2. Mr Andrew Burnham

MR ANDREW BURNHAM (sworn).

Questions From Counsel to the Inquiry

Lady Hallett: Sorry if we’ve kept you waiting, Mr Burnham.

The Witness: No problem.

Mr Keating: Thank you. For the record, could you give us your full name, please.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Andrew Murray Burnham.

Counsel Inquiry: Mr Burnham, thank you very much for attending today. Thank you for assisting the Inquiry by providing your statement which we have seen and which is before us. And you’ve had the opportunity to read that statement today, haven’t you?

Mr Andrew Burnham: I have.

Counsel Inquiry: And you can confirm that that statement is true to the best of your knowledge and belief?

Mr Andrew Burnham: I can.

Counsel Inquiry: Thank you.

I’m just going to briefly turn to your professional background, if I may. You have a long political career. You were a Member of Parliament for Leigh for under 16 years between 2001 and 2017; is that correct?

Mr Andrew Burnham: It is.

Counsel Inquiry: And you held a number of ministerial roles in government during that period, including but not limited to: you were Minister of State for Health in 2006 to 2007. You were Chief Secretary to the Treasury from 2007 to 2008, and you held two Cabinet roles between 2008 and 2010, first as Secretary of State for Culture Media and Sport, and then perhaps more relevant for our purposes, you were Secretary of State for Health from 5 June 2009 to 11 May 2010.

We will come back to it in due course, but it’s relevant because during that time you were Secretary of State during the swine flu pandemic.

Mr Andrew Burnham: I walked into the Department of Health in early June 2009, and three days later a global pandemic was declared. And I’ve always said to the former Secretary of State, Alan Johnson, who walked out of the door in the other direction, that he was a master of political timing always, and I think that demonstrates it.

Counsel Inquiry: Let’s see if we can master timings today in relation to your evidence, and we will touch upon perhaps after lunch and adjournment the position and your observations between the pandemic swine flu and more recently in relation to the Covid pandemic.

After you left government, as your party was out of government, you held a number of positions in opposition as the Shadow Secretary of State in relation to education, health, and in fact you were Shadow Home Secretary as well.

Mr Andrew Burnham: I was.

Counsel Inquiry: And it’s, of course, a matter of public record, you were elected as Mayor of Greater Manchester in 2017.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes.

Counsel Inquiry: And you’re currently in your second term of that –

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes.

Counsel Inquiry: – position.

I want to briefly just set out how the Mayor of Greater Manchester fits in, in terms of structure-wise, and perhaps try and do it simply if I can.

Is this a fair summary: there’s the Greater Manchester Combined Authority. That’s the upper tier of local government where there’s – sitting above but alongside the ten metropolitan borough councils within Greater Manchester.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes. The Greater Manchester Combined Authority, or the GMCA, is the ten councils, unlike the GLA, which is a separate body above local government.

Counsel Inquiry: Yes.

Mr Andrew Burnham: The ten councils come together to create the GMCA, so we very much sit alongside them. I’m one of 11, you could say, but maybe the captain of that 11.

Counsel Inquiry: And it covers a population of Greater Manchester which is 2.8 million approximately.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes.

Counsel Inquiry: And as in your – you chair the GMCA, as you describe, and your role is to steer the work of the Authority leading on issues such as the economy, transport in particular, and police and fire services.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes. I am the police and crime commissioner for Greater Manchester.

Counsel Inquiry: And you don’t have, or the Mayor does not have a public health function?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Not directly, no, although we have a very extensive devolution agreement, and the things that I am responsible for, like housing and other things, do impact directly on health and public health.

Counsel Inquiry: Yes. When one compares your role as Mayor of Greater Manchester and the Authority with the Mayor of London and the Greater London Authority which we just heard about, there is a difference, isn’t there?

Mr Andrew Burnham: There is.

Counsel Inquiry: A difference in perhaps just –

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes.

Counsel Inquiry: A difference in relation to the Civil Contingencies Act.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes. The GLA and the Mayor, I understand, are designated as a Category 1 responder in the Civil Contingencies Act. That’s not the case for the Greater Manchester Combined Authority or indeed any of the other combined authorities across England.

Counsel Inquiry: And pausing there. A Category 1 responder is someone who has a duty under the Civil Contingencies Act to plan, prepare, train and respond to an emergency.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes. We played that role in the Covid pandemic at a Greater Manchester level, so I convened a Covid emergency committee to sit above, if you like, the local resilience forum so that we were working in a highly joined-up way across the whole of our city region. But formally, we do not have that designation in the Civil Contingencies Act, and it would be helpful if we did.

Counsel Inquiry: That’s something which we’ll return to at the end, in terms of a lessons learned or things to improve going forward.

You touched upon the London – forgive me – the local resilience forum or fora. That’s a forum in a region or an area where a number of Category 1 responders come together to respond to an emergency or plan for emergency.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes, and the Greater Manchester Resilience Forum played a huge role in steering us through our response to Covid.

Counsel Inquiry: Yes.

Let’s move on to the next topic, which is the early days and awareness of Covid leading up to the first lockdown. And in relation to that, I can perhaps summarise your evidence, if I may. You can tell me if I’m on the right or wrong track.

You say in your statement that you first became aware of Covid through media reports, and your first real engagement was through the local Chinese community in Manchester, and there is a strong Chinese community in Manchester; is that correct?

Mr Andrew Burnham: That is correct. Manchester, as a city, had a long-standing twinning arrangement with Wuhan, so some of the familial connections that our Chinese community had were with that area. So I attended two community meetings in January, and I think one going into early February, when, you know, the community was in a very high state of alarm and was asking for my help to get PPE through Manchester airport, donations sent over. So I really became very aware of just how serious the situation was in China in that period of time.

Counsel Inquiry: Yes. And it was an outward looking view, concern for those people in China through that Wuhan lens. You did mention in your statement, again summarising if I may, that there was a first roundtable meeting on 18 February regarding Covid in Manchester, but really was only until 1 March that the strategic co-ordinating group, the SCG, we’ve heard about those already this morning, was set up by the resilience forum, the local resilience forum; is that correct?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yeah. Yes, that’s right, yeah.

Counsel Inquiry: That was in response to the first Covid case in Greater Manchester.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes.

Counsel Inquiry: Thereafter, you describe that in – it was really only around 13 March that your perception of the seriousness of the threat of Covid changed. Was that the position?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Well, it was changing all the way through that period. As I said earlier, as someone who had experienced a pandemic in 2009 as Secretary of State, I obviously had an understanding of how the situation might develop, so I was watching it carefully. I was following statements from the World Health Organisation. So I could see the picture changing, and so our understanding was building. And Greater Manchester in that period was starting to develop the arrangements that we would need or we felt we needed. The degree of co-ordination that we would need to pull together was building –

Counsel Inquiry: In relation to that, if I may, just to assist, is in setting up those arrangements, you mention that it was around 18 March that you, together with the leader of the local councils, established the Greater Manchester Covid-19 committee –

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yeah.

Counsel Inquiry: – on 18th. You mentioned that a few moments ago.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yeah.

Counsel Inquiry: On 20 March, the SCG declared a major incident.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes.

Counsel Inquiry: The position really was that it was in March where Manchester started to really move into a response phase; is that correct?

Mr Andrew Burnham: I think that would be fair. I mean, clearly, we’d taken some steps in February to co-ordinate, and we were building our response, but you’re right, the response phase began more formally in March. And obviously, the establishment of a Covid emergency committee, which was myself, the ten leaders, the ten directors of public health, senior players in the Greater Manchester system, the chief constable, chief fire officer, you know, that wasn’t something we were required to do, but as a mature administration across the city region, it’s something we decided to do ourselves, to make sure we were as highly co-ordinated as we could be. So –

Counsel Inquiry: Could I just ask you a question in relation to that?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yeah.

Counsel Inquiry: We described how Manchester was responding and putting in those structures in March. Was that something which was brought about regionally, self-created, or was that something under direction from central government?

Mr Andrew Burnham: No, there were some things obviously that are required in statute, but the Greater Manchester Covid emergency committee was a voluntary initiative on our part to make sure, as I said, that the political leadership of the city region was very much knitted in to the administrative leadership of the city region and, as I said, that we were as connected and joined up as possible.

