3. Mr John Swinney

MR JOHN SWINNEY (affirmed).

Questions From Counsel to the Inquiry

Ms Blackwell: Mr Swinney, may I begin by thanking you for the assistance that you’ve so far given to the Inquiry. You have provided a witness statement, which we can see at INQ000185352.

Thank you. Can we go to page 15, please.

Can you confirm, Mr Swinney, that that was signed by you on 5 May of this year, and it’s true to the best of your knowledge and belief?

Mr John Swinney: That is the case, yes.

Ms Blackwell: Thank you very much.

May we have permission to publish?

Lady Hallett: Certainly.

Ms Blackwell: Thank you, my Lady.

We can take that down.

Mr Swinney, you held the position of Deputy First Minister in the Scottish Government from November of 2014 until March of this year; is that right?

Mr John Swinney: That is correct, yes.

Counsel Inquiry: You began your political career as a Westminster MP for the North Tayside constituency from May of 1997, and you were then a member of the Scottish Parliament, first for North Tayside constituency from 1999 to 2011, and then for the Perthshire North constituency from 2011?

Mr John Swinney: That is all correct, yes.

Counsel Inquiry: You also held the roles of Cabinet Secretary for Finance and Sustainable Growth in the Scottish Government from May 2007 to May 2016, Cabinet Secretary for Education and Skills from May 2016 to May 2021, and Cabinet Secretary for Covid Recovery from May 2021 to March 2023. Is that all correct?

Mr John Swinney: That is all correct, yes.

Counsel Inquiry: Thank you.

I’d like to begin by asking you, please, about your ministerial responsibility for resilience, because as Deputy First Minister over the nine-year period, that was very much part of your portfolio, wasn’t it?

Mr John Swinney: That’s correct, yes.

Counsel Inquiry: What was the scope of ministerial resilience?

Mr John Swinney: Before I answer the question, would it be possible, my Lady, for me perhaps just to express at the outset of my evidence my sympathy to everyone affected by Covid and for the suffering that has been experienced, and also my appreciation to members of the public and our public service personnel who have done so much, along with colleagues in the private and third sectors, to sustain recovery.

In relation to the question, my responsibility for resilience was held essentially as an ultimate point of responsibility, I considered myself to be, in the government, responsible for resilience matters, accountable to the First Minister, and it was my role to make sure that Scotland had in place effective resilience arrangements.

Now, that didn’t mean that I did everything, because in one of the introductions to the Scottish Risk Assessment, for example, I make the point that resilience has got to be everybody’s business, so all aspects of government have to think through what are the resilience risks that are faced in their area of responsibility, but it was my responsibility to make sure that all of that was in as strong a position as it could be for any eventuality that we had to face.

Counsel Inquiry: Given that this was but one portfolio of many that you would have had your eyes across in the role of Deputy First Minister, do you feel that you had sufficient time to be able to devote to the subject of resilience?

Mr John Swinney: Life was always pretty hectic, to be honest, in all of the ministerial responsibilities that I carried out, but I did feel I had adequate opportunity to provide the strategic leadership to resilience issues that were required. But I stress that wasn’t a responsibility that meant I had to do everything. I was providing the direction, the strategy, the approach to be taken, but obviously motivating colleagues and all the relevant aspects of the Scottish government and our partners around the country to make sure that they were preparing properly.

Counsel Inquiry: Right. The reason that I ask you that question is, and you may be aware, that the Inquiry has heard from Sir Oliver Letwin who gave evidence to my Lady that there would be a benefit, in his view, of the UK Government having a senior Cabinet-level minister solely devoted full-time to a resilience portfolio. Do you think that that is necessary within Scottish Government?

Mr John Swinney: I think it’s a reasonable proposition, and one that is worthy of consideration, because I think we are – if I look back on my ministerial career, I spent 16 years as a minister, and I dealt with quite a number of resilience incidents across a whole range of different responsibilities and sectors. So – and as I look at some of the factors that are now affecting society, issues around about the climate, for example, I only think that resilience issues are going to become ever more significant and prescient.

Looking at some of the evidence that my Lady has heard in relation to the scenarios that can be faced as the world changes, you know, as the population rises, as climate change has its effect, there may well be a strong argument for the proposition that Sir Oliver Letwin has put forward.

Counsel Inquiry: I want to now ask you about a series of bodies and committees that were set up either just before or during your time in office, and I want to begin with the Cabinet Sub-Committee on Scottish Government Resilience, also known as CSC-SGoR, I think.

Now, the role of this particular committee was to give ministerial oversights to strategic policy and guidance in the context of resilience in Scotland; is that right?

Mr John Swinney: That’s correct, yes.

Counsel Inquiry: This committee met in preparation for emergency response and in order to keep abreast of matters related to promoting and improving civil protection and also preparing for special contingencies such as pandemic influenza. It was set up some considerable time ago, and indeed the last recorded meeting of it took place on 14 April 2010.

Now, I want to go to those meeting notes, please.

Which are at INQ000102935, thank you.

We can see the date there and present are yourself and also Nicola Sturgeon, and if we scroll down, please, we can also see others present, some of whose names have been redacted.

Let’s go, please, to page 7, and I’d like to look at paragraphs 11 and 12.

Now, of course, if we remind ourselves that 2010 was just after we had suffered the swine flu outbreak, we can see at paragraph 11:

“[Somebody present] introduced [a] paper … which analysed the implications of the lessons identified from the recent emergencies for the Scottish Government’s role in co-ordinating national emergency responses. He said that the requirement for SGoRR to be activated had greatly increased over the last 3 years, which included activation for the fuel shortages in 2008, the flu pandemic [that’s the swine flu pandemic] and an increasing number of weather related incidents. Scottish Resilience would shortly undertake a significant review of SGoRR’s capacity and its capability to support enhanced national decision making in the light of the lessons learned and this would include options for improvements in accommodation, IT, training, and staffing.”

