2. Mr Sajid Javid
MR SAJID JAVID (affirmed).
Questions From Counsel to the Inquiry
Lady Hallett: Mr Javid, I hope we haven’t kept you waiting for too long.
The Witness: No, not at all.
Ms Cecil: Thank you, Mr Javid, for assisting the Inquiry today. In relation to that, can I ask that you keep your voice up. And, as you may know, a transcript is being made of the hearing, and so it may be that I ask you to slow down, but if you can try to approach that with that in mind in terms of your tempo and speed.
Mr Sajid Javid: Okay.
Counsel Inquiry: If you’re not clear about any of the questions that I ask or need them to be repeated, please just let me know and I will do so. And, again, we anticipate that we will go to the lunchtime adjournment at approximately 1 o’clock in the initial instance.
Mr Sajid Javid: Thank you.
Counsel Inquiry: Mr Javid, you provided a witness statement to the Inquiry. That’s dated 18 October of this year. It runs to some 46 pages, and it contains a declaration of truth. Is that right?
Mr Sajid Javid: That’s correct.
Counsel Inquiry: Thank you.
Now, if I can just turn briefly, if I may, to your background. In terms of your current role, you’re currently a backbench MP, a Member of Parliament for Bromsgrove?
Mr Sajid Javid: That is correct.
Counsel Inquiry: Thank you. You’ve been involved in politics for some time, first being elected back in 2010?
Mr Sajid Javid: That is correct.
And if it’s possible, may I just say a few words at the start before we get into the questions, just for a few seconds, if that’s okay, my Lady.
May I just say that, first of all, I thank you for the opportunity for appearing in front of the Inquiry, I fully support the work of the Inquiry. The impact of the pandemic was, of course, unprecedented in our country and across the world. Sadly, many people lost their lives and there are many of their loved ones that are still grieving. I know some of them are here today as well.
I will perhaps probably never fully understand the scale of their grief, but I sincerely hope that this Inquiry gets to the bottom of what happened in our country at the time and that, as a country, we learn lessons from it so that, if there is another time, we are just so much better prepared. Thank you.
Lady Hallett: Thank you, Mr Javid.
Ms Cecil: Mr Javid, indeed, we are concerned today with the role that you played, firstly, as Chancellor –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: – during the pandemic. That was at the very outset of the pandemic until 13 February of 2020?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: And then subsequently when you came back into government as the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care in June 2021.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: But just to give a little bit of background to that, you’ve occupied a number of Cabinet roles within government?
Mr Sajid Javid: That’s correct.
Counsel Inquiry: First dating from 2014 –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: – is that right? That’s when you were Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport and Minister for Equalities.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: And it continued through various appointments: Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills; Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government; Home Secretary; and then, as we’ve heard – and then that’s when you moved into your position as Chancellor?
Mr Sajid Javid: That’s correct.
Counsel Inquiry: So is it fair to say that you’ve had significant involvement in Cabinet –
Mr Sajid Javid: That would be fair –
Counsel Inquiry: – the workings of Cabinet?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: And indeed, even before you became a Cabinet Minister, you were very closely working alongside other Cabinet ministers occupying great offices of state?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes, I had some junior ministerial positions.
Counsel Inquiry: Indeed.
Just dealing to Cabinet and crises, you were in Cabinet under different prime ministers, in fact, including David Cameron and Theresa May?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: And indeed a number of crises, including Grenfell and the Salisbury poisonings?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: In terms of those periods of decision-making, as opposed to when you were subsequently Secretary of State and, during the pandemic, for health and social care, you explain that that latter period was the most intense of decision-making in your career?
Mr Sajid Javid: That’s correct.
Counsel Inquiry: And why do you say that, if I can just ask you to draw upon your previous experience?
Mr Sajid Javid: Well, it’s not to take away from the importance and intensity of other crises or very difficult situations I had to deal with as a minister but I felt when I came in as Health Secretary although we had – the first year the pandemic had elapsed, we were still – you know, there were still a lot of restrictions in place, there was still a huge amount of concern over the pandemic, no one could be truly certain of the next course it might time and there was of course a huge pressure on my department, the Department of Health and Social Care, not just vis-á-vis the pandemic but also with respect to all the other aspects of healthcare, the NHS of course, but also social care.
Counsel Inquiry: You were fairly fortunate in the sense that you had, as I say, experienced crises before in Cabinet roles. You had been a minister by then for some nearly ten years or so, a decade. During that time, had you undertaken yourself any training in crisis management?
Mr Sajid Javid: The – well, first of all, in my experience in government there’s not really any training at all for really any aspect of being a minister and you asked me specifically about crisis training; so, in general, there was no training. But the only time, the only exception I would make to that comment, is that when I was Home Secretary there was some training for particular types of crises that the country might face, which wouldn’t be appropriate for me to go into what those might be, but there was specific training around that for an incoming Home Secretary.
Counsel Inquiry: Indeed. I believe you note that there is also training potentially in the Ministry of Defence, for example, available to ministers but certainly not within the Department of Health and Social Care?
Mr Sajid Javid: Not within the Department of Health and Social Care.
Counsel Inquiry: Thank you. If I can now turn to the Cabinet that was in place at the outset of the pandemic, it’s in your witness statement at page 12, paragraph 37, please.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: What you say there about Cabinet, so we’re talking about January/February of 2020, as the UK enters the pandemic, you consider:
“… the Cabinet that went into the pandemic had less experience of being in government or holding offices of state than many previous Cabinets. They were not a team who were well versed in the affairs of government outside the crisis, [you] can imagine that may have … caused difficulties during the pandemic.”
If I can just touch there for a moment, when you say they had less experience of government, how did you see that playing out initially through that January/February period and, more broadly, in terms of the time that you were in Cabinet?
Mr Sajid Javid: Well, the reason I’ve said this in my statement is because I think it’s fair to say when this Cabinet was put in place, and although there was some minor changes, I think, right after the general election, this Cabinet was essentially the Cabinet that was put in place I think, it would have been July 2019 by the new Prime Minister, Boris Johnson. I think the – obviously there was no expectation or even any thought towards a future crisis of these proportions and I think the focus was on the commitment of the new Prime Minister to deliver on the Brexit commitments and to safely – to take the UK out of the European Union.
There had been a lot of problems in Parliament in the previous government before the change in Prime Minister and I think the sort of one of the primary considerations was to have a Cabinet put together that would support the Prime Minister in that process, and that was largely the same Cabinet that was in place at the start of January 1 of 2020.
Counsel Inquiry: Thank you. And, of course, when it comes to February, later when –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: – we’ll deal with that in due course and when you resign, there is also a reshuffle that takes place then, with the new ministers being appointed.
Is it fair to say that you were one of the most experienced ministers at that time in January and February of 2020 within Cabinet?
Mr Sajid Javid: I think that would be fair, yes.
Counsel Inquiry: Thank you.
What you also say in relation to those issues is that the Prime Minister’s Office was not as strong or expert as it could or should have been. You describe the team as being too small.
Again, so this is looking at the Prime Minister’s office, Number 10 –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: – why do you make that observation?
Mr Sajid Javid: I would actually make that observation of any Prime Minister’s Office that I’ve – any Prime Minister that I’ve served. So as you alluded to earlier, I’ve served two other prime ministers, and that is because I found certainly from someone sort of especially when I first came from a private secretary into government, quite myself being quite surprised with how small a team a Prime Minister typically has in terms of there’s the political advisers, which is typically, you know, a small group of – I mean, it differs for every Prime Minister, it could be 10 to 20, maybe 25 or 30, but it’s a relatively small group, given the responsibility of the Prime Minister, and the civil service team is also relatively small compared to individual departments, for example.
And that – you will undoubtedly then have an impact of the Prime Minister and his or her team to then be able to deliver on the commitments of the government of the day.
Counsel Inquiry: Do you see that as one of the structural deficits within the set-up of Number 10?
Mr Sajid Javid: I think it’s an issue. Now, it has been said – you know, other people have discussed that this similar situation might say that but then there’s the Cabinet Office, and then, you know, there is a minister, typically the CDL, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, will lead the Cabinet Office and the Cabinet Office is there to sort of help co-ordinate initiatives across government to support the Prime Minister with his or her priorities.
But then the Cabinet Office is also led by a member of the Cabinet and, whilst it is a very responsive to what a Prime Minister may want them to sort of focus and advise on, that head of the Cabinet Office will also have their own set of priorities. So it’s not the same thing as being an extension of the Prime Minister’s Office.
Counsel Inquiry: There is a distinction to be drawn –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: – effectively between the two in the way that they Work and things, policies that they are developing?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: If I can turn now to looking specifically at the Cabinet and Number 10 initially –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: – as it existed in January and February of 2020, the outset of the pandemic?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: If I can call up your paragraph 37 again, please, what we see here is that your view was that Cabinet at that time was designed to place Dominic Cummings and the Prime Minister as the decision-makers?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: The goal was to centralise power in Number 10, with a preference for loyalty over experience.
Now, you talk about the centralisation of power and decision-making. Was that something you that you were privy to at that point in time?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes, that’s how I felt things were. They were very centralised.
Counsel Inquiry: And did that result in other ministers, including Cabinet ministers, being excluded from decision-making?
Mr Sajid Javid: I think sometimes it would have, and obviously a lot of – I wouldn’t have been privy to, you know, all those occasions. But the reason I say that is because it was clear that in Mr Cummings the Prime Minister had picked someone that he had decided to, for whatever reason, to trust with a huge amount of responsibility and power, and many times I felt like that the key decisions, many of the key decisions, were being made by Mr Cummings and not the Prime Minister, in a way that I had not seen with any other Prime Minister certainly that I had worked with.
What was different for me in some respects is that because I was the Chancellor, and therefore obviously oversaw the Treasury in its operations, it meant that it was much harder to exclude the Treasury from any key decisions because, even if those decisions are not directly related to the Treasury’s functions, any department, especially if it required resources, or even any kind of regulatory change, it would concern the Treasury and the Treasury, I think it’s probably the only department other than the Prime Minister’s Office, if we see that as a department, that has to sign off on virtually, you know, any sort of policy initiative or any policy change in government in what’s called – there’s a process that’s often referred to as the “write-round process” and the Treasury would be the one department that, other than obviously the lead department, that would get quite involved in most decisions.
So my point being that it was hard to exclude the Treasury. And then what that meant in the context of your question, Ms Cecil, was that if there were situations where, particularly if Mr Cummings wanted something to happen or had a particular view on a policy or an initiative, you know, I would know about it, my team would know about it, and if I had an issue with that or wanted to question it or had a different opinion, it was hard to exclude, but also many times I could block it and stop it from happening or at least delay it until I see the Prime Minister which was not always possible by other Cabinet ministers.
Counsel Inquiry: Indeed, we will see references to being power struggles between Number 10 and Number 11, the Treasury, during the pandemic in due course – not in relation to your time but later in the period.
But in terms of your role as Chancellor, effectively you had oversight across government –
Mr Sajid Javid: That’s right.
Counsel Inquiry: – for each government department, but also, significantly, Number 10 –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: – and any policies or processes emanating from there that required financial resource or input or indeed regulatory –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: – consideration.
We’ve heard some evidence in relation to Gavin Williamson and his – he says that he was excluded from decision-making. Is that something that you would have expected, bearing in mind how you’ve described the centralisation of power?
Mr Sajid Javid: I wouldn’t know the details of any particular sort of occasion that he might be referring to, but it is something, as a sort of part of a decision, the decision-making process at the time that I would recognise, yes.
Counsel Inquiry: In terms of decision-making, if I can just call up paragraph 49, please, page 16 of your statement. And you’ve touched upon this already in dealing with who was making those decisions –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: – in terms of how you viewed it at the time. Approximately a third of the way through, it refers to Mr Cummings, who was in post at that time. You say:
“I would say that during my time as Chancellor, I considered that he sought to act as the Prime Minister in all but name, and he tried to make all key decisions within Number 10 – not the Prime Minister.”
