6. Submissions on Behalf of the Cabinet Office by Ms Studd KC

Ms Studd: My Lady, in order to learn lessons for the future, it is vital to examine the decisions that have been the focus of this module and the structures in which those decision were made. We hope that the breadth of views expressed in the evidence of the witnesses supported by the Cabinet Office and Number 10 demonstrates our commitment to engage with the Inquiry as transparently as possible.

The Inquiry will need to consider the evidence in this module in the context of a novel global threat where all governments, not just the United Kingdom, were working in an environment of significant uncertainty about both the characteristics of the virus and the path of the pandemic.

As the threat from the virus became clearer, the government had to balance its wide range of possible impacts to protect lives and livelihoods in ways that were unprecedented in peacetime. There were different, strongly held opinions on the right responses to take. Cabinet government was required to harness the full range of perspectives across departments based upon the evidence available at the time in order to take into account the impacts of the virus on health, on the economy, and on society.

The hearings in this module have largely focused on 2020, particularly in its early months. As we noted in our opening statement, the United Kingdom response, having started in a climate of acute uncertainty, evolved over time as the virus was better understood, as more tools were developed to combat it, and as lessons were learned.

We would emphasise, my Lady, that the government has instigated significant and material evolutions to the way in which it handles crises and is making rapid progress against a longer-term programme to build a more resilient UK.

Over and above the many practical improvements already in place, the Resilience Framework published in December 2022 is a foundation upon which ongoing action and future lessons will be layered. This will include the careful considerations of recommendations made by this Inquiry.

As you may be aware, my Lady, the Deputy Prime Minister made the first annual statement to Parliament on risk and resilience on 4 December 2023, and this forms part of the commitment to raise awareness on resilience and to be more transparent and accountable so that there is an opportunity for scrutiny.

The government set wholly exceptional terms of reference for this Inquiry. Documents that would not normally be disclosed for many years have therefore been made available to you. As such, this module represents an unprecedented moment of transparency. You are of course aware that the Cabinet Office has provided the Inquiry with 30 individual or corporate Rule 9 statements and over 8,000 documents, to provide vital context for the decisions that were made.

The Cabinet Office invites you to look at the past through the lens of the future, so that this country can be better prepared. To learn lessons and identify what needs to be done differently, my Lady will want to understand not just whether the judgements turned out with hindsight to be wrong, but whether they were reasonable in the light of what was known at the time and the options that were available.

In this short closing statement, my Lady, I will address a number of points that have been heard in evidence before turning to the ways in which crisis and resilience structures are improving. We will also provide a more extended written closing statement.

I want first of all to deal with culture at the centre. Evidence has been heard in particular about the tone and content of private communications between colleagues which, the Cabinet Office accepts, was clearly not always of the standard that the public would expect. This should be considered both in the context of the nature of the communication, largely informal messaging that was intended to be private, and the prevailing circumstances, a fast-paced, uncertain and high pressure environment, where staff were facing stress both in the workplace and in their personal lives.

The Cabinet Office takes very seriously the broader evidence that’s been heard about certain elements of the culture at the centre of government in this period. In any workplace, even in a crisis, colleagues should be respectful to each other. In 2022 the Cabinet Office launched a significant programme, A Better Cabinet Office, in order to effect lasting change to the employee experience. The programme has six core themes, including one on leadership, respect and inclusion.

I will turn now to deal with the decision-making structures. My Lady, given the magnitude of the crisis that was facing not only the UK but also countries around the world, it was exceptionally difficult to balance the huge impacts of the pandemic across health, the economy and society. There were countless trade-offs, and no good options. Cabinet, the ultimate decision-making body of government, met and discussed Covid-19 throughout the relevant period. The early months of the pandemic were an exceptionally fluid time at the centre of government, as structures evolved with the path of the virus. Its sheer scale, pace and breadth meant that individuals and teams in the Cabinet Office, including Number 10, were seeking to manage a large volume of daily decisions. Any structures would have faced challenges with implementation.

As the initial acute phase of the crisis passed, new and clearer structures were produced for the prolonged challenge that followed, including the Covid Strategy Committee (Covid-S), Covid Operations Committee (Covid-O), and the Covid-19 Taskforce.

