Transcript of Module 2A Public Hearing on 29 January 2024
(10.00 am)
Lady Hallett: Good morning.
Mr Dawson: Good morning, my Lady. The first witness this morning is the Right Honourable Michael Gove MP.
1. Mr Michael Gove
MR MICHAEL GOVE (sworn).
Questions From Lead Counsel to the Inquiry for Module 2A
Lady Hallett: Mr Gove, I’m sorry that we have had to call you back again.
The Witness: Not at all.
Lady Hallett: I do understand the difficulties it may cause, but it was necessary, I’m afraid.
The Witness: Of course. Thank you.
Mr Dawson: You are Michael Gove?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: You have helpfully provided a number of statements to the Inquiry, but two particularly to this module. The first, if we could have it up, please, is INQ000371583.
It’s a statement dated 14 December 2023. Is that your statement?
Mr Michael Gove: It is.
Lead 2A: You have signed the statement?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: Do the contents of that statement remain true and accurate as far as you’re concerned?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: You have helpfully also provided us with an additional short statement, supplementary statement, with the reference INQ000236648. This is a statement dated 25 January 2024. Is that also your statement?
Mr Michael Gove: It is.
Lead 2A: Have you signed that statement?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: Do the contents of that statement remain true and accurate as far as you’re concerned?
Mr Michael Gove: They do.
Lead 2A: Thank you.
You’re a member of the UK Parliament for Surrey Heath?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: You were first elected to the UK Parliament in 2005; is that correct?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: You are currently the Secretary of State for Levelling up, Housing and Communities?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: You’re also currently the minister for intergovernmental relations?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: In your statement, you explain that you became significantly less involved in any aspect of the pandemic response after September 2021; is that broadly correct?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes, it is.
Lead 2A: In the period between January 2020 and September 2021, you were the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: From mid-February 2020 you became Minister for the Cabinet Office?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: And after September 2021, you continued to have contact with the devolved administrations, including the Scottish Government, in your post as minister for intergovernmental relations, but not in the context of the pandemic response; is that correct?
Mr Michael Gove: That is correct.
Lead 2A: As I say, you’ve given evidence already in connections with modules 1 and 2, both in statement form and in oral evidence. You are here today to give evidence in relation to the Scottish Government’s decision-making and, indeed, the UK Government’s decision-making insofar as it related to Scotland. I understand that you performed a role during the course of the pandemic as the minister in the UK Government who acted as something of a conduit between the two governments. Would that be fair?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes, it would.
Lead 2A: Over what period did you perform that role?
Mr Michael Gove: Essentially from the very beginning of the pandemic until the reshuffle in September of 2021 when I was appointed to my current post.
Lead 2A: Would it be fair to say that in the exercise of that particular role, although you didn’t hold principal ministerial responsibility for a number of areas, you are required to keep abreast of developments within both the UK Government and the Scottish Government with regard to the pandemic, so as to be able, intelligently, to be able to discuss with the Scottish Government matters relating to the pandemic response across the UK?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes, to the best of my ability.
Lead 2A: Thank you.
I’d like to ask you some questions about the interaction between the devolution settlement and the pandemic response. The module has already heard significant evidence about the devolution settlement.
Is it fair to say, as we’ve heard from other witnesses, that although the Scottish Government and the UK Government make decisions separately as regards matters within their respective devolved and reserved competencies, one might say that they share overall responsibility for policy decisions that impact Scotland?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: Reserved UK Government and devolved Scottish Government policies both impact outcomes in Scotland?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: And decisions, even decisions made by the UK Government with regard to its exclusive areas of competence in other parts of the United Kingdom, will have had an indirect effect on matters within Scotland as well?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: That’s perhaps because although these structures are man-made structures, the virus and its epidemiological flow did not respect those borders and structures?
Mr Michael Gove: Precisely so.
Lead 2A: At all relevant times during the pandemic, the Scottish Government had devolved responsibility for public health, the health of Scotland more generally, the NHS, including hospitals, schools and the social care sector is that your understanding?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: In your evidence to Module 2, you were asked some questions about this area, and you said on 28 November. It’s at the transcript at page 116, which is available on the website:
“… health is devolved and public health is devolved, but there is a distinction, I think, between two different types of public health intervention. On the one hand there’s the straightforward public health intervention, like keeping ourselves healthier, how much fruit do we eat and so on. That’s quite properly a matter for the devolved administrations.
“But when you are dealing with a pandemic and a pandemic which is raging across one island, Great Britain, then I do think that there is a case for saying that there can and should be certain UK-wide powers exercised at the centre.
I think that it is an open question, to draw that distinction between two different types of public health interventions because, again, one of the points that Michelle O’Neill makes, very fairly, is that the island of Ireland is a single epidemiological area. It was always regarded so in forms of animal health and a fortiori in terms of human health. So, again, these are difficult issues to manage and I wouldn’t say that this was a view that I hold passionately but I do think that the whole question about how you can ensure that the UK Government, short of the Civil Contingencies Act, can say, ‘Look, we need to override some of the independent decision-making you might make’, I think that’s worth considering.”
Was it fair to say that, in advance of the pandemic, it was reasonably foreseeable that in a health emergency of the nature of the pandemic which the UK faced, it would require, given the underlying devolution settlement, a degree of cross-border co-operation?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: Would you say that it was necessary for there to be clarity as regards precisely what fell within the ambit of the Scottish Government’s responsibility under the devolution settlement and what it was that the UK Government would do insofar as impacted upon Scotland?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes, and I think that there is a case for greater clarity overall about devolved and reserved responsibilities.
Lead 2A: Would it have been possible for greater clarity in that regard to have been achieved, given the fact that it was reasonably foreseeable in such a situation that cross-border co-operation would be necessary?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes, I think that, again, we dealt with a virus which was unprecedented in the speed with which it spread and also its lethality, but it is certainly the case that the devolution settlement evolves over time and we can learn from how we responded to this virus to consider how the devolution settlement might be improved in the future. It is of course perfectly open to conclude that no constitutional settlement will ever be perfect and that the current division of responsibilities is broadly right.
Lead 2A: But clarity in this regard, in order to maximise the effectiveness of the response, is really key, isn’t it?
Mr Michael Gove: Clarity is always helpful.
Lead 2A: Is the distinction that you made in your evidence in Module 2 between public health matters, which are clearly devolved, eating more fruit you refer to – we actually heard from Professor Devi Sridhar, public health expert, who talked about measures to fight obesity, smoking, alcohol consumption, all of which she had some involvement in. Is the distinction between that type of public health responsibility and some other type of public health responsibility a constitutional legal principle as far as you’re concerned?
Mr Michael Gove: No, I believe that it’s a practical operational question, and it relates of course to how we can protect the health of everyone within a particular geographic entity, in this case the island that is Great Britain. So a case has been made, and it’s one for which I’m sympathetic, that when one is thinking of some biosecurity measures in respect of dealing with a virus, for example questions over international travel or testing at the border, that there is a case for saying that that should be a UK-wide responsibility, exercised by the UK Government, and I submit to the Inquiry that this is a legitimate and respectable point of view, but, as I say, there can be arguments either way about the wisdom of going down that route, but it is certainly a case with which I have sympathy.
Lead 2A: As far as the position of the UK Government during the course of the pandemic is concerned, was it your and the UK Government’s position that the Scottish Government was responsible for matters of public health such as eating more fruit, but overall the UK Government retained responsibility for the management of the virus?
Mr Michael Gove: No, I think that it was clear from what happened during the course of the pandemic that the Scottish Government was responsible for deciding the non-pharmaceutical interventions that it believed were necessary in order to curtail the spread of the virus.
Lead 2A: Did issues around the division of responsibility in this regard remain contentious or difficult throughout the pandemic, in particular as a result of your particular experience of dealing with the Scottish Government in your four nations meetings?
Mr Michael Gove: No, I think in my evidence I make the point that of course there were differences in approach and of course we had different political parties operating across the United Kingdom, but the day-to-day management of the virus and the day-to-day responsibilities exercised by ministers in the devolved administrations and in the UK Government was for the most part constructive.
Lead 2A: My question was directed at trying to understand whether there was difficulty as regards the constitutional divide, rather than – a subject we’ll get on to – the personal interrelationships between people involved. What I was seeking to get at was: did it remain an issue as to what was the UK Government’s responsibility, what was the Scottish Government’s responsibility, which may of course have affected the – impacted upon the effectiveness of the overall response?
Mr Michael Gove: I wouldn’t want to jump the gun, but I suspect that some might, in this module, want to make a point about the degree of fiscal devolution that the Scottish Government enjoys and whether or not that should be greater and whether or not that would enable the Scottish Government or a future Scottish Government to respond more effectively. I’ve outlined my views on that question and I’m happy to return to them and, indeed, expand on them. But during the course of the pandemic I did not see any real angst about the constitutional situation presenting effective decision-making and an effective response.
Lead 2A: You mentioned in your earlier evidence the possibility, which I know you’ve discussed already with others in previous modules, that the way in which the pandemic management division, if you like, could have been approached was the use of the Civil Contingencies Act. You mention something “short of the Civil Contingencies Act” in your previous evidence. Would it not have been – if the UK Government wished to exercise a wider control over matters of public health, would it not have been an option, a preferable option, for the UK Government to have approached the division of responsibilities through that legal mechanism, about which we have, again, heard a little from previous witnesses?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes, I do believe so. The Civil Contingencies Act is designed to deal with a catastrophic coming from a clear blue sky, a terrorist incident or a hostile state actor unleashing the sort of havoc that requires an immediate emergency response, and also it involves the curtailment of independent action and liberty to an extent that I think most people would find difficult to take, save in such a particular emergency. But I do think that it’s worth looking at the operation of the Civil Contingencies Act and considering whether or not, between that quite powerful intervention and the other interventions that we saw exercised during the course of the pandemic, might there be a need for a new mechanism or a new way of operating in order to deal with potential future threats to public health or safety.
Lead 2A: Was this not literally a catastrophe that came from a clear blue sky?
Mr Michael Gove: No, because while it was undoubtedly a horrendous period in the life of our nations and the loss of life and the pain suffered by many was momentous, the threshold for the Civil Contingencies Act I think is rightly very high, and it is the case that, whatever successes or failures there were in the management of the pandemic, we could see the pandemic coming. It wasn’t as though it were, as I say, like a terrorist attack, when you move from a moment of peace and serenity to the sudden, dramatic loss of life that such an intervention might precipitate, or, as I say, a foreign state actor attacking. And the Civil Contingencies Act, by its very nature, leads to the centralisation of powers, the restrictions of liberties, but one would have to clear a very high threshold before initiating.
So my own view is that the Civil Contingencies Act is too draconian an instrument in many cases for the sorts of challenges that we might face in the future.
Lead 2A: The practical result, had that course been followed, I think you’ve already explained to us, but just to be clear, would have been that the UK Government would have had greater power over the way in which the pandemic was managed across the nations of the United Kingdom. Is that broadly correct?
Mr Michael Gove: It would have done, and –
Lead 2A: Yes, it would –
Mr Michael Gove: Yeah, and it would have had greater power over and control over the actions of local government and individuals and civil society. It is, as I say, a – by “draconian” I don’t mean to say that it’s never capable of being used, but it should only be used in very sparing and exceptional circumstances.
Lead 2A: In the end, the way in which the pandemic was managed – we’ve heard some evidence from a political expert who talked about the civil contingencies route or the public health route –
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: – being two options. The public health route was ultimately the one that was taken, if we can use that as a label; is that fair?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: What happened was that legislation went through the UK Parliament, which became the Coronavirus Act 2020. In the schedules to that Act, specific powers to do things like impose restrictions and ultimately lockdowns were accorded to the Scottish Government; is that correct?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: And those powers became vested in the Scottish Government on 26 March 2020?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: Was it your understanding of the Scottish Government’s position prior to that point that it was of the view that it had the constitutional power to impose restrictions and lockdowns in any event?
Mr Michael Gove: I believe that – I don’t know what the Scottish Government thought, but I do believe that the Scottish Government, if the UK Government had chosen not to act, would undoubtedly have pressed us to grant them powers in order to be able to have the sorts of interventions, the non-pharmaceutical interventions, the lockdown powers that were subsequently exercised.
Lead 2A: But your understanding, do I take from that, was that the – of their position – Scottish Government thought that those powers would require to be granted to them, ie they did not have them?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: So as far as the legislative framework is concerned, the powers to manage matters of public health, to impose restriction, lockdowns or anything short of a lockdown became clear, at least, on 26 March; is that correct?
Mr Michael Gove: It certainly – they were further clarified. I think one of my experiences of devolution is that at different points, in issues arguably less important, the Scottish Government has pushed at the boundaries of the devolution settlement in order to establish that which it can do. It’s inherent in the Scotland Act that those things which are reserved are listed and specified, but not those things which are devolved, and there is an argument put forward by the Scottish Government and others that anything that is not explicitly reserved is devolved and, therefore, it is open to the Scottish Government to – and the Scottish Parliament, to legislate in those areas. I won’t stray further into that debate now, but –
Lead 2A: Thank you.