Now, why do you say that?
Mr Sajid Javid: Because that’s how things seemed to be working at the time. So, for example, my private office, that’s my group of civil servants that are directly serving me as Chancellor on a daily basis, you know, quite often it’s not unusual, first of all, to get a request from the Prime Minister’s Office, Number 10 – it’s not unusual of course – but a lot of those requests, once probed, weren’t actually coming from the Prime Minister. They might be anything from a request for information, a request for detail, but also a policy change or a policy preference.
They, on probing further, would be coming from Mr Cummings and if it was one or two times, just a few times, then I wouldn’t have thought anything sort of unusual of that but it was constantly it seemed so many requests of that nature were coming from Mr Cummings, and on many occasions when I would then eventually meet the Prime Minister to talk with him and it’s worth just – this is relevant to one of your previous questions, because I was Chancellor, because I was literally living in the same building as the Prime Minister, I would not just see him on formal occasions but also informally as well, it might be at the weekend, in the Number 10 garden or somewhere, when I can say, “Look, I heard that you wanted this” or “You wanted that”, and he would sometimes just not even know that that request had come in his name.
And this could be, for example, to do – I was working in early from January to the February – in those two particular months I was working on the budget which was to come very soon in the New Year and, obviously, a budget is an opportunity to make a significant number of policy changes for the government, and I was getting a lot of requests relating to the budget which, on probing, were coming directly from Mr Cummings and not the Prime Minister and it’s not something I would have expected.
Just to add a little bit more to that, if I may, although that was the first time I’d served as Chancellor, I had been in the Treasury as both economic secretary and the financial secretary under George Osborne when he was Chancellor, so I had a bit of a sense about how I would have expected the things to work and this was very unusual.
Counsel Inquiry: An unusual structure –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: – structurally in terms of decision-making and communications?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: This paragraph also, and I’m got to go into it in any detail, deals with your resignation. The facts are already in the public domain –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: – and you’ve spoken on a number of occasions about that.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: But in terms of the evidence that this Inquiry has heard in relation to the dysfunctional nature, all sorts of different words have been used, as I’m sure you’re aware, toxic, dysfunctional, those types of things, feral. With regard to that, were you aware of that at the time in January and February, that that culture was existing within Number 10 or was that something that you were not sighted on?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes, broadly. I think it was a widespread feeling amongst a lot of the political advisers working in Number 10, many ministers, that the Number 10 operation collectively was quite dysfunctional. I think many ministers had noticed. We’ve just referred to a moment ago about who really seemed to be making a lot of the decisions. And, you know, you referred to my resignation and, as you say, you know, I’ve talked about that publicly, in Parliament and elsewhere, and unless you want to probe it further I won’t go into it. But one thing I will is if I think back to my resignation day as Chancellor on 13 February 2020, that on that day the Prime Minister had – this is just to demonstrate how widespread the feeling around Mr Cummings was within Number 10 at the time – on that day when the Prime Minister said he wanted to keep me as Chancellor but wanted me to replace all my advisers, which I refused to do, he asked me to take some time out.
He said “Look, just take 10, 15 minutes, you know, you go into a separate room, I’ll go to my study and let’s just – you know, you go and think about this and let’s talk again. I don’t want you to resign”, when I went into that room, I thought I’d sort of be on my own for 10/15 minutes and just think about it – obviously it was a big decision to resign as Chancellor – but while I was in that room I remember distinctly, you know, first Helen MacNamara coming in and then Eddie Lister, who was – Eddie Lister was one of the Prime Minister’s senior advisers, and Ms MacNamara, I think you know who she is from previous evidence – and they both came in to say the same thing, which was that the Prime Minister is only doing this because of Dominic Cummings, he’s asked him to do this, and he, the Prime Minister, doesn’t really know what he’s doing in asking you to do this, and this is all Dominic Cummings, “Don’t fall for it, Sajid”, was their message, that Dominic Cummings will be gone within a few weeks, there’s no way he can survive the way he’s going on. They both essentially – you know, I’m summarising –
Counsel Inquiry: Encouraged you to stay?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah, encouraged me to stay because they knew that the problem in Number 10, as they saw it, was Dominic Cummings, and that their view was that he can’t – he, Dominic Cummings, can’t survive in Number 10, in – carry on the way he is and he will be gone very soon –
Counsel Inquiry: If I can just interrupt you there just to bring you back really to the structural issues that faced us at the time, to what extent was that dysfunctionality, as you see it, within the Cabinet Office related to that centralisation of power or was it something that you’d also seen previously under other Cabinets?
Lady Hallett: I think Mr Javid said the dysfunctionality that he saw was in Number 10. I don’t think –
Ms Cecil: I’m terribly sorry, not Cabinet, in Number 10. My apologies, my Lady, you are entirely correct.
Mr Sajid Javid: That’s right.
Counsel Inquiry: In Number 10.
Mr Sajid Javid: To what extent – was your question – sorry, could you repeat, please?
Counsel Inquiry: Yes. I was just going to ask, to what extent did you consider that to be related specifically to that Number 10 environment as opposed to other administrations that you’d served under? Was it different or was it very similar to how governments operate generally in Number 10?
Mr Sajid Javid: It was different in my experience, and obviously I can’t speak to, you know, other governments. Certainly in my experience, I think the extent of dysfunctionality was something I had not experienced before in any government.
Counsel Inquiry: Now if I may turn just to the machinery of government in relation to cross-departmental working, cross-government working –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Lady Hallett: I’m sorry to interrupt again, Ms Cecil.
Ms Cecil: Not at all.
Lady Hallett: SPADs obviously – sorry, special advisers – obviously have a very important role and I have been told that they are technically civil servants but don’t, in reality, answer to the permanent secretary, they answer to their minister.
Mr Sajid Javid: That’s correct.
Lady Hallett: You’ve obviously had them. Is there anything in the set-up or the structure of the role of special advisers that you think might improve the position? You felt that one special adviser had gained too much prominence and too much decision-making power and responsibility. Is there anything you can think of in the structural arrangements that might help alleviate that situation without impinging on the discretion of a prime minister to appoint the special advisers he wants?
Mr Sajid Javid: I think, my Lady, it’s hard to think of something that would make a difference that wouldn’t impinge on the discretion of the Prime Minister or the minister. Technically, I believe that all special advisers are appointed by the Prime Minister of the day. The Prime Minister can appoint them and also, you know, dismiss them. But normally the relevant minister would have a say in who they would like to be their special adviser or not. But because the special adviser, the only members of the minister’s team that can be political, and there I think a minister does need people that are able to be political. I think it becomes then very hard if there was, for example – I mean, I have heard people talking about maybe there should be some kind of vetting process or panel for interviews and things like you would have with civil servants, but I don’t see how that could work with special advisers. I think a lot at the end of the day just comes down to the choices that a prime minister and minister makes –
Lady Hallett: The personalities?
Mr Sajid Javid: The personalities, yes.
Lady Hallett: Someone did suggest making special advisers accountable in the line of responsibility to the permanent secretary.
Mr Sajid Javid: I haven’t thought about that too much but my initial reaction would be that it would probably make the political side of their work harder, given a permanent secretary cannot be or should not be political in any way.
Lady Hallett: Thank you. Sorry to interrupt, Ms Cecil.
Ms Cecil: No, not at all.
Perhaps just rounding that off, what about merit-based, open recruitment based on competencies for those special advisers? Is that something you could see working?
Mr Sajid Javid: Again, Ms Cecil, I’m not sure how that would work in that – I mean, there is – first of all, I think in the process, if it’s done properly, clearly there is a merit part to it in that I think most ministers would clearly want to pick people to be their special advisers that they believe are up to their job and can carry out the role.
But it is – if what you’re getting at is that it is not a process where there is, as I say, a panel or some kind of objective process that’s gone through, then introducing that into the process would take something away as well, which does have value at times and that is the ability for ministers to consider things from a political perspective which, at the end of the day, all ministers are also politicians and they would need to have advice on that.
So, for example, when a minister – if I give you one quick example, in all my ministerial roles I appeared in front of media, you know, at least once a week. Sometimes when I was Health Secretary I’d would be doing five or six days a week. And obviously the media can ask you any question you want and some of those are deliberately political and you need to be well prepared for that and only special advisers can prepare you for that.
Counsel Inquiry: Well, those are still competences, aren’t they, and really what I’m asking about is some sort of open, transparent, fair recruitment process. You say that may take things away but one of the criticisms that has been raised in evidence during this Inquiry is the lack of diversity in terms of both politicians and those in Cabinet, but also those advising and surrounding them. Wouldn’t it also potentially add something in terms of that potential opening up in terms of diversity?
Mr Sajid Javid: I think that if there was more diversity in government and whether that’s ministers, special advisers, civil servants, it’s a good thing, you know – clearly diversity in a broad sense.
But I don’t – first of all, I think diversity, in terms of going into this crisis, was no different, in my opinion, or lack of diversity, with any sort of previous government either one that I’ve been in or others that I’ve known about, and it’s probably no different to many other very senior professions. As I understand it, I think, amongst barristers, I think about 80 per cent come from Oxbridge, so I think it’s probably not too different in many other professions.
Lady Hallett: I think you’ll find the figures are rather different today.
Mr Sajid Javid: Are they?
Lady Hallett: I hope so. I did quite a lot of work.
Mr Sajid Javid: I hope so too, but it’s probably disproportionate, my Lady.
Lady Hallett: That may well be the case.
Ms Cecil: And it’s really just exploring with you whether opening it up in that way would allow for that progression and that change effectively – operate systemic change because, obviously, there are structural issues, as you say, when you have that level of disproportionality?
Mr Sajid Javid: I think if there was more diversity in government decision-making, and again beyond just ministers – ministers are important, of course, in this – I think that’s a good thing. An example of that I may give if it’s relevant go, if it’s okay, I think relevant to this Inquiry is that when I was Health Secretary one of the things that I think I – was very important to me and I took very seriously was the, you know, health disparities, including racial disparities and one of the reasons I took sort of racial disparities and health outcomes, I guess more seriously than perhaps some of my predecessors, was because of my own experiences.
And so I think, you know, there are some clear cases where, you know, having more diversity can only be a benefit.
Counsel Inquiry: Indeed, and presumably would assist in decision-making?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: If I can move then now to deal with your time as Secretary of State, as I say, and look at some of those decision-making and structural arrangements that were in place then.
You came back into, as I say, a ministerial role in June 2021; so a latter part of the pandemic?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: And by that point, a number of decision-making fora had been operating for quite some time. So you had the 8.30 am meetings, Covid-O and Covid-S; is that right?
Mr Sajid Javid: That’s correct.
Counsel Inquiry: So at the point when you came back in, there was a rhythm in terms of decision-making and those meetings?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: Now, just dealing if I may with the 8.30 am decision-making meetings, that’s the primary meeting as far as you are concerned which involved decision-making; is that right?
Mr Sajid Javid: It was the, probably the most important meeting of the day, and as it suggests every morning at 8.30 and certainly when I first became Health Secretary in June 2021 those were daily meetings, including most weekends.
Counsel Inquiry: And just to deal with those individuals that were in the room at that point, that’s the Prime Minister, other relevant ministers as and when needed, heads of the NHS, and the Chief Medical Officer, Chief Scientific Adviser, so a broad range of people?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes, yes, and a number of the Prime Minister’s advisers.
Counsel Inquiry: Indeed.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yep.
Counsel Inquiry: Just dealing with decision-making from the centre, can I just take you, please, to paragraph 43 of your witness statement at page 14.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: What you do say in relation to that is that a lot of the decisions made from the centre were made at the last minute because of lots of back and forth between the departments. So the consequences of that are really what I’m interested in.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: And what we see there is that that resulted in decisions being made shortly before they needed to be implemented which caused confusion and problems with effective communication to the public and to others.