Could we scroll down, please.

“12. He said that the lessons learned would also provide an opportunity to develop SGoRR as a national emergency information analysis and decision-making hub, which was in line with the shared services agenda and National Performance Framework. It was planned to have discussions with COSLA, ACPOS, and the Chief Fire Officers’ Association Scotland on the option of co-locating mutual aid coordination centres for police, fire and local authorities with SGoRR. Such coordination would enable organisations to share resources and allow for a more streamlined approach to the collection and analysis of information.”

Thank you. We don’t need to read in any further.

So this was a committee which, as of April 2010, not only was active and had been activated because of the national issues that had arisen, fuel shortages, pandemic swine flu, and also issues with climate change, but was also very much looking forward to providing a level of service in terms of what was being anticipated.

Do you agree that, as far as this meeting was concerned, it very much looked as if the committee was going to be busy?

Mr John Swinney: Yes, and the work that flowed from that over a number of years I think demonstrates exactly that point.

Counsel Inquiry: So why was this the last occasion upon which this committee met?

Mr John Swinney: Essentially what – the work that was all envisaged in the paragraphs that have been read into the record was all work that was then taken forward, but not with the necessity of the supervision of that particular committee.

We essentially developed structures which had – which involved the creation of a Scottish Resilience Partnership, which in a sense was living out the point that I made in one of my earlier answers, which was that resilience had to be everybody’s business. So we needed to have a range of different organisations very much engaged in the preparation of active resilience functions, many of which are listed in those paragraphs 11 and 12 that have been read.

So that work was taken forward through the Scottish Resilience Partnership. There was direct ministerial involvement in that. I would have attended a number of Scottish Resilience Partnership meetings to provide the strategic ministerial direction. And obviously, in the course of a range of different other incidents, because after 2010 we would have a number of other resilience incidents in which we were actively involved, we would essentially develop that work in practice.

Counsel Inquiry: I understand your answer that the work was taken forward by other bodies, but you will understand that the UK Government had an equivalent committee called the NSC(THRC), or the threats committee, that didn’t meet in person between 2013 and 2017, and then it didn’t meet in person thereafter. The Inquiry has heard that evidence already. Do you think that there is value now in this sort of committee being reconvened and regularly meeting in order to ensure that these matters are kept very much within the forefront of ministers’ minds?

Mr John Swinney: My first response is to say that I do genuinely feel that these issues are very much at the forefront of ministers’ minds. I can say to my Lady and the Inquiry, you know, these issues have kept me awake at night for many, many years, on different questions, whether it’s about winter weather incidents or about the pandemic flu. So they’re very much issues that have been under active management and handling by ministers, with active engagement on a proactive basis to identify threats and risks, because that’s what led to the production of the Scottish Risk Assessment for the first time in 2018, which was to try to calibrate the risks that we might face. But there may well be the need for a particular forum to look periodically, formally, in a recorded fashion, to take stock about where preparations happen to be.

I think one of the reasons why we felt this committee didn’t need to meet was that – if I go back to the attendance list at that meeting that you cited from 2010, that was – all members of the Cabinet were present there, apart from the then First Minister, so, you know, we had Cabinet meeting on a weekly basis which allowed us to conduct some of these issues as well.

Counsel Inquiry: All right, thank you.

I next want to ask you about the Scottish Resilience Partnership, which you’ve just mentioned. The first issue is to make sure that I’m addressing it by its correct title, because when I suggested yesterday to Gillian Russell, who set up the committee, that it was called the Scottish Resilience Partnership, she corrected me and said it was called the Strategic Resilience Partnership. Which is it, please, Mr Swinney?

Mr John Swinney: Well, at the risk of contradicting a civil servant, it is, in my view, the Scottish Resilience Partnership, but it has a strategic remit, if that perhaps helps to build the bridge.

Counsel Inquiry: Perhaps that’s where the difficulty arose.

But in any event, this was set up during your time in office?

Mr John Swinney: Yeah.

Counsel Inquiry: But it was restricted, wasn’t it, to Category 1 responders? Do you think that that was, in hindsight, perhaps too narrow a remit? Do you think it should have been extended to other bodies beyond Category 1 responders?

Mr John Swinney: I don’t think so, but I wouldn’t rule out the necessity to look at this question. I think it’s important to look at who those Category 1 responders are. So around the table of the Scottish Resilience Partnership would be the leadership of Scotland’s 32 local authorities, the Chief Constable of Police Scotland, the Chief Fire Officer of the Fire and Rescue Service, the chief executive of the Scottish Environment Protection Agency, the chief executive of the Scottish Ambulance Service, and there will be others that I haven’t managed to remember off the top of my head.

So they would be representing a very broad cross-section of those who would have to deliver the resilience response, and, crucially, would have to make sure that appropriate preparations were being undertaken at a more local level, whether that was across the three regional resilience partnership areas in Scotland or the 32 local resilience partnerships representing each of the local authority areas.

So that body had to consider what might future threats be, and they had to make sure that we were developing the processes and the infrastructure that would enable us to handle any such circumstance should an issue arise.

Counsel Inquiry: How often were ministers involved in or in attendance at these meetings?

Mr John Swinney: Quite frequently. I certainly remember being personally at a number of these resilience partnership meetings, and that was to essentially – that attendance was to provide the direction of ministerial thinking.

So we would be considering – I can remember contributing to those discussions around a range of issues, some of which would be about pandemic flu, some would be about winter weather, some would be about cyber security, for example, which would be, you know, a number of the very live and topical issues that we’d be discussing.