Counsel Inquiry: Looking back now with the benefit of hindsight, do you think Manchester perhaps should have done more and done more earlier?

Mr Andrew Burnham: It’s hard to say because we weren’t getting any guidance from a national – a national level. It wasn’t being made clear to us, you know, what we should be doing. So we were – as I say, we were putting together the picture ourselves and beginning to develop the structures that we thought we were going to need to get us through what lay ahead.

So it’s always with hindsight, you would say, well, we would have been better had we done it earlier, but actually, we had started to pull together these collaborative arrangements in February. We had a meeting, for instance, with all of our big, voluntary sector partners in that month as well.

So, you know, always you might say, well, in an ideal world it could have been sooner, but in the absence of very clear instructions from central government, I think, you know, we did – we were quite unique, actually, in establishing our own full committee, that, as I say, united political leadership with more administrative leadership in the city region.

Counsel Inquiry: Was the seriousness of the pandemic in late February and early March clear to you as the Mayor of Manchester, Greater Manchester?

Mr Andrew Burnham: It was clear, and in that period, as is referenced in my statement, I started to make more public comment on pandemic policy nationally. Having been Secretary of State in a global pandemic, I felt I had something to contribute that was meant to be helpful.

I remember the day when I saw an article from a health minister appear behind a paywall, and I just thought to myself: this isn’t right. The country isn’t – we’re not getting this right. You know, people need information at this moment in time. You can’t have articles under – behind paywalls. And I kind of went public that day with a long thread of tweets, kind of being honest about my experience as Secretary of State in the swine flu pandemic. And we made many mistakes on communications. It’s hard communicating in a pandemic. And I tried to share that honestly and openly, and I called actually for a daily briefing. I said that there should be – and I said there should be a briefing that’s not led by politicians, because a mistake I had made in swine flu was giving out information which almost then was seen politically, and then it goes into the fray and all the rest of it. At that time, we agreed that the Chief Medical Officer of the time, Professor Sir Liam Donaldson, would lead our briefings, without politicians present, and I advocated that that would have been a better – a better approach.

Counsel Inquiry: So your view would be: a scientist alone giving a scientific briefing, and politicians giving a briefing separately?

Mr Andrew Burnham: I think so, and I think some of what’s come out though this Inquiry is how sometimes those different views were there, and they weren’t clear to the public because people wouldn’t be invited to the press briefing at Number 10. I mean, it needs to be better than that. If there’s a disagreement between the scientists and the experts and the ministers, I think people need to know that, and therefore that separation is helpful.

I’m not saying that every briefing should be done in that way, and it would be appropriate for the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet to stand with experts from time to time, but every day? The problem with that is it just makes communications too political.

Counsel Inquiry: Thank you. And that’s your reflection from your time as Secretary of State.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes, it is.

Lady Hallett: There are two questions on that, Mr Burnham .

Firstly, don’t you then have a problem potentially of inconsistent messaging?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Well, hopefully not, Chair. So you would try as a government not to allow that. You would hope, would you not, that ministers would be following – following the advice. I think the experts’ briefings should relate more to the epidemiological information, the profile of the virus, the advice to the public. I always felt uncomfortable saying: oh, you know, wash your hands, sneeze and this – you know. You know, don’t do this; do that. That’s not really for politicians to do. That is for – I would say, for experts to do. I think the public receive it differently from an expert than they do from a politician, and I think there is – there is a role for people standing together, as I said, but at the same time just giving more factual information to the public, in my view, is better done without politicians in the room.

Lady Hallett: But then you have the second risk I’m going to put to you, which is that some members of the public associate the expert with the decision-making. In other words, they attribute responsibility for the decision-making to the expert if you put them up front.

Mr Andrew Burnham: I think what I would say, Chair, is better separate the roles of different people so that the public can see those different roles. It was all merged together, I would say, in the communications through the Covid pandemic, particularly in 2020.

I think if the expert said, “This is our view and this is what we see in the evidence and these are the options for ministers,” and the next day the minister said, “Well, we – and now we’re doing this”, I think that – I’m not going to sort of put a huge emphasis on this because it’s hard to communicate in a pandemic, as I said, and I made mistakes as Secretary of State in that area, which I tried to share in the spirit of getting it right. But I think mistakes were also made in the Covid pandemic. There should have been a more – the drum beat of briefings should have been more officials and experts, but occasionally then ministers would come in together where, “We’re now taking a decision based on the evidence you’ve been hearing for the last few days, and our decision is this”. I just think that would have helped everybody. Certainly, as I’m sure we will come to over tier 3.

I don’t think it was understood at the time that SAGE had given very different advice to ministers. It looked like everyone was joined up.

Mr Keating: Mr Burnham, I think we’re going to come back to that. I don’t want us to get too much out of order.

My Lady, there’s one small topic which is linked to this, perhaps I could deal with that, which is linked to communication.

So, Mr Burnham, I want to stick with communication –

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yep.

Counsel Inquiry: – and how difficult it is but also in terms of chronology, we’re around just before the first lockdown and the announcement around that time from Mr Jenrick in – around 22 March or a little bit earlier, about the need for shielding and shielding those people. And in particular I have been asked to explore with you in relation to domestic abuse those who were at risk of domestic abuse, your concerns at that time in relation to those announcements and the impact for those who were at risk of domestic abuse.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Well, we were immediately on that issue, principally because the Right Honourable Beverley Hughes, who was my Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime at the time, was very concerned about those issues. And I think this is where you have politicians in the room with officers, those issues perhaps get brought out more quickly.

We were always conscious of the social impact of lockdowns. You know, what would be the effect of shielding, of lockdowns of different forms, and we were concerned, given, sadly, the high rate of domestic abuse in parts of Greater Manchester that that could exacerbate those concerns and who would be there to help people in situations when they were trapped in a very abusive situation.

Counsel Inquiry: And did you raise those concerns with central government?

Mr Andrew Burnham: We did. We discussed this issue a number of times. As I said, we always had the chief constable or his deputy at our Covid emergency committee. And, you know – and they took very seriously what we were saying, and we did relay those concerns to central government.

Mr Keating: Thank you.

My Lady, is that a convenient time?

Lady Hallett: Certainly.

We will complete your evidence this afternoon, Mr Burnham.

2.05, please.

(1.07 pm)

(The short adjournment)

(2.05 pm)

Mr Keating: Thank you, my Lady.

Mr Burnham, welcome back. Before we continue evidence, can I invite you just to slow down a little bit, because there’s a record being kept of what you’re saying. And also answers, if you could try to make them a little bit shorter, I think paradoxically we will cover more, if that’s all right. Let’s see how we get on.

In terms of the timeline, we were just coming up to the first lockdown in March 2020 and I just wanted to deal with the initial contact with central government in the lead-up to the first lockdown. You touch upon this in your evidence. There was three meetings. The first on 11 March, which I’ll summarise. You met Baroness Vere, who was a junior minister in the Department of Transport at that time, and that was in relation to funding as to public transport.

The second meeting was on 12 March, and this was one of more relevance perhaps, it was a meeting with Robert Jenrick, who was the then Secretary of State for the Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, MHCLG as it was then known as, now the Department of Levelling Up.

In relation to that meeting on 12 March, can you assist us, what did that relate to?

Mr Andrew Burnham: That meeting was to inform us about the commencement of the delay phase, and in effect I think it was the introduction of the shielding arrangements, but there were also some strange announcements about people not taking cruises or school holidays not happening, it was not an announcement that was in the sort of – you know, getting close to the heart – the enormity of what lay ahead a few days later. I think we talked about PPE, how were we getting on with local arrangements. It was quite a relaxed meeting, if I remember rightly.

Counsel Inquiry: But an opportunity for you to speak with the Secretary of State for MHCLG which was the liaison department between central government and local government?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes. And if I remember, I think we were beginning to say to him, you know, “We’re becoming more worried, it feels like it’s changing”. And it was a good opportunity. And although relations would get more difficult later in the year, at that point the fact that he was convening the mayors to have that type of discussion was a good thing.