Can you give us an example of that please?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes. So of course, my department, the Department of Health and Social Care, was overall responsible for health like many things with health, but especially during the pandemic, a number of the decisions that were being made, and I think in this paragraph I’ve used an example of travel restrictions, that other departments would have a huge involvement and in some cases they would be the lead on any potential travel restrictions.
And so an example would be when the Department of Health may have a view that, on travel restrictions, we had on testing, or certain countries – for example, there was a colour-coding of countries at the time – then that would be a view of the health department, but it would require a government decision, but in coming to that decision the view of the department transport would be very strong as well and strongly taken into account –
Counsel Inquiry: Ans would that decision be made with you initially and then changed subsequently?
Mr Sajid Javid: No, I wouldn’t go as far as saying the decision would be made with me. It would be the – I would have a view on that, and come – rather than a decision, I would describe it as a view or recommendation for the government, have a clear view, and that would be based on the advice that I was getting, the judgement call that I was making, and I would feed that view in probably formally through the Cabinet Office, there may be some informal discussions or actually at the 8.30 meeting, or maybe at the end of the 8.30 meeting with one or two of the people that were around the room.
And then there would be typically a formal meeting on that decision and that would be either a Covid-O or Covid-S, depending on the type of decision, and that would be led always by the Cabinet Office, and there would be ministers representing the relevant departments round the table or if it’s held virtually in that way, and then a decision would be made based on the discussion and also the paper that was provided for that meeting.
Counsel Inquiry: Thank you.
Mr Sajid Javid: And the paper would be provided by the Cabinet Office.
Counsel Inquiry: Thank you.
If I can now take you to Covid-O and Covid-S, you were not an attendee at Covid-O but you did attend Covid-S?
Mr Sajid Javid: That’s correct.
Counsel Inquiry: And you set out within your witness statement – I’m not going to take you through them, a number of different decisions and strands of work that you were involved in –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: – within Covid-S. A large number of them relate to vaccines and indeed a large part of your mandate at that time related to vaccines. You are aware that that will be the subject of a later module and so we are not going to deal with that today.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: But dealing with Covid-S, and we’ve heard a little bit about that already and the Covid Taskforce that was in place by this stage.
I just want to deal with some of the challenges that were faced within that environment and one of the ones that you raise in your statement is the late delivery of papers for meetings, agendas and supporting papers and submissions documentation.
You provide three reasons for that, the first of which is that it’s time-sensitive, and so unfortunately couldn’t be avoided?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: An issue arose, had to be dealt with.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: The second of those is leaks. You raise that as a significant issue.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: Now, you’ve sat on a number of other committees, decision-making fora, including the National Security Council. Has that ever been a problem previously in those situations?
Mr Sajid Javid: Not in the National Security Council apart from one well known instance, but other than that I think of all the – certainly of all the Cabinet committees that I was a member of, the National Security Council was the one again. Notwithstanding the one exception, that never leaked. And I think that would be for, you know, given the nature of the subject, the sensitivity, I think most people understand that, and clearly that was a good outcome that it didn’t leak.
Otherwise within government, if your question is: had I seen, you know, leaks of, you know, so many –
Counsel Inquiry: Had you experienced the same level of leaks before at any other point in your career?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes, during the Brexit negotiations and discussions in, when I was, especially when I was Home Secretary.
Counsel Inquiry: Thank you.
Then if I can deal with your third, the third reason, you explain – indeed, it’s within paragraph 45, and it’s here and pulled up on the screen –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: – in relation to that – that sometimes infrequently papers were only circulated shortly before the meeting in order to ensure that a particular option was chosen and/or to prevent other options being put forward –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: – effectively as a fait accompli.
Just dealing with that, can you give a brief example of when that arose in relation to the Covid response?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes. Again, I would probably draw on the example of travel restrictions. We had many meetings on which countries, for example, should be on the red list, the amber list, and so forth, or whether we should have, you know, PCR tests for people coming into the country or LFT tests and a discussion of that nature. And with those in particular I felt that there had been some sort of small group meeting excluding my department, you know, in advance and there had been some decision led by the centre on what the outcome should be, and that’s what the Cabinet Office would charge with making sure the outcome was.
And because it’s a collective decision of the committee that’s often the way that it went, because I might have a different view, and many of these meetings Jenny Harries might be presenting the health case or the CMO or other health experts, but I felt sometimes the decision was pre-determined.
Lady Hallett: Was there anything unusual in that, Mr Javid? I’ve chaired a number of committees and I’m often given pre-meeting briefings, and I often used to say, “So what is the advice you’re giving me that you think this committee, what decision do you think the committee should reach?” So there’s nothing unusual in there being a pre-meeting meeting.
Mr Sajid Javid: That there’s nothing unusual about that at all. I think it depends on, you know, what one believes should be the objectives of that meeting. So the pandemic, the issues were very fast-moving, very fast developing, and there may well be very relevant information that my department might have or indeed some other department that is very relevant to that discussion that hasn’t been taken into account because the pre-meeting just doesn’t have that information or perhaps they’ve not –
Lady Hallett: Sorry, that’s not my point. Forgive me, I didn’t make myself clear. I mean, when I was in this position and I’d have a pre-meeting briefing and I’d say, okay, so the advice that you think the decision I ought to take is X or the board out to take is X. And then I would go into the meeting and see what people said, but I relied on the strong members of the board to come up with the kind of information you had, even if I have been told what the preferred option was.
Mr Sajid Javid: That’s right. So in the examples that we’re discussing here, in these meetings there were Covid-S meetings, I would typically be at that meeting. I would make the case, you know, strongly on behalf of, you know, what I believe is right, what my department believes based on all the evidence is right, but sometimes I felt that no matter how strongly I made that case it just wasn’t going to – the decision had just already been made and it wasn’t fully going to be taken into account no matter how strongly I made that case.
Ms Cecil: Thank you.
Moving then, if I may, to other meetings and other relationships, you explain that you had a relationship with your counterpart in opposition?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: How would you describe that relationship? Did it work well?
Mr Sajid Javid: Very good and constructive. There were two counterparts I had during my time as Health Secretary and with both I would describe them as good and constructive.
Counsel Inquiry: In dealing with the relationships between your team and you and your department and the devolved administrations –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: – with specific respect to the Covid-19 response, you explain that you had weekly meetings. Was that something that you instituted?
Mr Sajid Javid: It was something I instituted as in, in a sense, that there were not weekly meetings planned when I arrived in the department. There were meetings, and I’m not sure how regular they were between the then Health Secretary and his counterparts in the devolved administrations, but I felt from day one that it’s really important to work together, to listen to each other, and not least because obviously, you know, I care about the United Kingdom but I also understood that England as an administration was making a lot of the key decisions that would affect other – the devolved administrations, such as on travel, we talked about, which is not devolved, the vaccine decisions, and I thought it was important to be working well together and where possible to co-ordinate, especially on vaccines, because I thought it was a huge issue of public confidence if we all were seen to work together in tandem and say the same thing.
Counsel Inquiry: Indeed. Within your – again, as I say, we’re not going to go into the issue of vaccines today, but within your statement you give an example of an occasion where there was potential divergence but worked together to ensure that one single joint message went out?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes, and we had all, even before I became Health Secretary, I think there was a general understanding to accept the advice of the JCVI, the expert committee that advise England and Wales on vaccines. So for the other devolved administration, Scotland and Northern Ireland voluntarily agreed to accept that but also to, when decisions were made by the JCVI to make sure that all the CMOs of the devolved administrations were aware of that and that when it went public that we did it at the same time.
Counsel Inquiry: Alongside those formal meetings there were also informal communications. You had a WhatsApp group –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: – effectively between the various health ministers?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes, and I felt – I did think there was an importance to that because I wanted the health ministers in the devolved administrations to know that they didn’t just have to wait for a sort of Thursday or Friday meeting when I typically had them, that they could contact me both formally through, you know, our respective offices but also if they had a question, they wanted to reach me, because things were so fast-moving, there were developments all the time, that they could contact me whenever they felt it was appropriate any time of the day, 24/7, I didn’t mind.
Counsel Inquiry: Now, you will have heard various things being said about the use of WhatsApp during the pandemic. Did you find that to be a useful tool or were there any disadvantages?
Mr Sajid Javid: I found it to be a useful tool. I mean, for the purposes of that type of communication, yes, obviously there will be other things that, you know, that would be not useful, but in general I found it a useful tool.
Counsel Inquiry: There was a point later in the pandemic in November when the Welsh Government and the Scottish Government called for a COBR and wrote a letter to the Prime Minister.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: You replied to that letter. There is no reference within the letter to a COBR subsequently taking place, but is it right that a COBR was convened as a consequence of those requests?
Mr Sajid Javid: I believe it was convened as a consequence of those requests, that’s correct.
Also, if I remember correctly, I think the First Ministers did not write to me, they wrote to the Prime Minister. I was asked to reply on behalf of the Prime Minister, which is not unusual, a department replying on behalf of the Prime Minister, and very soon a decision was made by the centre, because it’s always a prime ministerial decision to hold a COBR, to go ahead and have a COBR, which I believe, if I remember correctly, I think Michael Gove, the CDL at the time, chaired.
Counsel Inquiry: He did indeed and we will move to that when we look at some of the decision-making. It concerned Omicron.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: But it relation to that, was that the first COBR that had been convened since you took up office in June of 2021?
Mr Sajid Javid: Since I returned to government, I believe so.
Counsel Inquiry: Now, what I’d like to do now, Mr Javid, is turn to your role as Chancellor.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: And just have a look at how the situation developed in relation to Covid-19 through January and February from your perspective in the Treasury.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: It’s fair to say that your involvement was relatively limited because of your limited time within that position.
Mr Sajid Javid: That’s right.
Counsel Inquiry: But with regard to the COBRs that we’ve already heard about in late January and early February, is it right that you did not attend any of those?
Mr Sajid Javid: That’s right: I did not attend.
Counsel Inquiry: Can you recall if you were sent any notes of those at all?
Mr Sajid Javid: Notes … I … first of all, I didn’t attend, but that doesn’t mean to say the Treasury didn’t attend.
Counsel Inquiry: The Treasury were represented?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes. So if there was a COBR, I would expect there would always be a Treasury representation, and there may well also be a senior Treasury representation. And what I mean by that is that the Treasury is the only department that has two Cabinet ministers. So it could be the Chief Secretary attends, so it’s still very senior representation of the Treasury.
Also, it would be – I can’t think of a single instance, I think, where a Chancellor would attend a COBR that is not chaired by the Prime Minister. So I think those COBRs you are referring to were all chaired by the Health Secretary.
Counsel Inquiry: They were indeed and I’m going to move to that now in terms of why you did not attend.
You refer to, effectively, a convention and an informal rule in relation to COBRs that the more senior the individual in the chair, the more likely it is that other ministers will attend.
Now, at that time it was the Minister for Health and Social Care, and you at that point were the Chancellor. So you occupied one of the four great offices of state, so ranked effectively above him. Would that be the reason that you did not attend on that occasion?
Mr Sajid Javid: I don’t … I’m … it’s not the reason, as in if there was a – if there was still a good reason to attend, I would have attended, but it’s … the COBR when it had been called, typically what would happen is my department would be told, my private office would be told, and we would normally, based on the private office, would give advice based on who’s called – well, all departments would be called by the Prime Minister but who is attending. Basically, who is chairing the COBR. And they would have known it’s being chaired by the Secretary of State for Health, which would indicate that although because it’s a COBR it’s important because, you know, that’s what COBRs are for, that if it was even more important the Prime Minister would have chaired it, or perhaps if there were some particular, you know, unusual reason where the Prime Minister could not chair it – you know, for example, the fact that he’s travelling on some foreign business and the COBR had suddenly called – then there might well be a request for the Chancellor to attend. But there was no such request, as far as I’m aware, for the Chancellor to attend, and that would explain why, you know, other ministers in the Treasury would have attended.