Counsel Inquiry: In your witness statement to the Inquiry, you say at paragraph 9(sic):

“In the period running up to January 2020, the preparations for a pandemic were taken forward in Scotland as a combination of participation in the four nations activity across the UK and specific applications of this approach to the distinctive health and social care arrangements that reflected the devolved governance arrangements.”

And that:

“13. The approach of the Scottish Government would best be summed up as a pragmatic way of co-operating on a four nations basis …”

How do you say, Mr Swinney, that there was pragmatic co-operation between Scotland and the United Kingdom Government in terms of preparation?

Mr John Swinney: I think there would be – examples of that would be collaboration around some of the expert advice that would be available, so, for example, there would be representatives from Scotland that would take part in organisations such as SAGE, for example –

Counsel Inquiry: And NERVTAG?

Mr John Swinney: And NERVTAG. And we would gather expert information and advice to inform our own thinking within Scotland. So I would cite that as an example of where we weren’t trying to replicate what would be a very good and strong source of scientific advice and professional advice to government.

There would be co-operation around some aspects of procurement in relation to PPE, I think I recall. So – and then there would be other dialogue on a four nations basis where there really was no particular value in us undertaking a different and distinctive process.

Counsel Inquiry: All right, well, we’re going to come on and look at some of those. But whatever the political point that could be made about the devolved administrations and their connection and the strength of their connection to the United Kingdom Government, the truth is that pandemic planning was and ought to have been UK-wide as an effort, shouldn’t it, with each nation performing a role in a collective endeavour to prepare for a pandemic?

Mr John Swinney: I would say that, yes.

Counsel Inquiry: So I don’t want to dwell upon it, because the Inquiry has heard evidence from several witnesses now about this, but I’m sure you will accept, Mr Swinney, that the UK influenza preparedness strategy of 2011 should have been updated prior to Covid hitting, but wasn’t updated?

Mr John Swinney: I’ve obviously heard that evidence, yes.

Counsel Inquiry: Were you aware at the time when you were in office that there were plans afoot to update it but those plans in fact never came to fruition?

Mr John Swinney: I wouldn’t say I was specifically aware of that particular point, no.

Counsel Inquiry: You are aware, though, that a Pandemic Flu Readiness Board was set up –

Mr John Swinney: Yes.

Counsel Inquiry: – following the Exercise Cygnus recommendations, and one of the aspects of work for that board was to update this strategy. That work was eventually paused because of preparations for a no-deal EU exit.

Is it a source of regret for you, Mr Swinney, that on your watch that preparedness strategy was not updated?

Mr John Swinney: Obviously I would, in all circumstances, prefer to be able to achieve all of the commitments that were given to update material and to prepare accordingly. I think there’s very strong evidence of pandemic preparations in the strategies that were taken forward and in the work that was undertaken particularly within the health team within the Scottish Government that led on pandemic preparation for that to be the case. But there’s obviously aspects of work which have suffered as a consequence of what are the – in my experience, the inevitable congestion of multiple priorities that can often exist. And as the Inquiry will have heard, the preparations for a no-deal Brexit were a very real threat which had to be addressed and, as a consequence, some aspects of the work that was necessary to be undertaken for other areas of activity were not able to be completed.

Counsel Inquiry: Can I suggest, in addition to that, though, there appears to have been a sluggishness within the Scottish Government to implement aspects of not only the Exercise Cygnus recommendations but also those that had come from Exercise Silver Swan in 2016 and Exercise Iris in 2018? Because yesterday, during the evidence of Gillian Russell, we looked at some of the minutes from the Pandemic Flu Readiness Board from June of 2019, and some of the comments within those minutes expressed a surprise at how slow matters were progressing.

In addition to that, we have heard this morning from Nicola Sturgeon that so far as guidance for health and social care is concerned, there was a recommendation for that to be updated as far back as the Exercise Silver Swan report in 2016, and she has confirmed to the Inquiry this morning that when she left office in March of this year that had still not been implemented. So that is guidance and recommendations from several years ago.

Do you agree that that demonstrates an alarming sluggishness for the implementation of what are important recommendations?

Mr John Swinney: I think that there is a significant amount of guidance available in relation to the preparation for and the handling of a pandemic, and that guidance would be shared with health boards who would carry the responsibility for many of the actions that would be envisaged in such a plan.

The question – so there would be an element of guidance that would be available. There was perhaps a – well, there is a requirement from the commitments given here for that to be strengthened and advanced.

So it wasn’t that no guidance was available, it’s that perhaps updates were not provided in a timeous period for that, so –

Counsel Inquiry: Seven years.

Mr John Swinney: Yes, but –

Counsel Inquiry: No update within seven years to that guidance.

Mr John Swinney: But there would be other work that would be undertaken through the successive exercises between Silver Swan, Cygnus and Iris, which would be helping with the learning in different organisations as those exercises took their course and as professionals saw the sequence of events that were being under – that were unfolding.

So there was a source of information to assist in the strengthening of guidance, but the final material was available for consultation around about the time when the Covid pandemic struck.

Counsel Inquiry: All right.

It doesn’t give the impression that those recommendations were being speedily addressed, does it?

Mr John Swinney: There’s a lot of work been undertaken, but I think what I would have to concede is that there are multiple priorities that are difficult to wrestle with, within government, and I’ve – I don’t want to labour the point, but other events come along that unfortunately slow things up, and no-deal Brexit is one example, there would be other incidents that would happen, there would be other events that would happen in the sequence of events, that perhaps would mean that all the timetables we wanted to complete were not able to be completed as we would wish.

