2. Mr Reginald Kilpatrick
MR REGINALD KILPATRICK (affirmed).
Questions From Counsel to the Inquiry
Ms Blackwell: Thank you. Is your full name Reginald Kilpatrick?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: It is.
Counsel Inquiry: Mr Kilpatrick, thank you very much for the assistance that you have so far given to the Inquiry. I know that you have produced a witness statement, which we can see at INQ000190662.
If we go to the final page, which is page 31, we can see that you signed it on 5 May of this year.
Is that true to the best of your knowledge and belief?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: That is true.
Counsel Inquiry: Thank you very much. During your evidence, Mr Kilpatrick, please keep your voice up and speak into the microphone so that the stenographer can hear you for the transcript. Please speak slowly and clearly, and if I ask a question which you don’t understand, please just say so and I will repeat it or try to rephrase it. If at any time you need a break, again, just say so, and we will break for your convenience.
You began working in the Welsh Government in 1989 and by 2003 you’d moved into the senior civil service as director or deputy director for the budget, planning and management division. You then, in 2007, moved across to become deputy director of the local government policy division, and then from 2011 until September of 2020 you were the director of the local government directorate.
From that date until the present time you have held the role of director general for Covid co-ordination and director of local government directorate. Is that right?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: That’s correct.
Counsel Inquiry: Thank you very much.
I want to begin by establishing with you some facts about civil contingency as a devolved matter in Wales. The Inquiry has heard this week from Mr Drakeford on this topic, but I want to discuss it in outline with you because it’s fundamental to your role that you held between 2011 and 2020 as the director of the local government directorate.
Civil contingencies was not a devolved function under the Government of Wales Act of 1998, was it?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: No, it wasn’t.
Counsel Inquiry: But the Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 set a single framework for England and Wales, as did statutory and non-statutory guidance produced by the United Kingdom Government. There was a concordat signed between the United Kingdom Government and the Welsh Assembly government that was published in February of 2011, and within that concordat it established that the emphasis will be firmly upon co-operation and consultation between the United Kingdom Government and the Welsh Assembly government at both the planning and response stages with the views of Assembly ministers being taken into account in all phases of the decision-making process; is that right?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: That is correct.
Counsel Inquiry: You tell us in your witness statement that there were three reports on civil contingencies that ultimately led to the Welsh Government seeking additional powers in respect of civil contingencies; is that right?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: That is correct.
Counsel Inquiry: Just so that those are on record, they were the Wales audit office Civil Emergencies in Wales report of December 2012, which we’re going to come to in a moment, and in addition to that, the National Assembly for Wales Public Accounts Committee civil contingencies in Wales report of July 2013, and the Commission on Devolution in Wales, the Silk Commission, Empowerment and Responsibility of March of 2014.
But coming back to the first of those, the report from the Wales audit office in 2012, I’d like to take a look at that, please, because it helps us to focus on the development of the transfer of functions.
Thank you for putting up the first page. If we can go to page 4, please, thank you, we can see in the first main paragraph there:
“Many of the arrangements to deliver the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 work well but the role of the Welsh Government is unclear and there are opportunities for increased efficiency in local delivery.”
Over the page, please, at number 3, thank you:
“The approaches taken by Category One responders to implement the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 are inconsistent and responders are not effectively monitoring their activities.”
Can we go to page 8, please, and look at paragraph 8 on that page. On the right-hand side, just below the mid-line, thank you very much:
“The Welsh Government’s role in civil contingencies is complicated. As Wales does not have devolved powers for civil contingencies, the Welsh Government is not accountable for implementing or enforcing the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. However, the Welsh Government does have a role, through its Resilience Team, in:
“a. supporting local resilience forum activities;
“b. leading on all-Wales co-ordination;
“c. acting as a link between local resilience forums; and
“d. linking with the Cabinet Office and other United Kingdom Government departments.”
If we can go over the page, please, to paragraph 13, thank you:
“Complex leadership arrangements have not prevented the Welsh Government from providing effective support for the partners delivering the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. The different challenges of some recent major emergencies have demonstrated the ability of the Welsh Government and its partner organisations to provide an effective response. However, the United Kingdom Government has not devolved civil contingencies legislation to Wales, and does not categorise the Welsh Government as a Category One responder organisation with accountability for delivering the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. Whilst guidance from the Cabinet Office appears to set out that it is not the Welsh Government’s role to provide leadership of routine resilience activity, we consider the Welsh Government to be providing some of this function. The nature of the devolution settlement for Wales means that the Welsh Government’s role in civil contingencies is complicated.”
So that sentiment expressed again.
“We have concluded, and the Welsh Government agrees, that its role for civil contingencies is complex. The Welsh Government’s partners differently interpret the leadership and co-ordination role that it has developed, a situation that has led to a lack of clarity about the remit of the Welsh Government.”
Then to page 10, please, and paragraph 17, thank you:
“Too many emergency planning groups and unclear accountabilities add inefficiency to the already complex resilience framework. The current resilience structure is similar to the structure in England, with local resilience forums based on police force boundaries and with each Category One responder having its own emergency planning capability. We consider that the current structure is leading to inefficiencies at a local level, unnecessary complexity and unclear accountabilities, and is an ineffective framework for resilience in Wales. We also agree with the Simpson Review, that there is an urgent need for a fundamental review of local authority emergency planning services.”