Counsel Inquiry: Just dealing with that point in terms of when the Prime Minister chairs a COBR –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: – that in and of itself is a signal, isn’t it, across government?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: And COBR is an effective lever in that respect –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: – going back to those cross-government issues that you were talking about earlier?
Mr Sajid Javid: That is correct.
Counsel Inquiry: Now, dealing with the COBR and Covid update, you were provided with a short briefing on coronavirus on 24 January of 2020, and that’s INQ000328748. We see that here.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: It gives details of Professor Sir Chris Whitty’s update at the COBR meeting, effectively nothing really new aside from that that was already being reported in the news at that stage.
It just then goes on to discuss the triggers:
“… it will be the responsibility of the CMO to assess whether those points have been met … thought that the outbreak development will move fairly slowly, and it will take a few weeks before it is an issue here.”
As I say, this is 24 January.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: Of course, things changed much more rapidly than that and the first cases were notified on the 31st, less than a week later?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: It talks then about the other triggers for reassessment.
The next line down reads:
“The risk to the UK is low and is expected to remain low.”
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: What was your understanding of that? Did you understand the risk being low to mean as at that day or did you understand it in terms of the expected to remain low for the immediate future, short-term or intermediate term?
Mr Sajid Javid: I would have understood expected to remain low for the sort of in the sort of next few weeks, next couple of months it’s expected to remain low.
Counsel Inquiry: Indeed. Then the remainder of the update really deals with the response in terms of ports and what was taking place there, leafleting and so on?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: In respect to the Treasury’s focus at that time in relation to the potential pandemic, is it fair to say it was very much focused on the Chinese economy and any potential overspill in that regard in terms of global economy in the UK?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes. I would phrase it slightly differently, if I may.
Counsel Inquiry: Of course.
Mr Sajid Javid: It was considered – the Treasury was concerned about the impact on the UK economy.
Counsel Inquiry: Of course.
Mr Sajid Javid: You know, primarily the UK economy, because of what was happening in China, given the fact that China was the second largest economy in the world, and also as an open trading nation the UK would clearly be impacted by that.
Counsel Inquiry: Indeed. If I can just bring that up for one moment, it’s INQ000328752. This is a submission that you received on 5 January. It’s a briefing about the impact of Covid.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: As you identify, it predominantly focuses on the Chinese economy but in terms of its potential impact on the UK in that respect.
Bit is it reflective of how the threat was being viewed by government at that point, that any impact would be relatively limited and very much viewed through the impacts or trickle-down consequences of the impact on the Chinese economy?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes. So this is 4 February 2020 and, as you can see, this is a note to me from the Treasury team. And, as we’ve just referred, to I think it sort of is very much focused on the economic impact on the UK from a sort of China slowdown, perhaps international travel restrictions.
Your question, is this a fair reflection of the view of government, I think because it’s focused on the economy it’s more a view of the Treasury.
Counsel Inquiry: The Treasury.
Mr Sajid Javid: But the input into this in terms of the pandemic and the pathway – I guess it wasn’t even necessarily referred to as a pandemic then – but this new virus, would have come from the health department notwithstanding the Treasury itself does have scientific advisers as well.
Counsel Inquiry: You then sent a subsequent letter to the Prime Minister regarding the economic impacts of Covid-19.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: That again was sent in February of 2020?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: Setting out how effectively Her Majesty’s Treasury, as it was then, saw the key risk to the UK economy. At that stage we see here on the first page it’s a risk to global economy. If we can go to page 3, please, it sets out the potential risks to the UK economy.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: Effectively, if the impact – it deals firstly with:
“… the economic impact would be largely from a slowdown in China and could be in the range of 0.1-0.2 [percentage points]. However, the impact of an outbreak of Covid-19 on the UK economy is highly uncertain …”
It then goes on to explain it’s really – as you can see here, it predominantly focuses on supply chains and employment –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: – and timing work. Those are the areas on which it focuses. It then continues to set out the initial Treasury analysis and it bases it on a:
“… reasonable worst-case scenario of a UK pandemic flu outbreak [it explains] 50% of the UK workforce are infected … 2.5% mortality rate and a duration of four months … “
So, as I say, this is based –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: – so this is based very much on the UK pandemic in terms of a flu pandemic?
Mr Sajid Javid: That’s right.
Counsel Inquiry: It’s starkly different to what was eventually to eventuate?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: Sorry … with references to gross outputs and GDP, falling of 1.5 to 2% and of course as we know it was much more significant than that?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: And the pandemic lasting significantly longer than four months. Did you receive a response to this letter?
Mr Sajid Javid: I don’t recall a response to this letter.
Counsel Inquiry: In terms of the Treasury, at this point, and until your resignation –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: – is it right that you did not receive any advice about the impact of NPIs or a pandemic upon the UK economy in that respect – no modelling, no advice?
Mr Sajid Javid: Well, as you, Ms Cecil, you just referred to in this note, and this is on – I think this note would have been on the back of the advice which was on the piece of evidence you showed just before this, I think this is a repetition of those numbers that were in that note that was given to you by the Treasury, I think the assumption the Treasury made at the time was on a pandemic but based on flu.
So in terms of your question regarding NPIs, I don’t recall at this time, which was – would have been early February –
Counsel Inquiry: Indeed.
Mr Sajid Javid: – as I had left by the 13th, receiving or indeed asking for, to be fair, any kind of advice on, you know, NPIs, non-pharmaceutical interventions.
Counsel Inquiry: And indeed you do make that clear in your witness statement – it’s at paragraph 18 and 26 – that you didn’t see any modelling in respect of NPIs?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: Any economic plans in respect of the response or any discussion about vulnerable or at-risk groups or financial packages during your time as Chancellor?
Mr Sajid Javid: No.
Lady Hallett: Going back to you didn’t recall a response to this letter. Have I got it wrong, Mr Javid? It looks to me like a briefing by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Prime Minister.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Lady Hallett: And you weren’t expecting a response, you were providing information.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes. This would be possibly an unsolicited sort of note from me to the Prime Minister. I think that’s the most likely – I don’t think the Prime Minister had asked me for this. It was me, you know, setting it out to him. But I would – you’re right, my Lady, I would not necessarily have expected a response to that, certainly in writing. The most I might mention it to me at our next meeting but I wouldn’t have expected a formal response.
Lady Hallett: Or your private offices may have acknowledged it between them.
Mr Sajid Javid: That will certainly have happened.
Ms Cecil: And if that had happened you would never have been presumably any the wiser.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes, but I don’t think – I would need to be told that because there’s, you know, my private – one of the jobs of my private office was to try and keep me informed of what they thought was necessary.
Counsel Inquiry: Moving to another issue during this period, and that’s one of border controls, that was a particular concern of yours –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: – and continued to be a concern of yours throughout the pandemic, including later when you returned as Secretary of State for Health and Social Care?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: With respect to that, you had had a number of conversations starting from 31 January with the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care and the Foreign Secretary – so Matthew Hancock, Dominic Raab – about your concerns; is that right?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: You were told at that point that it was not an effective barrier, in short, unless other countries were doing the same?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah. If I may, just to expand on that a little bit.
Counsel Inquiry: Of course.
Mr Sajid Javid: What had happened was that – you can see from the evidence that you’ve shown, the kind of advice I was getting from the Treasury which, you know, by necessity was obviously economic focused and, you know, understandably.
I was also, you know, in terms of the broader sort of issues around the virus, the spread of the virus in China, to some other countries, just getting concerns, outside of my responsibility as Chancellor but just more as a member of the government, not just thinking as the Chancellor and I distinctly remember the weekend, and it would have been around the time, you showed me a piece of evidence there, I think it was 24 January which, if I’m not mistaken, was a Friday, so that weekend I had dinner with friends and – they had nothing to do with government, they were just friends but they were, obviously – you know, in government, as ministers, you’re constantly, you know, you know, you’re not interacting with the real world in the ways that you might want to. You’re constantly busy, I was walking, I was in my ministerial car.
So I was getting this information, really for the first time, from friends that were very concerned about the virus in China. One of them did a lot of business in China, and also one of them had a friend that was an epidemiologist, and he was expressing the concerns that had been expressed to him. So it just made me much more concerned that weekend.
That is why a few days later, I think on 31 January, when there was a Cabinet meeting – I believe a regional Cabinet meeting, so outside London – I got hold of Dominic Raab and Matt Hancock, brought them together at the sidelines of the Cabinet meeting and expressed my concern and said I’m really concerned about this virus what more can you tell me but especially I’m concerned about why are we not doing anything about our borders, and flights, in particular from China, because obviously we had so many flights.
I remember Dominic Raab quite rightly saying to me – at first he shared the concern, both of them did, but he also said, “That’s an unusual concern for a Chancellor to have, because I thought your team would be telling you not to stop flights” and I said, “Well, this isn’t about my team, this is just about what might be the right thing to do”. And then I said I wanted a meeting with the CMO. Up until that point, I’d never spoken to the CMO or anyone in the Health Department.
Counsel Inquiry: If I can bring you to that. You did receive advice, I’ll take that very shortly, if I may, from your department.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: And that advice was not to stop flights, partly because of the impact economically?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: And you described that as your officials were thinking it was also odd that you were asking about stopping flights?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: And could not understand why you were pushing it?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: And in respect of that, just stepping back for a moment and looking at the role of the Treasury –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: – you identify that you do have concerns in that respect with regard to how the Treasury sees that, because they are very much focused purely on the economics and the economy?
Mr Sajid Javid: That would be their primary concern, yes.
Counsel Inquiry: Indeed, of course.
One observation, and criticism that’s been made of the Treasury, is that it produced economic analysis when it suited their policy objectives and would not necessarily produce the counter-analysis or the counterargument or more broad analysis, economic in terms of the economy.
Is that something that accorded with your time there within Treasury?
Mr Sajid Javid: During my time at the Treasury, including my time as a junior minister in the Treasury as well, my view was if you wanted a sort of counter-analysis, a counter_narrative, you had to ask for it as a minister it would not be something that would automatically be presented to you if you’re faced with a policy decision.
Counsel Inquiry: Thank you. In terms of the way that it operates across government and feeds in those analyses, would it only do so when it was advancing a policy objective?
Mr Sajid Javid: When you say “it” do you mean the Treasury to government?
Counsel Inquiry: The Treasury, yes.
Mr Sajid Javid: Generally, yes.
Counsel Inquiry: Now, just going back to the chronology, you were explaining that you met then with the CMO, Professor Sir Chris Whitty. You had a conversation in relation to him but, again, you were provided with the same advice, that it was of limited use or utility in relation to stopping the pandemic; is that right?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes. I demanded a meeting with the health department and the key officials after I’d spoken to Matt Hancock and Dominic Raab. And that meeting, I wanted it asap, and I believe it took place then on 3 February. The ministers all of us and our civil servants we were physically in the meeting. It was in the Foreign Office –
Counsel Inquiry: If I can just draw you back to the specific advice that you were being provided with at that time.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: As I say, I just want to summarise it, if I may.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: The scientific advice was that it was not of great benefit effectively.
Mr Sajid Javid: That’s right. Sir Chris Whitty was on the phone and the advice was that having border restriction – having flight restrictions with China would have, you know, very little impact and so it wasn’t worth it.
Counsel Inquiry: Indeed, and you ultimately accepted that advice?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: You later were to raise concerns within the Treasury about possible wider economic impact of Covid-19 beyond the Chinese economy and import/export; is that right?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes, I believe so.
Counsel Inquiry: Then we come to a stage where on 13 February you resigned and that ceased your involvement then –
Mr Sajid Javid: That’s right.