Mr Michael Gove: – it is certainly the case that some would have argued that even if the UK Government had been idle, that the Scottish Government and the Scottish Parliament would have been empowered to legislate in this area.
Lead 2A: Despite, as I think you’ve accepted, the reasonable foreseeability of the need to have a cohesive, co-ordinated UK response in an emergency such as this, and the preferability at least of clarity around devolved and reserved competencies, this was not a matter which had been discussed or sorted out between the governments before the pandemic arrived, was it?
Mr Michael Gove: No, but there were regular occasions where the UK Government and devolved administrations would work together to consider how to deal with civil contingencies, and there were also arrangements to discuss how they might deal with pandemics, particularly, as has been discussed elsewhere, the prospect of a flu pandemic, which was the principal operating assumption when it came to a public health emergency that the UK Government was operating to.
Lead 2A: If there were a concern on the part of the UK Government that the Scottish Government tended to try to push the boundaries of devolution based on previous experience, it would have been perfectly open to the UK Government to clarify the boundaries between each government’s area of responsibility in advance as part of those preparedness exercises, would it not?
Mr Michael Gove: It would be possible, however precisely given the tendency, particularly under the Scottish National Party, to see if the devolution boundaries can be pushed, one can’t anticipate all of the areas where a Scottish Government might choose to push those boundaries. Again, one of the emerging challenges that we all face across the world at the moment is artificial intelligence. At the time of the Scotland Act AI was not a concept with which any of us were particularly familiar. There is an open question, probably not for this Inquiry so I shan’t labour the point, as to whether or not artificial intelligence and the threat that it potentially poses if not properly regulated should be regulated at a UK level or at a Scotland or devolved administration level. Again, my argument would be that we should have that discussion now, but we can’t always anticipate every future challenge that we may have to face, or indeed every future initiative that a duly elected Scottish Government might wish to press.
Lead 2A: In contradistinction to the concept of artificial intelligence, Mr Gove, public health was a matter which – to which, as you’ve said, a considerable amount of attention was paid in advance of the pandemic, therefore it was entirely predictable that public health was a matter which required a degree of clarification as to the constitutional boundaries?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes, but I don’t believe that in the response to the pandemic that the constitutional questions, which are of course of great interest, actually impeded day-to-day our response. So yes, in a perfect world, a greater degree of constitutional clarity on some of these questions would be preferable, but in the practical day-to-day operation of responding to the pandemic and the virus, I don’t believe that these were material considerations.
Lead 2A: Could I – you’ll be pleased to hear, Mr Gove, I don’t intend to take you through vast reams of WhatsApp messages, but I will take you to a few.
If we could turn, please, to INQ000163134, please.
These are messages that I understand were provided to the Inquiry by Mr Hancock, and they relate to discussions around a four nations approach to the governance of the Joint Biosecurity Centre in May 2020.
Do you recall the discussions around that issue at that time?
Mr Michael Gove: I do.
Lead 2A: The Joint Biosecurity Centre, I think, was formed as a new directorate within the Department of Health and Social Care in June 2020, eventually, to bring together data science assessment and public health information and expertise to assist in the fight against the virus. Is that a fair description, broadly?
Mr Michael Gove: Totally.
Lead 2A: Thank you.
Can we just look at these, please. These messages say – if we start at 30 May, 2.14 pm, it is said there that the owner of the cellphone, who we understand to be Mr Hancock, says:
“Yes. It should be a UK body like MI5. Pandemic response is a reserved responsibility. It’s the actions taken in response that are devolved.”
To which you respond:
“The sub (which I think should have gone 2 u) takes a different view – based on ‘legal advice’. Do let me know if you haven’t been sent it.”
Then the response thereafter from Mr Hancock is:
“I’ve now read the sub. I’m very unhappy with it. The JBC is designed as a UK institution that gathers and analyses data. It executes via many different agencies, local authorities, devolveds, OGDs etc. But there is no need for it to be run through a committee of the four nations. We wouldn’t put English local authorities on the board!”
Then at 9.01 Mr Hancock says:
“The advice this sub is based on wrongly states that ‘public health is devolved’. That is not true. Parts of public health are devolved (fat fighting; local response) but public health emergencies are a reserved matter. How can a sub on such an important matter miss such a critical part of the devolution settlement?
“Let’s discuss in the morning – this clearly needs sorting out.”
So, broadly speaking, what’s happening here is there’s a discussion over the extent to which this is – the Joint Biosecurity Centre would be a matter for UK Government control; is that right?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: And Mr Hancock has seen this as part of a more general attitude that he appears to have towards the way in which the public health response is being co-ordinated, saying, “The JBC falls within our remit” – the UK Government remit – “because the public health response more generally, in terms of policymaking, falls within our remit”; is that broadly correct?
Mr Michael Gove: That was Matt’s view –
Lead 2A: Yes.
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: And what you are doing here is you are bringing to his attention a submission, it would appear to be a legal submission, a piece of advice, which tends to suggest that that interpretation of the devolution settlement may not be correct; is that right?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes. And I think this goes very much to our earlier discussion. In the end, when the JBC was set up, as I think I mention in paragraph 74 of my evidence to this module, health ministers from all four administrations were on a ministerial board and the devolved administrations were represented on the Joint Biosecurity Centre steering board and technical board. So Matt, again – as the Inquiry has heard, Matt, and I think this was a good thing, was a bullish, determined, energetic minister who wanted to ensure that there was rapid and effective action taken in dealing with the virus. My responsibility was to seek to make sure that we worked effectively with all of the devolved administrations, so I didn’t seek to temper Matt’s energy, but I did seek to ensure that we were operating on all fours with the devolved administrations, and in the end we had an effective JBC broadly in line with Matt’s wishes but one which also involved the devolved administrations and which benefitted all.
Lead 2A: Is this, Mr Gove, indicative of a wider attitude within the UK Government, at least up to this point, that the UK Government was really in control of policy across the United Kingdom with regard to the management of the pandemic?
Mr Michael Gove: No, I don’t believe so, no. I think that at different times, naturally, there were some within the UK Government that occasionally found it irksome that they might have to deal with devolved administrations taking a different view, but overall the way in which the UK Government worked was respectful towards and inclusive towards the devolved administrations. So there may have been moments when individuals expressed – as energetic and determined individuals, anxious to see action this day, they may have expressed irritation at the need to, you know, take account of the devolved administrations but they would also at different times have expressed perhaps irritation with how Public Health England or another part of the government machinery were operating. It’s not, I think, a fundamental lack of respect, it’s simply an outworking of the energetic impulse of well meaning and public spirited individuals.
Lead 2A: It may not be a question of lack of respect, Mr Gove, but it is, I think, an indication as to Mr Hancock, who, let’s be fair, was a central part of the UK Government’s response –
Mr Michael Gove: Oh, yes.
Lead 2A: – it’s an indication of his understanding of the constitutional position. Despite legal advice to the contrary he is of the view that public health is devolved, and that – that public health is not devolved and that that statement was incorrect?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes, but I think I would balance that against the formidable array of evidence which shows Matt working collaboratively and effectively with health ministers across the United Kingdom. So Matt expresses a view, that view is born of his desire to press ahead energetically, but at the same time this is one conversation, an important one, but set against that there are the multiple, not just conversations but agreements and shared actions that Matt, Jeane Freeman, Humza Yousaf and others were responsible for.
So a single conversation of this kind shouldn’t be taken as evidence of the broader attitude that either Matt or the UK Government took to effective and co-ordinated work.
Lead 2A: It’s your understanding and perspective, as you said, that Mr Hancock and others in the UK Government worked collaboratively and effectively with the Scottish Government, and indeed the other devolved administrations, over this period. It is a consistent theme, however, of the Scottish Government evidence that, when attending or engaging in these apparently – or – these collaborative exercises, they felt very much that decisions had already been made by the UK Government and that they were simply being invited to be told what those decisions were. Their position is, in effect, as Mr Hancock seems to be expressing here, that the UK Government thought itself responsible for the public health response across the United Kingdom and that they were merely to be told what the decisions had already been, what they already were.
Mr Michael Gove: I don’t think that the – the actual evidence would justify that. It was the case, at different points, that the Scottish Government, and indeed other devolved administrations, chose a different path. My view was – and I think, to be fair, the view of most of those working in the devolved administrations was – that effective co-ordination and indeed a unified approach wherever possible was desirable, however there were occasions where the Scottish Government chose a different communication strategy, a different set of lockdown metrics, different ratios for when people could meet outside and so on, and we not only respected that but sought to work with the devolved administrations in that area. There were other areas, though, where it was undoubtedly the case that it was the strength of the UK Government that was enable – that was able to help everyone within the UK to respond better. We would not have been able to secure the effective vaccine roll-out that we did without the UK Government playing the role that it did in setting up the Vaccine Taskforce and so on. Of course the Scottish Government and those working within the Scottish NHS played a heroic role in supporting that, I would take nothing away from them, but I think it is important to recognise that there were critical elements of the pandemic response where we benefitted from having the broad shoulders of the UK Treasury and indeed the international negotiating and purchasing power of the UK Government.
Lead 2A: I think the timeline is potentially significant here, Mr Gove. What I’m interested in – you referenced the fact that there were times, either as regards public communications policy or the substantive strategy towards the management of the virus more generally, the Scottish Government took a different path. The timing of this is significant, in that we’ve already heard evidence that it was around May 2020 where that divergence, which was not a phrase that the Scottish Government witnesses liked very much, but that divergence started really substantively to occur.
What I’m interested in is why that divergence took place. Is it your position, Mr Gove, that there is no substance to the Scottish Government’s criticism of the UK Government in that in the period up to this point they were excluded from decision-making such that they had to take their own path?
Mr Michael Gove: No, I don’t think that’s a fair characterisation. We strove always to make sure that the views of devolved administrations were heard, respected and fed into UK Government decision-making. There was an intensity to the range of conversations at the beginning of the pandemic response that diminished a little as we moved into a period where it appeared that the virus was in retreat, and then, as the intensity of infection recurred, so the intensity of meetings recurred.
But the UK was not unique in having conversations between the central government and devolved or regional or other governments in how to respond, and again one of the points that I made in my evidence is that the Federal Chancellery in Germany sometimes had to deal with the fact that different Länder were pursuing different policies, and ensuring that there was an effective and unified response across the whole of Germany was a challenge.
So, yes, if you have devolution of any kind, and there were similar situations in France and Spain, then you will sometimes have divergent responses because, as administrations acquire more information about how to fight the virus, though – more options become available, and it is possible for public spirited individuals in different jurisdictions to argue for a slightly more energetic or a slightly more liberal response.
Lead 2A: You mentioned something of the intensity of the initial discussions, we may return to that in a few moments, Mr Gove. You, as you’ve already given evidence in Module 2, were heavily engaged – principally engaged, I think, in what are known as the four nations meetings –
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: – that took place. We know that these took place at different times, with a different level of regularity, and we know some of the matters that were discussed at these meetings.
Was your mission in setting up these four nations meetings to try to do something about the fact that the existing systems for Scottish Government/UK Government collaboration had failed?
Mr Michael Gove: No, I don’t think they had failed. Prior to the pandemic, my role as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster had been to prepare for Britain’s departure from the European Union and the potential eventuality of a no-deal Brexit. In that work, I had a series of meetings, conference calls, Cabinet committee meetings, with representatives, ministers and officials from the devolved administrations, and while of course the Scottish Government and the Welsh Government opposed the course we were on, they recognised that the UK as a whole had made that decision and we worked, I think, constructively during that period, even when it was a very politically contested goal to make sure that we were ready for every eventuality at that time.
And I think that of course it’s open to the Scottish Government to feel that they were not as involved as they should have been at certain points, but I think the reality is that there was frank and open discussion of the delivery options available to us in that scenario, as there was subsequently in Covid.
Lead 2A: I think it to be the case that although some meetings took place before this, this is in fact around the time when the regularity of those meetings started to pick up –
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: – is that broadly correct? As I say, they weren’t absolutely every week or anything like that –
Mr Michael Gove: No.
Lead 2A: – but one might say that from May onwards that was a period in which your engagement in those meetings and your efforts in those meetings were – that was the period when you were ramping that up to an extent.
Mr Michael Gove: Yes, with respect specifically to Covid, there were a series of meetings that took place, whether through the forum of COBR or otherwise, to agree the initial escalation towards the first lockdown, then subsequent to that ministerial implementation groups were set up in order to deal with the consequences of lockdown for public services, for the health service and so on. Then the ministerial implementation groups were wound down. That was partly because, as I say, the virus appeared to be in retreat, but partly also because these were quite cumbersome structures and we then moved to a different rhythm of meetings in the late summer and autumn of 2020.
Lead 2A: So in that narrative, just to make sure we’re getting the timing correct, you talked about the initial period, the ministerial implementation groups lasted over what period roughly?
Mr Michael Gove: I think from – until I suppose the second half of the spring of – into early summer of 2020.