To page 12, please, and paragraph 26, thank you:
“The absence of a national overview of the effectiveness of physical assets for an emergency response means their availability, maintenance or operation cannot be guaranteed.”
Then finally, please, to page 15 and recommendation 1, thank you, top right-hand corner:
“We recommend that the Welsh Government works with the Cabinet Office to agree how to strengthen strategic oversight of the delivery of civil contingencies legislation in Wales. This should encompass:
“- assessing the delivery of resilience planning under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, with the objective of bringing improved efficiency, consistency and quality;
“- the monitoring of national competence standards for emergency planning officers;
“- reassuring the public of Wales on the effective preparation for, management of and recovery from, civil contingencies; and
“- continuing to: improve access to information for responders; promote the sharing and use of good practice and the specialist skills required to delivery civil contingencies legislation; and organise and coordinate training, exercises and research.”
Now, we can take that down, please.
You say in your statement, Mr Kilpatrick, that following on from this audit, the Welsh Government actively sought additional powers under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 from the United Kingdom Government, but despite those attempts, by 2017, the government had not agreed to devolve these powers and you continued to build capability and resilience in order to plan for and respond to civil emergencies despite the fact that those powers had not been provided; is that right?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: That is correct.
Counsel Inquiry: Did the absence of those powers in 2017 hold you back in any way in terms of the level of preparation that you could engage with?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I think going back to the genesis of the report –
Counsel Inquiry: Yes.
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: – and our First Minister at the time, and subsequent First Ministers as well, there is a very clear responsibility – or they feel a very clear responsibility and accountability to the people of Wales to make sure that devolved organisations, and those would be Category 1 responders like Health, like local government, like the fire service and the ambulance service, are fully equipped and understand their role in the emergency planning, resilience and response field. And that is why they and we have taken this role very seriously. That is regardless of the fact that some of the issues raised in the audit report relating to the testing and the performance of local resilience fora remained, until 2018, the responsibility of the Cabinet Office rather than us.
Counsel Inquiry: All right. I mean, you clearly took things seriously, and the absence of the transfer of powers did not prevent you from planning and getting ready to respond, but why was it so imperative, in your view, in your position, to continue to campaign for the transfer order, which we will come to shortly, being made?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Okay. It was very important to us because the part 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act gives us a number of statutory powers by which we – can use to put duties on to local resilience fora or to Category 1 responders, and together they would enable us to develop our own approach to a civil contingency response, to an emergency planning response and recovery, that would suit Wales.
So we have a slightly different system, which is flatter, and I believe more agile as a consequence, but in order to put in a regulatory system that would enable us to oversee that and have a degree of accountability, we needed the transfer of functions from that part of the Act.
Counsel Inquiry: Ultimately the position did change with the passing of the Transfer of Functions Order, didn’t it?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: It did.
Counsel Inquiry: In 2018?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: From that time you would say, I imagine, that Welsh ministers have had a greater control in terms of policymaking, in the field of civil contingencies, and exercising a range of different functions under the Civil Contingencies Act?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: We have the opportunity now that the Transfer of Functions Order is complete.
Counsel Inquiry: All right, thank you very much.
I want to discuss for a moment the Wales Resilience Forum and a meeting that took place in October of 2018. We’ll come in detail to the forum shortly, but at a meeting of that organisation, the then Cabinet Secretary for Local Government and Public Services agreed to support a review of the emergency planning governance and structures that were then present in Wales, in order to ensure that they remained fit for purpose?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Yes, correct.
Counsel Inquiry: That comprehensive review was set in train, but, as we understand it, that review was not completed for five years and, indeed, not finally completed until this year; is that right?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: That is correct.
Counsel Inquiry: For what reason?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: The reason being – first of all, may I say we thought the review was a very important piece of work.
Counsel Inquiry: Yes.
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Ministers were very committed to it and, as officials, we saw this as a real opportunity to look at how we might use our new powers and duties under the transfer of functions in a way that would enable us to improve and potentially simplify the system.
Almost immediately that we had agreed the review should begin, the preparations for leaving – the exit without a deal, with no deal, began, so Operation Yellowhammer was sort of in its early days in the beginning of 2019, and certainly we were engaged with that around the end of 2018.
As a consequence of that, we had to prioritise the resources that we did have and therefore we focused on undertaking those Operation Yellowhammer preparations and delayed the review. We thought that was going to be for three months to six months. Unfortunately it proved to be a lot longer.
Counsel Inquiry: It turned out to be a considerable –
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: – period of time.
Is it your evidence, then, Mr Kilpatrick, that no work took place on the review until relatively recently or was the work started back in October of 2018 and then paused?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: No work began on the review until probably about 15 months ago.
Counsel Inquiry: Right.
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: That was when we closed down, finally, our Covid mobilisation programme.
Counsel Inquiry: What did the review throw up?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: The review threw up a number of very important things as far as I’m concerned. There was inevitably some echo of the audit reports that we had seen before.
