7. Submissions on Behalf of the Cabinet Office by Mr Strachan KC

Mr Strachan: Good morning, my Lady. I appear on behalf of the Cabinet Office today with Mr Harland, who sits to my right.

My Lady, the Cabinet Office would like to start by expressing its deepest sympathy to all those who lost loved ones during the Covid-19 pandemic. It acknowledges the huge personal sacrifices which were made by families across the country and the dignity and bravery of all those who continue to live with the effects of Covid-19.

The Cabinet Office pays tribute to the efforts and courage of public servants and all those who played a role in the response to the pandemic, from those on the front-line of health and social care to the scientists who worked on the vaccine and all those across society who kept the country running.

The impacts of the pandemic went far beyond the many whose health suffered directly. The virus and the measures taken in response affected the economy and society profoundly. This Inquiry will rightly focus on Covid-19’s profound effect on the United Kingdom, but it is right to remember that this was a global pandemic. It affected the lives of everyone. No country was left untouched, and each government had to make extremely difficult choices in mitigating the suffering and hardship caused to its citizens.

The UK Government established this independent public inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005 to provide the United Kingdom with what may be the most ambitious inquiry into Covid-19 undertaken worldwide. As the former Prime Minister stated when announcing the Inquiry, it is essential the government’s actions, its structures, processes and judgments are examined rigorously, candidly and objectively, so every possible lesson from this terrible global event as it affected the United Kingdom is learned and remembered.

To prepare properly for a future pandemic of this kind, such reflection and learning is essential, and it will build on the scrutiny that the government has received through Parliamentary inquiries and the National Audit Office.

My Lady, the pandemic was the biggest peacetime crisis our country faced in decades. Its consequences will be felt for decades to come. But it’s important to recognise the many sacrifices that have been and will continue to be made across our country as a result of this virus, and although the pandemic had profound consequences for all, its enduring impact on individuals, families, communities and groups will vary significantly, and the Cabinet Office welcomes the Inquiry’s role in considering the different impacts on all parts of our society, including those with protected characteristics under the Equality Act of 2010.

Thanks largely to the vaccines, Covid-19 has now been brought under control, though the pandemic placed huge strain on our public services and we are still, as individuals and as a society, dealing with the longer term consequences. The government is seeking to address those consequences, for example supporting those with long Covid, including funding research to understand better its causes, symptoms and treatment, and putting in place the elective care recovery plan to tackle the Covid-19 backlog in the NHS.

The government is also taking actions to improve the UK’s resilience, as set out in the UK Government Resilience Framework.

The Cabinet Office welcomes the role of the Inquiry in investigating the response of the Cabinet Office, as well as all other relevant government departments, to this crisis. The Inquiry should help us all understand what went well, and what did not, so as to improve the response should a pandemic threaten our country again.

There will be much to learn from scrutinising, with the full benefit of hindsight, what happened, first in terms of preparation and then by examining the response to the breadth and scale of the crisis created by Covid-19. Lessons can and must be learned. For a global event of this kind, it will certainly be the case that things could or should have been done differently. The Cabinet Office’s overriding aim is to learn all the lessons it can from such scrutiny and to make changes where appropriate to improve this country’s resilience against such events in the future. Both history and science sadly tell us all of the need to prepare for future challenges to come. This Inquiry offers us the chance to face them with an open mind and the best information possible.

The Cabinet Office therefore remains steadfast in its dedication to supporting the Inquiry in its vital work.

In response to the Inquiry’s requests for information in relation to Module 1, which, as Mr Keith has identified, concern the period dating back to 2009, the Cabinet Office has provided eight corporate statements from senior officials currently working in key positions in the Cabinet Office. In addition, the Cabinet Office has supported nine witnesses to provide Module 1 witness statements in their personal capacities, in which they set out their own views, reflections and suggestions for improvement in light of the requests from the Inquiry to do so.

These include the former Prime Minister David Cameron, Cabinet ministers, former heads of the civil service, and a number of these witnesses will assist the Inquiry by giving oral evidence during the forthcoming hearings.