Lead 2A: Right, and then you omitted to tell us about the COBR-O (sic) and COBR-S (sic) – Covid-O and Covid-S committees that were ones which were, I think, part of the Cabinet structure in the UK Government?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes, they superseded the ministerial implementation groups. And, again, one of the views that I had was that we needed to have a Covid Taskforce at the centre of the UK Government and that we should move towards a system similar to that which we’d had in order to prepare for our departure from the European Union, the so-called XO and XS split, but there were others who were more involved in the design and re-design of these structures in order to make sure that we had effective decision-making.
Lead 2A: The COBR meetings were attended by ministers from the Scottish Government?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: The MIGs, the ministerial implementation groups, attended by ministers from the Scottish Government?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: The Covid-O and Covid-S groups were not?
Mr Michael Gove: Covid-O did involve conversations with and attendance from Scottish ministers at certain points.
Lead 2A: These were effectively the UK Cabinet subcommittees; is that not correct?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes, to which Scottish Government and other devolved administration ministers were in attendance. Much as they had been with the XO meetings that occurred in the run-up to our departure from the European Union.
Lead 2A: And after the timeline we’ve been talking about, the structural timeline, is it fair to say, as I suggested at the beginning, that at about the point we’ve reached in the narrative, that the meetings, the four nations meetings which you were principally involved with, started to pick up pace as a means of communicating with the devolved nations?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes, exactly so. As well as the Covid-O meetings, I would hold regular calls with representatives, normally the First Ministers, in order to be sure that issues which were not necessarily on the Covid-O agenda but which mattered to them were ventilated and aired. It would normally be the case the territorial offices, the secretaries of state for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, would attend, and also officials, sometimes from the Treasury and sometimes from other departments.
Lead 2A: Despite the fact that, as you’ve accepted, there was a need in a pandemic of this nature to maximise and achieve effective co-ordination between the nations of the United Kingdom and their administrations, do you accept, Mr Gove, that the structures which had existed before this point that we’re talking about had failed and that your attempts to rectify these failed decision-making structures through your meetings were really an attempt to make the best of a bad lot?
Mr Michael Gove: No, I wouldn’t say they had failed but I would say that the approach that we took was a process of iterative improvement. I think to say that the approach had failed is – and again, I don’t want to police other people’s responses, but for people who believe in Scotland’s constitutional future as an independent nation, supporters of the SNP and other parties and organisations aligned behind independence, it is necessary to prove that the United Kingdom is a dysfunctional entity, and therefore the SNP and its supporters will often, when dealing with a situation that is not perfect, say “It’s a failure, this is a proof that the UK as a constitutional entity is broken”. As I say, the differences of opinion that occurred between the UK Government and the Scottish Government on day-to-day management of the pandemic were no greater than differences between the Federal Chancellery in Germany and the Länder in Germany or the Élysée in France and the respective regional administrators.
But, while I have great respect for the integrity and professionalism of Scottish Government ministers when it came to the handling of individual pandemic choices, we have to bear in mind that the political aim of the SNP is to destroy the United Kingdom, and from time to time they will make political points to that end.
Lead 2A: So if the Inquiry were to hear evidence from ministers and officials within the Scottish Government to the effect that the co-operation and co-ordination structures before this point had failed, are you suggesting that that evidence would be politically motivated?
Mr Michael Gove: I think one would have to look at each individual piece of evidence, but it is undoubtedly the case that the Inquiry has already heard evidence which shows that people within the Scottish Government were, at certain moments, looking at the political as well as the policy consequences of their choices.
Lead 2A: Does your apparent assumption that the Scottish Government and its ministers’ motivations are politically motivated, it would appear, in everything they do, would it not rather indicate that there was a completely dysfunctional relationship between the two governments at the time?
Mr Michael Gove: No. And again I hope I that I said, and your question gives me the opportunity to make clear, I don’t believe they’re politically motivated in everything they do. I think, as I hope I made clear earlier, that I have great respect for the professionalism with which many Scottish Government ministers conducted themselves and I do believe that their overwhelming motivation was to protect the people of Scotland from a virus. However, there are and were occasions when the Scottish Government, as we can see, was thinking politically, and of course it is the case that the SNP, as a political mission – which is to achieve Scotland’s independence, ie to destroy the United Kingdom, and – it would be naive not to be aware that highly skilled politicians, including those at the top of the Scottish Government, might well seek what they perceive to be political advantage at certain points. But I think it’s important that recognise that while that did occur at certain points, the day-to-day management of the pandemic preoccupied them as it preoccupied other ministers, so it’s a matter of proportion and a matter of precision rather than a broad assault of the kind that the question invited me to agree with.
Lead 2A: Is your evidence a thinly veiled assertion that the First Minister of Scotland managed the pandemic in Scotland in order to further the cause of independence?
Mr Michael Gove: No. I think it is the case, though, that evidence that we have heard shows that the First Minister and those working for her at particular times were thinking politically. And, again, in my own earlier evidence I made it clear that I had and have respect for the immensely hard work put in by many in the Scottish Government and their dedication to keeping people safe, but this Inquiry has heard and seen direct evidence of the Scottish Government thinking politically, and again, as I say, it would be naive to assume that people who have dedicated their whole life to the cause of Scottish independence would not at certain points see the political component to some of the decisions and some of the points that were being made.
Lead 2A: Did the UK Government seek to do the same thing to promote its agenda to keep the UK together?
Mr Michael Gove: No, because I think the most important thing that we felt was that it was important to ensure that lives were saved across the United Kingdom. I mentioned earlier my own view that the existence of pan-UK structures helped to ensure that – from the vaccine delivery through to the way in which eventually, after many difficulties, PPE was procured, helped. But I also think there’s a difference, and the difference is this: that to believe in the integrity and to believe in the protection of a state, a political unit like the United Kingdom, is a responsibility that I have and all UK Government ministers have. It’s not a small P political thing, it is a matter of duty.
Lead 2A: Ms Sturgeon is actually relatively complimentary of your role, Mr Gove, in the way in which you conducted yourself, but I think it fair to say that the statements that we’ve seen from Scottish Government ministers would suggest, as I’ve put to you, that although your efforts in the four nations calls were appreciated, they were seeking to make the best of a bad lot, as had existed before that point.
Mr Michael Gove: Again, to be fair to the then First Minister and others, they were – expressed irritation sometimes, and those irritations, as I say, may well have come from a good faith position in disagreeing with the UK Government over the precise measures that we were taking. And, as I say, I respected very much the determination of each First Minister to do, on a day-to-day basis, their very best to protect their citizens, and if frustrations were expressed I always sought to ensure that those frustrations were communicated to my colleagues in the UK Government and that, wherever possible, we were able to work together and to accommodate a unified approach.
Lead 2A: Thank you.
On 23 July 2020, Boris Johnson, the then Prime Minister, visited Scotland. Nicola Sturgeon did not want to meet him, as I understand it, during the visit. Is that your understanding?
Mr Michael Gove: That is my understanding.
Lead 2A: What intergovernmental discussion took place about the visit?
Mr Michael Gove: I don’t recall any.
Lead 2A: What was its purpose, from this perspective, of the UK Government?
Mr Michael Gove: The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom should be able to visit any part of the United Kingdom at any time.
Lead 2A: But what was its purpose at that particular time?
Mr Michael Gove: I believe that the Prime Minister visited Orkney, and I believe that he also was involved – I don’t know if it was at that time, but certainly on a subsequent visit, he wished to thank those involved in the vaccine response.
Lead 2A: Could we have a look, please, at INQ000274143. This is a Twitter post relating to the visit from 23 July 2020 by the former First Minister of Scotland, she said:
“I welcome the PM to Scotland today. One of the key arguments for independence is the ability of Scotland to take our own decisions, rather than having our future decided by politicians we didn’t vote for, taking us down a path we haven’t chosen. His presence highlights that.”
Were you aware of that tweet having been released on that day?
Mr Michael Gove: I’m sure I saw it. If not at the time that it was released, subsequently yes.
Lead 2A: During the visit the then Prime Minister spoke about the “sheer might” and “merit” of the Union.
Mr Michael Gove: Mm.
Lead 2A: Do these iterations show that both the UK Government and the Scottish Government were playing politics at this key time in the pandemic response?
Mr Michael Gove: No, I don’t – well, firstly, I don’t believe that’s true of the UK Government. I think it was a straightforward – an important matter of fact that the UK Government, whether or not it was led by a Conservative administration or by any other administration, by the nature of the unified strength, weight, presence that we had, was able – I mentioned the vaccine roll-out, PPE – to provide protection for all of the UK’s citizens, and I think it’s important that everyone, whatever their views on the constitutional future of Scotland or any part of the United Kingdom, everyone who is a citizen of the United Kingdom is protected by the United Kingdom, and whether or not they voted for the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, he or she is their Prime Minister.
Now, on this particular tweet, I recognise the political point that Nicola Sturgeon is making, but I don’t object to that point being made. I think that it is perfectly legitimate for the leader of a political party, with whose aims I profoundly disagree, to pass comment in this way. Of course. And I think I make the point in my evidence that from time to time during the pandemic, or at any point, SNP politicians would make the case for independence in – in broad terms, of course, perfectly entitled to do that, and I wouldn’t take exception to this tweet.
Lead 2A: You’ve mentioned the vaccine roll-out on several occasions, although I haven’t asked you any questions about it. Just for the sake of clarity, this was in July 2020.
Mr Michael Gove: Mm.
Lead 2A: This – I think you suggested that this might be connected to the vaccine roll-out. I think this may be quite considerably before the time when –
Mr Michael Gove: I think you’re right, and my apologies. I think – I remember that the Prime Minister visited Scotland – the then Prime Minister, Mr Johnson, visited Scotland on a number of occasions.
Lead 2A: Yes.
Mr Michael Gove: One of those occasions I’m pretty sure, subsequently, was to go to Livingston to thank those involved in the vaccine roll-out, but I think on this occasion the Prime Minister was visiting Orkney and I think he spent some time with crab fishermen there, and I think one of the points that he wanted to better understand as – as we moved towards a different approach towards fisheries outside the European Union, he wanted to get, as it were, on-the-ground feedback from those who were involved at the sharp end.
Lead 2A: We understand it to be the case that on 18 March 2020. Cabinet Secretary for the Constitution, Europe and External Affairs, Mr Michael Russell, wrote to you in your capacity as the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster setting out the Scottish Government’s intention to pause campaigning for a second independence referendum in light of the threat.
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: Is that broadly correct as to your understanding of the Scottish Government’s position in that regard at this time?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: Did you consider this tweet to be consistent with that undertaking?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes, as I say, I … I wouldn’t consider it inconsistent at all. Again, if it helps the Inquiry just to clarify, there will be moments when someone in Nicola Sturgeon’s position is either asked or involved in a political conversation and she will assert her faith in or support for independence. I don’t think this is a fundamental distraction from the work that she or anyone else was undertaking on the pandemic. I think the reason why Mike Russell wrote that letter is to say that individuals who had been working within the Scottish Government on an independence strategy were going to be stood down and transferred to Covid functions. I think that was the right thing to do. Obviously not a decision for me, but I was grateful to him for communicating it.
I think, and again I wouldn’t want to labour the point, the Inquiry has heard, however, about one or two other occasions where particular responses during the Covid pandemic were seen through a particular lens, so the distinction that I would draw is the commitment to upholding a set of political principles on which you were elected and which are your motivation and then, on certain occasions, seeing an opportunity to advance those political principles and potentially taking decisions through that lens.
Lead 2A: Was the purpose of the letter as you understood it not to communicate to you, and indeed to the Scottish and wider UK public, that although the SNP government in Scotland may have been elected on the basis of certain political principles and their principal policy of seeking independence, that those political considerations would be put to one side in the interests of the extreme public health emergency the nation was facing?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes. Well, again, I’m striving to be fair to the Scottish Government, with whom I have fundamental constitutional differences. I don’t think that either Mike Russell or Nicola Sturgeon could excise from their thinking at any point their desire to see Scotland independent in due course, but what they did do was to shift the resources that were being devoted to pursuing that to Covid, and I think that was the right thing to do. However, there were other occasions where, as I say, trying to be fair but not naive, the Scottish Government looked at things through a particular political prism with respect to whether or not the case could be made, in due course, for independence, and that therefore there were certain occasions where divergence was being considered through a political lens.
Lead 2A: Are there any particular occasions on which you think that was a problem?
Mr Michael Gove: Well, again, I think that the evidence that was discussed in this Inquiry last week with the former First Minister’s former chief of staff and special adviser would lead a fair minded person to conclude that the words “good old fashioned rammy” suggest that there was a search for political conflict rather than simply a divergence in policy conclusions.
Lead 2A: Her explanation of the messages to which you’re referring is that – although she was asked questions about the possibility that may have a constitutional political significance, that what she was seeking to do at that time was to try to bring to public consciousness the difficulties that the Scottish Government was having with regard to accessing particularly furlough funding in the event that they wished, as appeared to have been their right under the 2020 Act, to pursue different restrictions from the UK. So her position was that that was not meant in a constitutional political sense but in a more narrow political sense, in seeking to try to achieve better outcomes on funding for the people of Scotland.
Do you have anything to add to that, or is it your interpretation of that material that the constitutional political angle or argument that you’ve put forward is the correct interpretation, based on your experience from the time?