Counsel Inquiry: Yes.
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: The review also said, very pleasingly, that our governance structures and accountability structures were fit for purpose and worked. So that was quite good, that we didn’t – we weren’t beginning from a sense of failure, we were beginning from a sense of strength.
Counsel Inquiry: Yes.
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Nonetheless there were 15 recommendations, some of which were very closely aligned with the findings of the Professors Mann and Alexander report, which I know the Inquiry has seen, and I would agree with virtually all of them. I think they are exactly the sort of things we were looking for. How do we increase the capacity and capability of our function? How do we bring a degree of consistency and understanding and clarity to the systems that we are aiming to put in place across Wales?
Counsel Inquiry: Well, we’ll turn to look at three of those recommendations in detail towards the end of your evidence, but before we do that I’d like to ask you about ministerial responsibility. The First Minister has overall responsibility for civil contingencies and resilience within the Welsh Government; is that right?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: That’s correct.
Counsel Inquiry: What is the scope of the ministerial resilience portfolio?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: That would cover I think probably two things. That would cover our planning and preparedness. So the First Minister chairs the Wales Resilience Forum –
Counsel Inquiry: Yes.
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: – which we may talk about more – and that is, to me, a very important statement of the Welsh Government leadership to our civil contingencies community across Wales and to the Category 1 and 2 responders.
The second role is around their role as a minister in terms of setting policy, in terms of taking necessary decisions, which you would expect through that normal policy process. So we’ve discussed the report with him and we will continue to discuss the report with him, as we would any sort of normal policy minister. So that’s the second role.
Sorry, did I say two? I think there is a third role as well, which I think is really critical, and that is the role of the First Minister in response, and we’ve had a number of instances over the last – certainly with Covid and with Brexit, but a number of other mobilisations across Wales, and the First Minister brings a degree of credibility but also the highest level of decision-making that we need if we have to move quite quickly to make regulatory changes or other such measures.
Counsel Inquiry: So would your view, Mr Kilpatrick, be that it’s vital that the First Minister remains involved in his position with matters of resilience?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: Yes. You may be aware that Sir Oliver Letwin has given evidence to this Inquiry what seems like a long time ago now, but I think it was only a matter of a week or so, and he told my Lady that in his view the system would benefit, certainly in the United Kingdom, from having a senior Cabinet-led minister solely devoted, full-time, to a resilience portfolio. John Swinney was also receptive to that idea within the Scottish Government. What is your view as to whether or not that would work in Wales?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: It is certainly a benefit to us of having the First Minister leading resilience, and certainly, from my point of view, resilience and preparedness is an absolutely critical part of government. I would have no objection, certainly, if the First Minister was to make a new post which would lead on resilience. It would potentially make my job a lot easier. But these are decisions, I think, for the First Minister rather than me, but there are – there would clearly be advantages in doing that.
Lady Hallett: Arguably you’re coming down in Wales if I were to make that recommendation, because the point was to have somebody dedicated to it who had the ear of the Prime Minister and, in Wales’ case, the First Minister, but if you’ve already got the First Minister’s ear because he’s the man leading it …
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Yes, my Lady, I think there’s a balance between the amount of time and energy that a First Minister can dedicate to the emergency planning and response agenda, and we have been lucky, I think, over the last few years with First Ministers in Wales, and the other side of the balance is the seniority with which that function and that role is being pushed forward. At the moment we are very lucky to have a very senior minister, but equally a dedicated minister could provide us with a greater impetus in some of our day-to-day work.
Lady Hallett: Given the extent of the First Minister’s responsibilities?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Yes.
Ms Blackwell: Thank you.
I want to move on now to deal with some of the groups and teams which sit within resilience in Wales, starting with the Welsh Government Resilience Team, which you tell us in your witness statement is a crucial group in co-ordinating other groups and bodies.
It supports the Wales Resilience Forum; is that right?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: That’s correct.
Counsel Inquiry: And it co-ordinates resilience activity at an all-Wales level, establishing links between local responders and Whitehall, and it facilitates cross-departmental planning and response within the Welsh Government; is that right?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: Does it sit within the Community Safety division under the human resources group?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: The resilience team – there are two teams, there’s the Wales Resilience Partnership Team, which is that sort of supporting group for the Wales Resilience Forum, and it is secretariated by the Wales Resilience Team, which sits within my directorate, which is – it used to be in the HR department, it is now in the civil contingencies and national security division.
Counsel Inquiry: Right. Now, you’ve mentioned there the Wales Resilience Partnership Team. You may be aware that Dr Goodall was asked by Mr Keith this week whether or not that needs to sit separately from the Wales Resilience Forum or whether or not those two bodies could effectively be called under the same name.
Do you agree, Mr Kilpatrick, using that by way of an example, that the structures around resilience appear to be rather complicated?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: If you take all of the resilience functions and all of the response functions and all of the planning functions, it is a very complicated structure –
Counsel Inquiry: Could it be simplified?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: It could be simplified. As somebody who works in this area, if one looks at the – if you like, the functional unit, so if one looks at preparedness, as that would sit under the Wales Resilience Forum, that is a fairly simple structure, I would suggest. There are quite a lot of working groups but nonetheless it is a fairly straightforward structure. If we look at the Pan-Wales Response Plan and the structures that sit under that that we would use to respond to an emergency, again they are quite simple.
