4. Mr Reginald Kilpatrick

MR REGINALD KILPATRICK (affirmed).

Questions From Counsel to the Inquiry

Ms Paisley: Can you start by giving your full name, please.

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: My name is Reginald Thomas Kilpatrick.

Counsel Inquiry: Thank you very much for attending today.

You have been good enough to provide three witness statements to this module.

If we can identify those, please, one on behalf of the Local Government Directorate, dated 3 October 2023, INQ000292585, a statement dealing with enforcement of the coronavirus regulations, dated 1 December 2023, INQ000362241, and, finally, a statement provided in your personal capacity, dated 14 December 2023, INQ000274156.

You have signed all three statements with statements of truth; is that right?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: That’s correct.

Counsel Inquiry: Can you please confirm that their contents are true to the best of your knowledge and belief?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: The contents are true to the best of my knowledge.

Counsel Inquiry: And you also provided written evidence and gave evidence in Module 1 –

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I did.

Counsel Inquiry: – of this Inquiry, and it’s fair to say you continue to assist the Inquiry with its investigations and we would like to pass on our thanks.

In terms of your career and professional background, you’ve worked in the Welsh Government since 1989 in a range of financial and policy roles; is that correct?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: That’s correct.

Counsel Inquiry: In 2003 you moved into senior civil service as deputy director for the Budget Planning and Management division of the Welsh Government. You were then appointed deputy director of local government policy division of the Local Government Directorate in 2007.

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Correct.

Counsel Inquiry: And then in 2011 you became director of the Local Government Directorate. In 2013 you became, additionally, responsible for the Welsh Government civil contingencies and emergency planning function, community safety policy and the Welsh fire service.

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Correct.

Counsel Inquiry: And in January 2020, so the start of the period that this module is looking at, is it right that the Local Government Directorate sat within the education and public services group?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: It is.

Counsel Inquiry: In September 2020, you then became director general for Covid crisis co-ordination and director of the Local Government Directorate. Then in February 2022 there was a restructure of the directorates and the remit of the Local Government Directorate was transferred to a new group called the Covid Recovery and Local Government Group.

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Correct.

Counsel Inquiry: And you were appointed as the Director General of that group; is that right?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: That’s all correct.

Counsel Inquiry: So during the period with which this module is concerned, January 2020 to May 2022, you had direct responsibility for the Local Government Directorate; is that –

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I did.

Counsel Inquiry: – fair?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Yes.

Counsel Inquiry: Can we then look at Cabinet responsibility, please, for local government policy matters. From January 2020 to May 2021 that responsibility lay mainly with Julie James as Minister for Housing and Local Government?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: It did.

Counsel Inquiry: Then from May 2021 to the end of the period that this module is concerned with, Cabinet responsibility for local government policy matters lay with Rebecca Evans, as Minister for Finance and Local Government; is that right?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: It did.

Counsel Inquiry: Having dealt with the background and the various dates, could you please briefly explain the main function of the Local Government Directorate?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: The main function of the Local Government Directorate I think can be summarised in three, three things, really, one of which is regarding the Academi Wales, leadership college for the public service, so that sits in Local Government Directorate. The second part would be the community safety division, which looks after the operational day-to-day administration of justice and, principally, our relationship with the police, and our oversight of the devolved fire service.

The element that looks after local government relates to probably four things, one of which is making sure that we have a fair and functioning local taxation system, which provides about £3 billion income for the 22 local authorities, that we have a council tax system which enables councils to raise money directly from individual households which brings in about another £1.4 billion of income, and finally – sorry, I think that’s probably – sorry, that’s the first one. The second – I’m getting ahead of myself here.

The second point is around democracy and creating the statutory conditions for local authorities to function effectively, that is in terms of making sure there the democratic oversight is properly based in legislation and overseen, that the standards and conduct of individual members is put in a framework which enables them to understand what their roles are and how they should behave in conducting those roles.

And thirdly, how do we increase and improve the diversity of our elected members.

The third element is around local government funding, so it is my team that allocates the near £5 billion to the 22 local authorities through a formula, a very complex formula, which takes the quantum, we don’t unfortunately set that quantum in my team, that’s given to us, but that will then allocate those funds in a way that we believe is equal. It is done in collaboration with the 22 local authorities and provides everyone with a fair and open settlement.

The fourth division relates to performance and partnership. So you’ll see from my statement we are very committed to working in partnership with local government, and we support the statutory partnership council and a number of other partnerships. We also look after the performance, so how do we implement some of the provisions of the 2021 Local Government Act which sets out the statutory performance regime for the 22 local authorities.

Counsel Inquiry: Thank you very much.

Now, as you have just confirmed, from 2013 you were responsible for Welsh Government’s civil contingencies and emergency planning function as an additional responsibility. Can you please assist with the function of the Civil Contingencies Group generally.

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Yeah. The Civil Contingencies, as it was in 2013, and beyond, was the resilience team, and it was that team that led on the policy and implementation and operationalisation of our civil contingencies functions. So it provided leadership essentially to the Category 1 and Category 2 responders who are defined, as you know, under the Civil Contingencies Act. And to the extent that we needed to mobilise, which we did on a number of occasions, the Welsh Government and the resilience team, in particular under my directorship, would provide the co-ordination and communication around that response.

Counsel Inquiry: We’ll come back on to that group shortly, but in your witness statement at paragraph 24 – we don’t need that on screen – in terms of Covid itself, you say:

“It is difficult to be precise as to the date on which I first learned about Covid in my professional capacity.”

Now, given your responsibility for civil contingencies, is it unusual that you can’t pinpoint a date?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: No, I wouldn’t say it was. There are two types of civil contingencies that we deal with, one of which is a rapidly emerging event, for example a marauding terrorist firearm incident, and that would be very clear, it will move very quickly. With Covid, I think the circumstances were slightly different in that we were – during January and late December, I think most of us were watching the developments in China with great interest and increasing trepidation. And so while I can’t pinpoint the exact day at which I learned in my professional capacity, I can pinpoint the exact day when I believed it was time that the Welsh Government civil contingencies function needed to take some action.

Counsel Inquiry: If we can have on screen, please, a statement made by Vaughan Gething, Minister for Health and Social Services, on 24 January 2020, and this says:

“Welsh Government is closely monitoring the emergence of a novel coronavirus originating in Wuhan, China. Due to the enlarging geographic area affected and evidence of person to person transmission, it is likely that people will require assessment in Wales and the wider UK.”