Throughout this evolution, these structures ensured that ministers were able to make formal decisions in appropriate fora, supported by the evidence that was available at the time.

I’m going to turn to deal with collective agreement. Under Cabinet collective responsibility, Cabinet and Cabinet committees such as Covid-S, Covid-O and COBR, took decisions which were binding on all members of government. Collective responsibility allows ministers to express their views frankly and put forward their arguments freely, in private, while maintaining a united front when decisions have been reached.

This in turn requires the privacy of opinions expressed in Cabinet and ministerial committees, including in correspondence, should be maintained. This is obviously to be encouraged and provides the best opportunity to obtain consensus and facilitate good decision-making.

Having now heard the ministerial witnesses, the Inquiry will appreciate that it is reasonable and expected for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to have regard for the economy, just as it is for the Justice Secretary to have regard for those in prison, and for the Secretary of State for Education to have regard for schools. It should not be expected to be any other way.

There was typically an iterative process by which relevant ministers had the opportunity in a range of fora to provide relevant advice and information from their departmental perspectives before decisions were ultimately made in a formal decision-making meeting.

It is a strength of our system that it ensures that the full range of objectives and issues are raised, understood and taken into account in the collective decision-making process.

The Inquiry has raised an issue as to whether decision-making sufficiently engaged Cabinet and its committees, particularly in the early part of the crisis. Lord Sedwill’s answer to that was:

“Actually, in terms of the formal procedures, the key decisions were taken either in Cabinet or in the UK COBR with the devolved First Ministers and their teams in attendance. So I think in terms of formal decisions, the constitutional position, we sought to follow it.”

Lord Sedwill was also asked about the views of others in relation to the specific criticisms of whether Cabinet and its committees were adequately involved. He explained that in the early months of the pandemic it was a very challenging period. The Prime Minister with his officials and advisers had to determine his view, balancing the range of impacts and taking into account fluid and evolving data and scientific advice. Structures were put in place to ensure decisions were formally taken in a proper collective way.

Professor Sir Chris Whitty’s recollection accords with that of Lord Sedwill, when he told you that he formed the view that almost all major decisions that needed to be taken by elected political leaders were taken via formal process.

This evidence, from those who were closely involved in the constitutional process, and perhaps viewing the position from a slightly more independent standpoint, indicates that collective decision-making was indeed maintained.

WhatsApp was used to communicate, perhaps not surprisingly given the pace and the remote nature of much of the work, but the evidence does not demonstrate that decisions were made on WhatsApp or that it had a significant influence on the decision-making systems and structures.

In recognition of the increasing use of instant messaging, in March 2023 the Cabinet Office published stronger guidance on the use of non-corporate communication channels, which updated the guidance on use of tools such as WhatsApp, SMS and private email.

I want to turn to the response of the centre to the emerging pandemic. In order for lessons to be learned, the Inquiry has to look at decision-making whilst fully recognising the advantages of hindsight. In examination of this issue, the key question is what was known contemporaneously.

In a written statement from Katharine Hammond, formerly the director of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, CCS, a witness who you heard from in Module 1 but not in this module, sets out the work done by her team from early January 2020 in response to the risk posed by the virus.

The COBR meeting on 24 January 2020 was chaired by the Secretary of State for Health, as would be usual under the lead government department model during a health-related crisis. COBR agreed actions, focused on monitoring the emerging risk and joining up with the devolved administrations, and made decisions on the triggers for reassessing the UK response, confirming that the Chief Medical Officer would advise on whether or not they had been met.

On 27 January, CCS formally stood up a policy cell and an operations cell to co-ordinate its response to the novel virus. The crisis machinery provided for full and regular collective consideration and decision-making. The chronology demonstrates that there were 14 ministerial COBR meetings between 24 January and 26 March, and eight further Cabinet meetings where Covid-19 was discussed between those dates. At each of them, there was input from SAGE, and at each CCS continued to work on the recommendations from SAGE.

Professor Chris Whitty commented on the invitation for him to attend Cabinet on 14 February 2020, saying:

“… it’s extremely rare, in fact, that the Chief Medical Officer is invited to Cabinet under ordinary circumstances. This reflects the fact, I think, that government was acknowledging that this was a substantial threat.”