The findings of your Inquiry will enable the country to be better prepared for any future pandemic and the Cabinet Office is keen to use its conclusions to build and improve upon the changes it’s already implemented to enhance crisis management structures.

The Cabinet Office recognises that continuous learning is vital to maintain effective resilience.

The remainder of my opening statement covers just two main areas. First, the role of the Cabinet Office at the centre of government, as Mr Keith has referred to in his opening remarks; and second, a high level summary of the learning of lessons which the Cabinet Office has carried out so far and the actions it is already taking forward to enhance resilience for the future.

So, first, if I may, just something on the role of the Cabinet Office.

The Cabinet Office is a ministerial department of His Majesty’s Government. Its ministers currently include, among others, the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and the Minister for the Cabinet Office.

The Cabinet Office is responsible for providing support to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and to ensure the government works together to deliver for the people of the United Kingdom.

The Cabinet Office has a broad and fluid remit. Its key responsibilities include supporting collective government decision-making through the Cabinet and the Committee system, as you have heard, supporting national security, and co-ordinating the government’s response to crises, and promoting efficiency and reform across government, and monitoring and driving the delivery of priorities by other departments.

As such the Cabinet Office has a unique role in government which shifts in focus over time in response to priorities and challenges as they evolve. Within the Cabinet secretariat, for example, the Cabinet Office houses teams that co-ordinate policy, manage decision-making and look at issues that affect the whole of government or do not sit neatly within any individual department.

A range of cross-government functions are based in the Cabinet Office. The cross-government functions, also comprising multiple agencies and public bodies, support departments and civil servants across government to be professional, capable and efficient, delivering strong value for money for taxpayers, mitigating and managing risks to operations and ultimately helping departments deliver what ministers want.

One such function is the government commercial function, which includes the Crown Commercial Service. The Equality Hub was created within the Cabinet Office in September 2020, when the Race Disparity Unit, Disability Unit and the Government Equalities Office were brought together. The Social Mobility Commission secretariat joined the Equality Hub in April 2021, and the Cabinet Office has overall responsibility for the budget and resourcing of the Equality Hub. This is discharged in agreement with the Minister for Women and Equalities. All of the ministers with equality responsibility sit outside the Cabinet Office, and each has policy responsibility and decision-making authority on their specific equality issues.

Whilst it’s grown in recent years with changes in the machinery of government, at around 7,000 full-time equivalent staff, the Cabinet Office is smaller than some of the departments with large scale delivery responsibilities. Since its work is not orientated towards tackling one individual issue or risk, its structure and resourcing model adapt as needed.

Turning briefly to Cabinet government. In general the vast majority of decisions in government are made within individual departments, but some decisions, such as where the subject matter affects multiple departments, need to be made collectively at Cabinet or at Cabinet committee, either at a meeting or through what is referred to as a write-round to a Cabinet committee.

The Prime Minister of the day, with the advice of the Cabinet Secretary, decides the overall structure of the Cabinet committee system and there are broad principles and protocols set down in the Cabinet manual, but there is no definitive list of decisions which must be taken by collective agreement.

The Cabinet Office Briefing Room – or COBR – committee is the mechanism for managing the central response to major emergencies which have international, national or multiregional impact and are of a scale and complexity to require central government co-ordination.

Consistent with its need to provide an adaptive response, depending on the emergency, there is no fixed membership of COBR. In general, the chair will be the Secretary of State of the government department with lead responsibility for the issue being considered. However, with reference to some of the comments already made about the role of the lead government department, and also that of flexibility, it’s also important to note that invitees will generally include representatives from those departments or regions affected by the crisis under discussion, as appropriate.

As to the framework for emergency preparedness in the United Kingdom, risks are managed by systems in which departments and organisations from the public, private and voluntary sectors work together at the local, regional and national level.

The principal role of the Cabinet Office with regards to emergency preparedness is to set and operate the overarching framework for risk assessment, preparedness, response and recovery. The framework is founded in the Civil Contingencies Act of 2004, to which reference has already been made, and the Inquiry will be considering. This sets out, among other things, the role of local resilience forums as a mechanism for co-ordinating local emergency preparedness. The framework has evolved through time with associated regulations and guidance, which is also shaped by other relevant legislation such as the Equality Act of 2010.