So we’ve just been discussing your awareness. Would it be fair to say that 24 January 2020 is the last possible date?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Well, at this time the response to the coronavirus as it was during January was being dealt with by the Health Department, it wasn’t necessarily an event that was being dealt with collectively by the government, so far as I could see, and I don’t remember this particular statement being issued. But at that stage there’s no reason why that would have necessarily been shared with me in the civil contingencies structures.

Counsel Inquiry: Returning then if we can to the Civil Contingencies Group that we’ve just discussed, you confirm that you convened and chaired a meeting of that group on the morning of 4 February 2020, and you say:

“[This] provided the first opportunity for an informed discussion to take place at senior official level about the official information that was then available and the potential risks of Covid-19 as they might materialise for the Welsh Government.”

So what do you say triggered that meeting?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I would say my natural pessimism, in a sense. Working in the civil contingencies area, one of our doctrines is to prepare. It seemed to me at the end of January we were in the position where there was a potential for coronavirus to come to the UK and therefore to come to Wales, and my intention of convening that first Civil Contingencies Group was to find out more about it for myself, to find out exactly what we knew as a government at that stage, but more importantly to engage a wide range of policy colleagues from across the government, so that would be from the education, the social care department, a number of other departments as well, so that we could all understand the, if you like, the common recognised information picture at that point and to begin to consider what, if anything, we needed to do and when we might need to do it.

And I – I’m fairly sure that at that stage I was saying to that group of colleagues “You need to begin to go and talk to your sectors, to talk to education and to talk to business potentially about the potential for a pandemic”, and then to begin sort of, at that stage, draft thinking around preparedness.

Counsel Inquiry: Just one final question before we take a break. You mention in respect of the statement of Vaughan Gething that you don’t remember that being brought to your attention. Had that been brought to your attention, with what you’ve described as your natural pessimism, do you think you might have convened a meeting of the Civil Contingencies Group earlier than 4 February?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I’m sure I would.

Ms Paisley: Thank you, my Lady. Would that be a convenient moment?

Lady Hallett: Certainly. I shall return at 3.15.

(3.00 pm)

(A short break)

(3.15 pm)

Lady Hallett: Ms Paisley.

Ms Paisley: Thank you.

Can we please have on screen the minutes of the 4 February Civil Contingencies Group meeting, INQ000321239, and as discussed you chaired this meeting; is that correct?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Correct.

Counsel Inquiry: If we can look at page 1, paragraph 1.2:

“… the ECC(W) will be formally established today.”

Can you briefly explain, please, the role and function of the ECC(W) in a public health emergency such as this.

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Technically speaking the ECC(W) is a room rather than a group, sorry. But essentially what it does is to bring together the resilience team with the category 1 partners as defined under the Civil Contingencies Act to enable two things, really. First of all, to begin to plan and understand what each of the partners, each of the responders are doing in order to understand the issue that the – the civil contingencies issue they’re dealing with; and, secondly, to begin developing a common recognised information picture, ie what is the sum of all of the knowledge of those responders, in order that we can begin to co-ordinate and potentially communicate the actions that need to be taken across those partners and for us as a government, and particularly the resilience team, we can begin to tell ministers that that – that there is action under way.

Counsel Inquiry: So this is from 4 February 2020.

Can we briefly please turn to INQ00032120228.

This is a meeting of the Civil Contingencies Group on 18 February, and if we can look on page 3, and in the middle we can see it says:

“Gary Haggaty explained that at present, ECCW is not formally stood up but are considering the need to formally stand up in the near future.”

Then if we can go to the Cabinet minutes, please, from 25 February 2020, INQ000129852.

At paragraph 5.4, page 6, it says:

“… the Emergency Co-ordination Centre (Wales) was ready to ‘stand up’ if and when required.”

So my question is: can you help us with when the ECC(W) was formally established?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: The ECC(W) began operating in the way I described from 4 February, and that was in line with the weekly civil contingencies groups that we had put in place.

There is a threshold in the pan-Wales response plan at which – when we say the ECC(W) is stood up, that is more about the physical location of partners, and a move from normal working hours to extended working hours, because the amount of the number of issues that we need to deal with or the severity of the situation demands a greater input from the resilience team and those partners. And so I think by the time we got to 25 February, we were considering – sorry, I’m trying to remember the dates – moving the ECC(W) on to extended working hours, and then certainly during March we moved them from, I think, it’s 7 in the morning to 8 at morning, from 7 in the morning to 10 o’clock at night. So it was a gradual mobilisation.

Lady Hallett: I’m sorry, I didn’t really understand that answer. Could you help me again?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Okay.

Lady Hallett: Ms Paisley’s question was: when was the ECC(W) formally established?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I would say 10 February we wrote out to local resilience fora to explain that the ECC(W) was running at that point – I can’t remember the exact phrase that we used in the letter, but the team were operating from the 4th, and as we moved through February we were extending their working hours because the scale of the task grew.

Lady Hallett: I don’t know if you want to pursue it, Ms Paisley, I still don’t think I quite follow, but anyway …

Ms Paisley: Thank you, my Lady.

Lady Hallett: Maybe I’m not following who’s on – who is on the ECC(W)?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: That would be the resilience team, in my directorate. That would also be the Category 1 responders under the civil contingencies –

Lady Hallett: The local authorities and the like.

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: So there would be local authorities, health boards, the police and fire service, ambulance and the military.

Lady Hallett: So was it meeting? You talk about your team and extended hours. Was the ECC(W) meeting?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: It was not physically co-located at that point.

Lady Hallett: Sorry, was it meeting?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: The ECC(W) is a –

Lady Hallett: Well, it’s like COBR, isn’t it, we use it for meetings but it is actually a room.

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: It is a room, it is a physical location at which partners would gather together.

So to the extent that I can explain it without relation to a physical room, the partners were engaging on a daily basis from the 4th – sorry, from the original date through February.

Lady Hallett: Were they engaging in a meeting or by –

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: They were engaging in a meeting and they were engaging through providing information into the system.

Lady Hallett: Right. Thank you.

Ms Paisley: Can we perhaps stay on the topic of the ECC(W), please, and skipping ahead slightly, you wrote to local resilience forums on 10 March – and that letter is INQ000321241 – stating that from the next day, so that would be 11 March, that the ECC(W) would operate from 7 am until 7 pm Monday to Friday, and then this was increased to seven days a week from 8 am till 10 pm from 20 March and that was confirmed in a letter from the First Minister. Is that right?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Correct.

