3. Dame Morgan

DAME SHAN MORGAN (affirmed).

Questions From Lead Counsel to the Inquiry for Module 2B

Mr Poole: Could you please start by giving us your full name.

Dame Morgan: My name is Shan Elizabeth Morgan.

Lead 2B: As you give your evidence this afternoon, if I could ask you to keep your voice up so that we can hear you but also so that your evidence can be recorded. If I ask you anything you don’t understand, please do ask me to rephrase it. Dame Shan, you have provided a witness statement to this module, we have it there on the display, you’ve signed that on 13 December last year. I was going to say, are the contents true to the best of your knowledge and belief, but before I do that, I think you need to make a couple of corrections, if I just walk you through those. If we can, sorry, have page 18 of the witness statement up, just see if those have been made already. No they haven’t.

Now I understand that the meetings you refer to these paragraphs, so paragraphs 60, 61 and 62 as being hosted by Mark Sedwill, which you refer to as Covid-O meetings, were in fact Cabinet Secretary meetings, not Covid-O meetings, and you did not attend any Covid-O meetings; is that right?

Dame Morgan: That’s right.

Lead 2B: We will make those corrections to those paragraphs 60, 61 and 62. Other than those corrections, are the contents of that statement true to the best of your knowledge and belief?

Dame Morgan: Yes.

Lead 2B: I’m grateful.

You were asked to provide a witness statement to this module in your capacity as the former permanent secretary of the Welsh Government. In particular, you were asked to outline any role you played in key decisions that were made by the Welsh Government during the pandemic. Before I ask you questions about that, can I just start with a few questions about your career.

You joined the civil service in 1977. You were then seconded to the European Commission in Brussels between 1984 and 1987, before returning to the UK where you were appointed private secretary to the permanent secretary of the employment department within the UK Government in 1990.

You were appointed head of the employment and training strategy unit at the Government Office for London in 1992.

In 1997, you were seconded to the British Embassy in Paris as labour and social affairs attacheé, and served as ambassador to Argentina and Paraguay between 2008 and 2012.

And then in 2017 you were appointed as the Welsh Government permanent secretary, and also appointed Dame Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George; and I think I’m right in saying that you retired from the civil service in October 2021.

Is all of that accurate?

Dame Morgan: It’s all accurate.

Lead 2B: Start with some questions, if I may, then, about the structures of the Welsh Government.

If we can please have on screen INQ000066086. This shows the organisational structure of the Welsh Government as at November 2019, so namely the organisational structure going into the pandemic in January 2020.

We can see at the top the First Minister, below him a number of Welsh ministers and deputy ministers, and then we see your former role as permanent secretary sitting below those ministers and deputy ministers.

Now, we’ll come on to the specifics of your role in a moment, but essentially am I right that the permanent secretary is the head of the civil service within the Welsh Government?

Dame Morgan: That’s correct.

Lead 2B: You have the director generals, each of those director generals that we can see there, the four of them at that stage, each of those are senior civil servants reporting to you; is that correct?

Dame Morgan: It is.

Lead 2B: Now, Andrew Goodall, in his witness statement to the Inquiry, who we’ll be also hearing from tomorrow morning, he has said that:

“Despite the range of responsibilities we [namely the Welsh Government] are a compact administration. All ministers and senior leaders are under one roof and are frequently in the same room together. This enables the organisation to take advantage of being able to work in a highly integrated way, and make decisions at pace.”

Do you agree with that description that he gives of the Welsh Government?

Dame Morgan: Yes, I do.

Lead 2B: Professor Wincott, whom we heard from last week, he gave evidence that initially one might get the impression that the decision-making processes in the Welsh Government are overly complex, but he went on to say that having worked through the full body of material that he had been provided with to provide his report, he said a rather more coherent pattern of response from the Welsh Government has come into focus. Do you have any comments on Professor Wincott’s evidence in that regard?

Dame Morgan: Yes, I think that’s – I can understand why he made that comment. I think it’s fair to say two things: first, that the structures evolved over time and I think became less complex; and, second, that in any case because the Welsh Government is a very small organisation people knew each other very well and they were often on the different – the same person might be on different structures within the Welsh Government, and that meant that people were very well integrated.

Lead 2B: So would you say that being a compact administration was an advantage when it came to decision-making during the pandemic?

Dame Morgan: I think it was.

Lead 2B: Turning then to your former role as permanent secretary and the role of the civil service in Wales generally, all civil servants in Wales are bound by the Civil Service Code and, as such, they’re expected to carry out their roles with dedication and commitment to the core values of the civil service, namely integrity, honesty, objectivity and impartiality.

Now, you say in your witness statement that, for all practical purposes, as permanent secretary you were accountable to the First Minister. Just tell me, what does that mean in practice?

Dame Morgan: It meant that in practice I was clear that it was the First Minister who set my priorities for action, and in fact who made a very significant contribution to my annual civil service appraisal. My line manager formally was the Cabinet Secretary, but it was very clear in my contract and in the ways of working that I was very directly accountable to the First Minister for everything I did in that role.

Lead 2B: You describe in your witness statement the role of permanent secretary as having three main components. Perhaps if I just identify those: first, principal accounting officer. So by that you mean managing and accounting the proper expenditure of public money; is that right?

Dame Morgan: That’s right.

Lead 2B: Second, as we have discussed, leading the Welsh civil service; and then third, you were principal policy adviser to the First Minister.

Just as regards that third aspect of the role, would it be right to say you had general responsibility for overseeing the quality of advice that was presented to the First Minister and also Welsh ministers, but you were not directly involved in the provision of advice itself?

Dame Morgan: That is correct.

Lead 2B: You go on to say in your witness statement that:

“In practical terms, my responsibility as Permanent Secretary was to ensure that the right people were in the key positions supporting Ministers and that they had the right skills, experience and support to discharge those roles effectively.”

Did you find that at all challenging during the pandemic?

Dame Morgan: It was challenging in that, again, being a small organisation, there was a relatively small central core, if you like, of people who had the high level policy skills that ministers needed in order to prepare actions for the pandemic to prepare legislation, so we were heavily reliant on a relatively small core of people at the centre.

Lead 2B: Would it be right to say that the Welsh Cabinet is the central decision-making body of the Welsh Government?

Dame Morgan: It would be absolutely right.

Lead 2B: And that remained the case, as far as you’re concerned, throughout the pandemic?

Dame Morgan: That’s right.

Lead 2B: Now, as permanent secretary you attended meetings of the Welsh Cabinet, but you say in your statement you intervened rarely and, when you did, this was in your capacity as principal accounting officer. By that do you mean your interventions would usually concern sort of staff, budgetary issues?

Dame Morgan: Exactly so.

Lead 2B: Although the Cabinet led on collective decisions relating to the Welsh Government’s pandemic response, obviously individual ministers were required to make decisions in their own portfolios; that’s right, isn’t it?

Dame Morgan: That’s right.

Lead 2B: I just want to explore with you now some points about what informed decision-making during the pandemic. I’ll start, if I may, with the ministerial advice process. Can you just explain – we’ve got an example up on screen very helpfully, this is from 22 March – but can you just explain what a ministerial advice document is?