Counsel Inquiry: From your perspective, Mr Swinney, what was the impetus and purpose behind a Scottish Risk Assessment being implemented?

Mr John Swinney: I would say its purpose was to take the learning that we had from the UK-wide risk assessment and to ensure that it was tailored in any way that was appropriate for it to be tailored to the specific circumstances within Scotland.

Now, that would be more relevant on some of the challenges we would face in relation to winter weather, for example, which would be perhaps a more acute challenge for us than other parts of the United Kingdom. But its purpose and its objective was to be complementary to the United Kingdom National Risk Assessment.

Counsel Inquiry: All right.

Can we put up, please, the Scottish Risk Assessment for 2018. It’s at INQ000102940. Thank you.

If we look to page 3 – thank you – we can see your smiling face there, Mr Swinney, together with, if we look on the right-hand column, your personal feelings about the implementation of this assessment:

“I feel very strongly that resilience is everyone’s business. Our combined efforts to protect our society are the test of our resilience; the ongoing safety and security of our communities is the measure of our success. Building a shared understanding of the risks we face in Scotland is vital if we are to do this successfully.”

Does that accurately depict how you felt at the time that this was implemented?

Mr John Swinney: Yes, it does.

Counsel Inquiry: Thank you.

I don’t want to again cover evidence that the Inquiry has already heard, but you will I think agree, Mr Swinney, that so far as risk assessments are concerned, there is a risk assessment for pandemic influenza and there are risk assessments for high-consequence infectious diseases, but nothing in between, and the evidence that the Inquiry has heard is that consideration should be given to multiple scenarios or a spectrum of risks and that, going forwards, the risk assessments both nationally and also within the devolved administrations should concentrate on a much wider variety of what those risks should be?

Mr John Swinney: I think that’s a reasonable point. I think the – in the compilation of the Scottish Risk Assessment an effort was put in to try to ensure that we addressed the range of circumstances that we might face and, if my memory serves me right, I think in this risk assessment we identified and prioritised ten within that report. But obviously within that there are a multiplicity of different scenarios on each and every one of those themes.

So, to go back to this risk assessment, we would identify – I think we probably identified pandemic flu and winter weather as the two highest and most likely risks with the greatest degree of impact. Within those, there would be countless scenarios that might well be considered, and I think part of the challenge in all of this work is to be able to satisfactorily identify just how many scenarios it might be possible to consider, and then whether to prepare for them, because they will require a very different response. Of course, all of that stands to be very resource-intensive in the process.

Counsel Inquiry: Yes. Or to have a plan that is flexible enough to deal with different levels of or types of transmission and incubation periods and that sort of thing.

The Inquiry has also heard that there is a doctrinal issue with the way in which the reasonable worst-case scenario is unmitigated and encourages those planning for risks to plan for the consequences rather than for preventing them. Do you agree with that?

Mr John Swinney: I think the doctrinal approach in resilience, I think, is certainly focused on trying to mitigate the impact and to secure recovery as speedily as possible, but I don’t think that does justice to the wider perspective within government which – certainly in the Scottish Government – lays a very heavy emphasis on prevention.

So, you know, in so many aspects of Scottish Government policy, there is an emphasis on early intervention and prevention to avoid damaging circumstances emerging, whether that’s on policy questions such as child poverty or early learning interventions. But it has an application to some of the resilience questions as well.

Counsel Inquiry: Well, I’d just like to look at a different document, please, in order to explore your answer to that question in a little more detail.

Could we put up INQ000087205, please. This is a minute from the meeting of the Pandemic Diseases Capabilities Board in April of 2022, so it’s after the pandemic but I’d like to just look at the analysis here of preparation in order to better inform us of how we really should be considering preparing for any future pandemic.

Can we go to page 4, please, and look at paragraph 16. Thank you.

“Further, in line with the National Security Risk Assessment … methodology, revised pandemic reasonable worst case scenario models … represent unmitigated scenarios and so do not include a full risk assessment for the use of NPIs [non-pharmaceutical interventions]. Given that the imposition of lockdown in part accounted for a 25% drop in GDP between February and April 2020, the largest drop on record, and numerous secondary and tertiary impacts on all sectors, this represents a significant gap in the UK’s assessment of pandemic risk. Noting that, even without government intervention, we would anticipate spontaneous behaviour change and subsequent economic damage. What is more, the secondary and tertiary impact of these measures will have been unevenly spread throughout society, highlighting – and in areas exacerbating – pre-existing inequalities.”

If we can go to page 5, please, and then look at recommendation 2.1, this recommendation is that:

“All departments to use the outputs of recommendation 2 to produce a supplementary risk assessment to the NSRA that assesses the impacts of public behavioural changes on their sectors. The outputs of this work should be reviewed by ministers with a view to determining which behavioural changes fall within an agreed ‘Response Ambition’ that will provide clear planning assumptions to enhance cross-government preparedness arrangements for future NPI deployment.”

Then if we can go down to read through paragraphs 18 to 20, please:

“18. The unprecedented use of NPIs and significant changes in public behaviour seen during the Covid-19 pandemic required the provision of far greater economic support than pre-Covid planning assumptions suggested.

“19. The planning assumptions in the 2011 UK Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Strategy focused on the economic impacts of sickness absence. As a result, the strategy did not include many of the significant economic impacts we have seen during this pandemic, such as the dramatic drops in economic activity, significant shifts and reductions in consumer spending and disruption to global supply chains. The OBR’s Fiscal Risks Report from July 2021 suggests the UK’s real GDP declined by an unprecedented 9.8% in 2020 and as of September 2021, the NAO estimated the lifetime cost of government spending on Covid-19 will reach £370 billion.