Counsel Inquiry: Do you think those escalations happened quickly enough?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: At the time, I think they were reasonable escalations based on the information that we had. I’m not sure that had we brought those escalations forward it would have made a material difference to our response.

Counsel Inquiry: It’s right that in your statement you confirm, as Wales emerged from the first wave of Covid, that the Joint Emergency Services Group, Welsh Government and the strategic co-ordinating groups would undertake a lessons learned exercise, and that was to understand how the emergency services and preparedness structures had responded to the pandemic, and that was the Pan Wales Covid-19 Lessons Management Project Board –

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Indeed.

Counsel Inquiry: – which you chaired, and you confirm it met five times, and a lessons identified register was compiled to track the progress.

If we can, please, have on screen INQ000187578, and we can see that this document was last updated on 3 March 2023; is that correct?

And on page 19, we can see, under “Recommendations”:

“Review the triggers for the establishment of ECCW, and the response structures for ‘Health’ emergencies.”

And under paragraph 6.5:

“Prompt establishment of a full ECCW functionality should follow once a public health emergency is declared.”

We can then see at the bottom a comment:

“A formal review of the Pan Wales Response Plan will be undertaken and a task and finish group will be established to take this forward.”

Has there been a review about the trigger to establish the ECC(W) undertaken to date?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: The quote here, the work that is outlined here is being taken forward through our review of civil contingencies processes in Wales. I’m – I can’t confirm that there is a specific piece of work on the triggers for standing up the ECC(W). I agree that it is – it is a very important point of transition for us, and on reflection I can see that at the beginning, in those early days of Covid, we should have been clearer about the status of the ECC(W) and when we were moving through those phases towards full mobilisation.

Counsel Inquiry: Can we then, please, return our minds back to the Civil Contingencies Group meeting on 4 February, and we don’t need to have the minutes back up again, but the minutes note that there would be an internal meeting on 10 February to discuss the Welsh Government’s pandemic plan. Is that a meeting you remember taking place?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I don’t recall that meeting.

Counsel Inquiry: Your statement talks about the Health Emergency Planning Unit, or HEPU. Can you please briefly explain the role that HEPU played in the Welsh Government’s pandemic response.

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: My understanding of the Health Emergency Planning Unit is that it provided, if you like, an equivalent to the resilience team’s function for the NHS. So it dealt with civil contingencies planning, it dealt with how to operationalise some of those actions required by that planning, issuing guidance and determining policy for the NHS and the health service.

I didn’t have any detailed engagement with the operation of HEPU in the run-up to 23 March.

Counsel Inquiry: Can we, please, look at INQ000320719, which is an email.

If we can look at the email, please, from David Goulding. If we start with page 3, this email chain begins with an email from the UK Cabinet Office attaching SAGE planning assumptions and the draft communications plan on 13 February.

If we can then, please, look above that, and we have the email from David Goulding, and we can see your name appears along with some others, and it says:

“Please note the planning assumptions coming out from SAGE. I don’t propose any wider sharing of this as it states not to be shared beyond HMG and SAGE members. I assume it will go to COBR Ministers to consider and can then be shared wider?

“The assumptions reflect a pandemic but the one surprise is the clinical attack rate. If I am reading this correctly it suggests 80% whereas for a pandemic it’s 50%.”

If we can keep that in mind but now turn to the attached SAGE planning assumptions, INQ000320718, and we can see, first row, “Incubation period”, estimated 1-14 days, significantly longer than pan flu reasonable worst-case scenario.

Third row, basic reproductive rate is estimated to be 2-3 in Wuhan.

Fourth row, the doubling rate in China just 4-5 days.”

Seventh row, “Transmission”:

“Asymptomatic transmission cannot be ruled out and transmission from mildly symptomatic individuals is likely.”

Then on page 2, please, first row, we can see 80% of the population could possibly be infected, which is the point picked up by David Goulding in the email that he sent.

Then, the fourth row, 4% of the population could require hospitalisation.

It would be fair to say that these were worrying assumptions; is that right?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: That’s absolutely correct.

Counsel Inquiry: Would you agree that, looking at these assumptions, it was plain that this was going to be a whole-systems emergency by this stage at the latest?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: It was clear to me that it was going to be an emergency that would go well beyond the civil contingencies responses that we had been planning for and exercising for in the past, and indeed beyond those – consideration that we’d given the pandemic flu plans some years – well, the plans that were published some years before.

Counsel Inquiry: So did you have pause for thought at this point and consider: we’re not sufficiently prepared to deal with this?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: My response to David’s email was to raise the significance of the planning assumptions and what I could see as a developed communication plan within the UK Government which was attached to this, this email as well, with a range of senior colleagues.

Counsel Inquiry: If we could come on to your response in just a moment, but in terms of your personal thoughts, did you think, “We’re not prepared for this”?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I don’t think that crossed my mind at the time. My focus was much more on: how do we respond, what can I do personally and professionally to mobilise the organisation so that we can build a response, recognising these new and more serious planning assumptions.

Counsel Inquiry: If we can then go on to your response to David Goulding, please, and back to INQ000320719, please, and if we can go to the first page, and your email says:

“This material needs to be shared internally and rapidly.”

So would it be right to say that you were surprised that David Goulding had said don’t share it more widely?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I was surprised that the information wasn’t being shared more widely, given its nature and the implications for departments across the government.

Counsel Inquiry: So your response was to escalate this as quickly as you could to the director generals and to the permanent secretary?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: It was.

Counsel Inquiry: As far as you’re aware, do you know if these planning assumptions were cascaded higher up to ministers in Cabinet?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I don’t know. I was really focused on the operational response at this stage and trying to mobilise a wider group of colleagues across the organisation. I would have assumed that the discussion around the planning assumptions themselves would have been conducted through the Health Department.

Counsel Inquiry: So would it be fair to say that you didn’t directly discuss this with a minister?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I did not.

Counsel Inquiry: Is that a regret?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: This was very clearly a public health issue, certainly at this stage, and my professional view at the time was the experts and ministers needed to be discussing these matters and also the – more widely within the health and social care group.

On this particular day, as I say, my concern was to escalate to senior colleagues so that we could begin considering how we would respond as a government.

Counsel Inquiry: So it would be fair – you were operating on the basis that this would be passed on and you would focus on the operational response. Does it then surprise you or shock you that Cabinet didn’t in fact discuss Covid until 25 February?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I think – I don’t know what discussions were had within the Health Department and with the health minister, and the content of Cabinet agendas and the judgements of ministers about what was discussed was something that would have been a matter for them rather than me.

Counsel Inquiry: Can I please move on. We can take that down.