We may come back to talking about how these things relate to one another later, but there is a degree of complexity, however I think there is also a degree of simplicity when one begins to break that model down.
Counsel Inquiry: Right, okay.
Moving back to the Welsh Government Resilience Team, numbers have swelled, haven’t they, within that team over more recent times? I think it started off with six or so –
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: – officers and then the permanent secretary identified resources to double that, and now are there about 25 full-time staff members within the team?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: There are. They do undertake other duties, like cyber resilience, for example, but there is a team of around 25, and a new – a completely new director post looking after that team.
Counsel Inquiry: Does that work well? Is that enough by way of resource for what they need to do?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: At the moment I think it is sufficient for the task that we are facing. Clearly, once we have been through the review process, there may be recommendations that come out of that which we would want to revisit the structures, but currently I think we are adequately staffed for the task at hand.
Counsel Inquiry: You sit on the Wales Resilience Forum, don’t you?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I do.
Counsel Inquiry: We’ve already established that the First Minister sits on that group as well. What’s your role within that forum?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I represent the – if you like, the Welsh Government emergency planning and response function. I also have a leadership role across the emergency planning function, I think for the rest of the public service, and I provide advice to the First Minister in his role as chair.
Counsel Inquiry: Whilst sitting within that forum, you would have been aware that pandemic flu had been assessed as and remained the highest risk within the National Risk Register; is that right?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: That is correct.
Counsel Inquiry: How much of the forum’s time was devoted to preparing for a future pandemic?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: The forum has a wide range of issues that it has to deal with, which are articulated through a five-year and an annual business plan. Pandemic flu as a principal risk would have featured as part of that plan, but it would have been an element of that rather than a focus. The reason for that would be our colleagues in the Health and social care department were leading on that particular piece of work, and we would, as a forum, assume that that was all going according to plan and according to timetable.
There were some elements that we did talk about in detail as part of that business planning process, but the overall approach to pandemic flu planning was taken forward by the Health department.
Counsel Inquiry: Right. Within that forum, do you think the correct balance was struck between short-term risks and the necessity to deal with those and looking beyond that to long-term risks?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: We could have focused on the National Risk Register more than we did, and I think that is a legitimate point that’s been made earlier on in colleagues’ evidence –
Counsel Inquiry: Yes.
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: – and it is something that we have turned our minds very closely to over the last year or so and will continue to do so.
Counsel Inquiry: The final group I want to touch upon is the Joint Emergency Services Group, which you tell us in your witness statement is in existence:
“… to promote inter-operable working between services, working with the [local resilience fora] to develop preparedness and provide strategic oversight for the capture and implementation of lessons identified from public inquiries and other legal processes.”
Do you think that that group adds value to what is already in train?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: The group plays no formal part in our civil contingency or emergency planning and response structures. Nonetheless, I believe it adds significant value, and it’s been demonstrated to add significant value during Brexit and certainly during our response to Covid. It brings together the chief officers of the emergency services along with the military, coastguard and others, and provides us with an opportunity to really understand what those Category 1 responders’ issues are.
I think more importantly than us understanding, it provides probably the only forum in the UK for the emergency services to get together to understand how to work better collaboratively, but also how to pool their resources and develop very strong personal collaborative working relations. Just one example, if I may, on your last point about how the Joint Emergency Services Group is used, it has decided to oversee the Wales response to the Manchester Arena Inquiry recommendations, so that is taking a set of lessons identified, 154 I think, and making sure that they are implemented through a proper set of accountability and project management arrangements.
Counsel Inquiry: What does the group do, though, in the hiatus that might exist between a public inquiry making its recommendations or having to respond to any sort of legal issue that arises? Does it remain as a group that regularly meets or is it stood down?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: It regularly meets and it will deal with a range of issues that the members themselves might bring forward. So, for example, we’ve been discussing the sort of terrible problem of violence against the emergency services and what can they do together to address some of that, and equally, as the Welsh Government representative and our director general for health sits on that group, what can we bring either from a policy or a practical perspective to that group to help them address some of these really key issues.
Counsel Inquiry: So you would say that this group is important because it also, from time to time, has the space to look at other legal issues as they touch civil contingencies?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Yes, absolutely, and they work very – there is a – sorry for the jargon, but the chair of the local resilience fora chairs group will attend that meeting, so they have a direct line into the four local resilience chair people.
Counsel Inquiry: All right, thank you.
I want to move on now to cover the issue of risk. In your witness statement you make it clear that you understood through your time in the relevant post that the United Kingdom National Risk Register had been the basis of risk assessment in Wales, in fact since 2005.
But we know from the audit report that we looked at at the beginning of your evidence that, certainly by 2012, the Welsh Government and the Wales Resilience Forum had decided not to compile a national risk register for Wales.
