
This also correlated with, for example, the huge increase in people that came to the social security system. We were on average getting an additional 16,000 people a week that were then presenting for social security payments that weren’t before, and certainly within the first month, nearly, of the pandemic there was an increase in Universal Credit claims of over 40,000. So these were the type of numbers and the demand on the system that we were starting to be impacted by, and we tried to move as quickly as we could in order to meet those needs.
I think really what it highlights, you know, was the importance of the helpline, the fact that it was oversubscribed, you know, that the message did get out, I think through the emergency leadership group and through our community contacts that the helpline was there. We recognised initially there wasn’t enough resource and maybe we underestimated the initial demand, and we worked very quickly to try to rectify that as soon as possible.
Ms Treanor: Yes.
And the other initiative that I wanted to pick up on with you was the Access to Food initiative, and you had mentioned online priority slots. And we know that in England elderly and vulnerable people were, at the outset, able to access those slots online, but that in Northern Ireland your department had said that it was too complex to replicate that here, and very briefly I just wanted to ask if you could shed any light on the particular difficulty?
Ms Hargey: This was one area in terms of cross-departmental working, so the social market slots in England – England health system has a centralised database, so when they had looked at their shielding letters and who were going to receive them, they had one database that they could print off of those who were shielded. Here, we had over 500, because it’s within each of the local general practice surgeries across the North, so your local doctors surgery, and that’s how the Department of Health letters were issued in terms of those shielding and the vulnerable groups. That took an extra amount of time, I think it was almost two months additional, to actually contact all of those 500 different surgeries to get the information back in.
So I think there’s definite learning in the pandemic in terms of the system within health and how that’s structured, having a centralised database. I suppose not having a centralised database at that point hindered and delayed some of the interventions that we could do.
In the meantime, we did try to work with supermarkets, and particularly with local providers, around trying to make sure, you know, that if somebody self-identified that they were vulnerable, that they had the letter, that that should be accepted.
I think also at that time as well, that’s why we started the food box initiative, of over 200 food boxes that were then distributed across the North as well –
Ms Treanor: I just –
Ms Deirdre Hargey: – just to try to complement some of those gaps and some of those shortcomings in the database.
Ms Treanor: I would just like to ask you about the food box scheme. In a report published by Disability Action in September 2020, the organisation was critical of the support that had been offered and suggested that at times – and I think you’ve accepted this earlier – it was potentially inconsistent at times and at times it was unsuitable.
Were you aware of concerns around the consistency of the scheme at that time?
Ms Hargey: Well, I think – I mean, I recognise we were moving at pace. We were trying to respond to the urgent need that was presenting itself, and food was one of those key areas that was coming up.
Within the emergency leadership group, we had two groups that kind of covered the broad disability area, Inspire and also the NOW Project, who actually work within food as well, so we were taking advice from them.
I did read the Disability Action report that they did produce in January 2020, and I completely recognise the difficulties that were presented in the midst of a pandemic and of course, you know, I do recognise that there are areas that we definitely need to improve.
I think for example, you know, having Disability Action maybe involved in the emergency leadership group and other strands of work, that there’s definite learning that we can pick up from that.
We did try to move at pace at that time to make sure that that group was reflective, as much as it could be, but not too big that you couldn’t then do anything in terms of quick interventions. But were there shortcomings when you look back on that period? Absolutely. Are there lessons to be learned? Totally. And I think one of the big lessons was, even in terms of the disability strategy that my department had responsibility for, is to ensure that any of these interventions, whether they’re short term or long term, that we co-produce and we co-design the interventions and the work with the sector. And certainly lessons for the department is we did that with the disability strategy, where we worked directly with them, they worked with the departments in designing that strategy going forward.
Ms Treanor: Thank you, Ms Hargey, I’ll give you a break now and I’ll turn to you, Ms Ní Chuilín, I’m sorry I’ve been ignoring you. MS NÍ CHUILÍN: You’re okay.
Ms Treanor: Your first day in the role as 15 June 2020. MS NÍ CHUILÍN: That’s right.
Ms Treanor: When you came into office, were there any ongoing issues or difficulties within the department related to the pandemic response that you had to resolve? MS NÍ CHUILÍN: Not that I was aware of. I mean, I had, I suppose, the foresight of sitting on the communities committee, so a lot of the scrutiny role, and that’s the purpose of the committee, of the department, of the different interventions.