Counsel Inquiry: The last meeting before lockdown, in fact, was on 23 March, which was the day lockdown was formally announced by the then Prime Minister, and you had a meeting that evening at 6.30 with the Secretary of State for Transport, who was Grant Shapps at that time, and that was with other metro mayors and that was in relation to transport as well.

Was there any indication at that stage that lockdown was about to be announced?

Mr Andrew Burnham: I see – from my memory of that period it wasn’t so much what was happening in those meetings, it was what was happening outside of them. From the meeting with Robert Jenrick up until 23 March, I can remember things becoming increasingly fraught, to the point where on the Monday of 23 March I think I appeared on Good Morning Britain and called for lockdown, you know, a national lockdown. And I remember debating with my team, you know, it felt strange to say it when the government weren’t saying it at that time, and we decided it was right to say it because of what was coming through our directors of public health.

So it felt like the whole world was kind of saying, “This – we can’t carry on like this”, and yet, from memory, I think Grant Shapps possibly alluded to, “There might be an announcement coming later, you can probably guess what it is” type approach in that meeting, but I – no, we were not sat down and briefed on the implications of national lockdown.

Counsel Inquiry: And as a matter of record, two hours later the Prime Minister made the national announcements –

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes.

Counsel Inquiry: – on national television.

Another feature in terms of communication co-ordination, which is the focus of these questions –

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yep.

Counsel Inquiry: – relates to COBR and whether you were invited to attend any COBR meetings. You’ve heard questions being asked of Mr Khan in relation to that. So in the lead-up to lockdown number 1, were you invited to any COBR meetings?

Mr Andrew Burnham: No.

Counsel Inquiry: Did you ask to attend any COBR meetings?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Repeatedly.

Counsel Inquiry: In what way? Was this via officials, back channels, requests with secretaries of state?

Mr Andrew Burnham: I referred to a thread that I put out on Twitter in the session before lunch. Pretty sure that I said there that the mayors should be invited to if not all but certainly some COBR meetings. And the reason I said that was because I chaired it during swine flu. And it was a very open environment, it wasn’t a small number of people just meeting in total secrecy and, you know, keeping it all to themselves. Using the facility of the Cabinet Office we would often have a meeting with ministers in the room but then people able to dial in from around the country.

Counsel Inquiry: So in your view there was a way in which metro mayors could have been participants in COBR which was practical?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Certainly. I mean, it should have happened. I have a memory of chairing a weekly meeting during swine flu where, in the Cabinet Office, with all of the technology, you know, you could bring in voices from around the country. And I remember a council leader here or, you know, an official in the Welsh or the Scottish Government would intervene in those meetings. It was, I would say, the way it should have been done.

Counsel Inquiry: Just in relation to that, we’ve heard other evidence regarding the actual utility of the COBR meetings, whether there were much benefit to them, but at that time, from your perspective, what benefit did you think there would have been as an attendee at a COBR meeting?

Mr Andrew Burnham: A structured environment where serious issues could have been properly raised, for instance one that myself and the mayor of the Liverpool City Region raised right through the whole thing, and never got a response, which was financial support for people on the lowest incomes, insecure work, to self-isolate if asked to do so. So people who had no access to sick pay. We repeatedly raised that issue.

Counsel Inquiry: We’ll come back to that as a topic, if I may.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Sure. But also people excluded from public support, the self-employed, freelancers. You know, we were raising these issues but in some ways they had nowhere to go. You know, we raised them in the media because we had no alternative.

If COBR had been properly structured we would have been able to put these issues on the agenda, have proper response to them, but we were never afforded that opportunity.

Counsel Inquiry: And in relation to that, you touched upon your colleague, fellow mayor, metro mayor, the Mayor of Liverpool, and both of you in May and June 2020 made a number of public announcements seeking that you would have the opportunity to attend COBR. And in essence, is this a fair summary, that you wished to have the voice of the English regions represented?

Mr Andrew Burnham: 100%. Our worry was that there was a London-centricity in decision-making, and we properly wanted to create the balance in people’s thinking by saying, “Look, this is how it seems from here”. And genuinely, it was in the spirit of national emergency. We weren’t there to use it as a platform for politics or anything like that. It was simply to say, you know, “We are worried, this is a challenging situation, we want to be heard and just, you know, taken as seriously as anywhere else”.

I mean, a classic example would be the lifting of the first national lockdown –

Lady Hallett: Sorry, before we get to that, Mr Burnham, just forgive me for interrupting, rewinding a couple of stages, you said that you had asked to attend and then you mention a Twitter feed. Did you contact Number 10 and ask to attend COBR?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes. In many ways, Chair, the request was made. Did I write formally? I would have to check. I don’t recall ever saying, “Please invite me to COBR”, but the point was made to ministers in conversations. In some of the meetings, you know, that have been described, we would often make this point that it would be better if we were invited so we could discuss these things in a structured environment rather than in ad hoc meetings with ministers.

Lady Hallett: Second question: I have heard from others that COBR is effective for a shorter term emergency but not for the longer term emergency. What do you say to that?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Well, there needs to be a central co-ordinating body that brings together political decision-makers in any emergency, whether it’s short or long, I would say to that, be it COBR or a Cabinet committee.

I did not attend one meeting of COBR right through the pandemic, and people need to ask whether a city region with 2.8 million people in it should never have the opportunity to say: well, this is how it looks from here.

The only UK government body that I attended was the one of the nations, chaired by Michael Gove, when we had an issue with Scotland and a travel ban. That was the only formal central government committee that I was asked to attend.

Mr Keating: Which we’ll come back to.

We’re going to stick to a structured approach, following on from your desire to have a structured approach.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Can I come back to national lockdown?

Counsel Inquiry: Yes, please, we want to go back to national lockdown, yes. We’re going back to March 2020.

Mr Andrew Burnham: I mean, it’s just this is the critical thing – well, that was May 2020, of course, by that –

Counsel Inquiry: This is coming – I am going to move on to that. You’re now talking about leaving national lockdown, which I’m going to move on to in a moment.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Okay.

Counsel Inquiry: Let’s stick to communication and then we’ll move to the next part in the chronology.

You described, used the words “ad hoc” in your statement and indeed a few moments ago your communications with central government. You also mentioned that there was reasonable official level communications between officials, civil servants.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes.

Counsel Inquiry: So there was that reasonable communication.

Mr Andrew Burnham: There was.

Counsel Inquiry: There was political communication, we’ve touched upon some of it, but that was sporadic; is that correct?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes.

Counsel Inquiry: And you mentioned this, we don’t need to turn to it, at paragraph 76, is that in your experience, ministers actively encouraged informal and private communications about significant decisions And often initiate them. And you use an example: several ministers, including the Health Secretary Matt Hancock.

Was this a productive line of communication WhatsApps, texts, with ministers of state and secretaries of state?

Mr Andrew Burnham: It could be. And I often found it helpful that they would reach out in that way, but it wasn’t adequate because, actually, there needed to be a place where a mayor might raise something and everybody in the system heard it, and there wasn’t such a facility. So it was better than nothing, but it wasn’t sufficient.

Counsel Inquiry: In terms of the impact regarding – we’ve been talking about communication and coordination between local and central government from your perspective. And you touch upon this in your statement at paragraph 23, and you describe the approach to the pandemic as:

“… overly top-down and overly centralised … there was a lack of adequate consultation and poor communications. It frequently felt chaotic.”

Is that the view you formed?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Very much so. It was massively centralised. You had a mature system like Greater Manchester that was simply bypassed. And the kind of thing that sticks in my mind from the period we’re talking about is genuine astonishment when word came through from officials who were in good contact with civil servants in the department saying that local testing would be stood down. And to me that was like, you know, I could not even begin to get my head around why local testing teams in our what were CCGs at the time would be stood down.

Counsel Inquiry: So in relation to that, CCGs, to help everybody else stands for?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Clinical commissioning group.

Counsel Inquiry: Yes. And this was on 18 March 2010 is when you were – you’ve described it as a significant, a key moment that you informed that the local testing was stood down without consultation.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes. Mm-hm.