Dame Morgan: It is a classic civil service submission, policy submission document. So it will be drafted by the relevant civil servants and they will identify the key issues, they will set out a range of options, the impact of the different options, and they will give advice to the relevant minister about the range of options.

Lead 2B: So if we just look at this by way of example, not really the substance of it, we can see the top right where it’s come from. So it’s come, in this case, from the public health division. We can see who has cleared it, and we can see the date it’s been generated. And then perhaps if we can just come out – thank you – to the table, there we can see who needs to make a decision. So for this particular ministerial advice, a decision was needed.

Perhaps if we can, sorry, scroll out – sorry, the words in bold – we can see a decision there was needed by the whole Cabinet in this example, and then the table summarises the advice what’s been recommended and the timing.

Obviously the advice is then set out in the body of the document, and if we could go please to page 6, the annex that we see there, this is called clearance tracking. So am I right this identifies if the ministerial advice raises, as we see there, financial legal or governance issues; and then there’s a statement assuring the quality of advice, and then a copy list of who the advice is going to. Is that – that’s all roughly accurate?

Dame Morgan: Totally accurate.

Lead 2B: When would a ministerial advice be used?

Dame Morgan: It would be used on any issue of significance requiring a decision by ministers.

Lead 2B: And who in particular would have input? Presumably it depends on the subject matter of the advice, does it?

Dame Morgan: It does indeed. It would be senior civil service officials who would make sure that they liaised with colleagues in other relevant parts of the organisation to make sure that there was a joined-up response across the whole of the government.

Lead 2B: And how were decisions made under the ministerial advice process recorded?

Dame Morgan: They were recorded through a decision report, which was then normally included on the Welsh Government website.

Lead 2B: So these would be externally facing decision reports?

Dame Morgan: That’s right.

Lead 2B: Now, the ministerial advice that we’ve still got, the example we’re looking at, at page 1, I think it says at the bottom – yes, decision report:

“This decision does not require a decision report.”

Is that just again because of the subject matter of this particular ministerial advice?

Dame Morgan: Yes.

Lead 2B: Because it concerns legislation; is that right?

Dame Morgan: Yes.

Lead 2B: Now, presumably outside this process and definitely during the pandemic, urgent decisions needed to be made that wouldn’t allow time for this process to be followed. Did you have experience of that during the pandemic?

Dame Morgan: Inevitably. The – there were three core elements to decision-making in the Welsh Government. You’ve described the first one, which was ministerial advice on individual policy areas; the second process was Cabinet, where Cabinet papers on generally cross-cutting big issues were prepared, with input from a wide range of civil servants; and the third was the 21-day review process during the pandemic. And I should add that for each of these processes there was also a template setting out the requirement to evaluate the equality impact assessment.

Lead 2B: We’ll be coming to equality impact assessments specifically a bit later on, but just sticking with this process, so ministerial advice, Cabinet and then 21-day review process, what about where an individual minister needed to take an urgent decision, so sort of outside Cabinet? Presumably that happened during the pandemic?

Dame Morgan: There were processes for doing that and for making sure that any such decisions were made on the basis of evidence, and that they were properly recorded.

Lead 2B: When you say “properly recorded”, how would a decision being made by an individual minister, say, outside Cabinet or outside this ministerial advice process? How would they be recorded generally?

Dame Morgan: It would be recorded in pretty much the same way as ministerial advice.

Lead 2B: The Inquiry understands that in April – I think they started on 6 April – was the introduction of daily ministerial calls. Did you participate in those calls?

Dame Morgan: I was present, I think, at all of them, all that I could be present at. They were open to senior officials to attend.

Lead 2B: Again the Inquiry has received evidence to the effect that decisions were not usually taken during these calls unless obviously the urgency of the situation required it. Does that accord with your recollection?

Dame Morgan: That is correct. There were times when I think the need for a decision was flagged up in those calls, it was an opportunity to do that, but the decision would then be taken and recorded outside of those ministerial calls which usually lasted about half an hour a day.

Lead 2B: Change of topic slightly, and ask you some questions now about the Welsh Government executive committee known as ExCo. Can you help us, when was ExCo established?

Dame Morgan: It had been – it had been operating in a similar format when I first arrived in early 2017. I then, if you like, developed it to do what I felt it needed to do, and it became the core corporate decision-making meeting.

Lead 2B: I understand – and I’m right in saying, am I – that you chaired ExCo throughout your time as permanent secretary?

Dame Morgan: I did.

Lead 2B: Just briefly describe the role and function of ExCo, please.

Dame Morgan: ExCo was there to give me assurance that all decisions about corporate issues were taken with all relevant members of the senior Welsh Government team attending and contributing.

Lead 2B: And in terms of membership, am I right then that ExCo comprised director generals and senior policy officials?

Dame Morgan: Yes, largely on the corporate side, because one of the things about the staffing of the Welsh Government is of course it’s not like a Whitehall department, it is a whole of government organisation, and at the time that I was permanent secretary there was no chief operating officer and those functions came under my group, so therefore some of those people needed to be represented at ExCo for those kinds of decisions.

Lead 2B: The Inquiry is aware from Andrew Goodall’s witness statement that as well as ExCo there is something known as the Welsh Government Board. Was that something that was in existence during your tenure as permanent secretary?

Dame Morgan: Very much so, that was a well established body, it met about every six weeks, and it was a body that oversaw governance and general organisational strategy for the Welsh Government. It focused very heavily on governance, risk assessment and preparations of the annual report for the Welsh Government. It also looked after oversight of delivery of the First Minister’s priorities for government, and it would carry out on that basis horizon scans and sort of policy discussions to look at progress.

Lead 2B: I want to next ask you about some changes to the structures that we’ve been talking about, and also changes in personnel that happened during the pandemic.

In your witness statement, paragraph 38 of your witness statement, you explain that a committee named ExCovid was established in February 2020, which you chaired until your departure from the civil service in October 2021; is that right?

Dame Morgan: That’s right.

Lead 2B: Just briefly tell us, what was the purpose of ExCovid?

Dame Morgan: The purpose of ExCovid was to bring together the key senior policy officials and operational officials involved in responding to the pandemic. It followed a format that had been successful in preparations for a no-deal Brexit, and therefore I adopted that. So it was a similar but expanded membership to ExCo, which was the sort of corporate decision-making function. ExCovid was not there to take decisions other than in relation to prioritisation of areas of work and re-prioritisation of resources within the organisation.

Lead 2B: In October 2020, I think you decided that ExCovid would undertake a lessons learned exercise. We’ll return to this in a bit more detail later in your evidence, but just turning to one document at this stage.

If I can have INQ000300004 – thank you very much – this is the response of the permanent secretaries group to that lessons learned exercise; so that’s a group that sits under you. On this page under “Observations: What do you think worked less well?”

So we’re looking bottom right, thank you. And then, “For example”, yes:

“For example, ExCovid was set up with the intention of it being the senior decision-making and resource allocation body under Ministers, and I think that its terms of reference still reflect that. But we have found in practice that the pace and breadth of decisions needed made it impossible for ExCovid to fulfil that role and instead it acts in a strategic co-ordination and information-sharing role, which works very well; but is not how we envisaged it at the start.”