Now obviously if there was internal issues, they would not have been known to the committee, but I didn’t see any. I seen a department that was very proactive. I would consider that I had the privilege of working with officials who really wanted to do their best, and who were actually proud of the initiatives that Deirdre had brought forward.
It was – I mean, Deirdre had instilled very much a team approach rather than, you know, “us and them” or whatever. So I have to say I was quite impressed when I came in. Albeit on your first day, you have to come straight into an Executive meeting, you get your first day brief. And I had the – I had the experience of being in a department previously for five years, so I had the, I suppose, the experience and the knowledge to try and look underneath some of the things. But it was very good.
Ms Treanor: Were there any learnings from the first wave, for example, that you saw being implemented at that time? Was that something that the department was turning its mind to at that point? MS NÍ CHUILÍN: So I think, yes, there were. So, for example, I mean, the issue that Deirdre spoke about earlier, and you have raised yourself, around how to ensure that where gaps are identified to try and close them as best possible, now, Deirdre’s already mentioned it, I’m sure, I too listened to the disability – Nuala Toman’s evidence, and I have since read the report, and I was – I suppose I was a bit upset because I just didn’t like the feeling that someone felt that we thought they were invisible, to be honest.
But in terms of, you know, even at the very early stages – see, I’m coming, and I’m going into the department on the basis that there was already an equalities (unclear) before Covid. So it’s quite fair to say I don’t believe a rising tide floats all boats, because it does not.
I’m also coming into a department, like Deirdre, where there has been three years of a gap and over a decade of Tory cuts on the most vulnerable, and we are now in the teeth of a global pandemic where evidence from esteemed academics, WHO and others, were saying that the most vulnerable are likely to be – feel the impacts. So I’m always looking to see what else that can be done, to be fair.
Ms Treanor: Okay.
Shortly after you took up post in late August 2020, the Executive was informed that there had been a rapid increase in transmission of Covid, particularly among young people, and there were smaller clusters occurring over a wider area, and that increase in transmission continued really steadily – MS NÍ CHUILÍN: That’s correct.
Ms Treanor: – from that point until winter; do you agree? MS NÍ CHUILÍN: I do.
Ms Treanor: In your statement you indicate that you’ve considered whether what happened from August 2020 onwards demonstrates that restrictions had been eased too quickly or without adequate planning across the summer, and you indicate that you don’t believe that it did, and I just wanted to ask you why you thought that. MS NÍ CHUILÍN: So, I mean, I think there were several factors. I mean, over the summer there was a belief that the restrictions and easements, you know, would have actually been more effective because people would have been outdoors. So that was the issue or the concern, and I suppose even the hope.
But, I mean, there – and I don’t know if you’re going to touch on the modelling or whatever, but the best – the scientific and medical advice that we received for us was always the best guide. We also listened anecdotally and tried to get underneath the skin of that as well.
So I understand there may be many reasons for it, but certainly some of the restrictions possibly being lifted early may have been a contributory factor.
Ms Treanor: Okay.
At the meeting, just jumping slightly ahead in the chronology, of the Executive on 1 October, the First Minister suggested that an appropriate point had been reached to consider and implement a reset of the Executive’s approach to the management of the pandemic, and in your statement you indicate that you were supportive of that reset. MS NÍ CHUILÍN: That’s correct.
Ms Treanor: Can you explain what the rationale for that reset was, why you were supportive of it, and what it looked like in practice. MS NÍ CHUILÍN: Because I, first of all, think that – I mean, the reset wasn’t that ambitious, to be frank. It was a stocktake. It was: let’s look to see where we are, what is working well, what is not working so well, what we need to do better. Also I think it was completely appropriate that we do that. And I was in favour of a reset simply because, and I have listened to others who have said this, I think the pandemic was having an impact certainly on families in terms of mental health, not having access to the same money, despite all the mitigations that were put in place, if you’re trying to educate your children at home. There was a lot of other external pressures in addition to the pandemic. And they were coming at every minister, every minister was getting something similar. And indeed we were getting the feedback from the different fora and groups that were working with us all as partners. So I just felt – it felt right to do a reset at that time.