You attended some meetings with Mark Sweeney, and you describe this in your statement, in February and early March, and you explain these meetings were with your counterparts in the UK Government and the other devolved administrations, they were referred to as ESSIG, which means Essential Service, Society and Infrastructure Group; is that right?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: That’s correct.

Counsel Inquiry: You outline that the purpose of these meetings was to collate information and evidence on likely impact of NPIs to inform papers to be presented to ministers; is that fair?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: That’s correct.

Counsel Inquiry: Now, at this point Mark Sweeney was Director General of the Cabinet Secretariat in the Cabinet Office. Are you able to give an idea of how much contact you had with him in late February, early March?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Probably three meetings. I was an attendee along with a number of other colleagues from devolved administrations and the UK Government at, as I say, probably three meetings.

Counsel Inquiry: The Inquiry heard evidence from Helen MacNamara in Module 2.

If we could please have the transcript, 000000039. And I’m not going to read all of this out, but if we can just look at the following:

“The account that Mr Cummings has given is of you walking from the Cabinet Office into Downing Street and in fact into the Prime Minister’s study that evening – he wasn’t there, the Prime Minister – but you saying, and this is his account, but I think you agree with it, that you had just been talking to Mark Sweeney, whose name we’ve just seen, who was in charge of co-ordinating with the Department of Health.

“‘He said [that’s Mr Sweeney has said but you’re reporting it] “I have been told for years there’s a whole plan for this. There is no plan. We are in huge trouble”.’”

Now, to summarise, then, this was a conversation put to Helen MacNamara from 13 March 2020, and the upshot is that Mr Sweeney was saying on that date “I have been told for years there’s a whole plan for this. There is no plan. We are in huge trouble”, and my question is whether that’s something that Mark Sweeney ever said to you in those meetings?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: No.

Counsel Inquiry: Did anyone from the UK Government say words like that to you?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: No. The ESSIG meetings that I attended were very task-focused, very constructive, and intended solely on looking at the implications around, I think it’s six potential non-pharmaceutical interventions, and when I say implications, I mean what were the social implications, what would these measures mean if they were – for the economy if they were put in place.

So no, the meetings were very positive and forward looking.

Counsel Inquiry: Do you think, if that had been said to you, you would have done anything differently?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I would certainly have been very surprised to have heard anything like this reported in such a cross-government forum. Had – I think as a government, and my professional colleagues within Welsh Government, I think we would have probably acted quite differently over the following few weeks if we had understood that there was a lack of a plan. And I don’t know from this quote whether it’s a lack of a cross-government plan or a lack of a plan in Department of Health. But in any case I think some of our thinking may have been accelerated had we known of this exchange.

Counsel Inquiry: Can I please move on to a different topic, which is ministerial implementation groups, and it’s right that you attended almost all of the general public sector implementation meetings.

Can we, please, have on screen paragraph 167 of your witness statement from a personal capacity, INQ000274156. Here you talk about the MIGs operating, and you say:

“It was common for us to be provided with the papers during the morning of the meeting itself, which normally started around 1 pm. On occasion, the papers would be circulated as late as an hour or two in advance. That made commissioning, compiling and submitting briefings to Welsh Ministers, often on complex and wide-ranging subjects very challenging.”

Then I don’t propose to read the rest of this quote, but that gives us a general flavour of your views on the ministerial implementation groups.

How could those meetings have been improved?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I can think of two immediate ways that those meetings could have been improved.

First of all, a more collaborative approach to identifying the subjects that we really wanted to talk about as four nations, rather than those which may have a greater focus on England.

Secondly, as a consequence of that, potentially drawing up shared agendas, working together on how we would frame particular issues; and then, I suppose thirdly, how we would go about putting papers together that would properly reflect the views of the devolved administrations.

Counsel Inquiry: Can we then please talk about the 21-day reviews, please.

If we can start with the first of the 21-day reviews, and it’s right that the coronavirus regulations stipulated that they had to be reviewed every three weeks. The first review on 16 April 2020, you say that you brought together the team which undertook the first review; is that correct?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Correct.

Counsel Inquiry: The Inquiry has a statement from Thomas Smithson, who was heavily involved in the 21-day review process. We don’t need to go to his statement, but it’s at INQ000282461. He says:

“The first substantive piece of work I was asked to undertake was the first review of The Health Protection … Regulations … I did not have any team … this became my principal task, drawing on others’ views and evidence. There was no framework or process established, with my approach guided by legal advice on the obligations in the regulations, and public health and scientific advice on the progression of the pandemic.”

So would it be fair to say, as he says in his words, he undertook that review by himself?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: He also undertook that review under the supervision of Debra Carter, who was one of my deputy directors who I asked to move across and help establish the 21-day reviews, and she was present and overseeing the first three.

I also brought together a group of colleagues from across the Welsh Government who would help to provide information and to steer Thomas in the work that he was doing, and also to provide the necessary input of evidence particularly but also to help shape and quality assure the process.

Counsel Inquiry: Do you have a comment as to why he included in his statement deliberately, “I did not have any team”?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I don’t think Thomas had a team underneath him to help do the work, but there was a group of people around him to help, as I say, shape the review. Those colleagues probably didn’t write it in the way that Thomas did, but there was certainly a number of people who were supporting and advising him as we went through that first review.

Counsel Inquiry: In respect of his comments that there was no framework or process established for the first review, is that something you’d agree with?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: That’s absolutely correct. We only realised that we would have to review the regulations every 21 days around 23 March, when they were originally brought forward. So this was an area that we hadn’t anticipated. It hadn’t featured as any of – in any of the previous pandemic flu planning that we had done for the decade before. So it was essentially a very new and very demanding burden that was placed on us.

Counsel Inquiry: So is your evidence that you realised on 23 March that there would need to be a review in 21 days?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Yes.

Counsel Inquiry: And so why were those 21 days not used to create a framework or a process?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: They were. They were used – we – Tom basically created that framework as we prepared the first set of reviews, and that framework provided the basis for the second and the third and the subsequent reviews, and at the same time we spent every review reflecting on the last one to see where we could improve. And so by the time we got to the summer, I think it’s certainly my view – and I would hope colleagues would agree – that we had developed a very clear process with some excellent legal input which made sure that the decisions we were asking ministers to take would be well-founded, fed by a large number of pieces of evidence that would be renewed and refreshed and put forward as part of that process.