The Cabinet Office carries out a wide range of activities aimed at understanding and enhancing preparedness for emergencies across the board, and this is underpinned by an assessment framework encompassing the most serious national risks facing the United Kingdom.

Mr Keith has referred to that part of the framework which includes the National Security Risk Assessment, the published National Risk Register and, prior to its amalgamation with the National Security Risk Assessment in 2019, the National Risk Assessment processes.

The National Security Risk Assessment is the government’s main tool for identifying and assessing the most serious risks facing the United Kingdom or its interests overseas over a multi-year period. As will no doubt be appreciated, the National Security Risk Assessment cannot anticipate every possible risk that might occur across the United Kingdom, but instead brings together groups of risks of a similar nature in order to facilitate the planning required to respond to those risks.

The risks included in the National Security Risk Assessment are proposed by lead government departments based on their own expert internal advice. The National Security Risk Assessment process also includes panels of experts assessing the risks. The assessment is published and is subject to public scientific scrutiny. It underpins the development of national resilience planning assumptions. These set out the common consequences of the National Security Risk Assessment risks, and these are then shared with local and national responders to assist them in their planning to deal with the major national as well as more localised emergencies.

The focus on these common consequences rather than solely on specific risks is indeed intended to enable a flexible response to the widest range of scenarios.

The National Security Risk Assessment is periodically reviewed. Reference has been made to the fact that specific risks and capabilities that are identified in the National Security Risk Assessment, or the national risk assessments, are managed – the way they’re managed by lead departments. They are influenced by the broader strategic context for that department, such as related policy programmes, spending decisions and international factors. Lead departments carry out cross-government co-ordination, chairing meetings as appropriate as needed to deliver their responsibilities.

Other government departments also prepare for risks that the National Security Risk Assessment process has flagged up and attend preparation meetings.

My Lady, the Cabinet Office does not audit other government departments in this sphere, but the Cabinet Office did carry out work which was intended to inform other bodies of their capabilities and to enhance preparedness planning.

This has included work, I don’t think referred to as yet, such as: resilience capabilities surveys, which were responded to by the local resilience forums; the Resilience Capabilities Programme, which sought to assess how certain workstreams were being prepared for; sector security and resilience plans, which allowed lead government departments to set out their approach to the resilience of their critical national infrastructure; and a National Resilience Standards, which were intended to allow local resilience forums and others to benchmark their works against a consensus view of good and leading practice.

Where potential impacts are sufficiently severe or wide-ranging across departmental responsibilities, the Cabinet Office may convene and co-ordinate across government, and that might include co-chairing official boards with the lead department to help ensure that wider system impacts are considered.

The pattern and intensity by which Cabinet Office supports lead departments with their planning for specific risks varies by risk and through time, and, as is typical for the centre of government, ministers and senior officials will have to decide what level of support they should provide to other government departments, based on what’s known about the capabilities of that department, what needs other departments have, and the resources that central government can commit.

The latter is informed by overall resourcing decisions and the landscape of emergencies and contingencies that the government is tackling at any one time.

The Cabinet Office also has its own role in leading certain aspects of a response, if one is required, for example organising COBR.

While it can never be optimally positioned to respond to one individual risk, the Cabinet Office has channelled resources to meet specific emerging needs, and, over the time period with which Module 1 is concerned, the most pressing risks at any one time ranged from civil contingencies to national security threats, and wide-ranging policy and operational challenges.

In the period immediately preceding Covid-19 pandemic, the dedicated team on the UK’s exit from the European Union was the biggest single formation in the Cabinet Office. In 2020, those resources were re-assigned to Covid-19 as the pandemic emerged, and by the end of that year the Covid-19 taskforce had more than 300 people in it.

This taskforce was wound down in the spring of 2022, after emerging from the pandemic, and the focus moved on to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

In terms of devolution, the government works closely with the devolved administrations to promote effective emergency planning and response that is as far as possible aligned across the United Kingdom whilst respecting devolved choices.