Mr Michael Gove: I will leave it to fair-minded observers to decide.
Lead 2A: But do you have anything to add based on your experience of that period? I’m trying to understand whether that period is one of the periods that you’re identifying as this being an issue. Your understanding of that period. In that period did you have concerns in this regard?
Mr Michael Gove: (Pause). I always wanted to put to one side, wherever possible, considerations of this kind. But I made the point earlier that one should not be overly naive. As I say, it is possible, and I think this is the case, to have in the Scottish Government both a commitment from people who are public servants first to seeking to do their best for their fellow citizens, but also, given the cause to which they’ve devoted their lives, then the temptation at certain points to seek political advantage – is clearly there. And I think that the language used, the desire to have a “good old fashioned rammy” with the UK Government, and some of the other language used, which I shan’t repeat now, does lead me to believe that at that point there was a desire to pursue differentiation for the sake of advancing a particular political agenda.
But of course the First Minister, former First Minister, will be here later this week and I want to take as balanced an approach as I can, paying tribute to her energy and hard work in seeking to do what was right, while at the same time acknowledging that the SNP as a political movement has a clear goal and its members and its leadership have seldom missed an opportunity in other times to seek differentiation in order to advance that cause.
Lead 2A: We’ve heard some evidence from materials within the Scottish Government operation that, in trying to achieve good intergovernmental relations, certainly within the United Kingdom, there is often really no substitute for the heads of respective governments seeking to resolve differences, find solutions and find ways through in the interests of the people. Would you agree with that?
Mr Michael Gove: I think it depends on circumstance. And I think it also is the case that the UK Prime Minister has a range of responsibilities, whoever he or she is, greater than that of the First Ministers of any devolved administration. I think it is a good thing for the UK Prime Minister to have as good relations as possible with First Ministers. That obviously depends on a variety of factors, but it will often be the case, particularly when you’re dealing with an emergency like Covid-19, particularly when the Prime Minister will be leading the Vaccine Taskforce or operating, you know, 24/7 in a number of areas, it will often be the case that there will be a division of responsibilities, and in that division of responsibilities he may well choose to appoint, as he did, another minister to deal with the conversations with devolved colleagues.
Lead 2A: I’m not keeping a running score, but is there a reason why you keep mentioning the vaccines, although I’m not asking you about it?
Mr Michael Gove: Purely because that was one of the most important elements in our response to the pandemic, and also because I think that if one were to look at the whole history of our response to the pandemic, then I think it’s important – my own view, I don’t want to suggest that the Inquiry should apportion its time in any particular way – but it’s important to look both at how we responded in a way which enabled us to successfully exit lockdown and non-pharmaceutical interventions as well as obviously looking at some of the decision-making, flawed and otherwise, that meant that perhaps we didn’t lock down at the time that we should have done, in the way that we should have done.
Lead 2A: What was the UK Government’s exit strategy from the first lockdown, in particular with regard to the likely availability of a vaccine?
Mr Michael Gove: Well, we believed that it was important overall to seek to reduce infection to a manageable level, reduce R below 1, and to buy time, because we believed that it would be possible to secure a vaccine in due course and that was the goal towards which so much effort was directed.
Lead 2A: Can you give a little greater specification to the meaning of the words “in due course”?
Mr Michael Gove: Well, we wanted to make sure that we could get a vaccine as quickly as possible, and there were competing judgements about how quickly a vaccine could be secured, competing scientific judgements, but again the hope was that if we secured that vaccine then we would be able to put any thought of further lockdowns behind us.
Lead 2A: In his Module 1 evidence, the former Deputy First Minister, Mr Swinney, stated that:
“… generally relationships …”
This is referring to really the period at the beginning of the pandemic, which of course Module 1 was predominantly concerned with.
“… generally relationships between the administrations were pretty poor by that point. Poor in the aftermath of Brexit, because obviously constituent parts of the United Kingdom – well, we were – in Scotland we were not happy with Brexit at all, or not happy with the – and you obviously had to spend a lot of time on the no-deal Brexit, as the Inquiry heard this morning from Nicola Sturgeon. But generally relations were pretty poor.”
Would you agree with the assertion that generally, not just in relation to particular personalities, that relations between the governments at the outbreak of the pandemic were pretty poor?
Mr Michael Gove: No, I don’t think that – for the reasons that the former Deputy First Minister quite rightly points out, I don’t think that the relationships were as strong as they might have been, because of the divergent political views on Brexit. However, I would say two things.
The first is that day-to-day working on a variety of issues across all of the administrations was effective. And, again, I appreciated the professionalism and commitment of Scottish Government ministers to dealing with what might have been the consequences of a no-deal Brexit, even as they devoutly wished to avoid that outcome. I also wished to avoid that outcome, but there was, of course, a difference in political analysis.
The second thing, though, I would say is that personalities do matter in politics, and you can have people from different political traditions and different political parties whose style or whose outlook means that co-operation can be easier, and it is certainly my experience that there were people in the Scottish Government who were sometimes much more constructive than one or two others. And again, the Inquiry can draw its own conclusions in due course about how important personalities are, but personalities do matter when you’re dealing with tensions which inevitably involve some degree of politically divergent thinking.
Lead 2A: Can you identify those who within the Scottish Government, amongst senior ministers at least, were more constructive and those who were less constructive?
Mr Michael Gove: Well, I think the person who was undoubtedly one of the most constructive was Kate Forbes.
Lead 2A: Can you explain why you would single her out?
Mr Michael Gove: Well, I fear I may be straying into political commentary here, but –
Lead 2A: Well, please try to avoid that, Mr Gove. I’ve asked a question about the pandemic response.
Mr Michael Gove: Of course. (Pause). It was the case that in all conversations with Kate Forbes, she would eschew any political – what’s the word – not point scoring but point making, and concentrate on the business in hand. There were some other ministers who would sometimes – even as we could come to a satisfactory conclusion, would sometimes preface their points with some political point making.
So, again, I would say that she stood out, but also that, I think that, to be fair I know that my colleague Matthew Hancock found that both dealing with Jeane Freeman and Humza Yousaf in their roles to be very straightforward as well.
Lead 2A: Do I take it then that other senior ministers whom you’ve not mentioned fall into the other category?
Mr Michael Gove: No, I think it’s fair to say that the Deputy First Minister, John Swinney, was also very professional.
Lead 2A: Do I take it then that the First Minister falls into the category of other types of people –
Mr Michael Gove: The First Minister again was, as I characterised earlier, someone who was undoubtedly a focused and disciplined minister, but it would sometimes be the case, yes, that there would be a political complexion to some of the points she chose to make.
Lead 2A: I think you mentioned a moment ago when we were discussing the letter that was sent by Mr Russell at the beginning –
Mr Michael Gove: Mm.
Lead 2A: – that you had an understanding that some of the officials who had been working on Brexit within the Scottish Government were repurposed to working on Covid –
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: – was that correct? I should say, I think that’s broadly consistent with our understanding as well.
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: I just wanted to reflect on the particular comment made by Mr Swinney to the effect that Brexit and the very recent, at least temporarily, conclusion of the Brexit work at the end of January may have caused difficulties for those who had been involved in those difficult negotiations, if you like, between the Scottish Government and the UK Government at that time, in particular as regards the decision to repurpose those very people –
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: – into another difficult intergovernmental situation, as you described.
Is that your understanding of what broadly happened in terms of repurposing of staff and did you feel that there were lingering issues relating to Brexit as a result?
Mr Michael Gove: No, I didn’t detect any, no. So again, obviously it’s for the Scottish Government to decide how civil servants working for the Scottish Government should be deployed, and I think it was the case, yes, that there were some who, as I understood it, had been working on Brexit preparations who were repurposed and also some who had been working on the case for independence who were redeployed as well. And again I don’t know the numbers, but I think that is a welcome thing. But I didn’t detect that the experience of having worked on no-deal Brexit led to any lack of commitment or professionalism or any additional anxiety within the operation of the Scottish Government towards the UK Government in its Covid response.
Lead 2A: We discussed a moment ago, and I think we were in agreement, that there is a significant importance in our system when seeking to promote good intergovernmental relations that the heads of the Scottish Government and UK Government are able to interact in a way which is productive. Is that your position?
Mr Michael Gove: Ideally, yes.
Lead 2A: You say in your statement at paragraph 61 that:
“While Boris Johnson and Nicola Sturgeon were not soulmates, they were generally always able to secure pretty effective coordination of substantive policy, respecting devolved and reserved competencies.”
Is the description that “Boris Johnson and Nicola Sturgeon were not soulmates” something of an understatement?
Mr Michael Gove: Understatement is sometimes the most effective means of communication.
Lead 2A: Is it fair to say, and we’ve obviously, as you know, addressed this somewhat from the other perspective in some of the evidence we’ve heard already, that they simply did not get on at all?
Mr Michael Gove: No, I think … on one level they’re very different figures. On another level, though, they’re both skilled politicians, fired by passion, but they’re also people who knew at a moment or moments of crisis the importance of respecting – insofar as possible, and working together insofar as possible – respecting each others’ positions, working together.
I would say two things briefly. The first is that I think when the former First Minister’s former chief of staff was giving evidence last week, she observed that the first time that Boris Johnson and Nicola Sturgeon met, which of course was preceding the pandemic, they had, in effect, a debate in Bute House, and, you know, there was a – as I’ve observed before, the former Prime Minister enjoys debate, can hold his own, and it’s a sign of respect for someone else that he’s engaging in that debate. So he undoubtedly had a degree of respect for the First Minister. However, it is also the case, as the Inquiry has heard, my second point, that at times the First Minister expressed her disapproval of the way in which the Prime Minister was operating, and it was also the case that there were some people in our government and some people working for the Prime Minister who had a low or critical opinion of the First Minister. My view is that it was important to, in the interests of everyone, keep relations on as professional a footing as possible, and my observation is that in the formal settings where they interacted, that applied.
Lead 2A: Was the former Prime Minister advised against engaging more with the Scottish Government or other devolved administrations more generally during the pandemic?
Mr Michael Gove: There were one or two people who did take that view, yes.
Lead 2A: Could we look, please, at INQ000048313.
This is an exchange which I think we’ve seen before in previous hearings. It is an exchange between Dominic Cummings and Mr Johnson regarding the Cabinet Office on 12 March.
The passage at the top – if we could just see that briefly, the passage at the top – you may remember, Mr Gove, was one that was looked at. It reflected issues which Mr Cummings had with the way in which the Cabinet Office was responding. That’s been looked at obviously in some detail in Module 2. I’m just trying to give this some context.
So that was on 12 March. Then on the same day at the bottom there’s an exchange, and again, as happened in Module 2, may I in advance apologise for the language. Mr Cummings said:
“You need to chair daily meetings in the Cabinet room – not COBRA – on this from tomorrow. [I’m] going to tell the system this.
“NOT with the DAs on the [fucking] phone all the time either so people [can’t] tell you the truth.”
Why was Boris Johnson being advised that daily meetings at this vital time during the pandemic should be reorganised so that they took place in the Cabinet Room and away from COBR so that the devolved administrations, who were represented at COBR, would not be on the line to allow advisers to speak more freely with him?
Mr Michael Gove: Well, I think Mr Cummings himself was asked about this exchange in a previous module –
Lead 2A: Yes.
Mr Michael Gove: – and gave his account. The point he made then, which I think was a fair one, was that there needed to be a space in which the Prime Minister could interrogate data and recommendations, and different propositions could be put to him, and the Prime Minister could seek to test the strength of argument A or test the strength of argument B in confidence, before then coming to a conclusion about what he thought might be the right course.
It’s important to say two other things: that at the same time as Dominic was making this case, there was also a regular tempo of meetings with the devolved administrations’ ministers and representatives. And I think it’s also the case, as we discussed in a previous module, that sometimes it’s appropriate for the decision-makers in any jurisdiction to have a safe space in which they can float different ideas without fear of those ideas being taken out of context and you depict them in a particular way.
Now, again, different people may conclude that that is or is not an effective form of decision-making, but it is certainly the case that, whatever Dominic’s views and intentions – and, as I say, I think he fairly set them out in a previous module – it was not the case that we abandoned, nor do I really think that he was arguing that we should abandon, having regular meetings with the devolved administrations.
Lead 2A: Just to be clear, because I think there was a little difficulty in picking up something of what you said there, but you said it was important, I think – please tell me if I’ve got this wrong – that it was important that decision-makers would have a safe space in which they can float different ideas without fear of those ideas being taken out of context and to depict them in a particular way; is that right?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: Sorry, it was just I think that we missed a couple of the words there.
Was there a concern that if these conversations took place with Nicola Sturgeon in the room, that she would seek to depict the then Prime Minister in a particular way?
Mr Michael Gove: Well, again, I can’t speak to Dominic’s particular concerns, but it’s a function of government that the more people there are in a meeting, the greater the risk of a leak. When you have devolved administration colleagues on a call, obviously Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland represented, ministers from each jurisdiction, and officials, people from the territorial offices, I think – I have to be careful here – I think that actually Dominic’s concerns – though of course, as I say, I don’t want to speak for him directly, but I think they were slightly more to do with the Sinn Féin Deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland being on the call than the SNP First Minister of Scotland. But I think that, as I say, whatever was in his mind, it is a fair point to say that if you have a smaller and more intimate meeting, then you can allow the Prime Minister to interrogate certain propositions with the risk of leaking being proportionately lesser, but at the same time you can have regular, focused and effective, business-like meetings with others.