Counsel Inquiry: And then there was – you express a concern that the new location for testing from a central perspective was going to be at Manchester airport. And that was –

Mr Andrew Burnham: That location was chosen without any consultation with us. So the airport might make sense if you’re sitting in an office in Downing Street or in the Cabinet Office or the airport. Well, everyone can get – well, no, they can’t, actually. But there was a huge testing facility that opened that, in the end, people just couldn’t get to. If you live in Oldham or Rochdale, you can’t easily get to Manchester airport, but that was not understood, it would seem, but they didn’t ask us.

I mean, fancy opening a testing station in Greater Manchester without consulting us on the location.

Counsel Inquiry: Oldham, Bolton, north of the city; airport, south of the city.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Correct.

Counsel Inquiry: And, of course, if one has to travel, costs involved.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes.

Counsel Inquiry: I want to move on to the metro mayors group and a meeting on 1 May 2020 which you and your fellow members of that group had with the Prime Minister. And there was a document, which is at INQ000202008 – which we have right in front of us, thank you so much.

And we see at paragraph 2 just what the metro mayors are. Covers a number of different regional areas, represents over 40 percent of the population of England, and has a combined GVA.

This is where you’re going to be tested as a former chief secretary to the Treasury, GVA stands for?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Gross value added.

Counsel Inquiry: We probably don’t need to go into the economics too much, but it really just shows that there is significant economic output from those areas.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes.

Counsel Inquiry: 45% of the overall England GVA, 750 billion. And there’s a request there:

“Empowering mayors to lead recovery planning for their regions will help put robust plans in place …”

So this is where we’re still in restrictions. We’re looking forward to a period where restrictions may be eased.

I want to move on, please, to paragraph 5, if I may, and this document which was prepared by the metro mayors and provided to the Prime Minister; is that correct?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes.

Counsel Inquiry: And in relation to that it says:

“Recovery will be a national effort. We must work together to ensure alignment and planning and to give confidence to the country and our regions. To coordinate our efforts, we would welcome regular discussions with government – a monthly call between mayors, Prime Minister and Chancellor will help align our efforts.”

And what was the response at that meeting or thereafter in relation to this request for more regular communication?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Well, it didn’t happen. I think we had one meeting with the then chancellor, now Prime Minister, during the pandemic. One meeting, I think possibly two with the Prime Minister. But this call did not meet with approval.

And the thing I would just say, you know, the M9, for people who don’t know, this is a cross-party group of mayors.

Counsel Inquiry: We’ve heard this morning that there’s – I think there was at that time two Conservative mayors –

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes.

Counsel Inquiry: – and the bulk were Labour elected Mayors.

Mr Andrew Burnham: In fact, more. There was a Conservative mayor in Cambridgeshire and Peterborough, in the West of England, Tees Valley, and in West Midlands, Andy Street.

The thing is, we take seriously our responsibility as mayors to work on a place first rather than a party first basis. And that’s the strength that we can bring to UK governance that we can – and we do, so we were prepared, you know. You could see this in what we were saying to the government.

Counsel Inquiry: Well, a joint document from mayors from different political fields.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes. And this moment in time, there was still very much a spirit of: we’re all here to help. What can we do? Work with us. But then that changed through the year as we – as the – we just weren’t listened to, and that’s how 2020 proceeded. You know, the goodwill, the offers, we’re here, how can we help, work with us, use us –

Counsel Inquiry: Just pause there because we’re going to –

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes.

Counsel Inquiry: Just one more part of this document, and then we’ll move on to the deterioration.

So paragraph 9, please, which is on page 2, the bottom of page 2. Thank you.

So:

“Summary. Next steps.

“… we would welcome:

“A statement from government empowering mayors to lead regional recovery plans.”

And overleaf, please:

“Discussion with Chancellor on flexibilities and resources …”

Reference to financial fundings and:

“Regular meetings to align planning and agree action.”

So that was the position on 1 May.

And then on 10 May, there was an announcement regarding the easing of lockdowns – easing of lockdown, forgive me, as the path moving out of restrictions. And you describe that as a really significant occasion in your experience from the perspective of Mayor of Greater Manchester. Why was that?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Similar to the standing down of local testing. I was astonished when word filtered through – it was a Wednesday morning, I think – to our Covid emergency committee that there may be an announcement coming. Someone said at our meeting about: stay at home is ending tonight or tomorrow, and it’s going to become stay alert. And I was, what? How? You know, here we had such a high case rate. Here – I should say Greater Manchester, we had a high case rate. And bear in mind that Covid had spread from south to north. It had moved up through the country, through the Midlands –

Counsel Inquiry: So there’s a lag – a lag between London’s progress. In other words, Manchester was further behind in the recovery than London.

Mr Andrew Burnham: I think experts would say a two to three-week lag in terms of the way the peaks were experienced. But we were still very much closer to our peak than, I say, the southern half of the country.

Counsel Inquiry: So you had that surprise shock as to the announcement. Does it follow that there wasn’t any consultation prior to that?

Mr Andrew Burnham: There was zero consultation, and this is the point about COBR involving – this is a new infrastructure that we built in this country of combined authorities and mayors. And in the situation like this, it can add huge value to the national response to a pandemic. It was largely bypassed.

Counsel Inquiry: And if you were consulted, what would you have said?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Don’t lift it because it’s too early for Greater Manchester because we had a higher case rate than other parts of the country, and it’s why I say in my evidence statement that there was a London centricity in decision-making. I think were looking more at the picture in London, and they were more concerned with that than they were with the picture where we were. There was pressure to lift it from kind of voices here, and I think the decision was more influenced by that than what we were saying.

We didn’t – you know, we – if we’d have been asked, we would have told them that they shouldn’t do it. And I think because of that, Greater Manchester was left stuck with a high case rate throughout the rest of 2020.

Counsel Inquiry: Which we’re going to touch upon in a moment and how that caused reality difficulties.

Last point regarding the message in May about easing of lockdowns and return to work, which was one aspect as well which emerged.

How was the return to work message received by you and your fellow metro mayors, group members?

Mr Andrew Burnham: I mean, of course, everybody wanted to support the economy, but it was just more difficult for us. And I recall something from this period that needs to be remembered which was: a lot of people never left work. And in the less well-off parts of the country, people weren’t, by and large, sitting in their gardens doing whatever on Zoom. They were in work. And in boroughs in Greater Manchester, a high percentage of people were working in warehousing or in manufacturing or in other things. The worry we had, and, again, it was one that I shared with the Mayor of the Liverpool city region was, the workplace guidance wasn’t strong enough. The regulation said people should keep a 2 metre distance where possible. Where possible. And we were inundated, actually, with complaints from distribution centres, warehouses across the northwest, both of us, people saying that their workplace wasn’t safe.

Counsel Inquiry: If you had more notice or any notice, would that have helped being able to respond to these queries on a local level?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Always the case. If we had been involved earlier in the discussion and we could see how the thinking was building towards regulations or new messages to the public, we are would have been at least ready for those messages and we’d have been able to tell our own system how to get ready to implement it. It came mostly to a head for us in July, which you may want to get on to.

Counsel Inquiry: We will in a moment, but I want to deal with data, if I can, very briefly. I know it’s not the most exciting of subjects, but –

Mr Andrew Burnham: Well, it was a big one for us in this period.

Counsel Inquiry: And an important subject as well. We’re going to deal with data, and one of the issues you mention in June 2020 was: you were struggling to manage the stubbornly case rate in Manchester. That’s what you say in your statement at paragraph 19. And your lead director of public health was having difficulties in accessing data regarding those who had tested positive. And this was something which was causing real difficulties.

In terms of Test and Trace, that’s something which is going to be considered by the Inquiry at a later stage, so I want to deal with this quite shortly, but what was the issue in relation to getting data in June 2020 for you?

Mr Andrew Burnham: We couldn’t.

Counsel Inquiry: Yes.

Mr Andrew Burnham: We asked for patient identifiable data.

Counsel Inquiry: And that was refused. Is that the position?

Mr Andrew Burnham: It was refused. It was refused for weeks and weeks and weeks, and I had to enter another media battle to try and get hold of that data. This was data that they really had no argument with us. In the law that they passed in early March, the Covid emergency legislation, Covid-19 was added to the list of notifiable diseases.