You may be aware that a Scottish Risk Assessment was established in 2018, and of course that timescale fits in with the Transfer of Functions Order to Wales. What I want to ask you is this: at that time, when the Transfer of Functions Order had been made, was there any additional thought given to whether or not Wales should have its own risk assessment?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: We were beginning to think that. I think we had been aware since 2010/2011 that there was a National Risk Register and how did that relate to Wales. Of course there are four local community risk registers developed and held by local resilience fora, so we had some idea of the risks, and those local risk registers equally were based on an assessment of the national security risk register, so we weren’t without risk.
We undertook the first year of sector security resilience planning, which was, to begin with, an internal Welsh Government exercise to ask my policy colleagues who were in charge of particular sectors, like water or transport, what their view of the risk and preparedness was for each of those sectors, and we compiled one report and one set of ministerial advice. But again, unfortunately, we were unable to prioritise that work going forward because we had to turn our attention and our resources to Brexit.
Counsel Inquiry: Well, I’d like to look at INQ000187580, please, which is the 2023 review of the civil contingencies in Wales report, and go to page 33, please, which I think – thank you very much.
Under the heading “Risk”:
“[Welsh Government] and [local resilience forums] should work in partnership to interpret the UK National Risk Register and adapt UK level risks to Wales, working together to identify upcoming and potential risks that would significantly impact Wales, eg led by a Wales Resilience Board … detailed in [another section of the report].”
Has that recommendation been progressed?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Not as yet, no. I agree with the recommendation, I think it’s a very sensible thing. As I say, we’d been thinking along these lines for some time.
We are still considering the recommendations of this report and will clearly make a judgement on how we take them forward, but my – I think my priority at the moment is to understand what may be coming out of this module, and certainly to understand some of the Mann and Alexander recommendations and how they can fit in.
Nonetheless, we are – we do have a risk and preparedness group which has begun to do precisely this. We just have to move it out to the local resilience fora shortly.
Counsel Inquiry: So is there a prospect then, once this recommendation is progressed further, that Wales might have its own risk assessment?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I think there is a very strong prospect, if not a certainty.
Counsel Inquiry: All right, thank you very much. We can take that down, please.
Sources of advice for pandemic planning and preparedness. A great deal of scientific medical and technical support is provided by the United Kingdom Government and this Inquiry has heard about various bodies and organisations, SAGE, NERVTAG, the JCVI.
In Wales, is it right, Mr Kilpatrick, that Wales did not provide advice, as in scientific advice, for civil contingency and emergency health planning?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: We drew our advice from our internal experts – so we’ve heard about the Chief Scientific Adviser, the CMO, the Chief Scientific Adviser for Health – to the extent that we needed that. There were arrangements that were put in place relating to a STAC, a science technology advisory group, I think.
Counsel Inquiry: Yes.
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Basically that was part of our response arrangement, so should something happen where we needed very detailed specialised technical advice, our response plans would establish a STAC and that would draw in the necessary individuals or expertise, and that could be from anywhere across the UK, if, for example, they had a particular interest or a need to understand particulates in smoke or something.
Counsel Inquiry: Let’s have a look at this, please, and the arrangement between a STAC and a Welsh STAC and the United Kingdom Government.
If we look at INQ000107125, please. Thank you very much, page 7.
This is headed “Default STAC/Wales STAC, SAGE interaction model (information flows)”, and if we take a moment to orientate ourselves we can see on the left-hand side we’ve got “Welsh Government”, in the main box is “COBR” and “SAGE”, going down and up to the “STAC/Wales STAC” in the middle, and then on the left-hand side, down and up to the “Strategic Co-ordinating Group(s)”, and on the right-hand side, down and up and across horizontally to the “Recovery Co-ordinating Group(s)”.
Now, it is apparent from this diagram that there is no direct link between the STAC, and indeed the Wales STAC and the Welsh Government. Why would that be? Why would there be no direct link between the Welsh STAC and the Welsh Government?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: This is not a picture that I would recognise.
Counsel Inquiry: Right.
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I would suggest that unless there was a – well, even if there was a national incident that would demand the establishment of COBR and SAGE, if a strategic co-ordinating group in Wales convened a STAC, then that would report in to the Welsh Government and, to the extent that it needed to report in to the United Kingdom Government, it would be at least after consultation with Welsh ministers, if not by Welsh ministers themselves.
Counsel Inquiry: Right, so that makes perfect logic, doesn’t it, that the Welsh STAC would have a direct link in to the Welsh Government? Do you think that this diagram needs amending?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Yes, I would say so.
Counsel Inquiry: All right. Thank you.
We can take that down, please.
The Pan-Wales Response Plan. When you became director for the civil contingencies function of local government, you assumed responsibility for the Pan-Wales Response Plan, didn’t you?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I did.
Counsel Inquiry: Can we put it up, please, on the screen, it’s INQ000107119.
Now, you explain in your witness statement that the plan had been approved by the Wales Resilience Forum since September of 2005. We can see from this document, bottom right-hand corner, that this version appears to have been revised in 2019.
Did the Welsh Government undertake any formal evaluations of the resource capability of the local resilience fora and partners as part of readiness under the Pan-Wales Response Plan?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: We did not. The plan sets out the structures, the processes, the roles and responsibilities and the criteria for moving or for escalating action through those structures. We would not consider the resource requirements for other organisations as part of the review.