As we noted, there was an unfortunate leak of the decision to go for a second lockdown in the autumn of 2020, and I think that the fact of that information leaking, though it had absolutely nothing to do with devolved administrations, I think reflects, with the benefit of hindsight, an understandable concern on the part of prime ministerial advisers to give a Prime Minister, or for that matter a First Minister, a certain space to kick around some very sensitive issues.
Lead 2A: This message demonstrates an aspiration not to keep any particular devolved administration out, but all of them; is that not correct?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes. But to be fair, and I think this is reflected in some other evidence, while there were sometimes bilateral calls, the nature of a COBR meeting is that all of the devolved administrations would be represented. So it’s either Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and the UK Government, or just the UK Government, as it were. So again, I’m sure if Dominic were asked to provide further evidence on that, I’m sure he would, but, as I say, I think that his account in a previous module speaks for itself.
Lead 2A: Putting aside the concerns, legitimate or otherwise, about leaks, does this – is this exchange not consistent with the Scottish Government’s position that the UK Government made decisions and merely communicated what those decisions were to the Scottish Government in subsequent meetings rather than engaging them in the decision-making process?
Mr Michael Gove: No, because, firstly, Dominic was one voice, an influential one, but one voice amongst many. Secondly, and I don’t say this as a matter of criticism, but the Scottish Government will – did – have discussions and deliberations, whether at Cabinet level or otherwise, to which the UK Government wasn’t privy, nor should we have been. So some of the decisions that the Scottish Government will have made about when to or how to exit lockdown will have been decisions that they will have made – on a shared basis, with shared information and an understanding of where other jurisdictions wished to go, but they will have made their own decisions. I respect that.
Someone could say, well, suddenly the UK Government is having to deal with the fact that the Scottish Government have presented them with a fait accompli. You could depict it in that way, but I think that would be ungenerous. I think that one has to respect that there will be, at different levels of government, moments when, within that level of government, a decision will be taken or decisions will be taken about what is properly the level of government’s responsibility, but that at other points, before decisions are taken, views are garnered, conversations ensue, and thought, care and consideration is given.
Lead 2A: We’ve talked about the concept of Scottish Government divergence from the UK’s position about matters. Did this exchange represent a divergence on the part of the UK Government from the COBR system and in particular the devolved administrations’ involvement in it, which had been an important part of the pre-pandemic emergency planning system?
Mr Michael Gove: I do believe so, and I think again the point that was made by Dominic Cummings in his evidence is that, firstly, the COBR system can describe a way of bringing different parts of government and, indeed, different governments together, so it can describe a process, but it also describes literally a room. In his evidence Dominic made clear some of the deficiencies of COBR as a location for decision-making. But the broader point of bringing in the devolved administrations and others to critical decisions, that principle was maintained throughout.
I think it’s fair to say that the frequency of those meetings at certain points or the nature of those meetings was not what certain First Ministers wanted. Mark Drakeford wrote to me in order to ask for an improved tempo. We agreed. So, again, I’m not claiming that our system was perfect, but the aim, the desire always to ensure that we could co-ordinate effectively was there, and if I or the UK Government fell short at any point in the eyes of First Ministers, we always sought to listen respectfully, make good, and create structures that worked.
Mr Dawson: If that’s a convenient movement, my Lady, thank you.
Lady Hallett: Yes, of course. 11.40, please.
(11.22 am)
(A short break)
(11.40 am)
Lady Hallett: Mr Dawson.
Mr Dawson: Thank you, my Lady.
Mr Gove, before the short break, we were discussing some of the messaging in the early period of the pandemic, and in particular early meetings and discussions around COBR. So I’d like to continue on that theme, but move into a slightly later time period than the one we were discussing.
Could we look, please, at INQ000056221.
These are the minutes of a Cabinet Office meeting chaired by – sorry, COBR, Cabinet Office Briefing Room meeting chaired by the Prime Minister on Thursday, 12 March; is that right?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: We can see at the top that the meeting started at 1.15. Is that right?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: And in attendance, amongst others, are Nicola Sturgeon, Cabinet Secretary for Health in the Scottish Government, Jeane Freeman, Chief Medical Officer of Scotland, Dr Catherine Calderwood, and the Secretary of State of Scotland, Alister Jack, amongst others?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: Could we turn to page 6, please.
I’d like to look at a passage, please. There is some discussion around, obviously, the order of the day being what might happen in order to try to suppress the virus and deal with the impending threat or emerging threat. It states there that – it was stated at the meeting:
“That the Scottish Government was minded to advise against gatherings of more than 500 people. Their rationale for this to ensure the frontline emergency workers were able to prioritise the response to COVID-19.”
During that aspect of the discussion, there was a lot of other matters being discussed?
Mr Michael Gove: I do.
Lead 2A: Yes.
Could we also go a little bit further down page 6, from the words “That the public”, and that there was a concern also raised that the public had not grasped how cancelling mass gatherings would or would not impact upon the peak and that there needed to be more consistent messaging on this across the four nations, as it might be sensible to announce self-isolation and mass gatherings, recognising how this would support the resilience of the emergency services going forward?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: Then it says below:
“That cancelling mass gatherings may possibly impact upon people’s behaviours and so the group should continue when this policy should come into play.”
And then it says:
“So far government policy had been science led and as the evidence was not there for cancelling mass gatherings there would need to be a clear basis for taking this action. If this action was taken, there would be consequences for a range of sectors …”
And then just some other details on this on page 7, over the page.
It states that – up at point 6:
“The, CHAIR said that the advice was SAGE was that there was low confidence in the effectiveness of cancelling mass gatherings on limiting the spread of the virus.”
So overall, the snippets that we’ve taken there tend to suggest that there was a significant discussion at that meeting around the possibility of cancelling mass gatherings, the Scottish Government indicating that they were broadly in favour but the UK Government suggesting that the scientific advice did not support such a move at that stage.
Is that broadly the flavour of the meeting as you recall it?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: On page 8 it states that – under “Continuing” at paragraph 15:
“Continuing the CHAIR said that the GCSA should use the announcement to set out what stage two would be, and begin socialising options three and four to protect the most vulnerable. That the general public would not be asked to options two, three, or four immediately, but that these policies would come in the next few weeks. He respected the Scottish Government’s decision to cancel mass gathering to manage pressure on emergency responders, noting that as the epidemic progresses this approach may need to be taken by the whole UK to protect public services. However it was crucial for the government to stick to the SAGE advice and as far as possible, the Four Nations should try to stick together as one United Kingdom.”
Then on page 10, this is in the list of actions from the meeting, it states at point 1 at the top:
“CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICERS for all Four Nations, DEPARTMENT FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE and DEPARTMENT FOR DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT to prepare advice for consideration by COBR on approach to mass gatherings.”
Then at page 10 there is an indication under “Decisions” that:
“COBR will keep under review the policy towards mass gatherings, with particular reference to their impact on public and emergency services.”
Does it appear, therefore, that the minutes show that an agreed position had been reached to continue consideration of the cancelling of mass gatherings and that the chief medical officers of the four nations were to prepare advice to assist in making that decision?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: As far as you can recall, are these minutes an accurate representation of the discussion and the planning around that issue?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: If the Scottish Government during the course of the meeting had said it was going to make an announcement that mass gatherings should be cancelled and not defer consideration for the advice to be received from the CMOs, that would be reflected in the minute, would it?
Mr Michael Gove: One would hope so.
Lead 2A: Shortly after the meeting concluded, we understand that Nicola Sturgeon announced at 3.20 pm that mass gatherings of more than 500 people would be banned in Scotland. She also provided some other updates from the COBR meeting such as the decision not immediately to close schools, and she made these announcements before Boris Johnson was due to speak to the public about the outcomes from the very same meeting.
Did Nicola Sturgeon’s announcement about mass gatherings contradict your understanding of the agreed position reached amongst the four nations at the meeting?
Mr Michael Gove: It was certainly divergent, and I think in the fourth evidence statement that I give I make the point that, in fairness to the First Minister, she’d clearly indicated a minded to intent on mass gatherings, but whether or not she hoped that that was a clear indication of the direction that the Scottish Government would go down, the minutes record the fact that we agreed that we would defer any announcement until further consideration, and it certainly wasn’t the case that the First Minister had indicated that immediately after that meeting that she would announce such a policy.
Lead 2A: And the reason for the deferral is also stated at the very page we can see there. It was to be consistent, I think, with the approach taken to that point to try to understand and follow the science as best one could –
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: – and that there was a concrete plan that not just the CMO for the UK Government but that all four CMOs –
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: – would input into an advice about the utility, the perceived utility of that move; is that correct?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: What was the reaction within the UK Government to the announcement of Nicola Sturgeon to which I’ve referred?
Mr Michael Gove: Discomfiture.
Lead 2A: Did this create an impression that there were issues with the Scottish Government being trusted about four nations discussions with regard to the way in which the pandemic should be managed?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes, it did. There were colleagues of mine, ministerial and other colleagues, who were unhappy about the jumping of the gun, as it were. One can look at it in different ways. Was it right that Scotland should diverge in this way? Was it right that the First Minister should announce that divergence in the way that she did? Was it right that the First Minister should brief immediately after COBR, before the Prime Minister had an opportunity to address the country or before the Government’s Chief Scientific Adviser had an opportunity to address the country?
I think it’s important to stress that sometimes with politicians there can be amour propre. So I think that sometimes there will be a consideration on the part of one minister about another making an announcement before they do. But sometimes it’s more than amour propre, sometimes it can lead to a weakness in effective communication overall.
My own view is that, while I can completely understand the irritation, and it would have been preferable if the First Minister had not made that announcement at that time, that also we should also exercise or seek to exercise a degree of forbearance as well. So of those who expressed disquiet and discomfort, I was one of those who said, you know, in a pandemic, in a situation like this, sometimes there will be moments where others won’t necessarily act in a way that we would like, but let’s not – let’s not be too – what’s the word – critical or too unforgiving about that.
Lead 2A: Was there an expectation on the part of the UK Government ministers and officials, of which you were one, attending this meeting that the discussions would be confidential?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: Did the announcement, as far as you’re concerned, break that bond of confidentiality?
Mr Michael Gove: Again, I would always strive to be fair. I think it was unwise for the First Minister to issue that briefing in the way in which she did. However, it’s entirely possible that the First Minister may have felt that it was necessary to do so in order to be clear about the way in which Scotland was pursuing its mass gatherings policy and that that was different from the rest of the United Kingdom, and she may have felt that it was necessary to get that message out as quickly as possible.
As I say, I believe that it would have been preferable for either that intention to have been more clearly communicated in the meeting, or for there not to have been that briefing thereafter. But again, while I do think that it was an error on her part, I wouldn’t want to lay massive blame or huge opprobrium towards her on that. I think it’s important to get these things in proportion, and, as I say, I’m one of those who is inclined – or on that occasion I was inclined to say that we shouldn’t allow regret over this to prejudice continued good working overall.
Lead 2A: That is your position, Mr Gove – but you mentioned also that others were irritated –
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: – by this. Who were the others amongst key decision-makers in the UK Government that were irritated by this move?
Mr Michael Gove: I think other Cabinet colleagues were irritated, and I – again, I can’t recall perfectly, but I’m pretty sure that there was irritation within Number 10.
And also, if I remember rightly, I think that the Secretary of State for Scotland, Alister Jack, was concerned as well, because, as I mentioned, there was a worry at different times throughout the pandemic that divergence might be pursued for divergence’s sake and that might have been driven by political considerations.
I don’t see any direct evidence that on this occasion there were political considerations of the kind that I alluded to earlier that were operating in the First Minister’s mind, but again I can’t know what the motivation was, and on that occasion I was inclined to, wherever possible, give the First Minister the benefit of any doubt.
Lead 2A: This is a crucial time, obviously –
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: – in the approach to the pandemic strategy. We know from evidence from Module 2 that an awful lot was going on within the UK Government: SAGE was sitting, advice was being – coming in regularly –
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: – it was updated at new advice became available.
What I’m interested in exploring, Mr Gove, is the extent to which, at that crucial time, this event caused tension and difficulties between the governments which then followed on through the rest of the pandemic.
Mr Michael Gove: I think it was certainly the case that for some within the UK Government it was a – as I say, a moment of discomfort which generated disappointment, but my approach then, and I hope my approach generally, was not to allow moments of irritation or disappointment to curdle. It was important to accept that when dealing with different administrations, different politicians and so on, that you – sometimes you would not get perfect co-ordination – perfect co-ordination was preferable, but if it didn’t occur, to put things behind one and to concentrate on effective working in the future rather than dwelling on any disappointment.
Lady Hallett: Mr Gove, forgive my interrupting, but some might think that’s being rather generous.
It wasn’t just that the then First Minister announced the decision about mass gathering in Scotland, it was the breach of confidentiality.