Counsel Inquiry: – with regards to the Covid-19 response?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: At that stage, just taking again that part very briefly, if I may, you went to the backbenches?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: You very much took, and you explained with your statement, that you took the decision not to get involved with any of the groups that were being set up or in lobbying or anything of that nature.
Mr Sajid Javid: Ys.
Counsel Inquiry: And so was not involved with the government response until the following June of 2021?
Mr Sajid Javid: That’s right.
Counsel Inquiry: There was some communication between you and Matt Hancock in relation to borders in January of 2021. Do you recall that in terms of a WhatsApp conversation?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes, I think I do.
Counsel Inquiry: Again raising: why haven’t we closed the borders?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: You explain: it should be for all travellers, the benefits outweigh the costs. And the response that you get is: have you raised that with the boss, ie, the Prime Minister. You explain that you are doing lots of research on the pandemic generally.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: Did you ever raise that with the Prime Minister at that time?
Mr Sajid Javid: I don’t recall raising that with him, and I wasn’t in government.
Counsel Inquiry: Of course. Turning now –
Mr Sajid Javid: I’m sorry, if I may just add that I think it was to do with the Delta variant which was, I think, at that time very prevalent in South East Asia and we had a lot of flights in and out of South East Asia, that’s why I raised it. And also you slightly alluded to it, but I think it’s important is that although I was on the backbenches and not in government, one of the things I did take upon myself at that time was I became a senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy school and to do a research project and the reserve project was on the pandemic and broadly how countries in general at that time were responding to it and how they were taking different approaches, and I was trying to understand that and trying to think about that in the context of what the UK was doing.
So during that process I was doing a lot of research; I talked to a lot of people; I talked to ministers in other countries; I talked to, you know, epidemiologists and stuff. So my knowledge was based on that independent research that I was doing.
Counsel Inquiry: I now want to go on and deal with your time as the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, if I may.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: In June of 2021.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: Now, just so that we can just fix that in terms of the timing, the roadmap had been published earlier that year out of lockdown. Step 4 was due to take place on 14 June but had been delayed until 19 July. So it was within that period?
Mr Sajid Javid: That’s right.
Counsel Inquiry: Subsequent to that, on 14 September plan B was announced and then implemented on 8 December, and then face masks and so on came in on 10 December. So it’s that period that I’m now focusing on, if I may, and then moving into Omicron, the new variant that emerged in November of 2021.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: You came in, as I say, in June 2021, part-way through that roadmap. Your initial involvement, was it in discussions concerning the lifting of restrictions that were to come as part of –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes, when I arrived in the department, which I believe was 26 June 2021, the main discussion that was going on with respect to the pandemic within government was what’s the right time to move to step 4, you know, so the lifting of some of the restrictions.
Counsel Inquiry: At that point it had already been pushed back?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: And 19 July, was that a date that had been alighted upon?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes, and also another date that had been alighted upon was 12 July as a decision day.
Counsel Inquiry: Do you recall communications referring to it as “Freedom Day”?
Mr Sajid Javid: When you say communications, what do you mean, please?
Counsel Inquiry: Government communications, how it was being packaged.
Mr Sajid Javid: No, I do recall hearing references to July 19 as “Freedom Day”, but if your question is within sort of government documents and/or … no, I don’t.
Counsel Inquiry: Was it a government strategy in terms of outward-facing communications to your knowledge either within the DHSC or within Number 10?
Mr Sajid Javid: Not to call it “Freedom Day”. In fact, to the contrary, I recall it saying very clearly during the lead-up to July 19 that we must – we as in government – we must be clear that it is not “Freedom Day”. So it’s really important that whilst we remove some of the, you know, statutory, you know, restrictions, that people in general don’t feel that the pandemic’s over, everything’s back to normal, because far from it, the pandemic was still – you know, the virus was still very much around, and also there’s a bunch of other measures and restrictions that will stay in place: for example, around, you know, border control; the test, trace and isolate policy.
So it was really important, I think, to the contrary of “Freedom Day”, it was anything but “Freedom Day”.
Counsel Inquiry: In terms of your position and restrictions, at that point were you advocating for a loosening of restrictions?
Mr Sajid Javid: I was keen to see a loosening of restrictions if the evidence allowed it.
Counsel Inquiry: Did you consider that the evidence did allow it in summer 2021?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes, I did.
Counsel Inquiry: Do you recall – if I may just call up Patrick Vallance’s notes, please, INQ00273901, this relates to 30 June 2021, a meeting with Covid Dashboard. Page 613, thank you.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: “ONS shows big increase in numbers since last week, nearly a doubling. Rates are very clearly up in children.”
It continues on and we can see that Gavin Williamson, Secretary of State for Education is in the room, you’re also in the room. It records Gavin Williamson saying children shouldn’t be asked to do things adults aren’t but then has no knowledge of the ongoing study – that presumably is a study into transmission. It then continues:
“The Saj comes in.”
Is that a reference to you?
Mr Sajid Javid: I believe so.
Counsel Inquiry: “The study will only determine the policy for next term.”
So that’s school term, is it, that’s referenced there?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes. I believe so. I mean, obviously this is someone else’s diary entry but –
Counsel Inquiry: Of course.
Mr Sajid Javid: – I believe that’s what –
Counsel Inquiry: It records that you started to make policy on the hoof with you and the Saj and Williamson jostling for dominance and air time. Do you recall what this related to?
Mr Sajid Javid: I think it – so clearly this is Sir Patrick Vallance’s diary entries, as you said. It’s a sort of personal reflection by him about how he felt from this meeting. But I think what he’s referring to is a very live discussion at the time which was around the restrictions on school children and especially around, you know, the policy at the time of if one child got Covid in a class, the whole class was sent home –
Counsel Inquiry: Isolate.
Mr Sajid Javid: – and that was having a huge impact on schooling and ultimately the life chances of children. So it was a discussion about that.
The other thing, if I point out about this discussion, just I do get is relevant, it’s dated 30 June: I’d only been in position for four days.
Counsel Inquiry: Of course.
Mr Sajid Javid: So whatever information I had at the time, I’d had, you know, four days to sort of learn that, as it were, and obviously I’d learned a lot more in the coming days and weeks.
Counsel Inquiry: Can I just ask you about the last line. We see that Michael Gove also comes in and gets involved in the discussion?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah, yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: It appears that no decision as a consequence was made. I’m afraid we don’t know who says this, but somebody says afterwards they are “very worried about their new Secretary of State, never wants to learn before a decision, will rush into macho right-wing decisions playing to the audience.”
Does that characterisation from your perspective fit what you were doing at that point?
Mr Sajid Javid: No.
Counsel Inquiry: Thank you.
If I can then take you, please, to the discussions that were then going on in July – so again you’re very new in the job?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: 2 July 2021: it’s page 614, the same document, please. It’s a further meeting, and what we see in this meeting is a difference of views between the Prime Minister and the Chancellor and Michael Gove and you in relation to what should you be doing and the return to work. Mask wearing, effectively what NPIs should be put in place.
We see a more cautious approach –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: – being recorded in relation to yours and Michael Gove’s views and the Prime Minister and the Chancellor against that.
What we see here is in terms of the situation update: cases are up, hospital admissions are up, the Prime Minister is downbeat, talks of grim predictions. You say we are going to have to learn to live with it, and die with it says Prime Minister. Do you recall that conversation?
Mr Sajid Javid: I can recall me saying that, we are going to have to live with it. I – I don’t specifically recall the Prime Minister saying, “And die with it” but it’s possible.
Counsel Inquiry: Are they the type of words that the Prime Minister did use?
Mr Sajid Javid: It’s possible, yes.
Counsel Inquiry: You see then the Chancellor –
Mr Sajid Javid: It doesn’t mean – just if I may just on that, is that the Prime Minister in these meetings he often, you know, said things that it’s sometimes hard to tell between what he actually thought versus, you know, a joke or something, even when you’re discussing something as important as this, something to lighten the mood.
Counsel Inquiry: We see here the Chancellor is pushing very hard for the faster opening up and fuller opening up. At this point, the living with Covid strategy was still under development?
Lady Hallett: Pausing there, before that gets misreported, it’s not necessarily a reference by the then Prime Minister to lighten the mood; it could be taken in many ways. So I think we need to say that if it was said, which you don’t necessarily remember, it doesn’t mean it had that kind of intention.Things have got misreported, as you will appreciate, so I just want to make point. Sorry to interrupt.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes, thank you.
Ms Cecil: I just want to continue down, if I may.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: And it continues to record some further discussion about making masks voluntary; what will ministers say; they will do sometimes: I will, sometimes I won’t wear one?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: And we see later references to that also?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: “Are we going to encourage people to wear masks? Are we going to continue with this bollocks? It says he wants everyone back at work. We can’t have the bollocks of consulting with employees and trade unions. They all need to come back to work, all the malingering, work-shy people.”
And then goes on to ask or say:
“How much of the CS [presumably Civil Service] is back? How would you be able to tell?”
In terms of the consulting with employees and trade unions, was that something that the government was open to doing or did this, or was this the general attitude towards government in relation to trade unions?
Mr Sajid Javid: Other than the health trade unions, I wasn’t dealing with the trade unions, and I think this is probably a reference to the wider sort of group of trade unions, so I wouldn’t have been involved in that.
Counsel Inquiry: By the end of the meeting, what we have here is it ends by joking:
“Please record you’ve overcome my natural caution and bullied me into opening up.”
At that point it’s also recorded that the CMO and indeed Professor Sir Patrick Vallance have made the risks very clear. That’s in relation to rising numbers; is that right?
Mr Sajid Javid: I think that’s right, yes. And it also says here, if I may point out, it says basically it’s the PM and Chancellor against the more cautious Saj in that –
Counsel Inquiry: Indeed.
Mr Sajid Javid: I think the cautious point refers to something you you touched on earlier, Ms Cecil, which is that it wasn’t “Freedom Day” and restrictions were going to stay in place and it’s really important to get that message across.
Counsel Inquiry: Is it fair to say that at various points in thw autumn, so we move through that, you were also more cautious in terms of your advice?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes. Generally, that would be fair.
Counsel Inquiry: And lessening of restrictions in general terms, althoug there are some exceptions.
Counsel Inquiry: Yes?
Mr Sajid Javid: We move to 5 July, if I may, page 615. We see there it’s a Covid-O reference. Cases are still going up but Prime Minister wants a considerable package of freedoms. We see references to Gavin Williamson and schools. You come in to say the message is the pandemic is far from over. The link between cases and hospitalisation is weakened but not broken?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: What were your concerns at that point?
Mr Sajid Javid: Well, firstly, it’s something we referred to, my Lady, which is the pandemic was far from over, that it wasn’t “Freedom Day”. We still are in a pandemic and, yes, I felt that maybe for reasons we might come on to later that July, sort of leading into the summer, was the better time – there’s no perfect time – but was the better time to try opening up. So I strongly felt that and at the end I think we made the right set of decisions around opening up in the summer.
But what I wanted to get across was that people shouldn’t get this message that it’s over and we (must all remain cautious. Even if there’s no government restrictions, people should be advised to remain cautious. For example, if they’re meeting vulnerable people, if they’re meeting elderly relatives, going into a care home, things like that.
Also, there’s this point here about the link between cases in hospitalisation is weakened but not broken, I did say that a number of times around this time because, well, I meant it. There was some sort of sense amongst some people, I felt, within, you know, decision-making that the vaccines meant that hospitalisation won’t happen or there will be a lot less of it, and my fear was that, yes, the link is weaker, which is good in that there’s less of a link between infection and hospitalisation, but there was still a link and, as I say here, it wasn’t – we mustn’t pretend or think that there is no link any more. Clearly there was.
Counsel Inquiry: We see here that the Prime Minister refers to the decision to postpone – that’s step 4 presumably?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: – of the plan and it was postponed from June into July, so the right one because it gave us more time to vaccinate those that’s broken the link between cases and hospitalisations so is it fair to say that you had. Different views on that link at that point between –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes, I think I was very concerned about that link and I felt on the point – you, Ms Cecil, you just made about vaccination is at that time even a coule of weeks made a big difference in the the pace that vaccinations were going in terms of people are either getting their first vaccination or their second.