Turning to the Cabinet Office’s role in pandemic preparedness during the Module 1 timeframe, the work undertaken by the Cabinet Office in respect of pandemic preparedness is described in detail in the witness statements already provided to the Inquiry, and as I’ve already described, the Cabinet Office co-ordinated the risk assessment process with input from lead government departments. Pandemic influenza was identified as the top risk throughout the relevant period. New and emerging infectious diseases were also included in the risk assessments and registers, and throughout the relevant period, health sector preparedness was managed by the Department of Health and Social Care.

Beyond the Module 1 period, but noted here for completeness, in July 2021 the Department of Health and Social Care and the Cabinet Office jointly established the Pandemic Diseases Capabilities Board to enhance the cross-government and cross United Kingdom approach to preparing for a broader range of pandemics, including but not limited to pandemic influenza.

If I may turn to lessons learned and actions taken to improve preparedness, I’ve already noted that the government set up this Inquiry to conduct a thorough and objective assessment of its handling of the Covid-19 pandemic, with the aim, ultimate aim, of ensuring that all of the available lessons are brought to light, so the country is better prepared when the next pandemic hits.

Covid-19 developed quickly from an acute emerging threat to a pandemic requiring the whole of government to respond to a chronic challenge, and the Cabinet Office will support the Inquiry to capture every lesson for our emergency frameworks and pandemic preparedness, including both where we need to build on existing strengths or address weaknesses in the United Kingdom’s response.

But the government has sought to learn and improve throughout the course of the pandemic in real time. The Cabinet Office has also commissioned a number of reviews and made a range of changes to improve resilience and preparedness more broadly, with further improvements in train. As I’ll briefly explain, continuous learning and improvement are an in-built and vital part of the United Kingdom’s resilience mechanisms.

In terms of formal reviews, beyond the crisis, whilst respecting the Inquiry’s process and without prejudice to the Inquiry’s own conclusions, the Cabinet Office has carried out formal reviews in respect of resilience and preparedness, including the following:

First, the Boardman review of Cabinet Office communications procurement, which reported in December 2020, considering the preliminary results of a fact-finding exercise into the award of contracts for Covid-19 communications services made by the Cabinet Office in March 2020. It made three recommendations in relation to existing procurement policy and legislation, 13 recommendations in relation to Cabinet Office processes and governance, and 12 recommendations in relation to conflicts of interest and bias. The Cabinet Office accepted all of these recommendations.

Second, in January 2021, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat commissioned the Royal Academy of Engineering to undertake an independent external review of the National Security Risk Assessment methodology.

The Royal Academy of Engineering was asked to address a number of priority questions focused on scenarios, concurrent and compound risks and interdependencies, assessment timescales and cross-cutting issues such as data, expert input and diversity and inclusion.

It was also asked to deliver evidence-based practical and implementable recommendations for improvement, and its report “Building Resilience” was published on 21 April 2023, and the Royal Academy of Engineering’s review was conducted alongside an internal review by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, and the Royal Academy of Engineering’s review made 13 final recommendations and the Cabinet Office accepted and has or is implementing the majority of these.

Thirdly, the Boardman Review of Government Procurement … Covid-19, which reported on 7 May 2021, covered five key parts of the government procurement in response to the pandemic, and identified lessons to be learned for future procurement, and it made 28 recommendations which the government has accepted, and implementation of these has mostly been completed and has been subject to review by the Government Internal Audit Agency.

Fourth, in June 2021, the National Security Adviser commissioned a review into crisis capabilities in government, which reported in February 2022, and that review drew on lessons learned from recent crises, including Covid-19, and aimed to provide an examination of central government’s approach to crises, and that made 23 final recommendations, which the Cabinet Office has accepted in full and has implemented them or is in the process of doing so.

The Cabinet Office has also contributed to other third party reviews and publications in respect of lessons to be learned from the pandemic, and general resilience arrangements, including those conducted or submitted to Parliament, which sit outside the scope of this Inquiry. And more widely the Cabinet Office’s role is shaped by other significant government reviews such as the 2021 Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy.