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lady Hallett: You, as a long-standing and very experienced government minister, know the importance of confidentiality to government decision-making.
Mr Michael Gove: Yes, and my Lady, you are right that there were a number of people within government, including not just ministers, others, who were disappointed.
As I say, I think that I was aware that we were likely to be in this situation for the long haul, that we would need to work with the Scotland Government, and that while this was disappointing, and it certainly led some to believe that there should be a greater degree of care and caution in how we worked with the First Minister, my view was that we should try to maintain the best possible working relationship.
Mr Dawson: I think you used the expression earlier, when I asked you about irritation, irritation within Number 10.
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: Does that mean that the Prime Minister, then Prime Minister, was irritated with this statement?
Mr Michael Gove: I believe he was. One of the things about the then Prime Minister is that, again to be fair to him, he would often express irritation but he would seldom bear grudges, so he would sometimes express how disappointed he was but then quickly move on to the task in hand.
Lead 2A: We looked earlier at the messages which you’ve seen before in which Dominic Cummings is suggesting that discussions should take place outwith COBR, you have talked about the debate. Is there a connection between the air of suspicion and the perception of breach of confidentiality here on the part of the Scottish Government and the desire on Mr Cummings’ part to advise the Prime Minister to undertake his discussions about pandemic management outwith the ears of the Scottish Government and other devolved administrations?
Mr Michael Gove: Well, I think that the message from Dominic Cummings to Boris Johnson occurred in the morning of 12 March –
Lead 2A: Yes.
Mr Michael Gove: – and then Nicola Sturgeon’s press briefing occurred later –
Lead 2A: That’s my understanding, yes.
Mr Michael Gove: COBR occurred later. So in a way, one could argue that Dominic’s fears, as expressed in that message, were reinforced by Nicola Sturgeon’s action later that day.
I think that were there to have been, which I’m sure there must have been, a conversation between Dominic and the Prime Minister subsequently, Dominic could have pointed to the then First Minister’s actions and could have said “Well … “
Lead 2A: This is evidence for the proposal that I’ve made to you earlier this morning?
Mr Michael Gove: He – I’m sure he probably expressed views similar to that, yes.
Lead 2A: Okay. Did issues of confidentiality, leaking information from joint meetings, remain through the pandemic a concern on the part of the UK Government as regards the position of the Scottish Government?
Mr Michael Gove: There were concerns, and again that event I think was the sort of wellspring for those concerns.
But I don’t recall – even though there were disagreements on certain issues, I don’t recall any particularly damaging leak that could be laid at the door of anyone in any of the devolved administrations. It may well be that that happened, but I can’t recall another incident.
Lead 2A: But whether that was the case or not, did it create an apprehension on the part of key decision-making UK Government ministers that the Scottish Government effectively was not to be trusted?
Mr Michael Gove: Well, there were some people who would say, not that it was not to be trusted, but ca’canny when you are communicating with the Scottish Government on these issue, but, as I say, my view was that we’ve got to work together, we’ve got to rub along, there will be certain risks, of course, but it’s more important to seek to work collectively together.
And again, to be fair, the bigger the meeting of any kind, the greater the risk of leaks, and there were leaks at certain points, as we alluded to earlier, from within the UK Government that obviously had absolutely nothing to do with the devolved administrations and which sometimes impeded the effective delivery of policy.
But you have to accept that at certain times you have to broaden the cast list to bring people in, and that that risk of leaking increases proportionately.
Lead 2A: We’ve talked about the role that you played in meetings from roughly April/May onwards, the four nations meetings. We have also heard other evidence from a senior civil servant in the Scottish Government about attempts made around the May period where he characterised the position as being one of divergence –
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: – to try to make sure that the four nations message was reiterated from the Scottish Government perspective.
First of all, at this time, were attempts made to try to smooth over any irritation or concern such that the important relationship between the governments would be able to flourish as best as possible despite them?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes, and I think that some evidence for that would be the meetings of the ministerial implementation groups and the fact that they were meeting at that time relatively regularly to discuss support for the shielded vulnerable and the operation of other public services. That, I think, was evidence of a commitment on the part of every government to seeking, wherever possible, to work together. But of course the additional understanding that each jurisdiction had of the virus as the pandemic developed led to a difference of emphasis amongst some of the jurisdictions in how to handle it.
And again, as we touched on, it is both the case that at some points the Scottish Government were looking at things through a political prism. However, I think it is also the case that there were people both advising the Scottish Government and, for that matter, the Welsh Government, and people within the Welsh Government, who worried that the UK Government’s path out of lockdown, and certainly our decisions later that year, were insufficiently cautious. And again, I wouldn’t attribute to the Welsh Government anything other than a sincere level of caution slightly greater than that of the UK Government. I don’t think that their decision-making was influenced by anything other than their interpretation of the facts before them. And it was certainly the case, as we know, that the First Minister of Scotland was receiving advice from people who believed that a greater degree of caution and bearing down on the virus was necessary, so again, as we’ve also heard, there were other scientific and medical advisers who argued that the Scottish Government’s approach needn’t have been quite as restrictive as it was for as long as it was.
Lead 2A: We’ll come to that in just a moment, Mr Gove, but on this subject of the irritation, degree of concern, mistrust, one might say, you say in your M2A statement at paragraph 39:
“It became a particular irritation that many meetings relating to travel policy and ‘red list’ policies leaked. But it was also a sad reality that UKG-only meetings sometimes leaked.”
As you said.
Mr Michael Gove: Mm.
Lead 2A: “Nevertheless, we tried to include DAs in meetings wherever appropriate and sought to select attendees to ensure appropriate discussion even if that came at the risk of some leaking.”
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: Were your concerns about leaking of information relating to travel policies, the red list and the like related to the Scottish Government?
Mr Michael Gove: No. I think that, again, it was simply a fact, and I hope that the statement reflects that, that the bigger the cast list, the greater the risk. So I did not feel intrinsically that having the Scottish Government in conversations was a particular additional risk, but, as we’ve discussed, the experience of 12 March meant that there were those in the UK Government who did have that concern.
Lead 2A: And those included the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Scotland?
Mr Michael Gove: Well, the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Scotland were concerned after 12 March but I think in terms of the ongoing conversations that we had, I wouldn’t want to be in a position where I could state or overstate the concern expressed by either Boris or Alister. I know Alister is appearing later this week, so he’ll be able to offer his own perspective.
Lead 2A: Would it be fair to say, obviously as we’ve discussed, you were the principal, if you like, involved in those discussions in the period thereafter in the four nations meetings. Whereas you’ve told us you were prepared or able to put those concerns to one side, did it remain the position of other key decision-makers that they were not?
Mr Michael Gove: No, I think they did put them to one side actually. I think that … there was no evidence of anyone seeking to restrict attendance to any meeting or to restrict access to information. An expression of irritation is one thing, then seeking to act on it in a way that might be – what’s the word – long-term counterproductive is another, and there was no actual evidence of our being anything other than open and inclusive with information and seeking to include people in meetings wherever possible. And again, I think that both Number 10 and the Office of the Secretary of State for Scotland were committed to making sure that the relationships worked, whatever previous irritation might have been expressed.
Lead 2A: We have heard evidence in this module already, Mr Gove, on behalf of officials within the Scottish Government who were involved in the pandemic response at this stage and subsequently, that there were issues, as far as they were concerned, with accessing information in particular which was held by the UK Government which would be of assistance to the Scottish Government’s response.
Is that an accusation or a charge which you recognise to any extent?
Mr Michael Gove: No. The way in which SAGE operated, the way in which information was shared, there was never, that I was aware of, any scientific or public health information that the UK Government had that wasn’t shared, whether at the level of scientific advisers, chief medical officers, or ministers. So again, if anyone could point me to specific examples of information that should have been shared that wasn’t, then I could consider those, but I’m not aware of any – certainly of any significant withholding of information.
Lead 2A: Well, I was interested to know from your perspective, Mr Gove, as being someone who, at this stage, played an important role and, subsequently, a particularly important role with regard to intergovernmental relations, whether the issue of information flow from the UK Government and its various structures to the Scottish Government had ever been – whether that was ever a matter that was raised with you, a matter of concern on substantive, important matters at least?
Mr Michael Gove: No, and I did – I think that there might have been discussion about economic modelling at certain points, but the actual information, scientific information that we had, and of course some of that information was provisional, some of it was modelling, I think was always shared. And I think the whole basis on which SAGE operated, indeed the whole basis on which the medical profession and scientists operated, is that collaboration and information sharing is central to their professional ethos.
Lead 2A: Although we’ve heard variable evidence in this regard, some suggesting that SAGE and its subgroups worked quite well for those who were on the groups, as far as Scotland was concerned, but others have suggested that, for example, as far as Scotland was concerned, questions would have to be submitted in advance to SAGE such that there wasn’t the room for the kind of discussion which you’ve suggested is important in the political sphere. Again, is that something that was raised with you or are you aware of from your involvement at this period as being a concern from the Scottish Government’s end of the operation?
Mr Michael Gove: No. I don’t recall it featuring. There may have been requests or comments made about the need for information sharing, but I don’t recall any particular obstacle. Again, as the Inquiry has heard, when SAGE meets, except for, you know, one or two occasions, it meets without the presence of ministers and it meets with the CMO or the CSA there. SAGE will consider the questions put to it by different parts of government, but it’s important that it be a free and – free-ranging discussion with the clinicians, scientists and others in the room.
Lead 2A: We’ve heard – I’m interested in this particular early period in time, because you were involved in a lot of meetings and involved in a lot of discussions around that period, I’m interested in trying to explore with you your perspective on a particular matter. We have seen within some of the documentation, the noted documentation that we’ve seen, that there is at least one official who within Scottish Government thought in the period around about February leading into March that there – although there was significant activity at UK Government level, that – as – as expressed on 26 February – all departments in the UK Government are fully engaged and mobilised in a way that the Scottish Government simply isn’t. That comes from 26 February 2020.
I’m interested in understanding, Mr Gove, from your perspective, whether that was something, a phenomenon that you recognise, that the level of activity that was going on end of February, into March, in the UK Government, whether that appeared to be something with which the Scottish ministers and officials with whom you were speaking were equally engaged?
Mr Michael Gove: No, I think in the period, and it has been touched on elsewhere in the Inquiry, in the period late February, early March it is a fair charge that across the UK we did not act as quickly as we might have done to deal with the virus, but I don’t recall any reason for believing that the Scottish Government or any devolved administration was somehow dragging its feet particularly at that point in comparison to the UK Government. But others who have been more directly involved in preparations will have a better overall sense of that.
Lead 2A: At around that time and in light of the resilience structures which had existed prior to the pandemic, what would the UK Government’s position have been with regard to the Scottish Government’s powers to impose rather than simply recommend social distancing measures, up to and including lockdown?
Mr Michael Gove: I think our view would have been that any response to a UK-wide threat should be effectively co-ordinated. And again, as it turned out, one of the things that we would do is have conversations with Scottish Government ministers and officials, and indeed Northern Ireland Executive and Welsh Government officials, and seek to thrash out what the appropriate level of responsibility was and if people had the resources and powers required, as indeed we sought to do during the course of the pandemic with those – albeit that it’s a different set of questions – who had powers as mayor. So one of the things that we were discussing right at the very beginning of the pandemic is whether or not London should go first into lockdown, and there were conversations with the Mayor of London who was brought into COBR and so on.
I’m not suggesting for a moment that one should consider London, great city as it is, on a par with Scotland. You know, the nature of Scotland’s political, constitutional, historic character is different, so I wouldn’t want anyone to infer from that that I was suggesting and sort of constitutional parity. I’m just saying that, in operational terms, you would sometimes be faced with a new crisis, albeit that some aspects of it could have been anticipated – you just, through conversation, work out where are the correct levers for dealing with an issue of this kind.
Lead 2A: What I’m interested in exploring, Mr Gove, is the extent to which, at that stage, certainly from the UK Government’s perspective, it was anticipated, based on pre-pandemic resilience planning, that effectively the UK Government would be responsible for policy, deciding whether or not –
Mr Michael Gove: Oh yes.
Lead 2A: – there should be restrictions, and that the Scottish Government’s involvement would be in the implementation or operationalisation of that policy as opposed to fixing the policy itself?
Mr Michael Gove: No, I don’t think so, and I think that for those who would have given it a great deal of thought, there would have been an appreciation that health is devolved, and that the – a lot of the decisions would have been for the Scottish Government, quite rightly, to take.
So there may have been a haziness in some minds, and it may be that some might not have given every aspect of pandemic preparation all of the thought that might be required, but I think there was a pretty good general understanding of the need to respect the competences of the devolved administrations.
Lead 2A: But at that stage would it have been anticipated that Scotland, if it were necessary to impose social distancing measures, would have the power to do that as opposed merely to operationalise policies made by the UK Government in that regard?
Mr Michael Gove: I think the point has been made in previous evidence sessions that lockdown itself was a novel and contentious policy and that the overall approach towards the pandemic had been to seek to use testing, contact tracing and so on to mitigate its impact and to seek to control it. It was only after observing what had happened in East Asian countries that lockdown became a policy tool that was considered, obviously a controversial one.