Counsel Inquiry: Indeed.
If I may just deal with one discrete point –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: – please the luncheon adjournment and it just deal with DHSC and the background to all of this. There were preparations, or certainly discussion about the winter, planning for winter of 2021; is that right?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes, yes.
Counsel Inquiry: As I say, I appreciate this is still very much within the infancy of your time as the minister.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: Were you aware of the Academy for Medical Sciences: Preparing for a Challenging Winter report that had been commissioned and circulated?
Mr Sajid Javid: You mean by 5 –
Counsel Inquiry: In July?
Mr Sajid Javid: I don’t recall it specifically, I don’t.
Counsel Inquiry: Do you recall whether or not DHSC were gearing up their plans for the winter?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes, they were.
Counsel Inquiry: They were. And when you say they were, do you know what they had done at that point?
Mr Sajid Javid: I would have probably – I think this would have been less than two weeks into my new job, but I’m sure I would have had a briefing already on where they had got to with their plans.
I do remember some concern around flu and the fact that the previous winter, you know, just gone in 2020 there was a lot more – less prevalence of flu because of the NPIs and I recall being told that there could be a real resurgence in flu around the winter because there was just less natural immunity around, and having a number of discussions around flu vaccinations in particular around that.
Counsel Inquiry: Were you aware of concerns from other people that DHSC weren’t gearing up in that way in terms of operational accountability and with regard to a clear strategic plan?
Mr Sajid Javid: No, I can’t say I was.
Counsel Inquiry: If I can just call up, please, page 489, the same document. What we have here is a note from Sir Patrick Vallance again, in relation to DHSC, so the actual department:
“It is clear once again DHSC has done nothing, goes on to have a meeting with Gove, policy meeting trying to look at risks for winter. No one had looked at the AMS report [that’s the Academy for Medical Sciences: Preparing for a Challenging Winter report or another report} it was just with people just lobbing in. No clear operational accountability.”
Was that your experience of DHSC when you entered it from that June/July period?
Mr Sajid Javid: No, not at all.
Counsel Inquiry: In terms of the performance of DHSC, how would you assess that at that period in time?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes. So obviously I can only assess it for the time I was there –
Counsel Inquiry: Of course.
Mr Sajid Javid: – but in my experience I felt the organisation, the key people obviously that I was dealing with on a daily basis within it were very professional, very committed, incredibly hard-working, and I would actually go as far as to say amongst some of the best civil servants that I’ve worked with, including the expert advisers.
I think – I thought at the time, I still do, that the permanent secretary at the DHSC was exceptional in his abilities and were most civil servants htat I dealt with, including a UKHSA. I mean, I was impressed and I can – I think that means more when you’ve got, when one has more to compare it to and I had worked in or ran five departments before I arrived at DHSC and I can make a proper comparison to other departments, and I think it was very professionally run, but they had a lot on their plate.
Ms Cecil: Thank you.
My Lady, now may be an appropriate moment.
Lady Hallett: Certainly.
I’m sorry that we can’t finish you before lunch, Mr Javid.
The Witness: No, not at all.
Lady Hallett: But we will definitely finish you today, because we have another witness coming this afternoon.
Mr Sajid Javid: Thank you.
The President: I shall return at2 o’clock.
The Witness: Thank you.
(1.03 pm)
(The short adjournment)
(2.00 pm)
Lady Hallett: Sorry if everyone is getting very hot, I’m afraid it’s my fault, I was getting very cold.
Ms Cecil: It’s warmer now.
Mr Javid, we were dealing with the position in summer of 2021. I just want to ask you about a discrete topic that arose at that time. At that stage a high prevalence strategy, high prevalence of Covid-19 infection, was being considered and pursued; is that right?
Mr Sajid Javid: I’m not sure exactly what you mean by a “high prevalence strategy”.
Counsel Inquiry: If I can assist, on 20 July a paper –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: – was presented to the Covid-O group, that’s entitled “High prevalence planning: summer response”, and that sets out effectively moving through the major cross-departmental risks of high prevalence. So this is the policy that’s in place in the summer. NPIs have been relaxed at this stage, plan B yet to come, and so it’s effectively living with a higher incidence of Covid-19.
My question in relation to that aspect is that various patient representative groups, Long Covid SOS, Long Covid Support, Long Covid Kids, had written letters to you outlining concern about the move to step 4 at that point, slightly earlier in the pandemic. They complained and made representations to you that Long Covid was being ignored in those policy-making decisions in relation to high prevalence strategy moving forward, it was barely mentioned in the roadmap out of lockdown, and they asked that that be considered in policy. You may recall also that they were participants in Cabinet Office discussions and cross-Whitehall groups at the time, there were roundtables, and we’ve heard a little bit about those already, so I’m not going to go there in any detail.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: But given at that stage that there were no pharmaceutical interventions, indeed to a large extent remains the position now, to treat Long Covid, was there a conscious decision to accept the increased incidence of cases of Long Covid arising from that corresponding increase in infection from Covid-19?
Mr Sajid Javid: I think that the – it was well understood that, as we start removing the NPIs, albeit keep some of them in place, but start removing a large number of the NPIs, that I think what the words “high prevalence” then referred to is there would be at least for some period an increase in the number of infections. I think that was understood.
And then to the – addressing your point, Ms Cecil, round Long Covid, it would mean – you know, given the – you know, to get Long Covid you have to be infected in the first place – that as infections rise there would be a rise – no one I think at the time knew to what extent perhaps, but there would be a rise in Long Covid, at least had to be considered.
Counsel Inquiry: To what extent was that factor taken into account when reaching those policies?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: Relaxing restrictions, not maintaining testing and various other –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah, my view is that I think overall it was taken into account in – for a couple of reasons.
First I’d say that it was well understood, certainly by me and, I think, you know, the key people making the decisions, including the Prime Minister and his office, that having NPIs in place were not a risk-free option. Within – there were costs that come with NPIs.
So, for example, obviously I was concerned about health more than anything else, and obviously top of that list for me was the virus and the pandemic, but there were also associated health factors linked directly to the pandemic in terms of, for example, you know, mental health issues, the fact that people were not able to go to the NHS, for instance, in the normal way to see other sort of – other health challenges dealt with. So I had broader health concerns.
But also within Cabinet, so more broadly within government, there were understandably, you know, you referred to, in our earlier session, for example, some of the concerns around education and children, there were concerns around people being able to sort of go to work in the normal way, there were concerns with other departments, in fact every department would have some issue, we were talking about the transport department. So what the government was trying to do was to take a balanced approach to all of this, but on the basis that the NPIs couldn’t exist – should not exist a moment longer than they are necessary, and if the evidence supported it we had to find a time to remove the NPIs.
If I may add, one thing I distinctly remember at the time, and it came up in a number of discussions with the advice that I was receiving and I’m sure the Prime Minister was receiving from the CMO, the CSA and others, was that when we asked about, you know, the timing of removing these NPIs, and does it – what do they think and does it make sense, one thing that was said a number of times is that there’s no perfect time to remove NPIs, there never will be, but if you are going to do this and consider it, it’s much better to do it in the summer, because the virus likes the winter, people are more likely indoors in winter, you know, new variants have typically appeared in the winter, although, you know, we couldn’t be sure about it of course, and children were off school in the summer. So summer was a better time versus winter to do it. And if you don’t do it in the summer, remove some of the NPIs, then you are likely left with those NPIs going into the winter, then it’s too late, and therefore you have this really extended period of NPIs, and then all the costs that come with that as well.
So those are all the sort of factors – in a sense the factors that went into making that decision in July 2021.
Counsel Inquiry: Just picking up on that, that was when the vaccine roll-out was also going to be taking –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: – was continuing to be –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah –
Counsel Inquiry: – throughout that period –
(unclear: multiple speakers)
Mr Sajid Javid: – at a very strong pace.
Counsel Inquiry: Yeah. So in terms of a policy decision, was it considered that that was a trade-off worth making when taking into account those other issues that you’ve identified, whether it be schools, mental health and so on?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah, it – yes, in that – I would just add, broaden that a bit, you know, to govern is to choose, and ministers are always making trade-offs. Every decision pretty much I ever made as a minister is a trade-off, and this is a decision that was made for the reasons I just articulated, but it’s important that we had – obviously the – what we had then were the – unlike the previous summer, the year before, we had a vaccine, millions of people were getting vaccinated, many of them now turning up for their second vaccine, we had a lot more treatments, because – I understand what you said, and you were quite right, Ms Cecil, about treatment, I think you said specifically for Long Covid, it was still very much early days of the virus then in it, so I think it was hard to make a determination around the long-term impact of infection when we were – only had the sort of short-term experience at that time. But there was a lot more testing, there was a lateral flow testing, there were the test, trace and isolate rules and the international border rules, so it was, yes, a number of NPIs being removed but also a number of sort of protections and precautions were being kept in place as well.
Counsel Inquiry: May I ask you one final question in relation to Long Covid, and given that that was the choice taken –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: – why was there not at the same time a public awareness campaign warning people of the specific risks specifically of Long Covid, so that people were aware that albeit they may not have a severe reaction to the infection, for example people in low-risk groups for the actual Covid infection itself, may nonetheless still contract Long Covid?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah, I think that – I mean, certainly from the – the Health Department and also, if I recall, many of the things I was saying at the time, including on – but not just in Parliament, but in media appearances, Long Covid was something I was very much aware of and very concerned about. So, for example, during that summer or round about that summer there were a number of decisions that I made around Long Covid to, for example, to increase the funding available for research, I think it was £30 million, I increased it to £50 million –
Counsel Inquiry: If I can just pause you there, though. The question I’m asking is specifically about a public health communications strategy, a campaign so that people were aware of the potential risks of contracting Long Covid and so that they could take their own precautions if they so chose to.
Was any thought given to that, to a public campaign?
Mr Sajid Javid: I don’t – so if you ask me do I recall specifically a discussion around a campaign on Long Covid, I don’t. I recall many discussions that included issues and concerns around Long Covid, you know, specifically, and that is why, you know, for example I increased the research spending, I increased the number of –
Counsel Inquiry: As I say, I understand that, Mr Javid.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: My question really is very much focused, and I think you’ve answered it, the short answer is no.
Mr Sajid Javid: Not a – I don’t remember thought being given to a specific campaign.
Counsel Inquiry: Thank you.
Then if I can move on through the time, obviously there came a time when the Omicron variant was discovered?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: First identified in November 2021, South Africa, and then of course you were updated in your role by the Chief Medical Officer and others?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: Just dealing with that for a moment and moving through that, at that stage, the advice was that it was highly infectious?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: It was unclear if the vaccines would work for this particular variant?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: But at that stage severity was unknown –
Mr Sajid Javid: That’s correct.
Counsel Inquiry: – in terms of morbidity and mortality?
If I can just call up Sir Patrick Vallance’s notes at page 529 for a moment, please, I just want to deal with some of the discussions that were taking place in late November 2021.
NERVTAG and SAGE have met and discussed the position, this is 26 November, he records:
“How bad is this? We don’t know. JVT [Jonathan Van-Tam] says he has never seen NERVTAG so rattled. We need a policy …”
Continues onwards:
“… No 10 meeting PM very down about new Variant. Exasperated. Afterwards, No 10 says they are at war with No 11 …”
If I can just ask you about that very briefly. Were you aware of any concerns at that point, issues between Number 10 and Number 11 with regard to Covid?
Mr Sajid Javid: Not specifically. On most things my experience was that Number 10 and Number 11 at that time moved together.
Counsel Inquiry: Thank you.
Separately, if we carry on:
“… [and] that anything Javid says they assume is wrong.”