So, first question: I mean, do you agree with that comment?

Dame Morgan: Yes, I do.

Lead 2B: Did the actual role played by ExCovid change from its intended role and, if so, why did it change?

Dame Morgan: I think it evolved very quickly indeed to reflect what the organisation needed. It needed to make sure that everybody was joined up, that information was shared across the organisation, that everybody had access to the same understanding of what was happening. But, going back to what I said earlier on, it was very clear that decisions other than about resources, all policy decisions were for ministers.

Lead 2B: Generally, whilst we’re looking at one of these lessons learned documents, do you believe that the lessons learned exercises that were undertaken by ExCovid involved adequate self-reflection on the areas that did require improvement?

Dame Morgan: I think so. I think we got better at it as time went on, and they – I found them incredibly valuable. It was an important mirror for us to look at, and of course it gave rise to follow-up action as well.

Lead 2B: As of December 2021, I understand that ExCovid’s role and remit were transferred to ExCo. Now, I appreciate you had left post by this time. Are you able to comment as to why it transferred back to ExCo?

Dame Morgan: I can’t comment from any particular knowledge. I imagine Andrew Goodall, my successor, decided that there was at that point some duplication and the need for ExCovid, which I think we had all felt was a very valid body, had gone away.

Lead 2B: I mean, given that the membership of ExCovid was, as I understand it, the normal membership of ExCo plus I think five additional members, why was it felt that ExCo, which was a body already in existence, couldn’t simply absorb the work that was undertaken by ExCovid? Was there a need for there to be two bodies?

Dame Morgan: I believe there was a need for two bodies. In the beginning ExCovid met, I think, twice a week at the most difficult times and we did something in ExCovid that we didn’t do in ExCo, which was to have what we called deep dives on subjects, which meant that policy officials across the whole of the Welsh Government were being exposed to, for example, the risks involved in a very wide range of policy areas.

Lead 2B: You referred there to deep dives, and I think it’s also known as sort of challenge sessions, and in your witness statement you specifically recall a deep dive into the harms to children and young people. Can you recall what other deep dives were undertaken?

Dame Morgan: There were a very wide range. We looked at the vaccinations programme, we looked at international comparators, we looked at children and young people, I think a couple of times, we looked at care homes, the winter planning of the NHS; a very wide variety over time.

Lead 2B: If I can ask you now about some changes to roles rather than changes to structures.

If we can have a look, please, at INQ000299055. Bottom email, please, on this chain, it’s an email from you on 20 March to the four director generals, copies in a number of other officials within the Welsh Government. Yes, at the top of the page, you say:

“I’m picking up signals that SpAds and Ministers are getting increasingly concerned about a lack of overall coordination on our policy response to Coronavirus.”

Can you explain to me what did you understand those concerns to be and when were they first raised with you? This is obviously an email of 20 March 2020.

Dame Morgan: The concern I picked up was that we weren’t joining up well enough across the whole of the Welsh Government, that was something that I was trying to rectify with the establishment of ExCovid, so we intensified that process.

Lead 2B: You say in this email Andrew Slade – who was at the time, I think, director general for Economy, Skills and Natural Resources – could move some of his senior staff to a wider role within Welsh Government. And then, three paragraphs down, in respect of Tim Render, I think it’s suggested that he says there:

“… head up a new team responsible for policy response co-ordination and strategic planning.”

And then goes on in the fourth paragraph, you say:

“The new team would obviously sit alongside Reg’s role on ECC(W), COBR and LRFs/SCGs, Amelia’s work on shielding and Jo’s role as head of the Preparedness Group. But I’m clear we need some serious forward planning alongside the other excellent teams we have in place.”

Now, at this stage ExCovid had been established, I think Reg Kilpatrick was a member of ExCovid in his capacity as the director with responsibility for civil contingencies and emergency planning. I think I’m right in saying Reg Kilpatrick also led the resilience team which was operating out of the Emergency Coordination Centre Wales, as is acknowledged in this paragraph we’re looking at. Is the new team that’s being proposed in this email, is that the Covid project team, can you recall?

Dame Morgan: The new team with Tim Render was a small, time-limited team. I knew – I’d worked with Tim when I was in Brussels, I knew him well, I knew he had some really good experience when he worked in DEFRA on crisis and emergency planning for dealing with floods. I wanted to bring that expertise into the centre.

Going back to what I said early on, I was conscious that we were heavily reliant on quite a small core of staff and we moved them around, as Andrew Slade agreed to do there. We had to be very flexible, very fast acting to make sure that we were moving people with the right skills to the right place.

Lead 2B: Was this new team, the intention being that Tim Render would head up, was that new team given a name?

Dame Morgan: I don’t remember the name, I’m afraid.

Lead 2B: Could the work of Tim Render, the Covid project team, could that have been absorbed into ExCovid or the resilience team or any other team in existence? I suppose my question is: did there need to be another team added to already a multiplicity of teams?

Dame Morgan: ExCo was not a team, ExCo was a committee. The Covid project team was what evolved over time to provide some of the underpinning work. So Tim sat within that for a while, before he moved back to his previous role in what was called ESNR, working on rural affairs.

Lead 2B: If we could – I think it’s in the same chain but further – yes, further up page 6. Thank you very much. This is an email from Des Clifford, it’s right at the bottom of the page, second paragraph, third line, where he is saying:

“One possible drawback to creating the mooted central policy approach (and I agree that Tim is good at this sort of thing) is that it risks baking in further confusion about accountability … [Document read] … to the central team as opposed to existing directorate structures.”

Did you appreciate the concerns that were being expressed here by Des Clifford about confusions about accountability lines?

Dame Morgan: I did, but I felt I knew the skills that Tim could bring, and he for me was the right person at the right time to add those skills.

Lead 2B: In June 2020 you were involved in the establishment of the recovery secretariat. We don’t need the email, thank you. That was implemented in, as I said, in June 2020 on your advice to the First Minister. Can you just briefly explain why the recovery secretariat was established and what its role was?

Dame Morgan: The recovery secretariat was established to take a forward look. Much of the infrastructure that we’ve talked about so far was about the immediate response to the pandemic, but it became clear that we needed to do more forward planning, forward thinking on how we would work to – towards a recovery, and that’s what the recovery secretariat was there for.

Lead 2B: And Simon Brindle was appointed to the role of director of recovery. In Reg Kilpatrick’s witness statement to the Inquiry, he outlines at around this time – so this is June 2020 – responsibility for the 21-day review process transferred to Simon Brindle. Does that accord with your recollection?

Dame Morgan: It does.

Lead 2B: Was it right that, up until that transfer, it was Reg Kilpatrick that had been responsible for the 21-day review process; is that right?

Dame Morgan: That’s right, it came under him until he was promoted to director general, and then it moved across pretty much the same time to Simon Brindle.

Lead 2B: If we can have on screen, please – I think it’s another organogram, it’s INQ000066097, but this time we’ve moved forward to January 2021. We can see that Reg Kilpatrick, along with being director for local government, is now director general Covid-19, and we see his name at the bottom of that group.