Counsel Inquiry: To what extent is there a level of harmonisation between this plan and other planning for communicable diseases, perhaps UK-wide plans such as the strategy of 2011 about which my Lady has heard so much already, and the Cabinet Office guidance, and do you think that there could be an improvement in terms of the borders that exist between the various plans?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: There are undoubtedly many plans in this area, and I have a high regard for all of them in a sense, they’ve been very carefully thought out, most have been very thoroughly tested, the Pan-Wales Response Plan has been exceptionally thoroughly tested.
I think the issue for me around the plans is not necessarily the number of plans or whether they are initially effective. There is a more fundamental point about how they relate to one another and how an escalation through a set of plans, and for example some plans in our health and social care colleagues, would actually then relate to a mobilisation of the pan-Wales plan, and I think there is more work that we need to do to understand those borders between plans but, more importantly, the thresholds at which they become activated, and also the accountability around the activation. So we know who is taking the decisions and why and at what point.
For me, a lot of the – a lot of learning is still to be done about how we make sure that system works together as a coherent whole rather than as a set of plans.
Counsel Inquiry: Because, as you’ve just highlighted, clarity around accountability is crucial, isn’t it –
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: – in this area? Yes, all right, thank you very much. We can take that down.
Before we turn to look at the three aspects of the 2023 review that I want to take you through, I just want to pause for a moment and ask you about inequalities, because it’s an important aspect of this Inquiry, and the extent to which health inequalities and other health determinants, including vaccine uptake, were considered in pandemic planning.
I want to just look for a moment, please, at the Wales debrief report on Exercise Cygnus, which is dated October 2016 and is at INQ000128979. Thank you.
If we look at the final recommendation here, and of course reminding ourselves that this is the Welsh debrief report, we can see that the Welsh Government and the local resilience fora are:
“… to consider options for identifying people at risk during a flu pandemic and how resources from public services, voluntary sector, communities and individuals can be best used to provide targeted support.”
Now, that was set out in those terms in October of 2016. What has been done between that date and today to put that recommendation into action?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: There are a number of things that I can explain. First of all, the Welsh Government is acutely aware of the need to identify vulnerable people, and our initial response to this was to develop an IT system which we are able to use to draw data from a number of different Category 1 responders and Category 2 responders, and identify particular households where we believe there are vulnerable people. That might be people with mobility issues, or mental health problems or other issues. That system works very well, we use it on a very regular basis if there are potential flooding incidents or other civil contingency incidents where we need our local resilience fora or strategic co-ordinating groups to understand where vulnerable people are so they can plan to help them.
That also provided a really useful overlay when we were writing out the shielding letters at the beginning of Covid, so we could sort of cross-check and validate that we were actually picking everybody up through the hospital data and this other so-called jigsaw data.
We worked with the LRFs so that they would engage much more formally and much more regularly with the voluntary sector in order to draw in the great wealth of help and assistance and local knowledge from voluntary organisations.
We have the chief executive of the Welsh Council for Voluntary Action on the Wales Resilience Forum and sitting around any response table that we had.
So through Brexit we worked very closely again with the Welsh Council for Voluntary Action chief executive and her members.
There are also the faith and communities group, which is chaired by a minister within Welsh Government, which enables us to understand some of the particular issues around faith and faith communities.
So we have done, I would say, quite a lot. There is a good deal more to do, it’s a large area to work with, but we certainly have responded to that recommendation.
Counsel Inquiry: Do you agree that this is a really important aspect of planning?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Yes, I do. I think it is a really important aspect.
Counsel Inquiry: Can you confirm, Mr Kilpatrick, that going forwards this will be a priority in terms of ensuring that those who are likely to be the heaviest affected by any sort of civil contingency emergency will be considered?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I think to the extent that we can include, identify and work with vulnerable people, we most certainly will.
Counsel Inquiry: Thank you.
Then, finally, bringing ourselves up to date with the 2023 Review of Civil Contingencies in Wales, at INQ000187580, we’re going to look first at page 27 and paragraph 6.1 which is a critical recommendation. I think it’s the previous page, thank you. Governance and assurance:
“The conclusion of the review is that the governance arrangements which encompass civil contingencies and emergency planning in Wales are fundamentally sound. However, the frequency of the relevant meetings, such as the Wales Resilience Forum, should be reviewed to ensure strategic decision-making is made in a timely manner. Modifications and changes will be necessary over time to accommodate national priorities and the nature of risks, but the view of stakeholders is that an emphasis on evolution rather than revolution should be the approach adopted.
“There was a strong view amongst stakeholders that [local resilience forums] performed well and discharged their responsibilities under the Act effectively. It was conceded however that this statement is anecdotal rather than evidence-based, and no formal measurement of performance occurs or benchmarks for acceptability established. A strong view was expressed, especially during the workshops, that an assurance framework would support the sharing of best practice and drive organisational learning and development.”
Are there plans to create an assurance framework?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Yes, there are. I strongly support this recommendation. I also note that it was part of the Mann and Alexander recommendations as well, and I think there is a demand for this, as you can see, amongst the resilience community. It is something that, had we been able to undertake the review in 2018 –
Counsel Inquiry: When it was first established, yes.