What was your relationship like at that point with Number 10?
Mr Sajid Javid: It was getting testy, because of Omicron. And that – as you say, this is dated – so 26 November. My first – so things were moving very fast. My first briefing I received on Omicron, full briefing, was on 24 November, and I was very concerned by what I had heard and what the experts had told me. Just to pick up a point, Ms Cecil, you said on the vaccines, it wasn’t – so, as you said, they said it was much, much more infectious, from the evidence they had at the time, and clearly that turned out to be the case, so much more infectious. And also what was in my mind then was that I knew that each new variant had – you know, so when we had Alpha, Beta, Delta, they had been much more infectious than the other, and now this was much more infectious than Delta, which was already highly infectious, I was deeply concerned about that. But also, with regard to the vaccines, what I was told was that – not that the vaccines didn’t work, they may not work, because they’re – they may well be much less effective – ##: Effective.
Mr Sajid Javid: Right? So their effectiveness would be much less. And even a sort of a 5 percentage point decline would be significant if you’ve got a lot more infections. And then the point about severity is that we couldn’t be sure on the severity – is it less, more? – at the time there was no data. So I was deeply concerned, especially about the infectiousness, and I wanted us to take action and – some action, and take it ASAP. And – and I did start to take action straightaway: I think the next day I started – I announced some travel restrictions, I made a statement in Parliament on the 26th, and –
Counsel Inquiry: I’m just going to interrupt you there, Mr Javid, because we are going to move through some key moments.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: But there are some structural issues that I just want to deal with in relation to Omicron, and of course we have your witness statement which sets out the chronology.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: So just to very quickly summarise, throughout that November, December period, SAGE’s advice was that the infection rate was rising rapidly?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: And with regard to that they were advising that certain actions potentially be considered to be taken.
You were, as I understand it from your witness statement, in terms of some of those frictions that were arising, were certainly more on the cautious side and wanted some additional restrictions put into place because of your concerns about Omicron; is that right?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: Now, if I can just go through, so on 8 December plan B is announced –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: – is implemented, comes into force I think on 10 December?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: If I can just call up some meetings very quickly now, at page 555, please, of Patrick Vallance’s dairies, there is a meeting on 18 December of 2021, and that records that you were not invited to the meeting yesterday – I’m afraid it must be a subsequent …
But at any event, what it records is that you were not invited, and indeed what we see again on 31 December of 2021 is a similar meeting taking place with discussions about plan B, discussions about what to do, in fact – and indeed in relation to your advice also. But again it’s recorded it’s “bizarre to have this meeting without [the Secretary of State for the Department of Health and Social Care]”.
Were you aware of these meetings taking place at the time?
Mr Sajid Javid: No.
Counsel Inquiry: No. When did you first find out about them?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yesterday, when I saw this extract.
Counsel Inquiry: Why do you consider that you were not invited and present at that –
Mr Sajid Javid: Well, look, I – I can’t be sure, because obviously – you know, there was decisions for others. One thing I can tell you, it would be odd to – you know, these – obviously I don’t know about this meeting, I wasn’t there, but it sounds like just from this extract, and I can only go on that, it sounds like it’s an important meeting, there’s very senior people there, and they’re obviously discussing Omicron, the Omicron crisis, and my central job and role was to respond to that, and that was – so I was spending basically every minute of the day doing around that time, and not to have my input and therefore the input of my department, and that includes obviously not just obviously the UKHSA, the CMO, but the NHS. The NHS was huge factor in this, we would not want to see our hospitals overwhelmed. So I don’t know why I would – I wasn’t included. You’d have to ask the former Prime Minister.
Counsel Inquiry: Again, at the same time –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: – the advice that you are giving, your views at the time, certainly on 24 December, for example, is “We need to prepare for a massive increase in cases but hope it doesn’t happen”?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: Obviously. So planning and preparation.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: The Prime Minister is then recorded as concluding that there is no overwhelming case for doing anything.
In relation to planning and preparation, in the event that there was a subsequent wave, aside from vaccines and your role in terms of the NHS, were you aware of any other planning taking place at that point?
Mr Sajid Javid: You mean, what, outside my department?
Counsel Inquiry: Outside of your department and considering the use of NPIs or any other measures?
Mr Sajid Javid: I was not aware, no. I mean, I had – I wasn’t aware of any other planning taking place, to answer your question specifically but in a bit more detail on the – you know, we had already – so I know you – we started with a plan B, which was implemented, I think, on November 8th, but on 29 November, so that’s within days of me learning about Omicron, I’d already announced in Parliament a set of, you know, NPIs around, you know, PRC tests coming in, ten-day isolation rules for contacts and that – face masks in shops and –
Counsel Inquiry: I appreciate that, Mr Javid.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: We’re talking about what you were advising on
(unclear: multiple speakers)
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah, and by then – by then, having learnt a lot more about Omicron, my advice was to look at further – taking further measures, the advice that had come from me and my department based on the expert advice I was getting. And there was a Cabinet meeting, I can’t be sure, I want to say 20 December, where there was a – the Prime Minister – aware that I wanted to go further – wanted to seek the Cabinet’s view, and when we had that meeting, I recall the only people in the Cabinet that were supporting what I was saying about going further were Michael Gove and Simon Clarke.
Counsel Inquiry: Thank you.
I want to turn to another topic, which really is coming out the other side, effectively, and dealing with the Living with Covid strategy.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: So going into now 2022 –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: – just very briefly, you set out within your statement in some detail that there was a disagreement with Treasury in relation to and funding an apparatus, effectively the tools, as you see them, in relation to a pandemic, particularly in respect of infrastructure December – and testing, scientific research and so on. And you considered that funding ought to be maintained.
What you state in your statement is that the – is that as a consequence of that, they – the Prime Minister required further cuts to the Health budget if that infrastructure was to take place, to stay in place; is that right?
Mr Sajid Javid: That’s correct.
Counsel Inquiry: Did any of that infrastructure ultimately end up staying in place?
Mr Sajid Javid: Not to the extent I wanted it, so, you know, I was, I was – you know, like the Prime Minister, I was keen that we find, clearly, a way to live with Covid. We had, you know, we were – Omicron wasn’t over but I think that by the time we were putting together the Living with Covid strategy, clearly, you know, both infections, hospitalisations and – and deaths, that had all started significantly falling. The booster campaign, which I spent a lot of my time on, I know we’re not talking about vaccines but it made a huge difference by that time, so it is significant in this decision-making in that I think within six, seven weeks we had something like 30 million people boosted which was faster than any other country of comparable size. But on this specific issue I felt that as we now remove a lot of the restrictions, which I was keen to do, that we must have a capability in place for – to detect any future variant or perhaps even a future virus with a new pandemic, but to have better surveillance and also to be able to surge, you know, support and protection very quickly.
So I wanted a thing – I wanted more lab capacity, more scientific capability, some random testing, to keep some of the mobile testing units, I wanted to continue some of the waste water testing, and a stockpile of lateral flow tests, for example. So these were the kind of things I wanted.
I was only able, in the end, to secure a small portion of all of that, and also, for example, I wanted to keep the government’s commitment to the centre for pandemic preparedness –
Counsel Inquiry: I was going to come on to that in due course. That was announced, there would be this centre for pandemic preparedness?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: And what happened to that, in short?
Mr Sajid Javid: That was announced before I was Health Secretary, I believe it was when the UK was hosting the G7 in Cornwall, so I think that would have been December 2020, if I’m not mistaken, but around then, and – and the UK had made this commitment, rightly to have this, you know, as it sounds, a centre for pandemic preparedness, where it would just focus on nothing but pandemic preparedness, working with UKHSA and others, and I thought it was vital for in terms of lessons learned.
Counsel Inquiry: Indeed.
Mr Sajid Javid: And I pointed out to the Prime Minister at the time and his team that we are not going to be able to have this because there is no funding for it. Indeed, the funding that was offered for UKHSA was the same as what it was funded per annum pre-pandemic.
Counsel Inquiry: Indeed. If I can just take you back, though, to the centre for pandemic preparedness.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: In terms of that –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: – did the Prime Minister continue with that plan or did he abandon it?
Mr Sajid Javid: No, he dropped the plan, and he decided we’re not going to have it, let’s drop it, and – but he asked me not to say anything about it publicly and – you know, “Let’s just wait and see if people notice”, was his attitude.
Counsel Inquiry: So, “Let’s stay quiet and hope it disappears”?
Mr Sajid Javid: Well, “Let’s stay quiet about dropping the centre for pandemic preparedness”.
Counsel Inquiry: Final topic, Mr Javid, very briefly, you’ve covered it in quite some detail in your witness statement –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: – and that’s why I say I’m going to touch upon it very briefly, if I may, and that’s that of inequalities and health disparities, and within your statement it speaks of a number of different initiatives that you undertook in your role as Secretary of State throughout that pandemic period –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: – one of which was a review into inequalities in respect of the efficacy of medical equipment on the grounds of race, looking particularly at oximetry, the use of oximeters and so on and so forth.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: That consultation ran between August 2022 and October 2022, has that been published?
Mr Sajid Javid: My understanding, it has not been published.
Counsel Inquiry: Just dealing, again very briefly, in terms of future recommendations, what do you think could and should be implemented to improve equity for future pandemics in respect of health?
Mr Sajid Javid: So by – could I just being clear, when you say equity, do you mean sort of –
Counsel Inquiry: To address –
Mr Sajid Javid: – of disparities –
Counsel Inquiry: Indeed, to address those disparities that arise in a pandemic.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah. I think a lot – a lot can be done, and the pandemic clearly, sadly, hit people from deprived communities more. It was very unequal in how it affected people. You know, by and large, people that were sort of working people were hurt a lot harder than middle class people that could put themselves in their homes and order their food and things like that in lockdowns. And I – and that is, not surprisingly – my opinion, that’s not unique in terms of health disparities. Typically people living in deprived areas and neighbourhoods and things are hit a lot harder.
Counsel Inquiry: We’ve heard a lot of evidence about that, Mr Javid, already.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah. And so – so that was – so you’ve – answered your question what could be done. I thought it required – the whole approach required a cross-government strategy, because it’s not just the Health Department that can deal with these issues, and that is why I, within months of arriving at the department – because this issue was so important to me, I commissioned a White Paper to – development of a White Paper on health disparities, and I even took the – one part of PHE that was split was the – was called OHP, the Office for Health Improvement, and I changed it’s remit to the Office for Health Improvement and Disparities, but the White Paper was a cross-government piece of work that my department did. And it’s an extensive piece of work. We talked to every other department in government, a lot of arm’s lengths bodies, civil society bodies, put together really detailed analysis of what could be done to combat health disparities. And by the time I left the department I would say it was 99.9% done, it was virtually done, we were just looking for a slot for publication, but it was never published.
Counsel Inquiry: Thank you.
Just one, and hopefully this can be answered very briefly –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Counsel Inquiry: – in short, one potential possibility or solution as has been suggested is the creation of an Equality Department with a Secretary of State for Equalities, leading on that cross-governmentally. Is that something you could see working or not?
Mr Sajid Javid: No, I don’t know whether it requires its own department. There is of course as a – an Equalities Minister, I was for a short time the Equalities Minister as well, but I do think it needs a specific focus and a dedicated minister. So when I was Equalities Minister I was also the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport and I think it would have been better to have a dedicated minister to that role.
If there is one more thing I may say, Ms Cecil, just on equalities, is – health equalities generally but specifically in pandemics, you referred to the pulse oximeters and that is something I’d read about, I knew about before I was Health Secretary. I was deeply concerned about it, that’s why I commissioned the independent review by Dame Margaret Whitehead, the one that still hasn’t been published for some reason, into looking into medical instruments and their – and how they work on people of all races, and actually in both genders as well, all genders. And one thing I wanted to pursue, that I discussed with my counterpart in the United States at the time, was that I felt that if the UK and the US had a new set of rules for procurement of any medical instrument, to require that it must be demonstrated that it works for all races and it has been something the manufacturer has actually thought about. Then between the UK and US, with the US’s purchasing power, our procurement power as well, all – effectively all manufacturers of this equipment globally would start to follow this new standard. So I was – but before I could do that I wanted this independent inquiry to see if the evidence backed all this up.