Now, in your witness statement you confirm that in September 2020, following discussions between yourself and the four director generals, and also obviously the agreement of the First Minister, Reg Kilpatrick was appointed to this new director general role.

If we look at this organisational chart, as at January 2021 Reg Kilpatrick, as a new director general, appears obviously still to sit under – within Tracey Burke’s group as director general for education and public services.

Was the intention that Reg Kilpatrick would be a director general, would lead his own group, or sit within one, or was this a distinction without any meaning?

Dame Morgan: The intention was that he should lead his own group, and he did.

Lead 2B: Dame Shan, I’d like to next ask you some questions, then, about informal methods of communication during the pandemic, in particular the policies that were in place during your time as permanent secretary, dealing with the use of informal communications, which obviously include text and WhatsApp.

Just like to look at some of those policies with you. First is a document from January 2020, it’s INQ000396686, it’s called a SIRO notice, Senior Information Risk Owner notice, and it’s entitled “Social media”.

As we can see from the box at the top of this page, the purpose of the notice is to indicate organisation-wide changes to procedures that must be adopted by all divisions of the Welsh Government.

And if we could please go to page 2 of this document, under the heading “WhatsApp” it says:

“A summary of our position on WhatsApp is that its use does not allow us to comply with our legal responsibilities as a data controller. The … [Document read] … may not be used for Welsh Government business.”

Now, it is right, isn’t it, that the Welsh Government did not allow the use of WhatsApp on Welsh Government devices, so Welsh Government mobile phones?

Dame Morgan: That’s right.

Lead 2B: Now, the Inquiry does however understand that a number of Welsh ministers and officials, including yourself, did have WhatsApp on personal mobiles and also, in the case of Welsh ministers, Welsh ministers had WhatsApp enabled on their Senedd mobile phones. You were aware of that?

Dame Morgan: I wasn’t aware of that actually.

Lead 2B: So at the time you weren’t aware of the point I made about the use of WhatsApp on the Senedd phones?

Dame Morgan: Not on the Senedd phones, because I have no – no contact with – direct contact with the Senedd structures. But obviously I was very clear, in line with this memo, that the Welsh Government phones could not support WhatsApp.

Lead 2B: But you were aware – obviously you were using WhatsApp on your own personal mobile; were you aware that Welsh ministers and Welsh officials were using WhatsApp on their personal mobiles?

Dame Morgan: I wasn’t directly aware, but I would have assumed that they would do.

Lead 2B: Now, there’s no definition of “Welsh Government business”, but would you accept that discussing and commenting upon Welsh Government policy on the personal WhatsApp account would fall foul of this notice?

Dame Morgan: I think what this notice is making clear, and what I’m confident didn’t happen, is that no decisions should be taken in relation to Welsh Government business by WhatsApp on private mobiles.

Lead 2B: We’ll come on to the content of some of the messages in a moment, a bit later in your evidence. But it’s right, isn’t it, that throughout the pandemic, whilst you were permanent secretary, you were in a WhatsApp group with Andrew Goodall, Andrew Slade, Tracey Burke? I think that group is frequently referred to as “the quintet”, so that’s a reference to the regular meetings established across the director generals.

So in that group, to take one example, which we’ll come back to in a moment, you sent a message asking:

“Any questions for my phone call with Chris Wormald at 1400 hours.”

Would you agree that a question of that nature, although it is not making a decision, but a question of that nature is conducting Welsh Government business?

Dame Morgan: I would say that it was just a way of getting quick information, much more quickly than by any other route available. It would obviously have come ultimately in an email, so through the proper channels, and after the meeting with Chris Wormald I would have sent round a short note, not via WhatsApp but via email, that could be recorded. So for me that was just a quick heads-up that we needed some urgent action, rather than any kind of decision or business being conducted.

Lady Hallett: For those who don’t know him, Sir Chris Wormald, permanent secretary at the Department of Health and Social Care in the UK Government. Thank you.

Mr Poole: Thank you, my Lady.

So for you the key would be, even if there has been a conversation in WhatsApp, it is recording after the event the – if it is Welsh Government business, that has to be recorded either by an email or some other form that is retained?

Dame Morgan: That is very clear in the guidance.

Lead 2B: We can have a look at a second document, INQ000396685. This is, as it says there, Welsh Government information management and governance policy published August 2018 and then last reviewed February 2019. Can we have a look at page 2, please. It describes the policy, so its policy defines the way Welsh Government information and records should be managed. You’re described as the policy owner. We don’t need to go to it, but you signed this policy off on page 7.

If we could have a look, please, at page 17, paragraph 6.6, it says here:

“Text or ‘instant messages’ are electronic mail and messaging systems used for the … [Document read] … and preserve record content.”

Is that – as we’ve just discussed, that’s putting in black and white what we’ve just discussed, namely the importance of retention of –

Dame Morgan: Exactly.

Lead 2B: – records, if they’re created on, as it says, ephemeral means such as text messages or …

So this policy was informing those working within the Welsh Government about this need for proper management and preservation. This obviously was a policy that was in place throughout the pandemic. That’s right, isn’t it?

We haven’t seen anything – this was in place, although it’s dated “last reviewed February 2019”, it was in place whilst you were permanent secretary?

Dame Morgan: That’s right.

Lead 2B: Now, the next document, please, INQ000396694.

Now, this is an email sent on 29 October 2020. It’s copied to you. If we can just have a look at the second paragraph, please:

“In the last few weeks … [Document read] … civil servant.”

Then it goes on talk about:

“Our corporate platform is … [Document read] … chat feature.”

Prior to receiving this email, were you aware that Welsh Government officials were not following policies, were not recording discussions back to iShare as they should have been, and, perhaps more worryingly, were being pressured into using personal WhatsApp accounts for Welsh Government business?

Dame Morgan: I was not aware that anybody was under any pressure at all to use WhatsApp, personal WhatsApp accounts for Welsh Government business. Had I heard that, then I would have stamped on that immediately, obviously. I had discussed this issue with Peter Kennedy because I was the policy owner myself, so I was aware of his concerns.

I should say in this whole area of informal communications there were, if you like, sort of four safeguards, I think: the messages coming out from directors general themselves, very clear messages about what was acceptable, what needed to be recorded. There were similar messages going to the senior leadership group, the group of Welsh Government directors that met on a regular basis, and we used that for sort of cascading core messages. That was one of them.

We were very conscious that an Inquiry would be coming along in due course, and that we needed to make sure that all records were preserved.

Third point, the circulars, the reminders that you’ve highlighted here.

And then the sort of final element was something we called the internal control questionnaire, which was completed annually as part of the governance process for assuring the annual report, and each director was required to complete a questionnaire which set out the extent to which they had observed all of these practices properly. That was signed off at director general level, and there was subsequently a Welsh Government-wide discussion to make sure that we really had challenged the responses.

So I think that there were four levels, if you like, to give me assurance that the messages were going through that, whilst certain things were acceptable on WhatsApp, any kind of policy discussions or decisions were not acceptable; nothing like that could take place on private or any other WhatsApp.