Professor Sir Chris Whitty, when asked about this period, also said:

“You know, I think it’s very important we don’t look back and say, ‘Well, of course you can see this is what would have happened’ …”

He went on:

“… I’m just pointing out that the international evidence on this at the time is relatively clear. It was uncertain at this stage.”

The WHO of course only declared a pandemic on 11 March 2020.

What is clear, with hindsight, is that the virus was moving through the population quicker than anyone, including SAGE, had appreciated. Once this was understood, government advice was updated and the strategy to tackle the virus adapted.

In evidence, Sir Patrick Vallance explained how:

“The data that came in during the week leading up to 14th and 15th [March] showed clearly that we were much further ahead, [lockdown] was much more likely to be needed urgently than anyone had realised. That’s a data problem, but it was also, I think, a scientific problem, in that you can’t manage this with the precision that you think you can, and therefore you have to take different actions.”

Therefore, on examination of the contemporaneous evidence, the Cabinet Office rebuts the suggestion that it was not taking the virus seriously from an early stage. As to the decisions as to whether and when the mandatory stay-at-home order be implemented, and other decisions in this early period, the Inquiry will want to examine all of the factors in the round and consider the learning for the future.

I turn to deal with devolved administrations. The response to the pandemic was a UK-wide effort, underpinned by UK-wide collaboration. The Cabinet Office sought to involve the devolved administrations in decision-making throughout the pandemic. Given the national scale of the crisis, the devolved administrations were invited to COBR meetings from January 2020. First Ministers were invited to the meetings, although in practice they delegated to their health ministers for the first few meetings, in accordance with the lead government department model.

As central governance structures evolved, the devolved administrations remained involved, attending MIG meetings and, subsequently, Covid-O meetings, where a UK-wide approach was needed. At ministerial level, Michael Gove, as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, chaired regular calls with First Ministers of the devolved administrations. At official level, the Cabinet Office’s UK governance group supported a UK-wide response by helping departments to ensure the response fully considered the devolution perspective and UK-wide impacts.

The virus, of course, did not respect borders. The evidence in this module has shown that while the first lockdown was delivered uniformly across the UK, there was some divergence of approach later in the period. As the former Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, notes in his statement, this risked considerable public confusion and frustration when clarity of message was crucial.

The Cabinet Office invites the Inquiry to consider how different legislative options available to the UK Government might, in future, support a more uniform UK-wide response to a future pandemic or equivalent emergency.

You will, of course, want to reflect not only on the evidence that you’ve heard in this module, but also on the evidence that you will hear in the course of Modules 2A, B and C.

I’m going to deal with equalities. The Equality Hub provided multiple inputs across Cabinet Office and other government departments, including on the impact of Covid-19 on ethnic minority groups, disabled people and other disproportionately impacted groups. The government responded quickly to the emerging data on ethnic disparities in Covid-19 infections and deaths. Following a rapid review by Public Health England, on 4 June 2020 the then Minister for Equalities was appointed by the Prime Minister and Health Secretary to lead cross-government work to understand why Covid-19 had such a disproportionate impact on ethnic minority groups, and to review and inform the government’s response.

His Majesty’s Treasury was also commissioned to consider the disproportionate impact of restrictions on lower income and ethnic minorities.

The Minister for Equalities published four quarterly reports on the progress of this work. This made a number of recommendations which helped improve the quality of data and to identify with more precision which groups were adversely affected and for what reason.

They also recommended specific changes such as recording ethnicity on death certificates and the incorporation of lessons learned from the vaccination roll-out to improve take-up in future vaccination schemes.

The Disability Unit worked across government departments to identify risks affecting disabled people, and to support departments to mitigate these. This included ensuring processes and guidance better reflected the needs of disabled people, promoting accessible communications, co-ordinating across government departments to ensure the needs of disabled people were better considered in policy development and delivery, building a broader evidence base on disability and Covid impacts, and working closely with disabled people’s organisations and disability stakeholders to hear and amplify the voices of disabled people.

The government also established a disproportionately impacted groups workstream led by Dr Emran Mian to consider the Covid-19 impacts more widely, with which Cabinet officials in the Equality Hub and the Covid-19 Taskforce worked very closely.