“20. Clearly then, in line with recommendation 2.1, our economic risk assessment for pandemics must be updated to include a broader range of impacts, including the significant potential impacts of NPIs and behavioural changes on different sectors of the economy.”

So not only was much of the planning and preparedness concerned with preparing for the reasonable worst-case scenario, not preventing it from arising, but it would appear that planning was never really designed to deal with the fallout of any of the countermeasures that might be taken to prevent or cope with the reasonable worst-case scenario; do you agree?

Mr John Swinney: I think it’s difficult to – and this gets to the heart of so much of the assessment work that has got to be undertaken here – to identify what might well be the range of impacts that have to be wrestled with in any particular scenario, and then of course the more scenarios that we consider, the broader the range of variables that there will be.

But I think what the material that has been read I think fairly highlights is the very significant wider impact of the pandemic and its effect on our society, and, you know, as I – and we may well come on to this in other modules of the Inquiry’s work – but after we took the steps to, you know, the most immediate steps in March 2020 in relation to lockdown, I led a lot of work within government which was about trying to essentially reconcile much of this information as to how we then worked our way back out of that, and it became known as the “four harms framework”, where we looked at the direct Covid harm, the indirect Covid harm, the economic and the social harm that was being caused, and how we evaluated what was the right amount of risk to wrestle with, I suppose, in terms of trying to get out of a situation of lockdown. So, in a sense, I offer that information to try to illustrate that the dilemmas that are involved very much in this material were dilemmas that we were wrestling with, but I would concede that we were wrestling with them after lockdown had commenced, not before.

Counsel Inquiry: Yes, but going forwards, what we’ve just read into the record become part of pandemic planning, shouldn’t it?

Mr John Swinney: I would say it needs to, yes.

Counsel Inquiry: Mr Swinney, I’m afraid I’m not going to finish your evidence before the break, which we have to take in a couple of minutes, but before we do break I’d just like to ask you one more question, because you were Cabinet Secretary for Finance and Sustainable Growth for nine years.

Mr John Swinney: Yeah.

Counsel Inquiry: What are your views on the fact that, as a result of what we’ve just discussed, there was no real financial pandemic planning put in place for support or countermeasures?

Mr John Swinney: If I answer that in relation to the context I was dealing in, which is within the Scottish Government, I suspect your question, Ms Blackwell, might be getting towards: well, why didn’t you have a reserve to deal with these circumstances? And as I think a number of evidence – witness statements have provided this detail to the Inquiry, that was not within my gift to create. The financial arrangements of devolution essentially required the Scottish Government to balance its budget on an annual basis, and any resources that are carried forward are only carried forward on a very limited basis from one financial year to the next, so we are specifically, by the financial – the Scottish Government is specifically prevented from building up a reserve that it can deploy for eventualities of this type. That’s a commentary on the existing financial arrangements that exist within the Scottish Parliament.

Now, what I would acknowledge, and I’ve acknowledged this publicly on many occasions, that the scale of the economic intervention made by the United Kingdom Government in and around about March 2020 and thereafter was very welcome, from my perspective. It saved, you know, many people’s livelihoods from, you know, great jeopardy, but it is an illustration of the scale of the financial challenge that comes with a disruptive pandemic of this nature.

Ms Blackwell: All right, thank you very much.

My Lady, is that a convenient moment?

Lady Hallett: Thank you very much. Sorry we can’t complete you this morning, Mr Swinney. I shall return at 1.45, please.

(12.45 pm)

(The short adjournment)

(1.45 pm)

Lady Hallett: Ms Blackwell.

Ms Blackwell: Thank you, my Lady.

Mr Swinney, the first topic I want to ask you about this afternoon is intergovernmental relations, which is something that was touched upon by Ms Sturgeon in her evidence this morning, and for you to confirm that, in relation to the Civil Contingencies Act of 2004, there was a concordat between the United Kingdom Government and Scottish Ministers that was published in February of 2021, which was an agreed framework for co-operation between Scottish Ministers and the UK Government, not a legally binding agreement but with an expectation that each party would abide by it wherever practicable. Is that right?

Mr John Swinney: It exists, yes, but I think the date is much earlier than 2021.

Counsel Inquiry: Did I say 2021? I meant 2011, I’m so sorry. I’m glad you picked me up on that.

Mr John Swinney: Yes, yes. I think it may even be earlier than that.

Counsel Inquiry: Right, February of 2011 is the date that I have here, but we can check that.

In any event, it came into force, I use that word loosely because, of course, there was no legal binding nature attached to it, but an expectation that the Scottish Ministers and the UK Government would abide by it, and effectively from that date, if indeed from before, if you think that the agreement might have extended back beyond that date, Scottish Ministers agreed that certainly the spirit of the Civil Contingencies Act would be followed, and from that time Category 1 and Category 2 responders were identified, as indeed happened in England?

Mr John Swinney: Yes. The reason why I was just being a bit precise about the timescale is that I do have a concordat which was – pre-dates our government coming to office in 2007, so it must have followed, I think, some time soon –

Counsel Inquiry: Yes.

Mr John Swinney: – after the passage of the Civil Contingencies Act in 2004.

Counsel Inquiry: In 2004, yes.

Mr John Swinney: So those arrangements were –

Counsel Inquiry: Were already in place?

Mr John Swinney: Were already in place, and they, for example, envisaged the designation of – envisaged – they require the designation of an individual within the Scottish Government to be, at official level, a key resilience person, if I could use that terminology, and that was always followed through. So just so that I was clear about the document.

Counsel Inquiry: No, thank you very much.

In 2013, in fact, there was a memorandum of understanding and supplementary agreements between the United Kingdom Government and all of the devolved nations, with the intention of the devolution settlements having enduring qualities of good communication, et cetera, wasn’t there?