Ms Treanor: What changed after the reset in terms of the Executive’s approach? Was it essentially a stocktake rather than – MS NÍ CHUILÍN: It was more of a stocktake.
Ms Treanor: Moving on, then, to the Executive meeting on 8 October, and you might remember this one, this is the one where the CMO is reported in the minutes to have said:
“… never more concerned as CMO than I am now. Short window of opportunity. Sooner rather than later – intervention now to avoid situation in 2/3 weeks.”
The handwritten note of that meeting then records you as having stated:
“… Evidence clear – … if don’t get R below 7 …”
And I think that should be 0.7? MS NÍ CHUILÍN: Yes.
Ms Treanor: “… huge diffs - need intervention.” MS NÍ CHUILÍN: Yes.
Ms Treanor: And you go on to say that you were:
“Looking to see how [you could] help sport etc. Don’t point out what people already know – bring proposals to help.”
Now, in your statement you contextualise that a bit more and you say that you were alarmed at that point by what you were hearing from the CMO at that point. What action did you consider was necessary at that stage? MS NÍ CHUILÍN: So there was no recommendation that came, so for the CMO, and obviously he can quite ably explain this himself, but despite differences we did work in a collegiate way, and every minister in my opinion did their very best, and the Executive was the right place to air any differences or differences in approach or differences in emphasis, but for the CMO to come to an Executive meeting and to say that he was never more alarmed in his role as CMO, I think – was I paraphrasing? – and then not to offer, you know, advice or a recommendation, I just couldn’t understand the logic of it at all, to be frank. And I’m sure I wasn’t on my own. Well, I’d be shocked if I was on my own in thinking that way.
Ms Treanor: In the meeting you’re also reported to have said you were looking to see how you could help sport. Were vulnerable groups and communities at risk on your radar at that time? MS NÍ CHUILÍN: Yes, there were.
So without going into a whole context of it, so I – during that I lived on the New Lodge Road, BT15, one of the most deprived wards on these islands, and I was aware growing up, my whole life, the power of sports that had in keeping young people safe. It kept them out of conflict, but in latter years it kept them alive, particularly the GAA, particularly young men, boxing and other sports.
And, well, there wasn’t the same access to crowds or groups or meetings. And I know a lot of the clubs done their meetings outside. I seen the power of bringing – not only keeping the young people safe who were already engaged in sport but getting other young people to a meeting or to an event through sport. Because I believed that they offered positive role models and it was like the obvious thing for me to offer and arts and culture was the same.
Ms Treanor: Ms Ní Chuilín, if I could stop you there, in the context of a meeting where the Chief Medical Officer has said that he is never more concerned than he is now, might it seem a bit incongruous to focus, perhaps, on sports – without suggesting that they aren’t important for the reasons that you’ve suggested, but were(?) vulnerable communities – for example I think we’ve touched on older people, the disabled, and those groups that really formed part of your strategic responsibility. MS NÍ CHUILÍN: So when you put it like that, it seems, you know, sports just has came out of nowhere. I mean, there was a focus prior to that on young people, and my concern was – so obviously it’s not reflected, it’s not reflected and I accept that, but, you know, evidence and – albeit physical or anecdotal evidence says that children and young people particularly aren’t listening to messaging or there’s a perception that they are infected more, the rate (unclear) children and young people infection more, that was by way of an offering that this is probably a positive role model. It’s not to diminish what older people were facing or disabled people were facing, or women who were living in abusive relationships were facing. So I just want to get, put that on the record, to be honest.
Ms Treanor: Did the department at any stage undertake any work to identify and assess the impacts of the non-pharmaceutical interventions, for example, on the groups that you’ve just mentioned? MS NÍ CHUILÍN: Um –
Ms Treanor: – specific groups. MS NÍ CHUILÍN: So I can’t remember it in my time. I think we were just getting through as best we could.
I believe other than getting the information back about what was working and what other interventions were needed, other interventions that would actually help keep people safe.