Lead 2B: With those four levels in place, did it surprise you then when you received on 29 October 2020 this email notifying you that there were people within the organisation, civil servants feeling pressured to use personal WhatsApps to conduct effectively Welsh Government business?

Dame Morgan: I don’t recall specifically, but I’m sure it would have surprised me.

Lead 2B: Can we please look at INQ000396684.

This is the last policy document I want to take you to. It’s called “Guidance on private office records”. It’s dated 17 June 2009. Paragraph 4 on this first page, just talking about really scope of this guidance:

“This guidance applies to all information which is created in any … [Document read] … or government policy.”

Perhaps if we can go to the next paragraph, paragraph 5:

“The records of Special Advisers require separate consideration … [Document read] … might need to be introduced.”

Now, you referred a moment ago to Welsh ministers’ WhatsApp group, which was a chat that was extant during the pandemic. Having looked at the various policies and guidance we’ve just been through, was your reaction to the fact that on 25 November 2021 Jane Runeckles – who is the head of the Welsh Government’s team of special advisers and the special adviser to the First Minister – turned on disappearing messages in that chat?

Dame Morgan: My reaction is surprise, given that there was very clear guidance to all private offices. I should point out that I had at that point left the Welsh Government, so I wouldn’t have been directly aware of it.

Lead 2B: If messages concerning Welsh Government business are not otherwise being retained, as we’ve agreed they should be, would you agree that it is contrary to the policies on record retention that we’ve just been going through to have turned on disappearing messages in a chat involving Welsh Government ministers on 25 November 2021?

Dame Morgan: I have to say personally I’m not familiar enough with the technology to know what that means in practice, but I think the messages were very clear from the circulars and from all of the – all of the instructions that came out to private offices that we needed to maintain proper records, both for the Welsh Government but also for a future Inquiry.

Lead 2B: Final document on this topic, INQ000396461. It’s an email sent to all private secretaries to Welsh Government ministers. It’s dated 19 April 2021. Just reading from the first paragraph:

“As I mentioned at our Heads of Branch meeting last week, it is important that … [Document read] … in iShare …”

Then skipping to the third paragraph:

“Any and all official business that may have been … [Document read] … record of Welsh Government’s business.”

Now, that document from April 2021, that’s some seven months before the disappearing messages function is enabled in the ministers’ WhatsApp chat, and that’s specifically drawing the attention of ministers’ offices to the preservation of information for a future Inquiry.

Do you agree that it’s plain that even if decisions which – you’ve made this distinction earlier – were not being formally taken by informal communication methods, anything of business value, as it says in this email, should be formally summarised, stored in iShare?

Dame Morgan: Yes.

Lead 2B: Whilst you were permanent secretary, are you aware that that is something that was being undertaken in respect of text and WhatsApp messages?

Dame Morgan: It was certainly a message that was given very, very regularly because, as I said, we were immensely conscious that we needed to preserve a proper public record for the future.

Lead 2B: Change topics next, and I’d like to ask about your involvement in the initial phase of the pandemic, so the period January to March 2020. You say in your witness statement that it is difficult to be precise about when you first became aware of Covid-19 in your official capacity, but that you were on the circulation list of an official internal Welsh Government update on the new virus on 30 January 2020.

Now, we know the first meeting of ExCovid took place on 18 February 2020. Would this have been the first meeting that you attended in an official capacity regarding Covid, to your recollection?

Dame Morgan: To the best of my recollection, yes.

Lead 2B: Now, by this time, so mid-February, you were presumably aware that this new virus posed a serious threat to public health in Wales. Were you aware of that?

Dame Morgan: I was aware.

Lead 2B: What work had been done by you, or perhaps your office, prior to this meeting of ExCovid on 18 February, to begin to co-ordinate the response of the Welsh civil service to respond to Covid?

Dame Morgan: I think the first thing to say is that the health professionals led the initial part of the response to Covid, as you would expect, given their expertise. January I recall as a period of great uncertainty, with growing awareness of the threat. That was a time when the health team were focused on linking up with colleagues in the UK Government. I was very conscious that the CMOs, as you may have heard earlier, had a really excellent communication network, so I think during that whole period of January and later February, people were drawing on and strengthening their existing networks to understand what the evidence was telling us, what the data was telling us.

My first meeting of ExCovid, as you said, was 18 February. It followed on from an important email that Reg Kilpatrick sent a little earlier that month drawing everybody’s attention to the fact this was something we needed to prepare for in a more co-ordinated way across the whole of the Welsh Government. He had already stood up the ECC(W) from 5 February, although it had to expand later.

So there was quite a lot of action going on. February, particularly in mid-February, I remember us shifting up a gear and then really continuing with engagement intensifying as we moved towards the period of the lockdown.

Lead 2B: You say in your witness statement that another standard process adopted by ExCovid was the implementation of a risk register, which was a document that recorded the extremely broad range of operational risks that the Welsh Government faced as a result of the pandemic. When was the first risk register produced by ExCovid, can you recall?

Dame Morgan: I think it must have been April or May.

Lead 2B: And who was responsible for producing that?

Dame Morgan: I believe it was Liz Lalley.

Lead 2B: To change topic again and now move on to the co-ordination and relationship with the UK Government, you say in your statement that:

“… I and the Permanent Secretaries for Scotland and Northern Ireland also attended regular informal four-way meetings with the Permanent Secretary for the Department for Health and Social Care, Chris Wormald, who established these meetings in order to exchange views on Covid-19 developments and to share information. The first of these meetings took place on 6 March 2020 and they continued regularly throughout the specified period.”

Now, as we’ve already seen throughout the pandemic there was a WhatsApp group with Andrew Goodall, Andrew Slade, yourself and Tracey Burke.

Can we, please, have that WhatsApp group, INQ000303227. I think we’re beginning at the bottom of page 4, so this is on – yeah.

So top of that page, 17 March, you say, amongst other things – so the second entry at the top of that page, 19.26:

“Thanks for an excellent CovExco. Saw Jane R afterwards … [Document read] … structures and lack of DAs.”

Then Tracey Burke replies at 8.11:

“Quite a download through Shan but best we know it. I … [Document read] … from them…How best to raise? Tracey.”

You then reply at 8.13:

“I have a 3 DAs call this morning I hope and we’ll discuss it. I’m … [Document read] … development we’re seeing.”

Tracey then replies:

“Good. Vital we have sight of work of these groups – vital.”

Then you reply:

“Of course! Signs not good so far…”

Then Andrew Slade replies at 10.04:

“Yes. And I fear [Welsh Government] describing UK [Government’s] Budget … [Document read] … kept quiet on that topic.”

So just focusing, if I may, on the comments made about COBR, what did you understand to be Jane Runeckles’ concerns about the new ministerial structures and, as she says in her WhatsApp, the lack of DAs?

Dame Morgan: I think her concern was the same one that the First Minister had expressed for some time, which was the lack of predictability about structures. COBR meetings happened between about January and May, and they came back again sort of autumn and winter, but they died away in between, during which time there was the ministerial implementation groups, although those too died away. So I think Jane’s concerns I think reflected what I know were the First Minister’s concerns about predictability of communication and engagement structures with the UK Government.