So in a way, while the Inquiry I’m sure will have a number of judgements to make about the extent to which a crisis of this kind was foreseeable and the extent to which different types of preparation might have been put in place, there wasn’t anyone really anywhere in the western world who was thinking about lockdown as a desirable policy tool, and therefore the question, had we thought about, you know, if lockdown was required should the Scottish Government have this power or that power, wouldn’t have arisen, because people weren’t thinking about lockdown as the sort of policy that would need to be pursued.
Lead 2A: But if one were to put lockdown as a concept to one side –
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: – and simply think about the possibility of using social distancing measures short of a lockdown –
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: – so, for example, the cancelling of mass gatherings, was that something over which the UK Government’s position was that it would make the policy decisions, and that would merely be operationalised through existing resilience partnerships and arrangements within Scotland?
Mr Michael Gove: I don’t think so, but there may have been different views amongst those who were giving consideration to that question.
Lead 2A: Okay. In the period after the lockdown had been imposed – I’d like to take you through some various elements over time periods to get your broad impressions of the Scottish position.
In the period after the lockdown was imposed, we’ve heard evidence that a number of things were done within the Scottish Government operation, including the setting up of new directorates to deal with the Covid response, and indeed the creation of a new Scottish Covid advisory body, about which we’ve heard considerable evidence during the course of that week.
Was there a perception within the UK Government at this time, this is late March, early April, when that was being put together, the structures being developed over that rough period, was there a perception within the UK Government at that time that the Scottish Government was seeking to put together its own structures so as to be able to diverge its response away from the UK Government’s response?
Mr Michael Gove: I don’t recall anyone thinking that – that, no. As I said, there was a concern at certain points that divergence might be sought for its own sake, but I also think, to be fair, for Scottish Government ministers, knowing that they had direct responsibilities, there would have been a question in their mind: have we taken all the advice that we possibly can in order to know whether it’s right to maintain alignment with the UK or to diverge in any way? If I had been a minister in the Scottish Government at that time, admittedly an extremely unlikely eventuality, but had I been, then I think I would have wanted a second or a third opinion as well before I took particular steps. As I say, there were, I’m sure, temptations at certain points to think politically and to seek divergence for its own sake, but I don’t think setting up those structures is in itself a bad thing.
Lead 2A: You’ve used the expression “seeking divergences for its own sake” on a number of occasions.
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: Are we to take you to mean, when you’ve used that expression, that there was a perception, at least within the UK Government, that the Scottish Government diverged in order to try to further its aims for political independence rather than in the public health interest of the people of Scotland?
Mr Michael Gove: I think that most of the time, almost all of the time, decisions were made in the public health interest of the people of Scotland, but, as we touched on earlier, I think that temptation existed.
I think it’s also the case, to be fair, that the Scottish Government believed that its handling of these matters was somehow superior to that of the UK Government, that people would appreciate and recognise that, and therefore people would be prompted to think, “Well, how much better might life be if we gave the Scottish Government more powers and we moved further down the path towards independence?”
So there are two things. The first is that within the minds of Scottish ministers I believe it was the case that they thought “If we demonstrate that we are more efficient and more compassionate, people will think, hmm, give the Scottish Government more power”. And secondly, I think that they thought, at certain points, “We can demonstrate by our divergence the benefits of separating oneself from the UK”.
Now, again, the day-to-day outworkings of decision-making by the Scottish Government I believe were overwhelmingly driven by a desire to do the right thing, but, as I say, when one is dealing with a political movement that has a single overriding objective in the way that the Scottish National Party has, and when one looks at how the Scottish National Party operates and the way in which it looks at every political issue, through the prism of achieving independence, then that has to be borne in mind. The weight given to that obviously depends on individual judgement.
Lead 2A: To be fair, Mr Gove, I’m not sure what you’re describing there is in fact divergence for divergence’s sake. What you’re describing is a situation in which – a hypothetical situation, I think, in which, if the Scottish Government dealt with the pandemic more effectively and more compassionately, which surely would be something that the people of Scotland would want, that there might at some later date be some political advantage.
So why was it that the UK Government seemed to have a perception that this was divergent for divergence’s sake rather than for the purpose of achieving a more effective and compassionate response?
Mr Michael Gove: I think we’re not at variance, really. I mean, I think there are two overlapping elements to it.
So the first thing to say is that sometimes, and this is the whole point of devolution, you can have policy innovation in one jurisdiction that others can learn from, and that is not a bad thing, and sometimes that ability to vary policy and to learn can help every part of the United Kingdom to improve.
Now, of course during a pandemic, when clarity of communication and co-ordination of response is so important, then there is far more of an incentive to work together than to experiment in that way.
However, I think it is the case, and I think the First Minister at the time almost made this case, that she believed that Scotland’s, as she believed it to be, superior response would make the case for greater autonomy in due course. But it was also the case, as we heard from the evidence from Liz Lloyd, that at certain points the Scottish Government were tempted to go down a course where they would engineer a potential row, a rammy, in order to reinforce that political point as well.
As I say, it’s in the nature of the SNP as a political movement that it thinks slightly differently from other political parties, but it’s also in the nature of people who are public servants, like all of those who served in the Scottish Government, that they do so from a sense of duty and vocation, and I think that it’s important to try to take a balanced perspective on all of those questions.
And, as I say, this is my perspective, but I would respect those who would take a different view.
Lead 2A: It will be a matter for her Ladyship in due course, Mr Gove, but I suspect that the fact of temptation to go down a political course isn’t really what we’re interested in. What we’re interested in is whether the Scottish Government, in your view, gave in to that temptation, and whether giving in to that temptation resulted in a poorer management strategy than the Scottish people ought to have expected?
Mr Michael Gove: I think firstly if one looks overall at the response of the Scottish Government and then the outcomes in Scotland, outcomes at the end of the pandemic were not radically different in Scotland than from the rest of the United Kingdom.
And again, it’s not my place to say whether, in the handling of care home deaths or in the handling of other issues, Scotland’s approach was significantly better or worse than in other parts of the United Kingdom, but in the end, the number of – the tragic number of excess deaths across the United Kingdom was broadly – broadly similar. One could consider why those factors were there.
But I do think that the Scottish Government did think politically. Whether or not that had the impact of their management of the outbreak being significantly worse or better than it might otherwise have been, I cannot conclude.
So your point that of course my Lady will consider all of this evidence in the round, I absolutely understand. What I’m not seeking to do is to try to push the Inquiry towards any particular conclusion, I’m simply seeking to explain how I, as a politician, perceived or understood decision-making to take place, and there will be a weight of evidence that the Inquiry will want to look at, I’m sure, to conclude whether or not I’m being unduly critical. I hope I’m not.
Lead 2A: But the height of your evidence, I think, Mr Gove, is that you can indicate that your impression was that there was a temptation to diverge for a political motivation but you cannot point to any circumstance in which the Scottish Government gave in to that temptation, with particular results?
Mr Michael Gove: I think – there are two thing. There was a temptation – there were moments when the Scottish Government diverged. Did they diverge for political reasons or not I can’t conclude because I can’t make windows of men’s or women’s souls.
Lead 2A: In the period after the period we’ve just touched on, which was April 2020, we start to get into the period we were discussing earlier, when your involvement in the four nations meetings started to ramp up somewhat and continued to do so.
We’ve had a considerable amount of detailed evidence already from the Scottish Government in respect of – particularly from a senior civil servant called Mr Kenneth Thomson, related to difficulties which emerged around about a week into May, in particular a meeting at which the Prime Minister and First Minister attended, and an announcement made on 8 May by the First Minister of Scotland that the nations may start to diverge from this point.
There was then, you will no doubt recall, a COBR meeting on the 10th which was described by Ms Lloyd, who we mentioned earlier, in her notebook as a shambles.
At that stage, as I understand it, the Scottish Government’s position is that the UK Government had been less than candid about its intention to move away from the Stay at Home message towards the Stay Alert message which it ultimately adopted.
I would be interested to understand your perspective as a UK Government minister on that accusation.
Mr Michael Gove: I think both Liz Lloyd and, in her written evidence, the former First Minister have said that they felt that they had an issue with the Stay Alert message, but I think actually, of all of the things that one can point to during the course of the pandemic, a quibble over that wording at that time doesn’t seem to me to be one of the most important issues that arose, and indeed I think, as has been pointed out, the critique of the Stay Alert message was considered before any of the additional messaging around it was in place.
And again, the views of both the – both Nicola Sturgeon and Liz Lloyd about the UK Government and about Boris Johnson were always inclined to be critical, as I mentioned earlier, they came from a very different starting point. And as we know, in their private communications they were very critical. But the reality, I think, is that actually UK Government communications were at least as good as Scottish Government or any other administration’s communications. Later on, I think, in the pandemic there was a debate over Hands, Face, Space versus FACTS, and I think I touched in previous evidence on the fact that, while the Scottish Government was at that time a more trusted source of information within Scotland than the UK Government, the UK Government’s message was clearer, easier to grasp and so on.
So, again, we can have a long conversation about the finer points of communications here and the divergence and difference between them, but in the end I don’t think it was that material to the way in which the pandemic played out.
Lead 2A: You’ll be pleased to hear, Mr Gove, that I don’t think we need to have a long conversation –
Mr Michael Gove: Sorry.
Lead 2A: – about it, because my point is less to do with the communications element of this and more, as I’m sure you’re aware, to do with the Scottish Government’s position that around this issue they felt that they had been misled by the Prime Minister when he said – he emphasised in meetings the need to stick to the Stay at Home message and did not indicate that he was going to go down the Stay Alert route. That is a matter of confidence and trust about which we’ve said quite a lot today, and you’ve said quite a lot already. So rather than focusing on the marketing message, what is the UK Government’s position as regards the accusation that there was a genuine basis upon which they lost faith in the UK Government’s approach based around the messaging in this regard?
Mr Michael Gove: I think I mentioned earlier that, given what – the events on March 12, the best thing to do was to exercise forbearance. During the course of policymaking, during a pandemic or certainly any other crisis, it will sometimes be the case that individuals will make errors, that information that might have been shared isn’t shared, not out of malice or a desire for secrecy, but just because of the way in which rapid decision-making occurs. On the whole, I think it is better to err on the side of forgiveness or forbearance. Obviously on that occasion the First Minister and her team felt irritated, but I don’t believe there was any intent to provoke or deceive. I can’t recall all of the details of that time, but I suspect that it was rather more to do with the pace of decision-making than anything else.
Lead 2A: We’ve touched earlier – I think you touched in your evidence on the developments after this period –
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: – in particular the divergence or difference in approach to the management of the pandemic and indeed Scotland’s more cautious exiting –
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: – of the lockdown, and its development of what subsequently became known as the zero Covid policy.
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: This was a period in which you were actively engaged in four nations meetings. I was interested to know from your perspective what your understanding was of the rationale behind, and indeed the achievability of, Scotland’s elimination or zero Covid policy?
Mr Michael Gove: I remember conversations with the First Minister about the use of the word “elimination”, and I was seeking to understand what it was that the Scottish Government hoped to achieve. My own view is that, absent the vaccine, you couldn’t have an effective elimination strategy. And again I know that we’ve heard evidence about the seesaw analogy and so on. So I think that the pursuit of zero Covid was misconceived, but I don’t think it was illegitimate of the First Minister to seek to find from scientists and others different views about what the right policy was.
Lead 2A: We’ve heard a fair bit of evidence, both orally and in writing, that there was a perception within the Scottish Government that the Scottish people had a different tolerance level perhaps towards restrictions. Was that something that was ever expressed to you, that concept of Scottish people having a different attitude or tolerance towards restrictions, in your capacity as the main conduit of information between the two governments?
Mr Michael Gove: No, I don’t recall that ever having been said per se. I mean, I think obviously the Scottish Government pursued a slightly different approach, but … it is often asserted that there is a huge difference in values between people in Scotland and people in the rest of the United Kingdom, and my experience is that that is nationalist mythmaking, and that people in Newcastle or Liverpool or Manchester have the same values as people in Aberdeen or Broughty Ferry or Glasgow. And the – but it is sometimes the case that the SNP and their supporters seek to suggest that there is something about the national community in Scotland that is somehow different, more compassionate, more tolerant, than people in England, and I think that is divisive nonsense.
Lead 2A: We talked earlier about the details of the Prime Minister’s visit to Scotland on 23 July 2020, and it was put to you that the Prime Minister’s comments about the Union were an example of the United Kingdom Government politicising the pandemic response, and we had a discussion about that, and your position, as I understood it, was that the United Kingdom Government did not use the pandemic response to further arguments about the Union. Is that correct?
Mr Michael Gove: It was the case that some of what we were doing was self-evidently a consequence of the strength of the Union, so it would have been – what’s the word – curious to be reticent about that.
Lead 2A: Could we look at INQ000089054, please.