I was also aware that probably somewhere down the line, the arm’s length bodies that Deirdre and I worked with in our department which looked at libraries, museums, sports, arts, that was perhaps something that we could do collectively, again using the co-design and co-production model and working with the partners that – to be frank, they were the first responders. These people were the first responders going into communities with food boxes when everyone else was afraid. So it would be completely – it would be completely offensive to ignore them, so …
Ms Treanor: Ms Ní Chuilín, then on 13 October the Executive agreed a four-week circuit-breaker to commence on 16 October. In your statement you say that you consider that that decision was correct, but you suggest that it could have been taken earlier. Is that right? MS NÍ CHUILÍN: Yes, well, given what the CMO said on 8 October, and the restrictions were being brought in on the 16th, there’s a gap. So for that reason it could have been brought in earlier. But, as I said earlier, that meeting didn’t come with a recommendation, it came with a very strong alarming statement and that’s – that’s all, that’s all that was delivered, to be frank.
Ms Treanor: That’s something we can explore with – MS NÍ CHUILÍN: I’m sure you will.
Ms Treanor: – witnesses.
That takes us up to the Executive meeting on 9 November 2020, and the proposal from the Minister of Health at that meeting was that the existing restrictions which had been agreed on 16 October and were due to expire on 12 November would be extended for a further two weeks. Did you agree with that proposal? MS NÍ CHUILÍN: I did.
Ms Treanor: Now, we know that that meeting adjourned and reconvened several times across a number of days. It seems there was considerable difficulty in reaching agreement on the proposal and I want to ask you this: why was that proposal so controversial? MS NÍ CHUILÍN: I can’t answer that. I think you’re going to have to ask … I’m sure – I know you had Peter Weir in earlier, and I didn’t see all of Diane Dodds’ evidence, but I didn’t find a further two-week extension to keep people safe controversial at all, and so I can’t answer why they felt it was controversial.
What I can say, and I’ve said it in my statement, in my experience the DUP were concerned about the imposition of restrictions around this period, and certainly the first to try and get them lifted, and (unclear) understand it, because, as I said to you previously, we were – people were getting hit hard, financially as well as physically. But at the same time I would not describe asking for a further two weeks as controversial at all.
Ms Treanor: Now, I won’t open the minutes – or the handwritten notes, rather, of that meeting, but we know that it seems to have deteriorated as the days went on. Can you describe the tone of that meeting, and explaining what brought it to an apparent breaking point? MS NÍ CHUILÍN: Well, I mean, it was a first time that the cross-community vote was used. Previous to that – in my experience, previous to that, any votes that were taken were done on a majority basis.
You also had, and Edwin Poots can talk for himself, but certainly – and I don’t know if Diane Dodds was asked these questions or not, so forgive me, but certainly at times it felt like it was lives and livelihoods were seen as two separate issues, competing issues, when it was – it was all collective.
And the attitude about the scientific and medical advice that was given I felt at times was why people are afraid to disagree, and we did throughout this. I just felt that it was being disregarded.
I would have dealt with that like any other meeting, because those meetings need to be robust. Unfortunately they were not at times, and people had their guards up. But when the cross-community vote was called for, I just felt it was a complete inappropriate use of a mechanism that was brought in as part of the Good Friday Agreement to protect minority rights, equalities and human rights. And I could not and still don’t understand why that was called in.
Ms Treanor: Okay, Ms Ní Chuilín, just to explore that a little further, from the face of the handwritten notes of that meeting it seems that you said very little. Why was that the case? MS NÍ CHUILÍN: Sometimes the less said the better, to be frank. Don’t be thinking that because I wasn’t on the record as not having said anything that I wasn’t concerned or that I wasn’t disappointed or that I wasn’t upset at the use of the vote. I just feel – and you will see throughout the notes, for all ministers, throughout the Executive meetings that people normally speak to a paper or speak to an issue. I just felt it would have brought no further benefit, other than, you know, what you see already in the handwritten notes.
Ms Treanor: Ms Ní Chuilín, you’ve indicated that you felt, I think you said, disappointed and upset, and that you had concerns. Would it not have been important for you, as the Minister for Communities, to communicate that in that meeting? MS NÍ CHUILÍN: Well, let me also say that Michelle O’Neill, who was the deputy First Minister, chaired that meeting over a period of days. Michelle O’Neill, and indeed all (unclear) who spoke, but certainly from our party, articulated what needed to happen rather than going down what we needed – I couldn’t understand why you had to explain the need for an additional two weeks, particularly when we were going into a surge.