Lead 2B: You referred in your answer to ministerial implementation groups. Now, the Inquiry has heard evidence from Welsh ministers and officials to the effect that although ministerial implementation group meetings took place regularly throughout April and May 2020, they were usually initiated by the UK Government, often at short notice, and they say with the agenda being set by the UK Government. Does that accord with your recollection and your experience at the time?

Dame Morgan: It does.

Lead 2B: Did you have – take any action to secure the attendance of Welsh ministers and officials at those ministerial implementation group meetings?

Dame Morgan: There was a joint letter. Once the ministerial implementation groups started dying away, a joint letter went from me and from my counterparts in the Scottish Government and Northern Ireland to complain about the lack of engagement with the devolved administrations and the failure to establish a structure which would enable us to have the kinds of discussions that we needed to.

Lead 2B: In your view, would there have been a benefit to using the existing Joint Ministerial Committee rather than these newly created ministerial implementation groups?

Dame Morgan: No. The JMC is a very kind of formal structure. It didn’t meet once during the pandemic, which I think is very telling. I believe it has since been revised and strengthened, but it was a very formal and formulaic sort of meeting. I attended a number in my time.

Lead 2B: Returning to some WhatsApp messages, then, we’re looking at INQ000303227. I’m grateful, yes.

We’re – so just to orientate ourselves, 20 March 2020 you sent a message to the group, saying:

“Any [questions] for my phone call with Chris Wormald at 1400?”

Andrew Slade replies:

“From my perspective, his take on lockdown and timing. Lots of intel … [Document read] … useful to have/gauge his view.”

Then at page 6 Andrew Goodall says, so this is at 13.04 is the message:

“The process feels [so it’s second paragraph down] more and more like announcing a concept and working back ASAP in detail and practicalities – this reflects.

“The speed of events has meant that some of the spirit … [Document read] … announcements.

“As we discussed earlier it feels like creeping divergence … [Document read] … raise but happening all round.

“Are we ensuring we are… [Document read] … are doing.”

Then Tracey Burke says at 13.12:

“Yes agree to both Andrews’ points … [Document read] … homes et cetera. Tracey.”

To which you replied at 14.05:

“All excellent points but call now postponed. I can cover them … [Document read] … the Tim team. What do you think?”

Now, the “Tim team”, that’s the reference to the team you envisaged being headed up by Tim Render that we referred to earlier?

Dame Morgan: That’s right.

Lead 2B: In terms of these messages, though, at this time – so this is 20 March – did you feel there was a lack of co-ordination between you and your senior officials within the Welsh Government and your counterparts within the UK Government?

Dame Morgan: I think to be fair things were very fast-moving but, yes, I did. I think there was – there was quite a variation in the degree of engagement between different parts of Whitehall and the devolved administrations. Those departments like DEFRA and actually the Department of Health had a much better understanding of how best to work with devolved administrations. But that was very mixed across the whole of the UK Government.

Lead 2B: What did you understand by Andrew Goodall’s reference in these WhatsApp messages we’ve just seen to “creeping divergence and the spirit of sharing has been disappearing”?

Dame Morgan: I think he – I took it that he was concerned that, from the centre, there were anxieties about differences between the devolved administrations and the UK Government.

Lead 2B: Now, we know – certainly the Inquiry’s heard evidence to the effect – that early June 2020, that’s when MIGs were replaced by Covid-S, which was the Prime Minister’s strategy group, and Covid-O, which was the operations committee now chaired by Mr Gove. The Inquiry understands that the devolved administrations and certainly Welsh Government were not invited to attend Covid-S meetings, and were only invited to attend Covid-O meetings on a standing basis from October 2020. Is that right? Does that accord with your recollection?

Dame Morgan: That’s right.

Lead 2B: I’d like to change topic now and ask some questions, as I said I would earlier, about equality impact assessments.

Now, as with any new policy, when making decisions in respect of NPIs during the pandemic you would accept that there was a general duty, obviously, on the Welsh Government to consider vulnerable groups and those with protected characteristics; yes?

Dame Morgan: Yes.

Lead 2B: The Inquiry understands that no equality impact assessments were carried out for the initial 21-day review of the coronavirus regulations, nor in fact the next three reviews, so there were no equality impact assessments carried out in respect of the restrictions for nearly three months after the initial lockdown; that’s right, isn’t it?

Dame Morgan: My understanding is that there was a great deal of work going on, that there weren’t – that the team were under such pressure and ministers under such pressure that it wasn’t always possible to prepare a formal equality impact assessment, but nonetheless I should emphasise that all three of the decision-making processes that the Welsh Government used involved a detailed template which took the drafters through the process of an equalities impact assessment. We called it an integrated impact assessment, because it covered a very wide range.

So ministerial advice, as I’ve said already, plus Cabinet papers, plus the 21-day cycle, each had their own template for assessing the equalities impact of any policy or restriction or lifting of restrictions that was being considered.

So I think that whilst there were times when there were no formal – no formal impact assessments published, there were – there was always a great deal of thought given to the impact of different restrictions on different communities within the Welsh Government. And not just because there was a template setting it out, but also because I think all of us were very clear that it mattered a great deal to Welsh Government ministers, in particular the First Minister, that we should address all aspects of inequality in everything that we did.

Lead 2B: Now, obviously I can understand that the initial regulations were drafted under exceptional circumstances over a very short space of time, but in respect of the next three 21-day reviews – so obviously, doing the maths, that’s nearly two months – do you accept that full impact assessments could and should have been undertaken for those subsequent 21-day reviews?

Dame Morgan: I do. There was – I received during that period a number of letters from the Reverend Coombs, from the head of the EHRC in Wales, and we had a number of very, very worthwhile and positive discussions together. I had to explain that in the early days it was very difficult to publish equality impact assessments because the resource available within the Welsh Government for translating those impact assessments into Welsh was very thin, and obviously it was a period when we had to prioritise translation of the legislation.

And I should say that, as you might expect, it was not legal for us as a government to publish anything in English only, we had to publish the English and the Welsh versions together. So that was an issue.

I do think that Dr Coombs – I got the impression that she was reassured by the information that we gave her about the work that was actually going on, and that was extremely important, and the commitment that ministers were making in their decision-making process to … the effect of all legislation on different communities within Wales.

Lead 2B: Now, the Inquiry has got, and I think you in fact refer in your witness statement to the correspondence you’ve mentioned with the Reverend Coombs, so there were letters back and forth in July 2020, early 2021, culminating in the response from you on 10 March 2021. Would you say that the process for publishing EIAs improved after March 2021, after you had had that exchange with the Reverend Coombs?

Dame Morgan: I believe it did, although I’m conscious that I had to reply to one of her letters that we’d actually published the impact assessments in the wrong part of the Welsh Government website.

Lead 2B: Now, in Wales there’s a duty under the Rights of Children and Young Persons (Wales) Measure 2011, also the Children’s Rights Scheme 2021, a duty on the Welsh Government to have regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child in exercising its functions which in turn requires considerations of the best interests of the child, and the Children’s Rights Scheme also requires the Welsh Government to undertake a children’s rights impact assessment as part of an integrated assessment.