And so I do think there are things like that that could be done that would make a huge difference, because I was really taken back by some of the things I learned as Health Secretary. For example, that I think around a third of people in ICU units in 2020 with Covid, so the most affected, the most seriously ill, were from ethnic minority backgrounds, which was hugely disproportionate to the – you know, people from ethnic minority backgrounds in the general population. And I think that medical instruments, amongst many other things, had a big issue – role to play in that.
Counsel Inquiry: Thank you, Mr Javid. And as you will be aware, there will be a further module that, no doubt, will be looking at those matters in due course.
Mr Sajid Javid: Thank you.
Ms Cecil: My Lady, that concludes my questions.
Questions From the Chair
Lady Hallett: Just before we go to Ms Heaven, could I just ask: by the sounds of it, Mr Javid, one of the lessons to be learned is to resurrect your idea of a centre for pandemic preparedness?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes. Well, it wasn’t my idea, it was the Prime Minister’s idea, I happened to agree with it.
Lady Hallett: Right. Any other lessons to be learned?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes. I think there will be many lessons to be learned. I think that in terms of cross-government working, I think there can definitely be improvements in that. We touched on it in this evidence session, I hope, in a couple of examples. But I think there needs to be, you know, better systems put in place to get all government departments working for – when you have a single goal.
And I’ve seen where it can work. You know, when I was the Communities Secretary, I was determined to do something about rough sleeping. We had a cross-government group and it was – it had Prime Ministerial involvement and it could get done. So I think that can happen.
And then one final point I’d make – when, my Lady, you asked me that question it comes to mind – is NHS capacity and NHS capability. As you know, my Lady, a number of countries they took different approaches, there were a lot of similarities, but I think in responding to a pandemic that your available health capacity has a big – you know, is a big determinant of how you respond to the pandemic.
We don’t have many beds per head in the UK, in England, for example, it’s less than – it’s around 100,000. If you look at countries like Germany, France, other comparable countries, you know, they have more than double, triple, sometimes quadruple the number of beds that we have got. Similar for ventilator units, ICU units, doctors and nurses per head.
And I think capacity of the NHS is an issue, and this has been a long-running issue under successive governments, and I think the NHS model needs to be looked at, and I’ve talked publicly about this, and I think we should have a Royal commission on it and try to get, you know, government’s political agreement object a new way to provide the NHS with the resources it needs but I think NHS capacity is absolutely key to dealing with the next pandemic.
Lady Hallett: Thank you very much.
Ms Heaven.
I don’t know if you can see Ms Heaven round the pillar? Can you –
The Witness: Yes, I can.
Questions From Ms Heaven
Ms Heaven: Good afternoon, Mr Javid, I’m over here.
Mr Sajid Javid: Hello.
Ms Heaven: I represent the Covid-19 Bereaved Families for Justice Cymru, and I have three very short topics.
So the first topic is going back to those weekly meetings that you set up when you came into post in June 2021, and it’s a very discrete issue.
Can I ask: was advance notice given for these meetings by way of an agenda, do you recall? And if so, how long in advance?
Mr Sajid Javid: May I just ask, which weekly meeting are you referring to?
Ms Heaven: This is your witness statement, paragraph 77 –
(unclear: multiple speakers)
Lady Hallett: With the devolved nations.
Mr Sajid Javid: Oh, with the devolved nations?
Ms Heaven: Yes, sorry. I thought it was obvious. Just to be clear, I represent the Welsh Bereaved, so I am asking now about issues touching on the devolved administrations.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Ms Heaven: There was a weekly meeting, with the DAs, you said this was not something your predecessor did on a regular basis.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Ms Heaven: And what I would like to know is: do you recollect whether there was advance notice in the form of an agenda for these meetings, regularly, and if so how long in advance would that have been provided?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah, there was – generally there was advance notice, and I think at my very first meeting I said to my counterparts that we would have meetings on a weekly basis, and I’d said that I’d try to do those every Friday around 5 o’clock, if I can’t do it on a Friday I’d do it at the same time on a Thursday. But we did agree that because things were very fast-moving something might come up that doesn’t allow the meeting to take place at the exact time, so during the week leading up to that, you know, the Thursday/Friday, the timing of it would be confirmed.
For these meetings we would have an agenda and I would – I would obviously – my department would input into that agenda but so would the devolved administrations and they would give me, you know, very sensibly advance notice of things that they may wish to raise in that meeting. And then also, finally, in every meeting we would have, basically, “any other business” and so if there’s something that someone wanted to bring up, again because things were fast-moving, we could discuss those towards the end of the meeting.
Ms Heaven: Thank you very much.
Second topic is public health messaging and concerns around the unified approach with the devolved administrations.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Ms Heaven: And it’s just really to say to what extent you might be able to assist with this, appreciating when you came into post.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Ms Heaven: You have explained this morning that you recognised the importance, where possible, of co-ordinating with the devolved administrations, and I think as you said, in your words, you’d recognised at least that there were huge issues of public confidence, if we can all be seen to be working together?
Mr Sajid Javid: That’s right.
Ms Heaven: You may be aware that there have been concerns raised before this Inquiry, in part in writing, by the First Ministers for the devolved administrations, and one of the concerns relates to a lack of clarity in public health messaging by the UK Government about the geographical application of their decisions. And I think it’s probably fair to say that lots of these concerns were largely being raised during the time of your predecessor, but there is one document I would like to ask you about.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Ms Heaven: If we can pull it up, it’s a COBR meeting of 10 December 2021.
And it’s INQ000083854 – and there we have it on screen.
Can you see it there?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Ms Heaven: So we can see 10 December 2021, 3 o’clock, and you’re present there, and you can see also, can’t you, Mr Drakeford, Nicola Sturgeon and Michelle O’Neill from the devolved administrations?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Ms Heaven: I want to ask you about page 5, please, so if we scroll down, and it’s paragraph 17 onwards. I’ll read it out. Here we have a contribution from the director of communications, and:
“[They] said they were adopting an aligned approach where possible to ensure messaging across the UK responded to the emerging picture. That communications teams across the UK needed to accurately reflect policy changes by each nation.”
Then it goes on about the cross autumn UK issues?
Then just for completeness, at paragraph 18, over the page, you see an intervention from yourself where you are stating:
“… it was important to work together on the response to Omicron … consistency across the four nations was important …”
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Ms Heaven: What I want you to focus on though is paragraph 17 and those words in the middle:
“That communications teams across the UK needed to accurately reflect policy changes by each nation.”
Just thinking about that now, do you understand that to be a reference to this issue that I just asked you about a moment ago, so the territorial scope of policies not always being adequately explained in government communications from UK Government, and that being there a reminder, certainly in December 2021, that that needed to be improved?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes, I think this is really calling for it to be improved, and I think what that is getting at, at least my understanding of it, is that many of the responses to the pandemic, particularly the NPIs, were devolved. And, you know, whether it was Wales or Scotland for that matter, I think they might have a different set of NPIs, and that certainly was the case during Omicron, certainly for most of that period, and it was important, I think, to respect that there might be differences of approach but that they were – there was co-ordination in communicating that because otherwise it might be very confusing to the public.
Ms Heaven: And do you recognise that concern that I’ve just suggested to you about –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Ms Heaven: – the geographical reach of decisions not always being made clear –
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Ms Heaven: – by UK Government?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yes.
Ms Heaven: Final topic, then, I’m moving forward to the end of 2021, and here we – early 2022 and it’s discussions on international travel with the devolved administrations. I’m not so much interested in your views on this topic, it’s more really the process for engaging the DAs on this important issue.
So the context is, there came a point when we see differences emerging between the nations in relation to international travel, for example Mr Drakeford, First Minister for Wales and on behalf of Wales, was advocating at this time, we understand, a more precautionary approach to the UK Government opening up borders, and we have, I won’t bring them up, a series of letters Mr Drakeford writes to the Prime Minister and it’s responded to by Grant Shapps, and this is early January 2022, and I think you’re copied in but you’re not the one responding to be clear.
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah.
Ms Heaven: So here we have very sensitive discussions and indeed disagreement between the UK Government and the Welsh Government about the important matter of international travel and control of borders and it’s taking place in writing.
Now, it might be suggested that it’s surprising to see such important matters being discussed in this way in writing, and of course we know at this time the JMC system wasn’t operating, we know that there were significant periods of time, I think perhaps before you came into post, that COBR hadn’t met, and we know that concerns were being expressed by First Ministers about a lack of a formal structure for them to communicate regularly with the Prime Minister.
So my question is this: are you able to offer any perspective on whether, certainly from your time in office, you considered there was in fact suitable machinery or a workable system in place for conducting regular, high-level, intergovernmental meetings between the First Ministers of the devolved administrations and the Prime Minister?
Mr Sajid Javid: Yeah, it’s … I can obviously certainly talk about what my department did at my level with my counterparts in the devolved administrations. And as we referred to, I had sort of regular formal meetings, irregular contact in the sense that they were free to contact me any time, I could contact – so I felt that those relationships at my level were very constructive, they worked well, and I certainly value – I learned from my counterparts well. But I think your question was more at the Executive level –
Ms Heaven: Focusing at the higher level. And did you have any sense –
Mr Sajid Javid: – First Minister, Prime Minister level, if that’s what you’re asking me –
Ms Heaven: Yes.
Mr Sajid Javid: – it’s – I mean, I wouldn’t really fully know. I don’t think I would be able to fully answer that question, because what was going on at that level I really wasn’t involved in, and because I was dealing with things at my level, my departmental level, I – if there was an issue at the sort of leader of government level, I wouldn’t necessarily have been involved.
Other than – what I will say is that when I had my weekly meetings the issue that you just referred to, which was the issue around the sort of border controls in – I think in January you said – January 2022 – that certainly that would have been brought up in my own – in the meetings that I have – I had and at that time they would have been brought up by the Health Minister in Scotland, which was – no, sorry, in Wales, which was Eluned Morgan –
Ms Heaven: As I said, I’m not asking you about that in particular. If we can just finish, then, that topic and then I’ll be out of time.
So is it your evidence then that these concerns that the Inquiry has heard about, this lack of a regular forum for communicating at that very high level with the devolved administrations, was not something that you were aware of being communicated, certainly during the time that you were in post?
Mr Sajid Javid: No, I wouldn’t – no, there was – there were – I can think of letters that I might be copied on, so, for example, I think when you asked me about that Covid meeting in December – whatever the date, just now, the Covid meeting with the First Ministers that Michael Gove had chaired, I believe that came about because of a letter that was sent to the Prime Minister, I think by the First Minister of Scotland, if I’m not mistaken, and then the Prime Minister asked me to respond to that letter, which I did, and then this Covid meeting was held. And I can sort of sense from the fact that the letter went to the Prime Minister, I had to respond, and then Michael Gove chairs the meeting not the Prime Minister, that there’s probably some tension at that level, but – so I could – when you say “not aware”, I could sense some tension but it was not something that I regularly came into contact with.
Ms Heaven: Okay. Thank you very much.
Lady Hallett: Thank you, Ms Heaven.
Ms Heaven: Thank you, my Lady.
Lady Hallett: Does that complete the questioning –
(unclear: multiple speakers)
Ms Cecil: It does, my Lady.
Lady Hallett: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Javid. I’m afraid I can’t give you a guarantee we won’t ask you to help us again, but thank you for your help today.
The Witness: I would be very happy to come back. Thank you very much.
Lady Hallett: Thank you.
The Witness: Thank you.
(The witness withdrew)