Counsel Inquiry: Moving on then to engagement with local authorities, please, and you may be aware the Inquiry heard evidence this afternoon from Dr Llewelyn, and at paragraph 51 of your statement on behalf of the Local Government Directorate, you talk about “regular and open engagement with local government was a central principle of the Welsh Government Covid-19 response”.

Can we please have Dr Llewelyn’s second statement on the screen, please, at paragraphs 12 and 13. Here he says:

“For instance, the WLGA notes the statement of Reg Kilpatrick, who had been Director General, COVID-19 Crisis Coordination for the Welsh Government … [Document read] … local authorities, both collectively and individually, at the outset of the pandemic.

“13. Communication is not however the same as consultation and still less is it co-production. The WLGA considers that in several ways Mr Kilpatrick’s views about the extent of communication fail to recognise the extent to which there was inadequate early engagement with local government – engagement which could have ensured that the operational issues which local government would encounter were properly taken in account and which, had they been, could have much improved outcomes.”

What is your response to that?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I think the distinction between communication and consultation in the circumstances of the early days of Covid is a very thin distinction. So in practice every engagement that I, my team and ministers had with the WLGA, whether that was at leader level or at official level, were in effect consultations. They weren’t traditional civil service consultations where, as we know, we’d send out a paper and expect people to respond. They were very open, often very challenging meetings where we would be putting forward briefings, first of all, we would then be explaining our plans or our intentions for, within the 21-day review, what we were going to do next, and we would be having that, that real-time consultation at political level and official level, on a very regular basis, two, three times a week in some cases.

Equally about early engagement, I’ve engaged local authorities through my EU transition board on 4 February, which was three days after we had – after the World Health Organisation had declared Covid a global emergency and before it declared it a pandemic. So we’d begun consultation with some chief executives representing their regions through that forum. We were also, certainly from 10 February, in very regular engagement with all of the local authorities through the local resilience fora, in terms of helping them to understand the reasonable worst-case scenarios and the planning that they and their organisations needed to do, both to respond and as organisations themselves.

So I would dispute the fact that we didn’t consult. I think we had an extraordinary level of consultation. I think in February and March we had in excess of 30 meetings each month between the Welsh Government officials and ministers and local government. That was just my area.

If we look at subject specific issues, so housing or social care, there were other engagements that were going on – again, on a very regular basis, once or twice a week throughout Covid – to make sure that we understood the pressures on local government, that we understood their views, and those views would change – would be quite significantly different across the 22, and that those views were reflected in our advice to ministers or indeed reflected by ministers around the Cabinet table.

Counsel Inquiry: Can I please just read into the record, the INQ of that witness statement is INQ000410950.

In respect of early engagement, which you have just briefly touched upon, in your statement on behalf of the Local Government Directorate you do accept that engagement wasn’t always early enough; is that fair?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: That is absolutely – absolutely fair, and that engagement was – it could have been better, it most certainly would have been better had we had more information to share from the UK Government. We were quite constrained in what we could say, because the flow from the UK Government was at times limited, and particularly, you know, in the run-up to the first lockdown.

Counsel Inquiry: Can we, please, have on screen minutes of a meeting of the Welsh Government officials and WLGA representatives on 12 March, which we have at INQ000321234.

Lady Hallett: Just before you go on to that, can I just go back to your answer: you were constrained by limitations on the flow of information from the UK Government. As I understood it, the chief medical officers were meeting regularly, people from the devolved nations by this stage were attending SAGE, albeit maybe they should have been involved a bit earlier. I’m not following why you say there was a limitation on the flow of information, and that’s what constrained you; why you’re basically passing the buck for the criticism to the UK Government.

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I’m not passing the buck in the sense that I think some of the WLGA’s concerns were in the run-up to lockdown and the surprise with which that decision took them, and I think my – what I’m trying to demonstrate is that had we known more about the move of the Prime Minister to lock down on that Monday evening, we would have been able to share more information with them so that they could plan and prepare their organisations better. As it was, we didn’t have that information, as a government we were unsighted on that, although we did meet the local government leaders in the week before that lockdown decision was taken, to brief them and to discuss with them the information that we did have.

So I’m sorry, I didn’t mean to be passing the buck to the UK Government –

Lady Hallett: I probably shouldn’t have used that expression, Mr Kilpatrick.

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: It was more of a case that that was a particular decision that I know colleagues had concern about, and that was a concern that we also had, but we were unable to move ahead because we didn’t have the information.

Lady Hallett: So basically when you said “constrained by the limitations on the flow of information”, you will have specifically had in mind the –

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: It was that decision –

Lady Hallett: – lockdown?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: – particularly.

Lady Hallett: I follow.

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Yes.

Lady Hallett: Thank you.

Ms Paisley: Staying on the topic of engagement with local authorities, these are minutes of a meeting on 12 March, and if we can have on page 2, please, and it says:

“Update from Reg Kilpatrick.”

And we can see in the second paragraph it’s noted:

“How do we work with you to avoid series of meetings.”

And then page 3, we can see it says:

“Need to work out how we best channel guidance and info to get to the right people as quickly as we can. How do we work with you so we don’t create a whole series of meeting and share.”

That reads, would you agree, like a reluctance to have those meetings with local government?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: No, I don’t interpret that as a reluctance. What I interpret that to mean to me, and particularly at the time, how we work out the very best channels to engage and consult with the right colleagues in local government. We were under, as were our local authority chief executives and their teams, under enormous time pressure to turn guidance around, to develop new policy; and in some ways our traditional, rather hierarchical approach to consultation would simply not have worked. And so this quote from me is: how do we work out a different way of engaging? And I think we actually did that quite successfully.

Counsel Inquiry: I’m going to change topic completely, then, please, and ask about the Joint Biosecurity Centre.

You were closely involved in the early stages of the establishment of the JBC, and indeed you sat on the steering board that was set up to provide executive leadership to the organisation.

You in fact cleared a ministerial advice relating to the JBC on 2 June 2020. We don’t need that brought up, but it’s INQ000320880. You explain in the ministerial advice that the purpose of the Joint Biosecurity Centre is to detect, understand and rapidly act upon local, regional and national outbreaks of Covid-19 infection through targeted non-pharmaceutical interventions.

We then have the primary functions of the JBC, and then we can see it says:

“While there are still a number of issues to work through with respect to the detailed design and operation of the JBC, in light of the progress made to date in amending the operating model to better reflect Welsh interests, it is recommended that you provide an in principle agreement for Welsh participation in the JBC.”

And it’s right that the First Minister accepted the recommendation?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Correct.