Now, can you help us, were children’s rights impact assessments undertaken by the Welsh Government?

Dame Morgan: They were, and the Welsh Government website does contain those that were carried out. Just as an example – because I checked this, obviously – in February 2020 there was a children’s rights impact assessment on alert levels and restrictions in Wales. November the same year, there was one on adoption and fostering regulations. The following year there was a children’s rights impact assessment on moving to remote working. They were carried out regularly as separate significant impact assessments on their own, as well as the impact on children and young people being considered in the integrated impact assessments that we’ve been talking about earlier.

Lead 2B: If I can change topic, please, and ask some questions about your engagement during the pandemic with the Welsh Local Government Association.

On 21 March 2020 Chris Llewelyn, who is the chief executive of the WLGA, emailed you and the directors general requesting early engagement with the Welsh Government. Were structures and processes put in place to ensure early and effective engagement with local government?

Dame Morgan: There were already very good networks between officials who needed, for policy and operational reasons, to work closely with local government. So, for example, Reg Kilpatrick had excellent relations with his colleagues in local government in a variety of areas. The same with Tracey Burke, who was the DG responsible for education; for obvious reasons she needed those. What we did, as a result of invitations from the head of the WLGA, Chris Llewelyn, was set up meetings with him and with the 22 – well, the chief execs of the 22 Welsh local authorities in order to exchange views and ideas and concerns.

I would say honestly that I could have done more. I think it would probably have been a very good idea had I invited the chief exec of the WLGA to become a member of ExCovid, or at least come from time to time when there was an area of particular interest. I think I could have done more to establish that level of regular contact, and in retrospect I think I should have established myself a pattern of regular one-to-ones with both the CEO of WLGA and of SOLACE, the Society of Local Authority Chief Executives.

Mr Poole: Dame Shan, they’re all the questions I’ve got for you, but I understand there are some questions from core participants.

Lady Hallett: Yes, Ms Heaven.

Questions From Ms Heaven

Ms Heaven: Thank you, my Lady.

Good afternoon, Dame Shan, I represent the Covid-19 Bereaved Families for Justice.

The first topic, please, is again the issue of WhatsApp and deletion of message chats by members of the Welsh Government.

Just so that you fully understand the context of my question, obviously we’ve had disclosure of extensive WhatsApps and we can see that WhatsApp’s been used for a range of issues by special advisers and Welsh ministers touching on Welsh Government business work related activity from, for example, pre-announcing policy to officials, asking for clarification on government policy, policy discussions, seeking assistance on what officials and ministers should do in certain circumstances.

This is just a short list, but you get the idea.

So you have been asked about the disappearing messages being turned on by Jane Runeckles. I just want to give you another example. There are quite a few, but I’ll just give you another one. To be clear, you’re not in this WhatsApp chat, okay.

This is a WhatsApp chat called “Drake SPADs” and it’s 24 September 2020, and we don’t need to name the SpAd, but there’s a special adviser who says as follows:

“Just realised I’ve deleted the chat on this group for a very long time, will do now and recommend others to do so.”

Then he says noting “I” seems to mean “I have not”, okay.

So, as I said, there are others, I’m just giving you one example. So you’re obviously surprised about the Jane Runeckles turning on deleting messages, but do you agree that if other SPADs, special advisers, are deleting messages and encouraging others to do the same, there was obviously an issue on retention of WhatsApps that went much wider than Jane Runeckles? Is that a fair comment, do you think?

Dame Morgan: I think all I can say that there was a very clear message that had gone to private office about what the proper procedures were. I am not aware personally of the – of the messages that you’re referring to. I did read some of the WhatsApp chain that came through, but it was very long.

Something that struck me that I was certainly reassured by was that where ministers were asking for clarification of particular policy areas or decisions, then the SPADs – and I think it was, from recollection, usually Jane Runeckles – said that they would send an email to set that out.

So I was reassured by that kind of response, but I can’t really comment on the deletion of messages beyond saying that it was very clear from the circulars that had been sent to private office that that was not appropriate, that was not right.

Ms Heaven: No, so if special advisers are deleting messages and encouraging others to do the same, you’d agree that was clearly wrong, shouldn’t have happened?

Dame Morgan: That was not in line with our policy.

Ms Heaven: Did you ever turn on disappearing messages or delete WhatsApps?

Dame Morgan: I didn’t turn on disappearing messages and, as I said earlier, to be honest I wouldn’t know how to, but I know I deleted a few early messages. I have no recollection of why, beyond I suppose just an attempt at housekeeping. But I am very glad that the entire conversation has been made available to the Inquiry, because others and I think notably Andrew Goodall kept all his WhatsApp messages, very properly.

Ms Heaven: Okay, thank you.

I’m going to move on from WhatsApps now to the separate topic of face coverings. And just so that we can situate it, this is 9 June 2020 and, as we know, on that date Vaughan Gething gave a press statement announcing the latest position that the Welsh Government was taking on face coverings. And, I mean, he said a lot in that press conference, but the gist of it was that the Welsh Government was recommending face coverings on social transport – sorry, on public transport where social distancing was not possible, and of course we know by this time the UK Government had announced that on public transport face coverings were mandatory. So at this point on 9 June, we have this divergent approach on public transport, Wales versus England.

So I want to ask you about a WhatsApp exchange where you appear to be discussing this policy announcement. So if we can get up, please, INQ000388424, and it’s 004, please. The entry is right at the bottom.

Now, I appreciate that this – it’s tricky to remember hundreds of WhatsApps, so let me just take you to it. It’s at the very bottom here, and it starts off with – on 9 June at 10.32, you say:

“Hope all goes well at the press conference – it all sounded a bit muddled at 9 am.”

Then we have somebody whose name has been redacted saying:

“A number of heads banged together … [Document read] … from the TFW side.”

Then you respond again:

“Good – huge scope for multiple misinterpretation and face mask militancy.”

Okay. So first of all do you remember this exchange or –

Dame Morgan: Not in detail, I’m afraid.

Ms Heaven: Okay. Well, let me see if I can assist you. So the first thing is you’re talking about something having gone wrong. What had gone wrong? What was the concern around this announcement that had to be made on 9 June which, as we know, was clearly diverging from UK Government policy?

Dame Morgan: I don’t know what had gone wrong.

Ms Heaven: Okay, fine.

Moving on, then, you were talking here about face mask militancy. So that’s your phrase, and just to see if you can assist us with what you meant by that, see if I can assist you, do you mean that there may be a risk that certain people would have a go at other people for not wearing a mask?

Dame Morgan: Yes.

Ms Heaven: Okay.

So just to understand, then, why this was a concern for you: in the context of this policy announcement, was it being anticipated that the Welsh Government divergent approach on face coverings particularly on public transport could result in people having a go at other people, say for example an English person coming on the London train to Wales wearing a mask might then have a go, when they got into Wales, because somebody didn’t have a mask on? Was that what you were concerned about, do you think?

Dame Morgan: I think that would always have been a possibility, but I also think that there was very clear advice given to people about what was – what the rules were in Wales and what the rules were in England.