Mr John Swinney: Yes.

Counsel Inquiry: So there were these agreements in place from, I’m going to suggest, soon after devolution happened, which always attempted to propel along a good natured agreement and good communication between the nations?

Mr John Swinney: That’s correct, yes.

Counsel Inquiry: All right.

But we know that, after the onset of Covid, and commissioned by the four heads of government, there was a review of intergovernmental relations, and we know that because a report was produced dated January of 2022, and I think that was referred to during this morning’s session.

Michael Gove, who will be coming to this Inquiry to give evidence at a later date, who is currently Secretary of State for DLUHC and Minister for Intergovernmental Relations, has told the Inquiry in his written statement that at the time of the pandemic it was apparent that the broader matter of intergovernmental relations was not clearly agreed and there were difficulties encountered in relation to communication, but also matters of substance.

Does the fact that the four heads of state commissioned the review of intergovernmental relations suggest that Michael Gove might be right, that the practical difficulties that were encountered when Covid hit, in terms of communication and substance, indicated that further work needs to be done in terms of the way in which the nations work together in an emergency?

Mr John Swinney: I wouldn’t say that the working arrangements in an emergency were particularly poor. I think there was generally a pretty good amount of co-operation when we were operating in an emergency. In that respect, I’m going a way back to my period since 2007, generally when there was a difficulty and we were perhaps involved in a COBR call, which is a UK emergency call, there would be, you know, a lot of reasonable, practical engagement in an emergency context.

But the reason why that process had to be undertaken to form an agreement about how we were all going to operate was that generally relationships between the administrations were pretty poor by that point. Poor in the aftermath of Brexit, because obviously constituent parts of the United Kingdom – well, we were – in Scotland we were not happy with Brexit at all, or not happy with the – and you obviously had to spend a lot of time on the no-deal Brexit, as the Inquiry heard this morning from Nicola Sturgeon. But generally relations were pretty poor.

Counsel Inquiry: All right.

Mr John Swinney: Therefore there was, you know, a necessity to try to formulate some working basis upon which intergovernmental relationships could be improved.

Counsel Inquiry: So, moving forwards in terms of preparing for future pandemics or future civil emergencies, any level of clarity as to how communications and matters of substance should be taken forwards between the four nations would be welcomed?

Mr John Swinney: Yes.

Counsel Inquiry: Thank you.

Lady Hallett: Just in case an eagle-eyed commentator spots it, I think you, by slip of the tongue, said four heads of state.

Ms Blackwell: I’m sorry, I didn’t mean to say that, the heads of government.

Lady Hallett: Thank you.

Ms Blackwell: Thank you.

I want to move on now to ask you about the level of engagement, community engagement, between the Scottish Government and local government and also the Scottish Leaders Forum.

Mr John Swinney: Yeah.

Counsel Inquiry: You tell us in your witness statement that one of the hallmarks of the operating approach of Scottish Government during the period that this module is interested in was to engage widely with other public authorities, public bodies, business and third sector organisations to create a sense of common purpose in your endeavour, and you tell us that that was achieved through forums such as the Scottish Leaders Forum, which brings together senior public sector leaders from across Scotland, has regular dialogue with major business representative organisations, and interaction with a representative range of third sector organisations.

Tell us how important the Scottish Leaders Forum and the interaction between government and those sectors is.

Mr John Swinney: Very important on all aspects of government policy. I think if I – I’m now out of government, one of my big reflections is that one of the big problems of government is that government often operates within individual compartments and the necessary of cross-responsibility working to try to sort common problems – you know, the problem of child poverty or of climate change will not be solved in one neat little compartment in government, it will involve a whole range of different organisations, as will any issue in relation to resilience will invariably require a range of different organisations to be part of it.

So what the governments of which I was a part tried to foster was a climate of collaboration, co-operation across different public and private sector boundaries, third sector boundaries, so Scottish Leaders Forum would bring together basically the key public sector and third sector, private sector leaders around the country to try to formulate common purpose, and a common direction of travel in solving problems that we were all interested in solving but might have slightly different perspectives about who could do what in the process.

Counsel Inquiry: Right, in terms of emergency preparedness and pandemic planning, what level of engagement was there between the Scottish Government and the voluntary sector?

Mr John Swinney: There would be dialogue through, you know, the routine conversations we would have with the third sector about, you know, how they could perform a role within the delivery of policy. So if I think back to periods where, you know, I had responsibility for third sector relationships, 2007 to probably about 2012, you know, we’d be regularly involved in the third sector in the formulation of strategy, what role they could perform, how they could be involved. When it got to the stage of dealing with the pandemic, the third sector organisations would be operating very closely with local resilience partnerships, because, you know, we would encourage – we actually not just encouraged but we funded what were called third sector interfaces at local level in the 32 local authority areas in Scotland. So the third sector had an ability to influence the direction of policy and service delivery at local level.

Counsel Inquiry: The Inquiry has received a statement from Heather Fisken representing an organisation called Inclusion Scotland. It’s an independent non-party political representative organisation of disabled people across Scotland, with a network of over 50 DPO members and partner organisations as well as individual members. I want to give you the opportunity, Mr Swinney, to respond to what she tells us in her statement:

“Prior to January 2020 we were not invited to engage with government, UK, Scottish or local, regarding the extent to which inequalities and vulnerabilities should be factored into emergency preparedness and pandemic planning. We have routinely highlighted the obligation on the UK and Scottish Governments to involve disabled people in the development of law and policy. Failure to do this adequately means that inequalities faced by disabled people were not sufficiently factored in to emergency preparedness and pandemic planning.”

What does it say, Mr Swinney, about the partnership approach that such a significant organisation, representing such an important and vulnerable constituency in society, were not subject to engagement?