The Inquiry has heard much evidence in relation to data, and in particular the lack of data at the start of the pandemic. This was in part an inevitable consequence of seeking to keep pace with the development of a novel virus and its implications. The evidence that you heard from Simon Ridley set out the issues with data at the early stage of the pandemic and the difficulties with obtaining data from different departments and across government.

To understand how data was provided to decision-makers, in particular in the early stages of the pandemic, the Inquiry will benefit from considering the full range of evidence that has been provided, particularly the Cabinet Office’s written statements and the improvements that have been made.

The Inquiry’s data expert produced his statement without reference to the evidence submitted by the Cabinet Office, citing time constraints. There have been other criticisms of capability and capacity within government on analytics, science and software engineering, and barriers to data sharing. These are challenges which the creation of the National Situation Centre has helped resolve.

The CCS provided ministers and officials attending COBR with critical data, including during that early phase of the pandemic. 27 commonly recognised information pictures, or CRIPS, and 40 situation reports, or sitreps, were circulated between 24 January and 16 March. From 16 March, the cross-department sitrep was replaced by a specific Covid-19 dashboard. On 24 March the CCS launched the interactive version of the Covid-19 dashboard, which was available across government and used to brief the Prime Minister and senior members of Cabinet.

Enhancement to the structures supporting the dashboard and the broader work building a data analysis capability through the summer and early autumn of 2020 meant that by October 2020 a workforce of around 100 were focused on the provision of data and information to provide decision-makers with the most up-to-date picture across the economy, society, the NHS and direct Covid-19 impacts.

In the autumn of 2020, the data brought together by the Covid-19 Taskforce was supplemented by insights from the International Comparators Joint Unit, which was a partnership between the Joint Intelligence Organisation and the Cabinet Office and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office.

The National Situation Centre provides routine reporting on 160 key performance indicators. In addition to curated open source intelligence on its data analysis and situational awareness hub, which is available to use across government, in addition to preparing for all risks, the National Situation Centre is developing a biothreats radar which will provide near real-time monitoring of emerging biological threats that may impact the UK, and will be fully operational by 2025. It is widely recognised, and internationally, as world leading and provides a wholly materially improved service to the government decision-makers in a crisis which would be well above and beyond the experience of senior leaders in early 2020.

As was explored in Module 1, the government has carried out formal exercises to determine learnings from the pandemic. Within the Cabinet Office this has included the significant enhancement of the dedicated crisis response and crisis management excellence function in the COBR unit. This is in place to horizon scan immediate risks and respond to crises that emerge, including those of the character of the Covid-19 pandemic.

A new Resilience Directorate, overseen by the new head of resilience, is ensuring focus on preparing for, preventing and mitigating the risks in the medium and long term.

In December 2022, the Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak, created the National Security Council (Resilience), a new subcommittee which brings together cross-government efforts on risk and resilience. This committee is chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister.

The COBR unit has made meaningful and practical improvements to the crisis management facilities. This includes the opening of a major extension of the COBR complex to allow more flexible and effective working and decision-making, including the latest technology, data and video teleconferencing capabilities.

With regard to the longer term resilience structures, as you are aware, the government has published an ambitious UK Government Resilience Framework which sets out how the government will strengthen the systems, structures and capabilities which underpin the UK resilience to all risks and hazards, including those which are yet to emerge.

The government has reviewed and materially changed the way it assesses the most serious risks facing the UK, inviting wider external challenge, to strengthen the National Security Risk Assessment and to consider multiple scenarios in which risk can manifest, rather than a single reasonable worst-case scenario.

It has moved to a dynamic process of risk assessment, and published the most transparent ever National Risk Register in August of this year. And in line with the principle of prevention rather than cure, the Cabinet Office published a new Biological Security Strategy this year, setting out how it is protecting the UK and its interests from significant biological risks, including future infectious disease outbreaks. The programme is underpinned by £1.5 billion of annual investment.

The Cabinet Office acknowledges that our entire system – government, health and social care, our scientific and medical infrastructure, local authorities – took historic decisions in 2020 to 2021 unlike any others in peacetime, and it’s vital for future pandemics and future generations that any improvements continue to be incorporated into the new resilience system.

By way of conclusion, as part of identifying lessons, the Inquiry should also reflect on what worked well. It is clear from the evidence prepared for this module that the government got some big decisions right at a very early stage.