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: When it was first done – sorry, when we first had the transfer of functions – we would have delivered this as a priority.
Counsel Inquiry: Right, so this is going to go ahead?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Yes.
Counsel Inquiry: Thank you.
Second, then, you tell us in your witness statement that training in your view is a fundamental part of pandemic preparedness. Let’s look, please, at page 35 of this report and at paragraph 15. Thank you.
“The development of a centrally managed training and exercise regime should be considered.”
We there have set out in the series of bullet points the scope and functions of what should be included in that training and exercise regime.
Is this also something which you support?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I’m very supportive of this. We are – we already have a – I think quite a positive training offer, certainly for the first point here, the gold/silver/bronze commanders, which we need to widen out. I think there’s an issue about colleagues across the public sector stepping forward into this space, which is not always easy for people to take on –
Counsel Inquiry: But being trained makes a difference, perhaps, to somebody’s decision-making, doesn’t it?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Absolutely. The offer that we can provide of training and support is critical, I think, to widening that capability that we’re looking for.
Counsel Inquiry: Thank you. Finally in this report, could we go to page 29 and look at recommendation 4. Top of the page, thank you:
“Welsh Government should establish an executive board (Wales Resilience Board) reporting to the Wales Resilience Forum … and supported by the Wales Resilience Partnership Team … with the terms of reference for the WRPT adjusted accordingly.”
Now, at risk of promoting the creation of yet another organisational board, do you agree with this recommendation and, if so, why?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I’m still considering this and I’m still considering it with colleagues who might be affected by that. We haven’t yet spoken to either the Wales Resilience Forum or the Wales Resilience Partnership. I think your point about complexity is a really important one. I don’t want to do anything that is going to make an already complex system more complex, I want to do something that is going to make it simpler and more streamlined. Therefore I need a good deal more consideration of this recommendation and what the group is trying to achieve, because that’s the most important thing.
Counsel Inquiry: Yes.
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: It isn’t the group, it is what the objectives and the aims of – what the objectives and aims are that really matter to me.
Counsel Inquiry: Only if those objectives and aims demand that another board or another group be created should that be done?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I need to consider this in a good deal more detail.
Counsel Inquiry: All right.
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Because I’m not sure that those aims and objectives could not be done as effectively if not more effectively by existing structures.
Counsel Inquiry: Thank you.
Finally, Mr Kilpatrick, could we look at your witness statement, which we have at INQ000190662, and if we go to page 26, and paragraph 89, I think it’s the previous page, thank you.
You say this:
“In future, learning from Brexit and particularly Covid-19, it is necessary that a clear and deliverable corporate approach to these resourcing challenges is put in place that will identify colleagues, train them, and ensure that when required they will be made available to the response effort. That work is urgent and while some progress has been made on a ‘reservist model’ there is still some way to go before the approach is fully developed and embedded across the organisation.”
How can the aim and the desire to identify colleagues and train them in the way that you set out in this paragraph be established practically? And you describe the work as urgent; have minds been put to how this aim can be achieved in an urgent way?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: This relates to the Welsh Government itself, just to be clear, it doesn’t relate to the wider system. So it is a corporate issue for me and my senior colleagues.
Counsel Inquiry: Yes.
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I can assure you that work has been undertaken and minds are continually put to this. I don’t allow people to forget that, in order to run a sustained mobilisation of our emergency planning structures, we need people. I believe it is not always an easy place to work but it is a very rewarding job to do, and it is certainly at the forefront of the government priorities. So I will continue to work with colleagues in our HR department but also with other director generals to identify individuals and to identify the means by which we can really develop that cadre of people and, most importantly, that when something happens, get that cadre of people into place quickly and in a sustained way.
Counsel Inquiry: Thank you very much.
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Thank you.
Ms Blackwell: My Lady, that completes my questioning of this witness. I understand that you have provisionally provided permission to Covid Bereaved Families for Justice Cymru to ask questions on a particular topic.
Lady Hallett: I have, and I confirm they have permission.
Ms Blackwell: Thank you.
Questions From Ms Gowman
Ms Gowman: Thank you, my Lady.
Mr Kilpatrick, my name is Nia Gowman and I ask questions on behalf of Covid Bereaved Families for Justice Cymru. I’m going to ask you about concerns that you held in respect of the Welsh Government’s engagement with the UK pandemic influenza review and workstreams and for context the Inquiry has heard evidence that in June 2018 there was a senior officials meeting between the UK and Welsh Governments to discuss pandemic influenza preparedness, and the Inquiry has also heard that following that meeting there was an email disagreement between you and Mr David Goulding, the head of HEPU, in respect of feedback that should be relayed to Vaughan Gething as Welsh Minister for Health. With this in mind, can we please bring up exhibit INQ000108484, and specifically page 5, please. Thank you.
Mr Kilpatrick, do you have that document in front of you?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I do.
Ms Gowman: You should recognise this, I hope, as an email that you sent on 6 July in response to Mr Goulding’s summary of the meeting that I’ve referred to. Is that correct?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: That is correct.