Mr John Swinney: I think I’m – I’ve read Heather Fisken’s witness statement and obviously I’m troubled by its contents, because that’s the last impression or feeling I would want a person like Heather Fisken and the organisation she represents to have.

I think the government, the Scottish Government, has gone to a lot of lengths, as I just have recounted, through the arrangements that we put in place to make sure the third sector have got a voice throughout the formulation of policy, whether that’s around the design of Scottish Government policy or legislation that’s brought forward and, you know, there’s extensive consultation with third sector organisations about the formulation of policy within the Scottish Government. So I’m very troubled that that is the impression that Heather Fisken has about the extent to which the organisation she represents has been involved.

I think –

Counsel Inquiry: It’s not just an impression, is it? She sets out quite clearly that, having offered the assistance of that organisation, and acknowledging the importance of an organisation like that being involved in pandemic planning, her pleas were ignored.

Mr John Swinney: Well, I regret the fact that that’s the case, and I think that, you know, that can and should be rectified by the Scottish Government.

Counsel Inquiry: Thank you.

I want to return now to, again, something that was covered in evidence this morning, and following on from your comments that certainly at some point during the Covid outbreak relations between the Scottish Government and the United Kingdom Government were not perhaps as cordial as they should have been.

It’s the UK Resilience Forum and the presence or absence of Scottish Government at these meetings, and given that there was a level of – or a lack of clarity following Ms Sturgeon’s evidence about whether or not the Scottish Government were present at some of the meetings, I think it’s important for us to look very briefly at the minutes.

So can we look at the minutes of the first meeting, please, which are at INQ000198919.

This is the meeting on 14 July 2021, chaired by Paymaster General Penny Mordaunt, and if we can scroll down, please –

Lady Hallett: I don’t think Ms Sturgeon was questioning that the minutes existed.

Ms Blackwell: No, no.

Lady Hallett: I think she was questioning the accuracy of the minutes.

Ms Blackwell: Or indeed whether or not the government were present.

Lady Hallett: Yes.

Ms Blackwell: So we can see representatives from the following organisations who were in attendance. Scottish Government are the first in the list. Thank you.

If we can now look to the second meeting, which is at INQ000198920.

This was a meeting that took place on 3 May 2022, chaired by Minister for the Cabinet Office Michael Ellis, and if we can scroll down, please, to those present and absent, thank you. If we can scroll up the page, please, thank you.

We can see:

“Invited organisations unable to attend:

“Scottish Government …”

Then, finally, INQ000198921, which is the third meeting, taking place on 2 February 2023, chaired by Oliver Dowden.

If we can look at those in attendance and those absent, please.

“Invited organisations unable to attend”, at the bottom of the page, we can see, fourth bullet down, Scottish Government.

So it rather looks as if the minutes suggest that the Scottish Government were not present in meetings 2 and 3.

My question to you is this: do you think that their absence from these meetings was a reflection on the poor quality of relations between the nations?

Mr John Swinney: No. But I wonder if I might just see on that, the minute – that last minute, I wonder if I could just see slightly higher up –

Counsel Inquiry: The one that’s on the screen now?

Mr John Swinney: Yes, please. If I could just see – it’s – I just wanted to check, it says “Meeting held in” – sorry, it’s –

Counsel Inquiry: If we can go to the next page, please.

Mr John Swinney: Forgive me for –

Counsel Inquiry: Not at all.

Mr John Swinney: – the process here, because it’s material to the answer I’m going to give.

Counsel Inquiry: Yes, of course.

Mr John Swinney: It says:

“Meeting held in person and by video conference.”

Okay. Thank you for. That.

So, no, I don’t think it’s about the nature of relations. In the short time I’ve had to explore this, and, as I say, I’m no longer a member of government so it takes me slightly longer to get answers to things, at least –

Counsel Inquiry: No, no need to apologise.

Mr John Swinney: On the first meeting, the Scottish Government was present. On the second meeting, the Scottish Government had planned to be present but, from what I have been advised, the videolink was not working and unfortunately there were people ready to be involved but could not participate because of technical issues.

On the third meeting, what I’ve been advised, and that’s why I wanted to see this wording, was that it was an in-person meeting in London, and that minute contradicts what I’ve been told, and this was at a period where we were wrestling with winter weather challenges and our staff numbers were under pressure.

I’m also not certain that these were invitations extended to ministers to participate. So I would need to check whether that was a ministerial …

But around this time, or certainly around about this period, I discussed collaboration on this question with Michael Ellis, who was I think, at the time, Minister for the Cabinet Office –

Counsel Inquiry: Yes, he was.

Mr John Swinney: And basically we had an in principle conversation about the necessity for co-operation.

So to go back to the question you put to me, Ms Blackwell, did I think this was – the absence of the Scottish Government was in any way an indication of poor relations, on that point, no, unreservedly not. I think it was perhaps logistics and issues that got in the way, but I will make sure there is a definitive answer given to the Inquiry to explain that point.

Counsel Inquiry: Thank you very much.

The final matter I want to ask you about is the National Performance Framework.

We can see this at INQ000102917.

This was established, I think, during your time in office, and it demonstrates that organisations in Scotland were working together, doesn’t it, to achieve collective aspirations for all members of society?

Mr John Swinney: Encouraging them to do so.

Counsel Inquiry: Yes. It’s INQ000102917, please.

Right. Now, this is a pictorial representation of the framework, isn’t it? Can you explain to us how it works, please, Mr Swinney.