Ms Heaven: But why, just on this face mask militancy, why are you concerned that there may be face mask militancy? Why was –

Dame Morgan: I was concerned about people being angry.

Ms Heaven: Okay. Why?

Dame Morgan: Because there was such a lot of emotion at the time around the pandemic, not surprisingly, and I was concerned about any anger amongst – amongst people.

Ms Heaven: Does this maybe suggest that there was a degree of hesitancy, certainly within certain quarters of the Welsh Government, about mandating and requiring Welsh people to wear face coverings in public, that there was a hesitancy?

Dame Morgan: I didn’t detect any hesitancy. I think you’ve heard earlier today from Sir Frank, who will have explained to you the advice he gave to the Welsh Government at different times. So I would not say there was any hesitancy. I think the Welsh Government and ministers at all times were very clear about the decisions they had taken. So, no, not hesitancy.

Ms Heaven: What expert evidence did you have to suggest that this concept of face mask militancy was something that had to be considered or given any credence at all? Did you have any expert advice?

Dame Morgan: I had no expert advice, I wouldn’t describe that comment there as … as a comment of significance beyond general concern about people’s reactions to each other when they were under the horrendous pressure of the pandemic.

Ms Heaven: Thank you very much.

Thank you, my Lady, those are my questions.

Lady Hallett: Thank you, Ms Heaven.

I understand that we’ve had some extra questions come in. Mr Gardner, do you have a question?

We’re running out of stenographer time, so just to make sure everybody understands, I will cut people short when we get to the stage where we’re running out of time, over running out of time.

So, Mr Gardner, was there a question you wanted to put?

(Pause)

Lady Hallett: Actually have I got the right …?

Yes, very well, ask your question, Mr Gardner.

Questions From Mr Gardner

Mr Gardner: Dame Morgan, I just want to pick up from where we were in your answers to Counsel to the Inquiry relating to children’s rights impact assessments.

Would you agree with me that for CRIAs to be effective, there should be contemporaneous documents?

Dame Morgan: Sorry, for what to be effective?

Mr Gardner: For them to be effective documents, they should be completed contemporaneously?

Dame Morgan: Ideally, I would agree with that, but there are of course circumstances where it’s not absolutely possible to do that, if there are competing priorities.

Mr Gardner: And how would they go about considering the impact of policies and decisions if they’re not completed contemporaneously?

Dame Morgan: They would draw on contemporaneous evidence. I think that is the point, and that takes us back to the need to record all evidence and how decisions were taken.

Mr Gardner: But how would they be in the mind of the decision-maker if they’re not being completed alongside the decision?

Dame Morgan: The – I think in most cases they were. It depends whether you’re talking about the integrated impact assessment that was carried out at the time of the ministerial advice paper or at the time of the discussion on the 21-day review. If you’re talking about the separate impact assessment on children and human rights, those were very – those were significant documents which inevitably had to draw on a range of information.

Mr Gardner: So in effect am I – would I be correct to say, as Sally Holland said in her evidence, that certainly in the early stages of the pandemic, children’s rights impact assessments were not being habitually undertaken at the time of the decision to which they relate?

Dame Morgan: I think it depend what you mean, because I am confident that none of our ministers would have taken any decisions that had an impact on children and young people without having considered those factors.

Mr Gardner: I’ll come back to that, I think, in the general point, but –

Lady Hallett: I’m not sure you will, Mr Gardner, I’m afraid we’re going to have to cut you short there. I’m sorry.

Mr Gardner: There, my Lady, or just one?

Lady Hallett: There.

Mr Gardner: I’m grateful.

Lady Hallett: I’m sorry, Ms Foubister, I thought you were looking at me quizzically, I’d completely forgotten I’d given permission for you to ask one. You wanted to ask permission to ask a second one, is that right?

Ms Foubister: I think we have two pre-approved ones, and it was a further one, but I can – if we have time, I’ll ask permission –

Lady Hallett: Thank you.

Ms Foubister: – to ask the other ones.

Thank you, my Lady.

Questions From Ms Foubister

Ms Foubister: Good afternoon, Dame Shan, I represent John’s Campaign and Care Rights UK.

I’m going to refer to your witness statement, which is INQ000371233, on page 10 at paragraph 33, and you say at the beginning of this paragraph that you believe that the Welsh Government had a strong focus on vulnerable and at-risk groups, and you cite initiatives such as the BAME advisory group. Do you believe that the government had the care sector in mind?

Dame Morgan: I do believe that.

Ms Foubister: Are there any examples of comparable initiatives in relation to carers or people who require care?

Dame Morgan: I’m afraid not having had notice of the question, I … I can’t give an example that springs to mind, but – but I know that Welsh Government ministers were looking at all vulnerable groups and looking at whatever they could do to manage the pandemic across the whole country. I can’t at the moment think of a specific example. I’m sure there will be an opportunity to do that in later parts of the Inquiry.

Ms Foubister: You explained deep dives to us earlier this afternoon, and you mentioned specifically a deep dive on care homes. Do you recall what that covered and would it have covered, for example, consideration of the indirect harms of the Covid response on people in care homes?

Dame Morgan: I think I referred to a deep dive on social care, and I don’t recollect the detail of that discussion. But the whole point of the deep dives was to look very broadly at the immediate and the longer term impacts of any restrictions, any policy developments. So I am quite sure that we would have covered that.

Ms Foubister: And so just to be clear, because I think earlier you referred to care homes and just then you said social care, would it have covered things like unpaid care, domiciliary care, rather than just being limited to care homes?

Dame Morgan: I don’t recall I’m afraid in sufficient detail to be able to say confidently.

Ms Foubister: My Lady, that leads me to the one we don’t have permission for yet, if there’s time for me to request it.

Lady Hallett: It’s about whether – well, you can ask the first one, which is the health professionals led the initial part of the Covid response.

Ms Foubister: Yes.

So, Dame Shan, earlier you explained that health professionals led the initial part of the Covid response. Does it follow that you considered their involvement became less pronounced as the pandemic progressed and, if so, do you think that was right or do you think they should have remained at the forefront of the response?

Dame Morgan: Not at all, I think the rest of us joined in. It’s that way around, that we went from – we went from a response by the Welsh Government that was led by the excellent health professionals to a Welsh Government-wide response. At the beginning it was the health minister who led in discussions and negotiations with the UK Government, for example, but as time moved on and it was clear that there – what the potential impact of the pandemic might be across Wales, then the whole of the Welsh Government took part in those discussions.

So rather than the health professionals being put on one side, we were heavily dependent on them throughout the whole process, and, as I said, I think Andrew Goodall led that process really outstandingly.

Ms Foubister: Thank you.

Thank you, my Lady.

Lady Hallett: Thank you very much indeed.

Thank you very much for your help, Dame Shan. I’m tempted to ask you what it’s like going from the diplomatic service to running the civil service in Wales, but I think maybe for another time.

Thank you very much for all you have done.

(The witness withdrew)

Lady Hallett: Right, that completes today’s evidence.

Mr Poole: My Lady, it does.

Lady Hallett: We shall return at 10 o’clock tomorrow.

(4.24 pm)

(The hearing adjourned until 10 am on Tuesday, 5 March 2024)