Counsel Inquiry: So local authority was under a duty – a local public health authority was under a duty to report Covid-19.

Mr Andrew Burnham: It had to be reported.

Counsel Inquiry: Yes.

Mr Andrew Burnham: And yet this new Test and Trace system that they had outsourced said it didn’t have to give us this data, and ministers said they didn’t either, and we had to show them the law that they had passed, and this was important to us.

Counsel Inquiry: And why was it important, in terms of getting that data?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Because lockdown had been lifted too early. We had a high case rate. Many of our residents were in jobs where they didn’t get sick pay. They couldn’t go home if they were ill because their employment wouldn’t support them being paid if they were off ill. So we had fundamentals that were hard to deal with.

We wanted – the difference between the Test and Trace system and what we wanted to do for our proposals for a more locally run tracing, contact tracing, was the national outsource system was making calls from call centres that nobody was answering. We wanted the data so we could knock on doors, and we said to government right the way through this period: local contact tracing will be much more effective than the call centre approach. And in the end, I had to get Greater Manchester fire and rescue service to kind of put a team together so we could say: please just give us this data. Let us do local contact tracing.

Counsel Inquiry: You got the data in due course after –

Mr Andrew Burnham: After a battle.

Counsel Inquiry: Yes. And was applied? Did you apply that on local level after obtaining the data? Did you do any –

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes, of course.

Counsel Inquiry: Okay. Going to move on to a different topic. Test and Trace is one which we’ll return back to.

I want to deal with a topic which perhaps you never thought you were going to deal with when you were elected in 2017 is when you found yourself in a dispute with the First Minister from Scotland. I’ve been invited to address that with you. Is it –

Mr Andrew Burnham: It was 2021, just – because we’re not just in 2020 now.

Counsel Inquiry: That’s correct. Thank you.

And in 2021, there was – was it 2021, or was it 2020 when there was an issue between you and the First Minister regarding a ban on the people of Manchester travelling to Scotland, or people from Scotland travelling down to –

Mr Andrew Burnham: 2021.

Counsel Inquiry: 2021, thank you. So that’s where we are in the time period. And is this a fair summary, that there was an announcement by the First Minister that those people from – Scottish people weren’t allowed to travel to Manchester, and people from Manchester weren’t allowed to travel to Scotland?

Mr Andrew Burnham: The first I knew about it was I was on my weekly phone-in on BBC Manchester. And a lady rang in from Bolton, and she said, “Our walking holiday has been cancelled in the Cairngorms because the guest house says they can’t take somebody from a Bolton postcode.” so I went back to the office and asked the office to check, and sure enough, we discovered that the Scottish government had put a ban on Bolton people travelling to Scotland without any notification or information about that. And that was the first I became aware of the issue.

Then if you go forward a few days later, I was actually sitting in my garden the night after England had played Scotland at Wembley in the delayed European football championships, and there was a picture of lots of people in the fountain in Trafalgar Square, but underneath that photo was a headline that said: Scottish government puts travel ban on Salford and Manchester. That’s quite a big deal when you’re putting a travel ban on – that was the first I’d heard of it when they actually banned people from Manchester and Salford travelling to Scotland. No notification. No consultation. Exactly what the Scottish National Party would always have accused Westminster of doing to Scotland. Well, they had done exactly the same to us.

Counsel Inquiry: So pausing there. No consultation in the way you’ve expressed.

Was there any subsequent discussion about how this was going to be enforced? Was there police officers lining the platforms at Manchester Piccadilly?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Well, no, we – no, there weren’t, and you know, we – it wasn’t our policy. We had no understanding of what they were trying to do. And as I understood it, the Scottish government wasn’t enforcing it because people from Scotland were coming down and getting off the train at Manchester Piccadilly. It was bizarre, if I’m honest.

And, as I say, Michael Gove invited me to the committee of the nations, and I had an exchange with the former First Minister at that meeting. In the days that followed, we pointed out that the case rate in Scotland had gone higher than in Manchester, Salford and Bolton, and it wasn’t long before the travel ban was removed. But it was another example of how the lack of UK coordination –

Counsel Inquiry: A bizarre footnote to the pandemic perhaps, and at that meeting with Mr Gove, I think there was an agreement between you and the first ministers, a joint ambition towards a more unified approach as far as possible.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes.

Counsel Inquiry: And let’s move on then, if we may. We’re going to move well into summer 2020, so we’re now going back a year, but in that summer 2020. And 30 July is the next significant date in 2020. That’s when the UK government announced local restrictions on household mixing in Greater Manchester from midnight.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes.

Counsel Inquiry: How much notice and detail did you receive in advance of that announcement?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Minimal. I had a call around about four o’clock from the health secretary, and he said that we needed to do something because the case rate in Greater Manchester had got too high. I said, yes, I can see that it is too high. We are not against doing something, but I can’t just announce with you that – I’ve got to go through the local council leaders. He asked me if I would do that. This, in effect, would become what’s known as Tier 2, so –

Counsel Inquiry: It wasn’t Tier 2 then –

Mr Andrew Burnham: No, it wasn’t called that. It was the first restrictions on household mixing.

Counsel Inquiry: Yes.

Mr Andrew Burnham: It was to be ourselves, parts of Lancashire and parts of West Yorkshire that would go under these restrictions in late July, but it was chaotic.

You asked me before when you quoted me as saying it felt chaotic. This was as chaotic as it gets because they were putting these restrictions on us. He gave me an hour to talk to our local leaders, and to those who claim that we were being obstructive or – we said we were ready – we can see the issue. We’re ready to work with you. But we did immediately start to make the point that this is going to have an impact on people. It’s going to have an impact on people’s businesses.

What I remember is that about 8 o’clock that night, the Health Secretary made a very cursory announcement to a TV camera in 4 Millbank that we would be going under these restrictions, and then all hell broke loose. My Twitter feed, which was – I was using it a lot at that time to have direct communication with people in Greater Manchester. It was just absolutely inundated with people saying: I’m a painter and decorator, I work in people’s homes, can I go to work tomorrow? I’m a childminder, can I go to work tomorrow? I’m a domiciliary care worker, can I go to work tomorrow?

Counsel Inquiry: So the lack of notice –

Mr Andrew Burnham: There wasn’t a Q & A. There was not a UK Government frequently asked questions that we could point people to. There was nothing. There was nothing put up on the website. If something went up, I think it was gone 11 o’clock that night, probably even later –

Counsel Inquiry: Did this also align with the time of Eid? Eid was – the celebration of Eid was around that time.

Mr Andrew Burnham: It did. And I think there was a concern there would be, you know, large-scale household mixing as we saw similarly played out at Christmas, you know.

Counsel Inquiry: Yes.

Mr Andrew Burnham: It was – the same thing got played out, didn’t it?

Counsel Inquiry: In terms of managing a message, doing it at such short notice for such a significant religious festival –

Mr Andrew Burnham: It was as if they hadn’t realised that, realised it late and – yeah, and hence to the situation we found ourselves in.

Counsel Inquiry: I’m going to move on slightly to this period of local restrictions, inverted commas, Tier 2 (unclear). You’ve got 12 areas within Greater Manchester –

Mr Andrew Burnham: Ten.

Counsel Inquiry: Ten, forgive me. Of those ten areas, were they – was the restrictions uniform to the ten areas?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Initially, but you can imagine that there was lots of kind of – people were suffering under these restrictions. They weren’t light. If you can’t mix at home, it has a real impact on people.

Counsel Inquiry: But there was a variation in Greater Manchester between cases. Some were higher in certain areas; some were lower in certain areas.

Mr Andrew Burnham: That’s right. So at the time those restrictions went in, Wigan borough, where I live, was quite low. And I would be out walking the dog, and people were saying, “Why on earth are we in these restrictions?” But then Wigan’s case rate changed while we were in and went higher, and then the places that had had higher had gone a bit lower, and then they were complaining.

In the end, we used to have this weekly process with the government – it was at their gold committee. They would work through this whole process every week, reviewing restrictions. And our ten boroughs would lobby at the GM Covid emergency committee saying, put the case forward for us to be taken out. We want to be – we tried to stick with a Greater Manchester approach for a long time, but in the end, it got hard to manage some of the differences, and I think Stockport were taken out at one point and Trafford possibly were taken out at one point.