Lady Hallett: I think we’ll leave that there, Ms Treanor. I think it’s very political territory and I think we’ve probably had enough –
Ms Treanor: Understood, my Lady.
Just one final question on that meeting Ms Ní Chuilín. We do see you having an exchange with the Chief Medical Officer at an earlier stage in that meeting, and the handwritten note of the meeting records the deputy First Minister as having asked the Chief Medical Officer about isolation figures, and he gives
an answer which I’ll summarise. He says that this was
a previous Executive question where he “shared
information from England [and] Wales …
[Northern Ireland] [probably the] same as elsewhere”.
And from the notes you then appear to have been critical
of the modelling, and you say you:
“Need robust modelling – public money …
reasonable ask … when will we see this data – asked
two weeks ago … need more robustness than what I have
seen … need clear info.”
What was your concern about the modelling at that
time? MS NÍ CHUILÍN: Well, that actually sounds very curt and
rude, so as just to say, I simply – I wasn’t
challenging the CMO, what I was challenging was that
I didn’t feel the experience of here in the North was
reflected. So I believe it was almost a very centrist
approach.
Now, I had to prepare in my department the number
potentially now, and obviously it wasn’t – it wasn’t
down to a specific number, but, in the general, get
an idea of how many people may have or may need a Covid
isolation payment, how many people are going to try and
access discretionary support, which is a grant, not
a loan, because Deirdre insisted that happened, because you’d have really needed it. You know, so things like that.
So I wasn’t – it does sound like I was being quite rude. I was basically saying I have asked for this before. I was conscious that I had to account for public money, I didn’t assume that this money would be forever flowing, and I was anxious – to be more honest, I was more anxious than critical. And I also was concerned that the experiences here, given the history of poverty and deprivation and discrimination and the impacts that that had were not reflected in any modelling going forward in the future. So …
Ms Treanor: Thank you for that, Ms Ní Chuilín. I certainly wasn’t suggesting that you were being rude. MS NÍ CHUILÍN: No, no, I accept that, but when you read it out, I even feel it sounded a bit curt, and that’s not us.
Ms Treanor: Finally, then, Ms Ní Chuilín, in your view, did the meeting of 9 November have any impact on Executive relations thereafter, and if so, what was the impact? MS NÍ CHUILÍN: Well, I think there certainly wasn’t the same confidence coming from others – well, from the DUP or Edwin Poots – about the scientific and medical advice then, so that was worrying.
I also think that the use of the cross-community vote over something that I felt should have been a natural instinct for us to do, and that worried me, so … and I believe that we all were concerned about how we were going to try and get the mitigations and the support to people as best we could, at the same time knowing that the funds aren’t going to be here all the time.
So I do think it was an amalgamation of things, and I think anyone to go to chair and to go through a three-day meeting, it does have an impact. Now, I’m not saying, you know, it was forever lasting, but it did impact.
Ms Treanor: Thank you, Ms Ní Chuilín.
My Lady, I have no further questions.
Lady Hallett: It’s Ms Campbell.
Questions From Ms Campbell KC
Ms Campbell: Thank you, my Lady. My question in fact is for you, Ms Ní Chuilín, and it’s really picking up on some of the themes of the evidence that you’ve just given about the impact of decisions.
Can I take you back to June 2020, because we know and you know that just two weeks after you took over in post as Minister for Communities, you chose to attend the very high profile funeral of Mr Storey, and you deal with it in your statement, and perhaps we can have
a look at the way in which you address it. It’s at
paragraph 209, thank you. I’m grateful to the technical
staff.
You were asked by the Inquiry whether public
confidence in the Executive’s decision-making was
impacted by breaches of rules and standards by public
figures in the North or in Britain, and you believed
that this did impact on public confidence. And you go
on to say that you attended the funeral of your dear
friend Bobby Storey in a personal capacity and you
accept by doing so you caused hurt to families who lost
loved ones during the pandemic, and you apologise for
that.
Ms Ní Chuilín, by the time that you took over as
communities minister in June 2020, you and everyone will
have been only too aware that the Executive had imposed
previously unthinkable restrictions on our community and
that those restrictions had required a great many people
to make very painful sacrifices, particularly around the
attendance at funerals of parents, of children, of
partners, or, as you put it, of dear, dear friends.