Counsel Inquiry: You go on to say in your witness statement at paragraph 175:

“During an extraordinary time, it is my view that the development of the JBC was an exemplar of effective joint working on a complex matter by the four nations, achieved with a proactive attitude, commitment and a desire to succeed.”

Can you explain what leads you to say that?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Our normal experience with working with a number of other Whitehall departments is that sometimes it can be quite difficult to really work in collaboration. The JBC, as an offer to us as a Welsh Government, I thought was particularly exciting. I thought that the individuals involved were highly committed to delivering that task.

Sorry, would you repeat the question?

Lady Hallett: Why was it so good?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Why was it so good? Well, I’m answering this question in two ways, really. The concept was great, the individuals I think were also really committed. We did not make – we did not achieve the full potential of the JBC, and I don’t mention that in my statement, but I think on reflection we had great opportunity; however, for a number of reasons, it was just not – it was not possible to create that sort of four nation organisation that would feed back into our own deliberations and our own creation of evidence and actually to our own 21-day review.

Ms Paisley: So it was a good idea, but it didn’t quite manifest itself in that way?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: It was a great idea that was, I think, just not completely delivered on the ground.

Counsel Inquiry: We have a statement from Craiger Solomons – we don’t need to go to it – it’s INQ000291490, and I want to just briefly summarise some criticisms made and ask if you agree with them.

The first, paragraph 49:

“… commissioning of … projects came directly from policy leads … [who] had little understanding of devolution.”

Would you agree with that?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I’m not quite sure what he’s getting at there, because the commissioning of projects – we would have the opportunity to commission projects into the JBC. I presume he’s referring to the fact that projects would be commissioned that would look at England only. If that is the case, I can understand why that would be. I think there were some issues about securing access to data for Wales.

Counsel Inquiry: Another criticism he had, perhaps following on from that paragraph 50:

“There was a clear divide in the JBC between teams who were supporting the Devolved Administrations and those who were supporting UK Government. [As such] If the work was carried out for UK Government, typically UK Government ministers were asked for approvals before sharing with [the] Devolved Administrations. [Which] meant … [very] little evidence [was] developed that could be used to inform policy making … in Wales.”

Is that a fair criticism?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: That is not my understanding of how the JBC worked, from either my own experience or from a colleague, Jo Trott, who was embedded into the JBC specifically to underline our commitment to it as an organisation, but also provide us with a really clear understanding of what the JBC was doing and how it was going about it. So, I’m sorry, I don’t recognise that criticism.

Counsel Inquiry: It’s right that the Joint Biosecurity Centre was integrated into the UK Health Security Agency in October 2021. In your view, did that change the focus at all?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Yes, I think it did, actually, and I think some of the – the independence of thought and the independence of action that we enjoyed previously sort of dissipated, and so the relevance of the JBC to us as a government dissipated alongside that.

Counsel Inquiry: Moving on, then, to a few questions about local restrictions, please.

On 3 September 2020 you received a call from the chief executive of Caerphilly County Borough Council, who wanted to discuss her concerns about the rising number of infections in the area and wanted to discuss with you what measures could be taken to try and bring those under control. Is that right?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: That’s right.

Counsel Inquiry: You then emailed Dr Atherton, Dr Orford and Simon Brindle, and we can see your email, please, on screen, 4 September 2020, INQ000320919.

We can see the first paragraph:

“She was unsure about how to engage Welsh Government or where she should get advice from regarding which NPIs would be effective and appropriate in the circumstances and her ability to act locally. I looked back at the CV Control Plan for Wales which is not specific about the escalation from local/regional to national and does not describe how this should happen. For example, it is not clear how the local/regional interests or concerns get fed directly into HPAG considerations.”

So at this stage was there a lack of clarity as to how local authorities should approach and respond to local outbreaks?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Well, clearly my colleague chief executive in Caerphilly was not aware of the escalation process. The ICT and the – sorry, the OCT and the IMT, incident management team and outbreak control team, that were operating in the region at that stage, from an earlier email, were saying this was not a matter of concern. And so I think what this email demonstrated to me is that there was – there was a structure in place, but nonetheless the chief executive and, I think, the leader of the authority were becoming very worried about what they perceive – or what they saw as a growing number of cases within the authority.

Counsel Inquiry: So is it your evidence that there was a plan in place that people understood?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I think looking at the coronavirus control plan, there was an annex which we added to that document which would point the outbreak control teams towards the strategic co-ordinating group in the first instance.

Counsel Inquiry: So then it could have been clearer?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: It could have been clearer.

Counsel Inquiry: And we know that there had been local restrictions in fact in England in the summer of 2020, and you say in your witness statement, about this fact:

“… it was not unusual for incidence in Wales to be two to three weeks behind that in the south of England, and therefore we were confident that we would experience similar growth in due course, and were planning on that basis.”

So would you agree work should have been done on these plans earlier than when they actually needed to be put into action?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I think we should have been clearer during the summer, given that we were beginning to consider the chances of a second wave, and we should have been clearer with colleagues across these civil contingencies planning structures about what would happen and what should happen and what plans were available.

Counsel Inquiry: It’s right, isn’t it, that ultimately it was agreed Caerphilly would compile, in conjunction with Public Health Wales, a list of additional measures that it wanted to implement; then these proposed measures would be further discussed within Welsh Government before advice went to ministers? Is that right?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: That’s correct.

Counsel Inquiry: Do you think that that was the right way round, namely that the onus was on the local authority to come up with a plan of action rather than the Welsh Government?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: That was in line with the Public Health Wales control – communicable disease outbreak control plan. So we were following Public Health Wales guidance at that point.

Counsel Inquiry: It’s right that ultimately an HPAG subgroup was created, which you chaired?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Correct.

Counsel Inquiry: What was the purpose of this subgroup, and was that something you found helpful?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: The reason why – and if I may call it HPAG OSG for brevity – was created was in recognition of the speed at which the issues in Caerphilly emerged. The cadence of meetings that were in place over the summer I think were weekly, and clearly, as we were moving into a period of significant growth in the virus, we would need also to adjust our plans so that we could act quickly.

So HPAG OSG was put in place two days after the Caerphilly – the Caerphilly measures were put in place, and the group met daily for quite some time after that, simply because we needed all of the experts in a room looking at incidence, looking at pressures, and being ready to provide advice to ministers within hours if necessary.

Counsel Inquiry: If we can then go further along the timeline into September, please, and moving on towards the firebreak. We don’t need to bring this up on screen, but on 18 September 2020 there was advice from TAC which advised that a package of non-pharmaceutical interventions on local and national scale may be needed to bring R back below 1.