Counsel Inquiry: Going forward, ten individual areas, boroughs. Is it practical having restrictions in Stockport and no restrictions in Bolton or vice versa?

Mr Andrew Burnham: No, it’s not.

Counsel Inquiry: And why is that? What’s the difficulty?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Well, it gets you to whether the tier system works. People are going to travel. Life does not end at a local government administrative boundary. People are going over that boundary every day. People don’t live their life within those – the boundaries of those boroughs. You know, Greater Manchester, it’s a system where everyone’s crossing those boundaries every day, going around their work. As I say, it’s something that might make sense in an office somewhere, but it didn’t make sense – the reality of it didn’t make sense.

Counsel Inquiry: So on the ground, with a desire to make things work in the public interest, we move through summer 2020, and we’re into August, autumn 2020. And on 8 September, further restrictions were imposed by the UK government on Bolton. And that was without consultation, and you describe that as another key moment. Why was that?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Because, again, from nowhere, all hospitality was closed in the borough of Bolton with no package of support for the businesses affected.

Counsel Inquiry: So pausing there. Not wishing to be London centric, Bury has got a proud history. Would it be described as an area which is economically deprived, or parts of it have got economic deprivation?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Bolton?

Counsel Inquiry: Yes.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes, you would say it’s quite mixed, but there are parts of Bolton that have significant deprivation.

Counsel Inquiry: So in relation to the need for financial support, was there any financial support offered when this was announced?

Mr Andrew Burnham: None.

Counsel Inquiry: And did you –

Mr Andrew Burnham: And the former Conservative leader of Bolton who we worked really closely during the pandemic who sadly passed away the following year, he was saying to me, whatever you can do, Andy, I’ll work with you. The government should not treat a place like Bolton like this. And the frustration we all felt was – because they’d just done it to Bolton. It was like no-one else could see it, no-one else in the country was bothered, but the impact there was really huge. And I do just by an aside just need to say there was a strong feeling that Eat Out to Help Out had caused some of the problems that Bolton were experiencing.

Counsel Inquiry: Let’s focus in on Bolton, not Bury – Bolton for a moment. So you had this background where there was restrictions which had now been imposed in Manchester since May.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes.

Counsel Inquiry: A lack of financial support.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes.

Counsel Inquiry: No financial support for the people – the businesses of Bolton.

Mr Andrew Burnham: True.

Counsel Inquiry: And was there – was this something that you raised at any stage with Matt Hancock, the Secretary of State for Health?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Frequently.

Counsel Inquiry: And the response?

Mr Andrew Burnham: To be fair, he was more sympathetic, actually, than some of the other ministers that I spoke to about this matter.

We were coming through the summer into the early autumn feeling increasingly frustrated. We’d spent pretty much the best part of year by now saying: look what’s happening here. Help us. Help us with the contact tracing. Give us that data. Help us, you know, support you to put in place measures, rather than this chaotic way, and particularly help our people and our businesses if you’re going to ask us to close them. And it felt like we were just shouting into the abyss in this period.

Counsel Inquiry: Let’s move on to 5 October, which is a meeting between the metro mayors and Mr Hancock.

And something you touch upon your statement, and perhaps we could bring that up, at paragraph 70 of your statement. You describe how you had that meeting. This is cases had risen across the country in September. We’re into October. And that’s the context. And at paragraph 70 (a):

“… we wanted to see a clearer role for mayors in informing decision-making, communication and engagement since March has been limited.”

Again, this request for a regular meeting.

And response from Matt Hancock in relation to this request for more regularity in contact between the metro mayors and central government, can you recall?

Mr Andrew Burnham: I think there was a like a broad: oh, yes, we must. And: it needs to get better. But I’m just looking at the date on this note, 5 October. It sticks in my mind because two days later, it was my 20th wedding anniversary. And I’d been out in Manchester with my wife, and we were getting a train home, and on the train, I remember we were looking at our phones, tomorrow’s front pages, and one of them was: pubs to close across northern England. So this was the first of the Tier 3 –

Counsel Inquiry: Yes.

Mr Andrew Burnham: – issues coming, and that had not been mentioned to us in this meeting, just –

Counsel Inquiry: So in terms –

Mr Andrew Burnham: – a couple of days before.

Counsel Inquiry: Okay. So in terms of the timeline, your wedding anniversary two days after that, and you’re going to refer to something which wasn’t mentioned at this meeting.

Let’s turn to 70, paragraph (b), please, thank you, overleaf, and we’ll see what else was mentioned at the meeting so everyone can put into context.

You talk about the local restrictions, lockdown measures. I say “you”. You refer to it in statement:

“The tiered approach being developed was helpful.”

This is the prospective tier approach:

“The current position at that time was too complex, and we must take steps to support people to comply. A crucial element of these plans must be clarity on how and when places move back out of these measures [i.e. between the tiers].”

So the view at that stage – this is before you have experienced Tiers 1, 2 and 3. The view expressed was that the tier approach would be helpful.

Why did you hold that view at that time?

Mr Andrew Burnham: I mean, this was an M9 document if I remember, not a Greater Manchester document.

Counsel Inquiry: It’s quoting – I think you refer to your statement –

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes.

Counsel Inquiry: – (overspeaking) voice from you in that?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Because I was in – you’ve always got to remember, I was in a different position to the other eight mayors in that we’d been under restrictions and others hadn’t, and I’d grown frustrated about the approach, particularly the lack of support.

I think this was trying to articulate the view of everybody, and it did touch then on some of the frustrations everybody had, i.e. there was a feeling that if you go into these measures, you don’t come back out again. They just – they stay there, and everyone wanted a de-escalation sort of regime. When do you come out if you’ve gone in?

Counsel Inquiry: So if you pull out of the document again. So a consensus approach, if this is you producing what was presented as a metro document, but you had your concerns.

We move on to financial support as well, a real need for financial support at paragraph (c), that:

“The impact of Covid was obviously not only health. Lockdown could only work if financial support was in place for those we were asking to close businesses or limit activity.”

Mr Andrew Burnham: This was very much informed by the Bolton experience, and I was pleased that Andy Street supported it.

Counsel Inquiry: Yes. He’s a mayor based down in –

Mr Andrew Burnham: The West Midlands, yes. And he and I and the other mayors had always worked together in a very practical way, and we did in that period of time.

Counsel Inquiry: And a Conservative Mayor.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Conservative Mayor.

Counsel Inquiry: And we go up to paragraph 71, please, and the last point in relation to this:

“… we advised that there were concerns about the processed tier system [to put in context] with restrictions and no identifiable support. Support was most likely to be available from a national circuit break” –

Mr Andrew Burnham: That’s what we were calling for –

Counsel Inquiry: “… rather than the north standing alone.”

Mr Andrew Burnham: That’s was we – see, that’s what we were saying. There should be a national circuit break. Leaving the north of England under restrictions and the rest of the country not.

Counsel Inquiry: Was that the view, without being overly emotive about it, but did you and your fellow metro mayors feel that the north was standing alone?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Well, the thing was, if you go back to start of the pandemic, it went up from the south, and it was national lockdown when it was there, but when we had the high case rate and it was about to come back down the country, it was then regional and tiers. And did we feel like we were standing alone? Definitely. Very much so. It just felt that we were treated in a way that other parts of the country wouldn’t be treated. There is no way – there is honestly no way that a borough in greater London or I would say in the wider southeast would be treated like Bolton were treated. No way at all.

Counsel Inquiry: Going to move on to another topic linked to this which is the debate about Tier 3 restrictions which occurred in October 2020, shortly after this meeting. And I’m going to summarise your evidence and then ask you a couple of questions if I may.

You describe that were was unprecedented engagement between Greater Manchester and the government around this time, 7 October, your wife’s anniversary – your anniversary, and over the next few days. And the issue concerned, the sticking point concerned financial support, and you raised the concern that there needed to be sufficient financial support.

And to summarise quite a complex issue, the sticking point related to the level of financial support. A national lockdown would have 80% of a person’s salary, whereas is it right that what was offered in these discussions was less than that 80%?