Rather than just hurt, can you see the impact that
that had on our community in terms of anger and
resentment towards our publicly elected representatives? MS NÍ CHUILÍN: I can, Ms Campbell, and I just want to take the opportunity again, again, to apologise to the families who lost a loved one. I am very sorry. I absolutely do see the impact, and I also recognise that people were more than angry. So I accept that, and I really am sorry.
Ms Campbell: Do you accept also, though, that it’s not a matter of hindsight, looking back on the impact, that attending such a public funeral in those circumstances as a representative of our community, the consequences of that must have been foreseen by you in your decision to attend? MS NÍ CHUILÍN: I think that’s a fair point.
Ms Campbell: Not only, Ms Ní Chuilín, did you attend, but in order to get to the funeral, you used your ministerial car. That’s a point that you have latterly accepted, I think, in the summer of 2020. You accepted that you did use your ministerial car. MS NÍ CHUILÍN: I did, and I reimbursed the department for its use.
Ms Campbell: But the decision to attend a funeral at all, but in fact the decision to attend a funeral in a ministerial car, surely you can see and could have seen that that will have contributed to a sense of disillusionment within the community – MS NÍ CHUILÍN: So I accept what you’re saying. I had business in the Assembly straight after the funeral, so I had to go to the Assembly and bring in regulations that afternoon. I accept I should not have gone to the funeral in a ministerial car.
Ms Campbell: Well, is it further than that? Do you accept that you should not have gone to the funeral at all, given your role as a Minister for Communities? MS NÍ CHUILÍN: I can see the hurt and the anger, and I accept – I accept that now, yes, I do.
Ms Campbell: Thank you.
Lady Hallett: Thank you, Ms Campbell.
I think we have some questions remotely. Mr Stern, have you got a link?
Questions From Mr Stern
Mr Stern: Thank you, my Lady.
Ms Hargey, Ms Ní Chuilín, can I check whether you can see and see me clearly?
Ms Hargey: Yes. MS NÍ CHUILÍN: We can.
Mr Stern: Thank you. I ask questions on behalf of Disability Action Northern Ireland. Disability Action Northern Ireland is a disabled people’s organisation, and that is an organisation run by and for disabled people.
I have two topics I want to ask you about. The questions are directed at both of you. First, engagement with disabled people’s organisations, and second, DFC’s disability strategy.
So turning first to that first topic. Ms Hargey, you gave evidence earlier this afternoon about the voluntary and community sector emergency leadership group, the ELG, and you mentioned in your evidence the fact that Disability Action Northern Ireland hasn’t been represented on that group.
Now, given that the DFC is nominally responsible for social inclusion policy, including for disabled people, why did the membership of the ELG not include any disabled people’s organisation representation when it was initiated in March 2020?
Ms Hargey: Well, I think I explained at the start in terms of the emergency leadership group, when I came into the department and we were hit with the pandemic, I did try to widen that group to make sure that it was more representative of communities on the ground so that we could have that direct impact fed into the department.
I also wanted to make sure that it was representative of those key areas of work where there would be vulnerabilities within the community. So there were two groups that cover those with disabilities that were involved in the emergency leadership group. As I say, the NOW project that works with people with disabilities – it’s a social enterprise – and also Inspire Wellbeing in terms of that. But I also accept that in reading Disability Action’s document in looking at the concerns and the lived experience of those with disabilities and the impact that the pandemic had should Disability Action as a group in its own right have been there, I would say yes, they would.
And I added to that, that in terms of developing then the disability strategy, we did learn, you know, really right away from the pandemic, even in terms of the role of women, there was nobody – there were women on the group but maybe not from the women’s sector, and we rectified that issue also.
But I think in moving with the inclusion strategies around disability, then I did take a decision within the department that those strategies should be co-designed with the sector, with the communities on the ground to look at the direct impact. I had met with those sectors and with representatives from the community and those with disabilities as well – now, it was on a Zoom call because of the pandemic – to talk to them in terms of the direct impact. And what we also done was, as we were developing the emergency response going forward, we learnt from that as well early on. So one of the programmes in terms of where we netted in to ensure that we included disability was the Job Start Scheme, so looking at employment issues for young people within the labour market in and around the pandemic. And the Job Start Scheme, this ran across England, Scotland, Wales and here. We slightly delayed the introduction of the scheme here because we included a specific focus on looking at disability in work because we recognised that that was a gap in terms of some of the initial analysis that was coming through.