Do you recall being aware of that advice on 18 September?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I have seen the advice and I’ve read it, but I couldn’t confirm that I was – I’d read it at – well, yes, I would have been aware of it at the time because it would have formed part of the 21-day review material.

Counsel Inquiry: Generally speaking, then, you would have read TAC advice as part of that review process?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Yes.

Counsel Inquiry: Again, I don’t need it to be brought up on screen, but on 21 September 2020 SAGE was advising that a circuit-breaker should be considered to return incidence to low levels. Is that something you think you would have been aware of at the time?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: It’s very unlikely that I would have seen SAGE advice, I relied on TAG and TAC to provide us with the necessary information for the 21-day review.

Counsel Inquiry: If we return, then, back to TAC advice, there was further advice on 25 September, 2 October and 9 October. If we can please have on screen the 9 October advice, which is INQ000066397, and if we could have page 2, please, we can see:

“The Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies … estimate of the reproduction number … has fallen since last week, but there is still exponential growth of COVID-19 cases in Wales as Rt is still above one.”

Second bullet point:

“This may lead to hospital admissions rising across Wales unless further control measures are applied.”

Fifth bullet point:

“For the first time in this wave of infections, the incidence for Wales is higher than 100 cases per 100,000 people and the total test positivity for Wales is 7.8%. All local authorities have seen more than 25 cases per 100k over the past week and have above 2.5% test positivity.”

Now, looking at this timeline, would you agree that as early as 18 September 2020 and the first TAC advice that we looked at, there had been calls to start considering a circuit-breaker lockdown?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: There were certainly discussions about a circuit-breaker lockdown, indeed.

Counsel Inquiry: And it’s right that on 12 October 2020 you attended a COBR meeting at which the First Minister, Mark Drakeford, asked whether a circuit-breaker or firebreak lockdown would be considered, as had been advised by SAGE?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Mm-hm.

Counsel Inquiry: Do we take it, then, from the First Minister’s question, that Wales was waiting for the UK to make the first move in respect of a circuit-breaker?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: No, I don’t think that’s a fair inference. The First Minister and Cabinet were looking at the evidence and information as it related to Wales and, as we saw, would have been prepared and were prepared to take their own action if necessary.

Counsel Inquiry: Now, it’s right that the firebreak implementation group was established – and that was by yourself – that was 14 October and, as we’ve just discussed, there had been advice from as early as 18 September to start considering this.

Do you think that that group should have been established earlier to at least start considering it?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: There were – there were discussions ongoing between TAC and the CMO and others, including me, about the potential for a firebreak for a couple of weeks before that date. So just because there wasn’t a group established to consider formally – and I think that the firebreak implementation group was much more about implementation and options – the growing need or the growing understanding of the pressures for a firebreak had been in discussion for a couple of weeks before that.

Counsel Inquiry: Can you help us with this: are you aware that the Swansea modelling team was only asked to model a firebreak on 11 October 2020?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: No, I wasn’t aware of that.

Counsel Inquiry: It’s right the firebreak implementation group met a number of times; no minutes were taken of those meetings. Given the significance of the work of that group, is that something that should have been formally recorded?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Quite possibly we should have taken a minute, but the products – the product of that group were a series of papers that were compiled by Tom Smithson particularly but contributed to by others, and were submitted to Cabinet and to ministers for discussion. So to the extent that there was a record of the work of the group, that was summarised in those papers.

Counsel Inquiry: Having discussed the timeline, would you accept that there was a delay in implementing a circuit-breaker?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: We – we began our work on 13 October, I – if memory serves me right, the first discussion by ministers was on the 18th. I may not have that date completely right, but there were three further – or three Cabinet discussions on the basis of the work of my group which culminated in a final decision about a firebreak, which was then implemented on the 23rd.

Given the amount of information that we needed to deal with, given the development of the policy, given the legal issues that needed to be considered, I think we moved as quickly as we possibly could from the initial commission by the First Minister to the production of options for Cabinet and then the final decision. It was certainly our very highest priority organisationally at the time.

Counsel Inquiry: In respect of the initial commission by the First Minister for your group, would it be your opinion that that commission should have come earlier?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: We – regardless of the commission, maybe we should have been doing more structured thinking in advance of that commission. However, as I say, we – I think we saw the COBR meeting as a bit of a turning point and some of the views expressed by the Chief Medical Officer in England about events internally in the south east of England.

Counsel Inquiry: Final topic, then, please, which is the topic of shielding, so we’re circling back.

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Okay.

Counsel Inquiry: If we can have on screen INQ000197994, which is an email chain starting at the bottom 18 March 2020 from an individual at the Cabinet Office sent to you and to others:

“I am copying Simon Ridley, Cabinet Office DG newly responsible for co-ordination on health and social care during the pandemic. He needs to speal to you as early as possible today about shielding of vulnerable people. I’m emailing to make the contacts and know Simon would be keen to arrange a conference call.”

If we can then look at page 3, please, and you send an email which says – it’s at the top, this is 20.20 on the same day, stating:

“Thanks Simon. It would be very helpful to see some paper or plans (or the slide pack material sent to LAs in England) first thing tomorrow to help the discussion at COBR. Did I miss a conference call earlier?”

So this would seem to suggest that on 18 March 2020, so five days before lockdown, there were no real plans in place for shielding; would you agree?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: There weren’t in Wales, and this was the initiation of the conversations with the UK Government about its plans for its shielding programme.

Counsel Inquiry: So is it your evidence that it was the UK Government that hadn’t prepared for shielding?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I think my evidence would be that none of us had really given that detailed discussion for the impact of social isolation measures on our most vulnerable.

Counsel Inquiry: And do you think that that is something that Wales could and should have been doing by this point?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I – I don’t – I can say we should have been doing it; we should have been doing many things, with the benefit of hindsight. At the time, we were very focused on a whole range of issues about moving into a lockdown potentially, and then once – after 23 March, managing that lockdown. So I’m not sure that it is fair to say we – we could have done anything at that point.

I would also say that this is a very good example of sometimes that sharing of information between the Welsh Government and the UK Government being quite late and often quite restricted.

Ms Paisley: Thank you very much, Mr Kilpatrick. That’s all the questions that I have for you.

My Lady, there are some granted Rule 10s and I believe there may be a live application.

Lady Hallett: No, I think that’s disappeared, thank you.

Ms Paisley: I’m very grateful.

Lady Hallett: Ms Heaven.