Mr Andrew Burnham: So my memory of this meeting is very much that it was dominated by financial support. Because this was about the tier system. In principle, not what they hadn’t told us they were about to do within a day or two.

But we were really clear at this stage: you can’t do this. You can’t do a Bolton to everybody. You know, you’ve got to put in place proper financial support. And to be fair, I think Matt Hancock understood that, and he said he would take it back to the Treasury. I remember him saying that in that meeting. I said, look, I won’t be – I can’t support measures without that support. And I said really clearly, at that point, you can’t tell people working in pubs, bingo halls, betting shops, that they only get 67% of their wages because that’s what was kind of building around at this time, that there would be a kind of Tier 3 package for people whose work places were closed.

Counsel Inquiry: And what would the answer be to someone saying, well, 67 percent of someone’s wage is sufficient compared to 80 percent.

Mr Andrew Burnham: So these, by definition, are people on the lowest wages. So when everyone else was sitting in their gardens on 80 percent, why would they get 67 percent? What would be – possibly be the justification for that?

Counsel Inquiry: Yes.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Other than they were in the north of England in low-paid jobs. Oh, well, you know. That’s how it felt to us, and that’s why – this is the issue about the Tier 3 debate. It became a point of principle about this. They tried to portray that we were quibbling about 75 million or 65. It wasn’t. We were saying: you’ve got to put enough money in the system to give people on very low wages that – at least an 80% furlough scheme.

Counsel Inquiry: I’m going to return to that in a moment –

Lady Hallett: Except we are coming to that in a later module, Mr Keating.

Mr Keating: Yes.

Lady Hallett: Have we had enough for this module?

Mr Keating: Nearly. We’re nearly there, my Lady. I’m going to trespass on your patience just for a moment.

In relation to this, and this is going to the point to assist my Lady and is in relation to whether a tier system was going to work and, actually, in relation to that, isn’t it right that you had a meeting on 14 October with Jonathan Van-Tam –

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes.

Counsel Inquiry: – and a junior minister for health, and there was expression – you asked whether the tier system, would it be effective? Would it address rising cases. And what was the response in relation to that?

Mr Andrew Burnham: So we were sceptical about the tier system because we’d been under it since July and it hadn’t worked. And we knew if they carried on with the 67% furlough that there would be definite damage to people’s lives and people’s businesses.

So in meetings, and particularly with Jonathan Van-Tam, myself and the ten leaders of Greater Manchester said give us – if we’re going to do this, you have to guarantee to us that this is actually going to work and it’s going to bring the cases down, the R number down below one.

Counsel Inquiry: And the response?

Mr Andrew Burnham: He couldn’t give us that guarantee. And I think if I could, this gets to the heart, really, of my evidence and what I wanted to say today.

Counsel Inquiry: I’m going to draw that together and give you that opportunity and draw this topic together. And it’s right you didn’t – there was an agreement between you and central government; that’s a matter of fact.

Mr Andrew Burnham: We heard the Deputy Chief Medical Officer say the Tier 3 approach wasn’t going to necessarily bring our case rate down.

Counsel Inquiry: And you’re aware that there has been criticism in central government and in wider media of the stance you took, that you were being obstructive and had behaved appallingly. I’m quoting a minute in a meeting. I want to give you the opportunity to be able to respond to that criticism, and then I’m going to move on to another topic.

Mr Andrew Burnham: I’ve seen that minute, the Covid-O minute. And frankly, it is – it’s nothing short of disgraceful, the points that were made in that minute. They – to quote back what you just said, “the Mayor of Greater Manchester was with behaving appallingly”. It wasn’t me that was behaving appallingly; it was the people in that room that were behaving appallingly because they were about to impose a policy on Greater Manchester which they knew didn’t work, and that’s something that I’ve only now realised looking at other people’s statements to this Inquiry.

And it makes me angry on behalf of the people of Greater Manchester that they sat in that room and they up imposed a policy that they had been advised by SAGE and others would not work. Indeed, I’m reading Matt Hancock’s evidence to this Inquiry. I could give you the number if you wish to call it up.

Counsel Inquiry: We’re going to have the advantage of him giving evidence himself in a few days’ time.

Mr Andrew Burnham: So let me just quote from his written evidence. I won’t – this is critical for us because I think the people of Greater Manchester need to hear this and understand this. He says in his evidence about Tier 3:

“I was in despair that we had announced a policy that we knew would not work.”

Counsel Inquiry: Did he explain or express that to you around the time of your discussions and negotiations?

Mr Andrew Burnham: No, he didn’t.

Counsel Inquiry: No.

Mr Andrew Burnham: And I see this conversation in this Covid-O committee, where they are then starting to talk about a punishment beating for Greater Manchester that Lancashire should have a lighter set of measures imposed than Greater Manchester, since they had shown willingness to co-operate, tougher measures should be imposed on Manchester that day.

Because we stood up for people in our city region who would otherwise have really struggled had they gone into that lockdown without the funds to help them. Because we took that stand they decided to make, you know, an example of us.

And it was – it’s unbelievable for me now to look at evidence saying they knew it didn’t work they knew Tier 3 didn’t work, but they were going to impose it on us without enough financial support.

Counsel Inquiry: Mr Burnham, I’m going to invite you to pause there. I wanted to give you that opportunity. I think you’ve had a reasonable opportunity to deal with that matter, and I’m going to move on and hopefully have your assistance in relation to another topic. Is that okay?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Mm-hm.

Counsel Inquiry: Communications, and another area I have been invited to explore with you is the wider communications from central government and how they were received on a local level from your perspective and in relation to certain communities, certain communities – minority ethnic communities.

From your experience, was there issues with the central communication, central Government communication , or blanket messaging, as you described it?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes. I mean, we worked hard to make sure that the core messages from the Government were put into languages that could be understood by everybody in Greater Manchester. I think – if I’m being fair, I think there was some collaboration on these matters between public health information experts in Greater Manchester and at the government level, but it was a constant challenge. The absence of British Sign Language interpreter at the daily briefings was unforgivable, to be honest, all the way through.

Counsel Inquiry: We have dealt with that in evidence already but thank you.

I’m going to move on really as a final section and firmly with lessons learned how to do things better going forward.

There may be a couple of topics you might want to raise. One of them you have touched upon already, and I promised you I would return back to it, would be that – your view as to the placement of the metro mayors in the civil resilience structure.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yeah.

Counsel Inquiry: I think I said I would come back that.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes.

Counsel Inquiry: That’s something you wanted to deal with?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes, I just think it’s what should be there in a situation like this.

Here’s my central argument: a more devolved approach to the pandemic would have been a safer approach to the pandemic. The way we run this country is often concentrating power in a very small number of hands in Downing Street and in the middle of Whitehall. It’s disfunctional in normal times; I would say it’s dangerous to run things like that in a pandemic. You look at countries like Germany that adopted a much more devolved approach to these things.

Counsel Inquiry: Just pausing there, in terms of you had the Hine review when you were post the swine flu pandemic. Is there any view that you have regarding the view of subsidiarity in view of this?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Well, that was the central call from the Hine review, which I set up. It said that a future pandemic should be handled in a much more delegated way, devolved way, with much greater subsidiarity. And it would appear that that had not been taken on board.

And the thing that I kind of – we’ll come back to and back to, is it just – the absence of those structures just meant that people, whenever I spoke to them in Downing Street or Whitehall, they just didn’t seem to know how people were feeling in our part of the world. It had been miserable, really, all through 2020, with almost endless restrictions, but they just didn’t seem to know.

If I could just inform the committee on the kind of final day, when we were about to have Tier 3 imposed on 20 October 2020, I had a final call with the then Prime Minister, Mr Johnson, and he was saying, “We just need you to agree to these Tier 3 restrictions and the package of support.”

And I said, “Well, we can’t, it’s not enough. You know, we’ve been under restrictions for a long time.”

He said, “What do you mean?”

I said, “We’ve been under restrictions since July. You do know about that, don’t you?”

Counsel Inquiry: And what was the response?