This is a paper entitled, I think, “State of the Union”, presented at a meeting of the Cabinet Office, held on 21 July 2020, two days before the Prime Minister’s visit to Scotland; is that correct?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: It’s a paper presented by you?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Lead 2A: Could we turn, please, to page 2. It says there:
“Perceptions of the Government’s and the devolved administrations’ response to COVID-19 reflect wider challenges in microcosm. In Scotland, only 27% of people think that the UK Government is putting in place the right measures to protect the UK from COVID-19, but 70% of respondents believe the Scottish Government is putting in place the right measures to protect Scotland. In Wales, these figures are 29% to 65%, and in Northern Ireland 36% to 61%.”
Could we turn to page 5, please. A proposal is made at paragraph (d) saying:
“We need to change perceptions of our response to COVID-19. There is a real opportunity to outline how being part of the Union has significantly reduced the hardship faced by individuals and businesses across the UK, and will continue to do so. But as outlined in paragraph two, satisfaction with the UK Government response to COVID-19 in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland is low. Building on the work of the Treasury, we need to generate further, tangible examples of where we have acted in the interests of citizens across all four nations, and all departments should review their COVID-19 response to identify examples that could be utilised in future communications.”
Page 7, please. The page before that. Paragraph 17, I think. Yes, sorry, down at the bottom.
“Conclusions
“17. Absent COVID-19, I am firmly of the view that the risk to the Union would be the greatest challenge this Government needed to confront – and unfortunately it is in no way lessened by the parallel demands of the epidemic and our economic recovery. In the lead up to May next year, and throughout this Parliament, protecting and strengthening the Union must be a cornerstone of all that we do. This paper therefore asks Cabinet to agree the need to act, to endorse the strategic approach described in paragraph six, and to take forward the specific actions detailed above and summarised at Annex A.”
In this paper, you are setting out the strategy of the United Kingdom Government to use the Covid-19 pandemic as a means to strengthen its arguments in favour of the Union; is that not correct?
Mr Michael Gove: I think it’s the case that I am seeking to make sure that people appreciate the way in which the existence of the United Kingdom and its institutions has enabled us to deal effectively with the Covid pandemic, pointing out that the degree of trust and support for the UK Government and for devolved administrations when it comes to response to Covid is divergent, and seeking to ensure that the fact that we’d been, to an extent, hiding our light under a bushel was something that we should seek to address.
Lead 2A: This was the reason for the Prime Minister’s trip to Scotland on 23 July, wasn’t it?
Mr Michael Gove: I don’t believe so, no.
Lead 2A: You mention in this paper the need to try to highlight some of the things which the UK Government thought it had done well in the pandemic response in order to try to counteract a general impression that seemed to exist, in polling at least, of the Scottish people that opinion of the UK Government’s response was low. Is that what you’ve tried to do in your evidence today by constantly referring to the vaccine roll-out, Mr Gove?
Mr Michael Gove: No, I think that there are a number of cases where the UK Government’s response was significant and helpful across the United Kingdom, so I think the Covid business intervention loan scheme would be one such. The – our whole approach that we took towards furlough. I think it would also be the case that the way in which we managed in a competitive international environment to source PPE would be another.
It’s my responsibility as a minister of the UK Government to uphold the United Kingdom and to point out from time to time that to dismantle its institutions and its structures would be harmful and deleterious to all of its citizens. But when it comes to something like the pandemic, I not only think it’s necessary to demonstrate how we’ve benefitted, I think it’s also necessary to concentrate on making sure that those benefits are spread equally across the whole United Kingdom, which is why I believe that one needs to work constructively and openly with those in devolved administrations, respecting their role and their mandate but also being clear that to be passive in the face of an attempt to break up the United Kingdom is not to be even-handed, it is to quit the field when there is a direct danger to the wellbeing of every citizen of the United Kingdom.
Mr Dawson: Thank you, Mr Gove.
I have no further questions. There are some core participant questions.
Questions From the Chair
Lady Hallett: I have one, just before Ms Mitchell comes. Mr Gove, I noticed when we were looking at your third witness statement that you mentioned at paragraph 39 – I’m sorry, I haven’t got any reference, I don’t think we need to bring it up – that the – when we were talking earlier about Nicola Sturgeon making the announcement about the mass gatherings and then about whether or not schools would be closed, we talked about breach of confidentiality, but I noticed that in your witness statement you said that devolved administration ministers didn’t consider themselves bound by confidentiality, because the Ministerial Code that you consider makes it bound applies to UK ministers not to the devolved nations, so that could explain why Nicola Sturgeon didn’t consider herself bound by confidentiality; is that right?
Mr Michael Gove: It could. So I think it is manifestly the case that the Ministerial Code does not apply to ministers in devolved administrations, but one would have hoped that the nature of the discussion and the sensitivity of the matters under discussion would have meant that at the very least a degree of, if not confidentiality, certainly respect for the conclusions of the meeting might have led her to wait until after there had been a formal announcement by the UK Government.
Lady Hallett: I understand that.
Secondly, if devolved administration ministers don’t consider them bound by a duty of con – it – wouldn’t it be possible to set up a meeting whereby – just like we would at a meeting say that the Chatham House rule applies, that one could say this meeting is bound by confidentiality, isn’t that possible?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes, it is. And I think it’s also the case that there was a sort of broad understanding that when you’re meeting at any sort of – what’s the word – joint ministerial level that if there’s going to be communication afterwards, that you have an agreement, formal or informal, about whether or not there’s going to be a communique or a press conference or whether or not someone is going to be allowed to brief the media in a particular way. So that’s generally done in an ad hoc way, but it could be formalised.
Lady Hallett: Thank you.
Ms Mitchell.
Questions From Ms Mitchell KC
Ms Mitchell: I’m obliged.
I appear as instructed by Aamer Anwar & Company on behalf of the Scottish Covid Bereaved.
Mr Gove, I wonder if I can ask you a question arising from your statement where you talk about the issue of financial clarity.
Now, just to allow you a moment to remember the context of this, you set out a proposed memorandum of understanding of what issues we might like to consider in relation to any future pandemic and how we might be able to think of various issues in advance to reduce, I suppose, any issues that might be problematic. In that regard, you say “financial clarity for each DA”.
Can you first of all explain what you mean by financial clarity?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes. I think that it’s important for the widest possible understanding to exist of how public services are funded within each of the devolved administrations and what the flexibility is that each of the devolved administrations have. And work has been done by the UK Treasury in order to ensure that each of the individual devolved administrations is happy with the way in which, for example, the Barnett formula works and the way in which their respective tax varying powers can be deployed.
Ms Mitchell KC: Is that post-pandemic that work has been done?
Mr Michael Gove: I think that work is continuing, so I think it is the case that, throughout the development of devolution, there have been both conversations at an official and ministerial level about making sure that people can understand how the fiscal framework can be improved and how understanding of, for example, the Scottish Government’s borrowing powers can be appreciated and, if necessary, deployed.
Ms Mitchell KC: And is the financial clarity, not simply the financial clarity of those within Scotland but also within the UK Government, as to where the lines are drawn, is the conversation two-way, I suppose?
Mr Michael Gove: I think it’s at least four-way, but yes.
Ms Mitchell KC: And where do you see the four-way?
Mr Michael Gove: With Wales and Northern Ireland as well.
Ms Mitchell KC: I see.
Moving on to question number 2, we heard you earlier give evidence that, in the context of leaks by the Scottish Government and, in fairness, the UK Government, but in the particular instance of leaks by the Scottish Government, the UK Government might have to ca’canny in communication with the Scottish Government.
I’d like to ask you about a comment that you’ve made in your statement where you say:
“I accept there were occasions where materials were distributed shortly before meetings. It seems to me that there were probably good reasons for this, including the incredible fast pace of events, and in some cases the need for security and confidentiality of the material to prevent leaks to the media.”
And you go on to explain that there were such delays and last minute documents given also to the UK Government, it wasn’t simply those that involved the devolved administrations.
Can I ask, in what instance would it have been appropriate to hold back documents for a meeting to prevent leaks to the media. And secondly, can you provide any instances of this occurring that you’re aware of?
Mr Michael Gove: Yes, throughout government it will often be the case that documents will be held back. There have been a number of occasions when there have been UK Government-specific discussions, not about Covid but about other matters, where the paper before the meeting which will be the basis for discussion is shared only with ministers an hour beforehand, sometimes ministers are invited into a reading room and given an opportunity to absorb the information and the proposition before then going into general discussion.
It is the case that most civil services overall dislike the idea of decision-making being affected by leaks. Most civil services believe that they serve their government well by making sure that confidentiality is respected. And I think that is absolutely right and it would have been, I think, for the Scottish Government civil service and for the UK Government civil service just a matter of propriety that they, when dealing with sensitive issues, would restrict the circulation of those papers, which would often be, you know, containing policy discussions, in such a way as to minimise that leak.
However, when we’re dealing with an issue like Covid, the overwhelming majority of the information required, the background information that will feed into a discussion, would have been shared and widely known before getting into that detailed policy discussion.
Ms Mitchell KC: And in relation to the second part of my question, can you give any specific instances of this that you’re aware of?
Mr Michael Gove: I could. I can’t recall at the moment but I can certainly write back to you and to the Inquiry with further and better particulars.
Ms Mitchell KC: I’m obliged.
I move on, briefly on to question number 3.
You talk in your statement about the issue of parity of decision-making between the Scottish Government and the UK, and effectively the issue of the Scottish Government being involved in UK decisions and whether or not that should mean that the UK Government be involved in Scottish decision-making.
Does this point us to a position where really the best way to deal with these things when we’re dealing with a pandemic, a cross-UK issue, is the involvement of the body such as the Joint Ministerial Committee or something of that name going forward in these instances?
Mr Michael Gove: I think it is open to debate what the best method is. As I mentioned earlier, other countries have similar challenges, and even when you have a federal constitution like that in Germany, it was still the case that there were tensions between what the Federal Chancellery sought to do and what the individual Länder sought to do at particular times.
It’s very rare in politics that you can design a piece of constitutional or governmental machinery which doesn’t then need to evolve to take account of new strains and new information. So it’s entirely possible that lessons can be learned about better intergovernmental working, but, as we discussed earlier, (a) quite a lot depends on the nature of the crisis being dealt with, and then also something depends on what people’s ultimate goal is.
So my view is that intergovernmental working is there to make sure that devolution serves the people of Scotland and the United Kingdom Government serves all of its citizens.
Mark Drakeford in Wales will take the same view, even though his view of devolution might be slightly different, because he too is committed to making devolution work and making intergovernmental relations work.
With the best will in the world, the SNP, even though on the day-to-day basis they want to serve the people of Scotland, don’t want intergovernmental relations to work because their ultimate goal is to break up the United Kingdom.
Ms Mitchell KC: Well, I’d prefer if we tried to look more positively at the way in which, going forward, intergovernmental relationships can be taken.
Mr Michael Gove: Yes.
Ms Mitchell KC: Minimising party politics and minimising the politics of personality, could you give your view to this Inquiry as to what best format that might take? Would it take simply getting all the people involved round the table and making decisions together, like the Joint Ministerial Committee, or can you think of any other body or type of way of decision-making that would assist?
Mr Michael Gove: I think that it’s certainly the case that that helps, and it is – it is the case that following on from Lord Dunlop’s review that we now have in place a tempo of meetings and a set of structures to ensure that intergovernmental relations work effectively. And I think that it’s perfectly possible to say that that can be improved, but for the moment, I’m not – I don’t want to be Panglossian about it, but for the moment I think that that is an effective and workable means of reconciling different policies and bringing discussions together.
Ms Mitchell: I’m obliged.
My Lady, I’m obliged.
Lady Hallett: Thank you, Ms Mitchell.
Thank you very much indeed, Mr Gove. I hope we won’t have to call upon you again. I’m not giving a guarantee, but I don’t think it’s likely, so thank you for your help.
The Witness: Not at all. Thank you very much, my Lady. Thank you.
Lady Hallett: Right, 1.45.
Mr Dawson: Thank you, my Lady.
(12.52 pm)
(The short adjournment)
(1.45 pm)
Mr Dawson: Procedural matter
Mr Dawson: My Lady, before we get to this afternoon’s witness, there is one procedural matter that I would just like to clarify, if that’s okay.
On Friday 19 January the Inquiry heard evidence from Dr Jim McMenamin, as your Ladyship will recall, who had previously provided the Inquiry with a witness statement and accompanying documentation, including some WhatsApp messages. An extract of those WhatsApp messages was put to Jason Leitch on 23 March and subsequently published on the Inquiry’s website the same day. The specific extract is from INQ000268025.
In the published extract, the formatting of the messages may make it appear as though Dr McMenamin is agreeing to a suggested deletion of WhatsApp messages. Our interpretation is that this is not the case. Dr McMenamin was replying to another message earlier in the chain of correspondence not shown in the extracted text. The formatting of this WhatsApp message for presentation in evidence makes the message appear chronologically and does not illustrate direct responses to other messages out of sequence in the chain of correspondence. For the avoidance of doubt I wish to make sure that the evidence shows that Dr McMenamin did not delete any messages. It is in fact Dr McMenamin who provided the Inquiry with the WhatsApp messages contained within that document via his employer, Public Health Scotland.
Lady Hallett: Thank you very much, Mr Dawson.
Mr Dawson: Thank you, my Lady. The witness this afternoon is Ms Jeane Freeman OBE.