Questions From Ms Heaven

Ms Heaven: Good afternoon, Mr Kilpatrick, I represent the Covid-19 Bereaved Families for Justice Cymru.

The first topic I want to ask you about is data, please, so it’s about the adequacy of data that was being pulled together for the 21-day review process.

Now, you deal with this at paragraph 121 of your witness statement, but don’t worry, I will indicate to you what’s in that, so we don’t need to bring that up.

Of course you explain there that you’re pulling together data, or your team are pulling together data for the 21-day review process in order to inform advice to ministers. You give some examples of the sorts of data that was being pulled together: TAC and TAG data; you’re also looking at stats about pressure on the NHS; you’re looking at confirmed cases of Covid-19; and you say all of this was being scrutinised daily by ministers.

Now, Andrew Nelson, who was the chief information officer at Cwm Taf Morgannwg University Health Board, is highly critical in his witness statement to the Inquiry of the inability to extract data from NHS systems in Wales, and he says:

“Certainly in the early part of wave 1 this resulted in large swathes of information not being readily available to the NHS in Wales. There was limited access to prevalence and admission data from which we could monitor or estimate growth rates to provide an effective operational response.”

And crucially, he says:

“… there was no differentiation between community and hospital acquired infection.”

And I think it’s fair to say he limits that to sort of the March time.

So my question is this: did you know about these concerns with extracting data and the adequacy of data at the time and, if so, were ministers also aware?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: No, I didn’t know about those – those issues or the issue that Andrew raises. I wouldn’t have expected to know. I didn’t work in the Health Department, and my responsibilities didn’t extend to the sort of health informatics or the NHS data or data collection. In putting together the 21-day reviews, we would rely on TAG and TAC as our principal source of epidemiological and public health information.

Ms Heaven: But if ministers are not being given necessarily the best data, isn’t that something that they need to know to make their decisions?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Well, that would have been a matter for my colleagues in health, who would understand these issues much more clearly and much more directly than I.

Ms Heaven: Understood.

Next topic, please, is a WhatsApp discussion. So what I’m going to do is first ask you to look at a series of WhatsApps. You’re not in this group, just so that you’re aware, but you’re mentioned. And just to be clear, I’m not interested in the content of what is said about you, it’s what is said about the meeting.

So if we could get up, please, it’s INQ000331038, please. This is a WhatsApp chat group called the “Coronavirus legal hotline”, containing Welsh Government officials, lots of special advisers, legal officials, and it talks a lot about guidance.

So if we can start, please, by – it’s 21 May 2020, and it is Helen Little(sic) at 10.54. It’s very difficult to see, but we’ll try to zoom in.

Can you actually see it there in that sizing, or is that a stretch?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Did you say the 20 –

Ms Heaven: If not I’ll read it to you.

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Sorry.

Ms Heaven: So we have Helen Little(sic) here. So what we know is there’s a WhatsApp chat here going on about a meeting that it would appear that you’re involved in, and I’ll just read out some of the chat.

Helen Little(sic), who’s Helen Little(sic)?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Helen Lentle is the director of legal services.

Ms Heaven: So she says:

“Dylan, this is doing in my head.”

Dylan says – who’s Dylan?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Dylan. Dylan is the head of the office of legal …

Ms Heaven: Has it come off your screen?

Lady Hallett: Yes, it’s come off the screen.

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Yes.

Lady Hallett: So finish your answer.

Ms Heaven: Finish your answer.

Lady Hallett: I’m sorry to interrupt you.

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Dylan is at the office of the – sorry, OLC. He’s our counsel – he supports our Counsel General.

Lady Hallett: We now need to make sure we’ve got the right document.

Ms Heaven: Yes. I’m not going to read out the – yes.

Lady Hallett: No, it’s just that –

Ms Heaven: I think some of it’s been redacted. I know which bits have been redacted.

Lady Hallett: Are you happy just to read it out?

Ms Heaven: I’ll read it –

Lady Hallett: Okay.

Ms Heaven: – because we’ve got very little time.

So let me just read it. So Dylan says:

“Me too.”

Helen Lentle says:

“Have left now, meeting with [somebody else].”

Then Dylan picks up again, because he’s been asked by Jane Runeckles what the meeting’s about, and he says:

“Guidance, an hour of our lives we’re not getting back … [Document read] … time goes on and more people get involved.”

And then I’ll move forward a little bit in the chat, and Jane Runeckles is asking – she appears to be on a different meeting – what’s going on, and Dylan says:

“Reg is ignoring our advice.”

And Jane Runeckles says:

“Oh god.”

Helen Lentle said:

“It’s not going well.”

And then Terry Kowal, who’s he?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: He works for Dylan who, can I just say, is the head of the Office of the Legislative Counsel.

Ms Heaven: I see. He said:

“What is this meeting about again?”

Jane Runeckles says:

“Arggh.”

And then Helen Lentle said:

“It’s about Reg not wanting to do something that may be different to what he wants.”

Then I’ll just fast forward to the end. There’s another comment there Helen Lentle, Helen Lentle said:

“Reg hates us all and doesn’t want another discussion.”

So I just want to understand. I’m going to show you some minutes of the meeting that we think it is, but can you remember that meeting?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I can’t – from this, I can’t remember what that –

Ms Heaven: Completely understandable.

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: No, no.

Ms Heaven: So let me ask you the second document, then, which we think might be the minutes, it’s the INQ000221027.

So this would appear to be the only minutes that we have of a meeting on this day involving yourself, 21 May, and it’s titled “… next Part 3” and it relates to discussions on Covid-19 measures, schools, workplace, general attitude and public, and we can see there’s a number of people present there.

I’m not going to ask you about what’s documented there, because there are lots of things documented, but just looking at that title there, “What next Part 3” and those attendees, do you think that probably is reflective of the meeting?

Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I’m sorry, I couldn’t confirm one way or another. I wasn’t part of the WhatsApp group, and I don’t really know what they were talking about. I have seen this note and, frankly, it’s not a great note of any meeting. So I’m sorry, I can’t – I can’t help you.

Ms Heaven: Okay. Well, that’s my question.

Thank you very much, my Lady.

Lady Hallett: Right.

Thank you very much indeed, I’m very grateful for your help. I’m not sure whether that’s the last demand we’re going to make upon you, or request, but thank you anyway.

The Witness: Okay. Thank you.

(The witness withdrew)

Lady Hallett: 10 o’clock tomorrow?

Mr Poole: Yes, my Lady.

Lady Hallett: Thank you all.

(4.23 pm)

(The hearing adjourned until 10 am on Thursday, 7 March 2024)