Mr Andrew Burnham: And to me it didn’t seem that he did know about that. He wasn’t aware that we had been struggling all of that time. And I think it’s the absence of a kind of place every week where people can report in to say, “This is how it feels for us at this moment in time”. That, I think, led to a situation where there just wasn’t an understanding of what some of the things that Government was doing, what they were actually – or the impact they were having on people’s lives.

And that’s why I hope this committee – this Inquiry will make some clear recommendations about a more devolved infrastructure that can then both have its – be represented at a national UK level but then be given more responsibility to deal with the pandemic at regional local level.

Counsel Inquiry: Mr Burnham, thank you so much.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Thank you very much.

Mr Keating: My Lady, I think you’ve granted permission for questions from one of the core participants?

Lady Hallett: I have.

Mr Weatherby.

Questions From Mr Weatherby KC

Mr Weatherby: Thank you, my Lady.

Mr Burnham, as I think you know, I represent the Covid Bereaved Families for Justice UK group, and you’ve known of that group since it formed because you were, in fact, one of the first public figures to support the call for this public enquiry.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes.

Mr Weatherby KC: I’ve got permission just for two short points, picking up on the matters you have been asked about. I’m just going to ask you about the period in the middle of September and then, briefly, the middle of October.

On 16 September you wrote a letter to Mr Hancock, which I will put up just to remind you of it. It’s INQ000165174.

Now, I’m not going to read through that but it’s a letter from you to Mr Hancock, Secretary of State for Health, setting out a whole raft of proposals for escalation measures to be implemented, quite sophisticated measures to be implemented in Greater Manchester in response to the rising cases across the ten council areas, including support for self-isolation, local food support, services for vulnerable groups, vulnerable people, a call for some changes to local enforcement powers to target enforcement better, and localised enhancement of test, trace and isolate that you’ve already mentioned.

Is that right?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes.

Mr Weatherby KC: Then if we can just flick on to the next page –

Mr Andrew Burnham: I think this is what I was saying a moment ago. This is what a more devolved approach to the pandemic in our view looked like.

Mr Weatherby KC: Yeah. The reason I wanted to put this up is so we can all see, the Inquiry can see, the level of sophistication and thought that Greater Manchester has have put into this. But the second series of bullet points on the second page is – then referred to the other side of the coin, which is what you needed from Government. And that included additional funding to help the self-isolation proposals, you needed some legislative changes to support targeted approach to enforcement, and realistic levels of funding to enable local and time-limited interventions, as you have said. So, again, a sophisticated set of proposals from your side. And then as there’s a list of asks, and of course the perennial need for resources to support that. Is that right?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes.

Mr Weatherby KC: So we can take that down, please, and just briefly put up INQ000165173.

So the next day Mr Hancock responds in a series of WhatsApp messages with you, and I think this rather evidences what you said earlier about him having a cordial, helpful engagement with you on this level; is that right?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes.

Mr Weatherby KC: And he’s checking with you things which were – essentially just needed to be checked over with the latter. You are making clear – at the bottom, is that should be prepared to do localised curfews, your concern about the confusing patchwork of restrictions across the ten council areas, and a clear sense that they are of limited and deficient effectiveness. So you are explaining to Mr Hancock the purpose of your letter and what you need, and that seems to be going all fine in terms of your communication and detail and his orientation to you.

Now, in terms of the financial support, am I right that this was particularly related to low paid and vulnerable groups, because without financial support then there was no way of ensuring the effectiveness of these measures to reduce the high case level?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yes, this was a theme, like I said before we’d raised all the way through. Greater Manchester has a higher number or people who can’t access sick pay or who don’t get paid if they’re not –

Mr Weatherby KC: Yeah, so people on zero hours, people in the gig economy. You mentioned some self-employed people.

Mr Andrew Burnham: There was a survey by UNISON North West early in the pandemic that found that 80 per cent of domiciliary care workers in the north-west said they wouldn’t be able to self-isolate if they were asked to do so because they wouldn’t be paid. It brings home – you know, if you can’t fix that issue, you can’t fix the –

Mr Weatherby KC: Yes, and you are acutely aware of that as the Mayor for the area.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yeah.

Mr Weatherby KC: Now, we’ve looked at the immediate response from Mr Hancock by the WhatsApps, but did this letter of 16 September, did this actually lead to any greater financial resources being provided?

Mr Andrew Burnham: I think there was still modest moves later in 2020, but they were never – there was a scheme to be administered by local authorities, but it never got close to the simplicity of the scheme that myself and the Mayor of the Liverpool City Region were calling for.

Mr Weatherby KC: Yeah, so these extra resources, to a large extent, were not – you were not able to implement them because of a lack of resourcing?

Mr Andrew Burnham: They never were. Yeah, they – we never –

Mr Weatherby KC: Second point, and briefly, fast forward a month, but same theme, 19 October. I just want to put up a note prepared by the Cabinet Office.

INQ000104731.

Again, I’m not going to go through it but I just wanted to prompt your memory.

So this is a note of a meeting with your counsel leaders and Mr Jenrick, Minister of State, and this, I think, was aimed at reaching agreement on Tier 3 and, from your side certainly, a financial support package for Greater Manchester.

I just want to look at the “Headlines” section that’s been highlighted there. The summary, and that’s Robert Jenrick himself, he:

“… summed up by stating there seems to be a lot of common ground, but not on financial support measures.”

Then in the second bullet point he reaffirms that a hardship fund was not an option tabled by Her Majesty’s Government.

Later, we don’t need to go to it, but later in the document Ed Lister raised, and it was agreed, that time wasn’t on anybody’s side, given rapidly increasing infection rates.

The reference to your request for a hardship fund was again, going back to the things we’ve just discussed, assistance for the self-employed and those who simply could not afford to stay off work. Obviously hadn’t been resourced up to that point. Was there any further financial resourcing for these measures or did the Government stick to its guns in terms of saying, “Well, we like your ideas, but we’re just not going to pay for it”?

Mr Andrew Burnham: No, it stuck to its guns. I mean, what we were calling for was money to top up that 67% furlough, that top-up wages point. That’s what that refers to. And the government at that point was saying, “No, you can have 65 million”, which was the core kind of funding that everyone had been offered. And in fact, although they claimed that they were negotiating with us, that was a formula actually that they were applying to everybody in Tier 3.

So the next day we go into the final – because this was 19 October, the next day the 20th, the final conversation I had with Robert Jenrick, that – that was the last person I spoke to before they said, “We are imposing” – well, he told me that – he said, “You’ve been through the whole thing now, we’re going to impose.”

And I said, “Well, we’ve tried to work with you. We don’t think what we’re saying is unreasonable. So I take it with you imposing, you’re imposing what you put on the table, the 65 million.”

“Oh, oh no, there’s no guarantee of that.”

Mr Weatherby KC: Yes?

Mr Andrew Burnham: And what happened was there was then a – I went outside to tell the world that we were having this imposed on us and we tried to avoid it and we tried to get the best that we could and we didn’t agree with it, and it was in the middle of that when a Greater Manchester MP, Lucy Powell, sent a text to my political director saying, “I’m in a meeting with Hancock, he’s telling us about the details of the imposition and he said that we are going to get 25 million.”

So not only did they not guarantee that, they tried to then initially say they were going to punish us with this –

Mr Weatherby KC: With less money?

Mr Andrew Burnham: Yeah. And this is – this is how this whole – at this stage, how this whole thing was handled. It was like classic divide and rule. And should misters be doing that in the middle of a national emergency? No, they should not.

Mr Weatherby: I had a third point but you have already answered it, so thank you, Mr Burnham.

Mr Andrew Burnham: Thank you.

Lady Hallett: Thank you, Mr Weatherby.

Mr Keating, that completes the questions for Mr Burnham?

Mr Keating: It does, my Lady.

Lady Hallett: Mr Burnham, thank you very much indeed for your help.

The Witness: Thank you very much, thank you.

Lady Hallett: Right, for the time being – encouraged to take a break now. I shall return at 3.25.

(3.10 pm)

(A short break)

(3.25 pm)

Lady Hallett: Ms Cecil.

Ms Cecil: Indeed, my Lady.

May I call Steve Rotheram, please, the Mayor of Liverpool City Region.

Lady Hallett: Sorry to have kept you waiting.