Ms Gowman: We can see from that email that you were concerned that the Welsh Government had not been adequately engaging or providing a reasonable level of practical support and resource to the UK pandemic influenza review or the workstreams required to progress the necessary and important updates to pandemic guidance, such as the UK influenza preparedness strategy of 2011, and local resilience forum pandemic flu guidance 2013. Is that correct? Were those your concerns?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: My – yes.
Ms Gowman: We can also see from that email that you appeared to express particular concern in respect of the approach of the Welsh Government, namely that the Welsh Government waits until the Department of Health has produced its own material before revising its own.
In simple terms, were you concerned that the Welsh Government were being reactive as opposed to proactive in respect of those guidance documents?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I think my views on – the sentiments I was expressing in this email were – reflected a desire for Wales to play its part in what is clearly a very important part of UK Government pandemic planning. My first issue I think was around the Pandemic Flu Bill, and that we played a full part in that, and the reason for that is quite simple, because there are a number of things which I know the Inquiry has heard about this week relating to excess deaths planning, and other provisions which the Pandemic Flu Bill was actually going to bring a conclusion to. So some of those things that weren’t actually delivered would have been delivered by the Bill. And as I work very closely with Katharine Hammond in the Cabinet Office, we were both quite concerned that Wales needed to be doing as much as it could in order to bring that wider set of actions to a conclusion.
Also, I think we have a great advantage in Wales in that we can draw resource and expertise in much more easily from across, in this case, our NHS planners and, to some extent, from our local resilience planners in local government and so forth, and we shouldn’t miss the opportunity to use that expertise in order to do our work and, in this case, to do the work alongside the United Kingdom Government as well.
Ms Gowman: Because the risk if that does not happen is that, one, the broader guidance cannot benefit from the Welsh expertise, but also that guidance isn’t then framed in a way that is fit for purpose for the Welsh population and Welsh issues; is that fair?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: Of course we would want to make sure that any guidance that was produced at a UK level reflected the conditions in Wales and our concerns, because Wales is socio-demographically quite different to parts of England and the UK. So, yes, I think you’re right.
Ms Gowman: In terms then of the approach that had been evident up until that point when you were raising your concerns, did you have concerns that that suggested an attitude of apathy or complacency in respect of certain departments within Welsh Government?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: No, I wouldn’t agree that it was apathy or complacency. I know that the colleagues who were copied in to this email are extremely diligent and hard working and understand the breadth and importance of their work. I think this was an issue that emerged from a particular meeting and was dealt with in the way that it was, through the email exchange.
Ms Gowman: We can see in terms of the conclusion of that email exchange that, notwithstanding the concerns that you raised in respect of resource in particular, the conclusion was simply to reflect to the Minister for Health that there was considerable work remaining, no reference to resource issues. Do you agree?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I agree that’s what the email says, but if I might add that the work on the Pandemic Flu Bill so far as I’m aware was completed on time to enable the legislation to be brought into force when it needed to be.
Ms Gowman: But insofar as the plans and guidance are concerned, it’s correct, isn’t it, that the 2011 strategy was not updated and neither was the guidance, the 2013 guidance for local resilience forum pandemic flu updated either, that didn’t happen?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: So far as I know, that is correct.
Ms Gowman: Despite you having raised concerns about resource, no further resource was committed to planning for a pandemic of any kind after you raising those concerns; is that correct?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I’m sorry, I cannot answer that, those would have been decisions taken in the health and social care department and I have no knowledge as to how they’ve subsequently managed their people or their resources.
Ms Gowman: Given that those plans and guidances weren’t updated, do you accept that that contributed to Wales being inadequately prepared for the Covid pandemic when it hit?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I think we would have been in a better position had the plans been updated, I think we would have had a better understanding of the risks as they currently were at that time, but ultimately we were working on a set of assumptions and those plans would have been based on those assumptions.
Ms Gowman: One final question, Mr Kilpatrick. Sir Frank Atherton within his witness statement to this Inquiry, and this is at INQ000184902, at page 13, paragraph 55, set out his view in respect of the plans that did exist in Wales, and at paragraph 55 we can see that in essence he set out that the plans were “predicated on a short, sharp shock; something that would disrupt the normal functioning of society for days or weeks”. Do you agree that that was the presumption upon which Wales was operating?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I wouldn’t disagree with the Chief Medical Officer on this point.
Ms Gowman: And by continuation of that point, the plans were wholly inadequate for the pandemic that we then faced?
Mr Reginald Kilpatrick: I think the plans would have been different had we been working on a different set of assumptions.
Ms Gowman: Thank you, Mr Kilpatrick.
Thank you, my Lady.
Lady Hallett: Thank you very much.
Thank you very much, Mr Kilpatrick. You are now free to go. Thank you for your help.
The Witness: Thank you.
(The witness withdrew)
Lady Hallett: I’ll be back at quarter to.
Ms Blackwell: Thank you, my Lady.
(2.35 pm)
(A short break)
(2.45 pm)
Lady Hallett: Ms Blackwell.
Ms Blackwell: My Lady, please may I call Robin Swann.