As to actions to improve preparedness, as a result of these reviews and publications, as well as internal lessons exercises, the Cabinet Office has already made significant changes to the way government deals with resilience and crisis management. Amongst other things, the Crisis Capabilities Review recommended that a new permanent Cabinet Office crisis team should be established, with its responsibilities to include owning and implementing plans for scaling up central government’s response in the face of major crises.

Following this, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat was split into two: the COBR unit now focuses on the government’s response to emergencies, and the Resilience Directorate has been established to lead on longer term resilience issues.

The pandemic exposed a need for a material improvement in how government generates and interrogates data to support decision-making in a crisis, and as a result the National Situation Centre, based in the Cabinet Office, was established and became operational in October 2021, and it now serves as a focal point for data and an analysis in emergencies.

COBR facilities themselves have been modernised and upgraded, including new physical office space and improved information and communication technology provision.

The Cabinet Office has established the UK Resilience Forum, which met for the first time in July 2021, bringing together national, regional and local government, private and voluntary sectors and other interested parties, to improve communication and collaboration on risk and help align emergency preparedness activity.

In 2022, the Cabinet Office published the findings and recommendations from its review of the Civil Contingencies Act, and also promulgated a new version of the National Security Risk Assessment.

My Lady, the government published its new resilience framework on 19 December 2022, and the development and publication of that was a key commitment made in the integrated review, and it was prepared following a public consultation, with input from across central government, the devolved administrations, local government, the private and third sectors, and of course the public.

It sets out the United Kingdom Government’s plans to strengthen resilience to 2030, and the measures set out in the resilience framework include, first of all:

“Delivering a new UK Resilience Academy [built out from the Emergency Planning College] making world class professional training available to all that need it.”

Secondly, the creation of a new Head of Resilience position, responsible for guiding best practice, encouraging adherence to best practice and setting guidance.

Thirdly, introducing an annual statement to Parliament on civil contingencies risks and the United Kingdom Government’s performance on resilience.

Fourthly, clarifying United Kingdom Government roles and responsibilities for each National Security Risk Assessment risk.

Fifthly, growing the UK Government’s pool of advisory groups of experts to inform risk planning and provide external challenge.

Sixthly, strengthening local resilience forums in England.

Seventh, building private sector resilience by providing guidance on risk in order to help the businesses to meet new standards on resilience.

Eight, continuing to deepen and strengthen the government’s relationships with the voluntary and community sector in England so as to better understand and integrate their capabilities at the local and national levels.

Nine, developing a measure for social vulnerability as an indicator of socio-economic resilience, and how risk impacts across communities and vulnerable groups in order to inform decision-making.

Ten, updating guidance with local responders, the voluntary and community sector, and communities to support them working with vulnerable groups.

Eleventh, conducting an annual survey of public perceptions of risk, resilience and preparedness.

And, twelfth, establishing a comprehensive national exercising programme focused on priority National Security Risk Assessment risks to test key capabilities and provide a stronger framework to capture and track lessons learned identified across government.

Alongside the publication of the resilience framework, the Prime Minister formed a subcommittee of the National Security Council chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister specifically to consider matters relating to the United Kingdom’s resilience.

The government recognises there is always work to be done to ensure that the United Kingdom is well prepared for future crises, and to this end the Cabinet Office will listen carefully to the evidence and contributions from other core participants in Module 1, and looks forward to the Inquiry’s report and recommendations in due course.

Thank you very much.

Lady Hallett: Thank you, Mr Strachan.

I gather I mispronounced your name, please forgive me. You’re not the first and I fear you may not be the last. So, please, anybody, if I do mispronounce your name, please tell me. I won’t be at all offended. On the contrary, I would welcome being corrected. So thank you very much.

Mr Strachan: Not at all, my Lady, I’ve got used to answering to both pronunciations.

Lady Hallett: I can imagine, yes!

Right, that completes the submissions of the core participants.

Mr Keith.

Mr Keith: Well, my Lady, ahead of schedule, may I please call Professor Jimmy Whitworth and Dr Charlotte Hammer to give evidence.