Mr John Swinney: Essentially what – at the core of it in the centre are an explanation of the purpose of Scottish public policy and the values that should underpin that, in the circular area in the centre. Then around about it are a series of national outcomes that we work with others in Scotland, whether they’re in the local authority partners, third sector organisations, the private sector, to agree, to try to achieve those outcomes. So they are aspirational about the type of country we’re trying to create.

Counsel Inquiry: The reason that I wanted to highlight it during the course of your evidence was that the Inquiry has heard from Sir Mark Walport, who spoke of the need, regardless of what approach government takes to future funding of national resilience, we perhaps should consider having a national resilience assessment across all areas of society in order to ensure that the best level of resilience is achieved.

Do you think that that principle could work together with the National Performance Framework that we see is currently in force in Scotland?

Mr John Swinney: I think that would be beneficial, and I think there is a constant challenge that we’ve got to be aware of on resilience issues about how the world is changing.

If I can perhaps give an illustration of that, we had a very severe and acute storm in the northeast of Scotland, Storm Arwen, and there was a very extensive amount of damage particularly to power cables, and what, of course, we discovered very, very quickly is that without power supplies, people’s dependence on mobile technology, broadband, for which vast amounts of life now hinge, stops. And it’s all very well saying, you know, “We’ll get the power back on tomorrow”, but if the power can’t go on for seven days, which in Storm Arwen was the case, that is an acute challenge to people.

So the resilience effort is – you know, the Inquiry will understand I’m not much of an electrical engineer, you need the proper people who know what they’re doing to do that. So the necessity for whole approaches to resilience threats, whatever they happen to be, which Sir Mark is suggesting, is a very welcome suggestion.

Ms Blackwell: Thank you very much.

My Lady, that concludes my questions for Mr Swinney. You have provisionally granted permission for Scottish Covid Bereaved to ask two discrete questions. May they do that now, please.

Lady Hallett: Ms Mitchell.

Questions From Ms Mitchell KC

Ms Mitchell: I am obliged, and in fact one of the questions has already been dealt with in full before with Ms Sturgeon, so I only need to take you to one question now.

I would like, Mr Swinney, for your comment on evidence given to this Inquiry by Dr Jim McMenamin. He was a consultant epidemiologist in Health Protection Scotland and, as you will know, that’s the lead body protecting the Scottish public from infectious diseases at the time that pandemic planning was taking place, and also at the time just before the pandemic.

I’m not going to ask the Inquiry to physically go to the statement, but just for the record it’s his statement, the Inquiry number INQ000183410.

In that statement to the Inquiry, at paragraph 146, he explains that staffing numbers reduced at Health Protection Scotland between 2005 and 2020.

Now, he indicated that this was due to a number of factors, but he specifically highlighted that one of the factors was the requirement placed on all NHS boards by the Scottish Government to make what he describes as cash releasing efficiency savings, and as a result of that, of course, clearly, staffing numbers were affected.

Further, he explains at paragraph 145 that the newly formed Public Health Scotland, so the body that was taking over from the other one, the opening budget for that and staffing levels were not sufficient for Public Health Scotland to deliver the health protection and response required by the pandemic.

From your position, having, in your own words this morning, the responsibility to make Scotland in as strong a position as it could be for any eventuality we had to face, do you accept the evidence of Dr Jim McMenamin that, amongst other factors, the Scottish Government requirement to make cash savings in the previous body, the newly formed Public Health Scotland didn’t have the budget or staffing levels to provide health protection for Scotland pre-pandemic?

Mr John Swinney: My view is that Public Health Scotland provided the Scottish Government, our local authority partners – and I make reference to this in my own witness statement – with a huge amount of immensely reliable information and trusted information to enable us to form our decisions. So part of the benefit of the reform which was undertaken to establish Public Health Scotland was it was a body jointly owned, if I could use that terminology, between the government and local authorities. So there was – often local authorities might dispute the evidence base that government has taken its decisions based on. On this example there was none of that because we jointly owned the body of Public Health Scotland and there was wide confidence in the quality of the material and the information that came from Public Health Scotland.

So, in that respect, I want to put that on the record, about the strength of that information that was available from which decision-making then came.

Where I would accept is that there were financial pressures – there were financial pressures throughout every aspect of the public sector in Scotland and we’ve had a prolonged period of austerity which has required us to make – to live within very challenging fiscal – a very challenging fiscal environment in the Scottish Government. Having said that, the health budget, which would have funded Public Health Scotland, would have been the budget that grew the most compared to any other aspect of the public – of public budgets.

So yes, there would be efficiency savings required, they were required of everybody, but in that context the health budget was growing to a greater extent than any other part of the public budgets for which the Scottish Government has responsibility.

So what that answer is designed to do is to acknowledge the strength of Public Health Scotland but also to accept that, in a challenging fiscal environment, we have to ask organisations to perform strongly to live within the financial resources we have available to us.

Ms Mitchell KC: So despite the fact that Public Health Scotland would have had the budget that grew most compared to other aspects of public life, it still wasn’t, in terms of budget or in terms of staffing, prepared for the pandemic?

Mr John Swinney: Well, I – certainly from my experience of Public Health Scotland I thought Public Health Scotland contributed formidably to the handling of the pandemic and at no stage did I feel that we did not have the necessary information or interventions available to us, from – well, particularly Dr McMenamin and his colleagues at that time. So from my perspective I felt they were able to make that contribution, but I do acknowledge that the burden of austerity and the requirement for efficiency savings has been acute for many organisations.

Ms Mitchell: Thank you, my Lady, that concludes my questions.

Lady Hallett: Thank you very much, Ms Mitchell.

Thank you very much indeed, Mr Swinney, thank you for your help.

The Witness: Thank you, my Lady.

(The witness withdrew)

Ms Blackwell: My Lady, the final witness of the day and indeed of this week is Catherine Frances.