And one step further to that, that did lead further on into the pandemic. We had the Harkin Summit then – it’s an internationally renowned disability summit looking at the connection between disability and work, and the Department for Communities sponsored that summit to come to Belfast. And, again, we worked collaboratively; we actually co-designed that summit with the sector.
So I recognise in the early start of the pandemic, where we were moving at pace, we wanted to get support out on the ground. I tried to be as inclusive as I could, but I recognise there were gaps in that. We acknowledge that, and we have since tried to rectify that with department work going forward.
And I think also the issue of data because I think it came up, sorry, in earlier questions. You know, that is a broader issue, I think, in learning coming out of the pandemic as well and how data is collected across government and how it’s desegregated in terms of disability or gender. I think there is definitely a gap there and more work to be done in the time ahead.
Mr Stern: Ms Hargey, a moment ago you mentioned the NOW Group. Can I just confirm, it’s right, isn’t it, that the NOW Group, that’s a social enterprise supporting learning disabled people into employment, but that’s not a disabled-led organisation, is it?
Ms Hargey: It is a social enterprise group, but it works with those with disabilities. We also worked with Inspire. We also worked with the Older People’s Commissioner And the Children’s Commissioner as well, but I do accept that we should have had Disability Action on as a key organisation that, you know, more broadly works on behalf of the sector.
I mean, I did read the report in terms of the early interviews that were done with people with disabilities, you know, and I completely accept the plight and some of the impediments that they faced, and I do think as a department – I mean, I accept that now that they should have been involved. I think we worked to rectify that in all future work the department done. We did include organisations such as Disability Action and others in co-design and responses to programmes of work that the department are leading on.
Mr Stern: I’m grateful, Ms Hargey.
The second topic now is the disability strategy. Now, on 24 September 2020, the DFC announced that work would commence on the development of a suite of new social inclusion strategies and that was to include the disability strategy.
Ms Hargey: That’s right.
Mr Stern: Now, the projected launch date of that strategy remains publicly advertised as December 2021 on the DFC website. Now, entirely appreciating that neither of you are in ministerial posts at the DFC now, can you assist the Inquiry as to why that strategy has still not been published?
Ms Hargey: Yes, well, I can cover that for all the inclusion strategies – disability, gender, sexual orientation and poverty – which intersections with the Covid Inquiry. They are cross-departmental, they’re Executive policies, so even though the Department for Communities are leading on the development of those, they need cross-Executive approval. And because the Executive came down in February 2022, we then couldn’t bring those policies to the Executive to be approved.
Now with the Assembly up and running and with an Executive now in place, I would be confident that the new minister in the Department for Communities will bring those forward.
There were also delays in the devisement of the strategies in terms of when we would have liked to see them completed. Obviously Covid had an impact because the department’s energy then focused on mitigating the worst effects of the pandemic, but also because we took a deliberate approach to co-design these policies with the sectors, and that took more time in order to facilitate those discussions.
We, I suppose, engaged with all of the sectors, including the disability sector, and that was something that they agreed to. I know I had done a direct meeting with those that were involved in the co-design of the disability strategy, because I also recognised that disability legislation here is way out of date. I think that’s part of the lessons learned in terms of the implications. And we worked with them in terms of that co-design approach. But I am – it was – because there was no Executive, the policy couldn’t progress, and I’m confident that that will be an area of priority for the new Executive that has just been formed.
Lady Hallett: Thank you very much. I think we’ll have to leave it there, Mr Stern, thank you.
Mr Stern: Thank you, my Lady.
Lady Hallett: Thank you both very much indeed. I hope you didn’t mind doing it jointly, but it did seem to be a good idea, given you had the continuity between you. MS NÍ CHUILÍN: Thank you.
Ms Hargey: Thank you.
(The witnesses withdrew)
Lady Hallett: Thank you, 10 o’clock tomorrow.
(4.26 pm)
(The hearing adjourned until 10 am on Thursday, 9 May 2024)