Initial funding for the Oxford vaccine came from a research call launched on 4 February 2020, and the vaccine technology was re-purposed from work on a MERS vaccine which had been funded back in 2016.

The UK led the world’s first successful clinical trial for a treatment for Covid-19, RECOVERY. It identified dexamethasone, an inexpensive and widely available steroid, as an effective treatment for Covid-19, saving many lives.

The Prime Minister launched the ventilator challenge, a call to arms, in which 14,000 ventilators were produced in around three months.

The evacuation of British nationals from overseas was completed efficiently and without delay at the early part of the pandemic.

The system for shielding, which the Inquiry has heard was a huge and rapid cross-departmental effort.

The Nightingale hospitals were constructed in record time.

The government’s economic support through furlough, business loans and Universal Credit was one of the most comprehensive in the world.

As is to be expected over the whole period with which this module is concerned, the level of uncertainty reduced and the response evolved over time. The various strands of information could be brought together into a whole picture as the virus was better understood by the scientists, the data picture improved, the uneven impacts of lockdown became better understood, the early investments for example in vaccines provided new interventions, and lessons were learned about the management of a prolonged whole-of-government response.

Countries across the world took different steps at different times as the prevalence of the virus varied over the period of the pandemic. Ultimately every death is a tragedy for each family, but the United Kingdom’s performance can only be understood fully by reference to the whole period and the international context. Estimating excess mortality is complicated, and factors such as how the baseline is chosen can have a material effect on the estimate.

A joint report by the Government Office for Science and the Office of National Statistics looked at a range of different studies and found that the United Kingdom placed around the middle of the rankings for excess mortality, regardless of which measure is used.

Taking into account all of its recent revisions, the ONS estimated last month that the UK GDP was 1.8% above pre-pandemic levels in the quarter 2, April to June 2023, ahead of France and Germany.

My Lady, the Prime Minister reminded us, at the start of this week, of all the various ways that people suffered through the pandemic, including of course those who lost loved ones. The Inquiry has also heard from and about very many talented and hard working individuals who rose to the challenge that the pandemic posed and worked tirelessly for the good of the country. They should be commended for their public service.

Thank you.

Lady Hallett: Thank you very much, Ms Studd.

Does that complete everything, Mr Keith?

Mr Keith: My Lady, I believe it does.

Closing remarks

Lady Hallett: Thank you all very much indeed.

We have now completed the oral hearings for 2023 for both Module 1, preparedness for the pandemic, and Module 2, core UK decision-making.

Several other modules and investigations are under way covering the extremely wide range of issues set out in our terms of reference. Just to give people some idea of what everyone’s been doing: to date – and this is for Modules 1 and 2 alone – over 210,000 documents have been obtained and analysed; over 73,000 documents have been disclosed, and therefore analysed by those to whom they were disclosed; many hundreds of Rule 9 questionnaires and witness statements have been obtained and analysed; dozens of witnesses have had their accounts and their actions and opinions tested in these public oral hearings.

It is an extraordinary achievement, given the Inquiry only started formally in June 2022. It’s taken a huge amount of dedication and industry by the Inquiry team, the material providers and by the teams representing the core participants to get us this far, and I am extremely grateful to them all.

The Inquiry is already working hard on producing a report for Module 1, and as soon as this is ready it will be published. We hope that will be by the summer, early summer of 2024.

The Inquiry will also now start work on preparing a report for Module 2, considering – and I emphasise it again – all the relevant material, both oral and written, that we have obtained. There has been considerable focus in some quarters of the WhatsApp material, but they are just a part, a relatively small part of all the material that I will be considering with the assistance of the Inquiry team.

I have expressed the hope that the Module 2 report will be published in 2024, albeit towards the end of the year, given the amount of work that has to be done. However, until I’ve heard the evidence in Modules 2A, 2B and 2C next year, I’ll be unable to work out if it is going to be possible, but we will do our very best.

All the module teams are well aware of my desire, and I consider it a need, to publish reports as speedily as we can, but obviously it cannot be at the expense of thoroughness.

So the next oral hearings for this Inquiry will be for Module 2A, and they will begin in Edinburgh on 16 January 2024.

Thank you all very much indeed, and I hope you have as happy a Christmas as you can. Thank you.

(12.30 pm)

(The hearing concluded)