Transcript of Module 2C Public Hearing on 8 May 2024.
(10.00 am)
Lady Hallett: Ms Dodds.
Ms Dobbin: Good morning, my Lady. May I call the first
witness, please, Lord Peter Weir.
1. Lord Peter Weir
LORD PETER WEIR (sworn).
Questions From Lead Counsel to the Inquiry for Module 2C
Ms Dobbin: Lord Weir, can I ask you to give your full name
to the Inquiry, please.
Lord Peter Weir: I am Lord Peter Weir of Ballyholme.
Lead 2C: Thank you.
Lord Weir, I think you have a witness statement in
front of you which –
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: – you signed on 23 January 2024.
Lord Peter Weir: That is correct.
Lead 2C: I’m sorry, I was just going to ask, first of all,
whether or not you’re content that that witness
statement is true to the best of your knowledge and
belief?
Lord Peter Weir: I am content, yes.
Lead 2C: Thank you. We’re going to move on to hear your evidence
in just a moment, but I think you wanted to say
something –
Lord Peter Weir: It’s just very briefly with the indulgence of the Inquiry.
As both a former Executive member and also on a personal basis, I feel it is important before we move into the detailed evidence, I want to express my sorrow to all those who suffered in whatever way through the pandemic, and particularly to pass on my sympathy to the families of those who lost loved ones during the pandemic. I appreciate that the hurt will not be healed and that nothing that any of us can do can bring back those loved ones, but I hope that as a result of this Inquiry, while I think we all hope and pray that there will never be a repeat of the pandemic, hopefully perhaps it can lead to lessons learned that can mean that if we do ever find ourselves in that terrible situation again, that however we tackle it can be done in a better way to what has gone before.
Lead 2C: Thank you.
Lord Weir, can I begin then please by asking you a little bit about your political career. I think it’s correct that from 1998 until about 2022 you were a member of the Legislative Assembly in Northern Ireland; is that correct?
Lord Peter Weir: That is correct, yes.
Lead 2C: And I think that you were, and you remain in fact, a member of the Democratic Unionist Party; is that
correct?
Lord Peter Weir: That is also correct, yes.
Lead 2C: I think during that long career you had many roles
within the Legislative Assembly and within your party,
and I think those included that you sat on the education
committee for some time; is that correct?
Lord Peter Weir: Yes, that is correct, yes.
Lead 2C: I think you were chief whip for your party as well; is
that also correct?
Lord Peter Weir: That’s correct. I think as a result of the various
roles that I have, it probably gave me a little bit of
insight that – I was at a range of different levels
within the Assembly, so saw perhaps a wide range of
various aspects, shall we say, of the way that the
Assembly operated.
Lead 2C: All right. I’m sure we’ll come back to that in the
course of your evidence, and I think it’s right, then,
that for a period between 2016 and 2017, you had a role
as education minister in Northern Ireland before the
power-sharing arrangements were suspended; is that
right?
Lord Peter Weir: That is also correct, yes.
Lead 2C: Then when they were restored you came back to that role
on 11 January 2020?
Lord Peter Weir: That is correct, and I served in that role then until June of 2022.
Lead 2C: So across the course of your career, had you always had an interest in education?
Lord Peter Weir: I think it was something that I’d always had a level of passion. I feel that ensuring – one of the best things that we can do as a society is to try to give better life chances to our children and young people, so it was always something, even before I took up a formal role that I had a considerable level of interest in.
Lead 2C: In terms of the powers that you had as the Minister of Education in Northern Ireland, it’s an accepted matter, isn’t it, so does that mean within Northern Ireland that the minister effectively has full powers in relation to all matters relating to education, or is there a limit to that?
Lord Peter Weir: Well, I think there’s a limitation, I suppose on – maybe on two grounds. As subject matter, I suppose it may be helpful to the Inquiry, education now would cover – the department would cover most of the issues that were there in other jurisdictions. I think the one very major distinction in terms of direct role is that, other jurisdictions, education would also include third level education of further and higher education. It isn’t – that is within the Department for the Economy here.
And I think that whenever we say that there is a full control, the nature of the power-sharing arrangements and the checks and balances within Northern Ireland mean that anything that is done is much more subject to a duty to bring things to the Executive and get Executive approval, so there is perhaps much less of an opportunity that if a minister – if any minister is so minded, for them to go on a – more of a – call it a solo run or have a wider, more unlimited authority.
Lead 2C: All right.
Just coming back then to those matters that fall within the responsibility of the Department of Education, you’ve already made the point that it was limited to essentially education prior to university and college; correct?
Lord Peter Weir: Yeah.
Lead 2C: So up until the age of 18?
Lord Peter Weir: That is correct, it would cover most aspects of childcare or elements of preschool education, primary and secondary education, and also youth services, and specifically also then special schools and special educational needs.
Lead 2C: Yes. And I think it’s also right, just in terms of comparison to other parts of the United Kingdom, that the Department of Education in Northern Ireland doesn’t, for example, have a specific remit in relation to child protection or a general remit; any role that it has in child protection would be limited to the education sphere. Is that correct?
Lord Peter Weir: That would be correct. I think as regards issues around child protection and, for example, in terms of, broadly speaking, vulnerable children, that is principally within the remit of the Department of Health.
Lead 2C: Yes.
So just coming back, then, to the situation as you met it in January 2020, what you’ve said in your witness statement – and I don’t think I need to take you back to it – is that it was – it’s your view that the suspension of power-sharing arrangements between 2017 and 2020 did have some negative impacts, but that these effectively, and I’m summarising, shouldn’t be overstated. Is that right?
Lord Peter Weir: That would be correct. Do you want me to expand on it?
Lead 2C: I was going to just ask you a little bit about that.
First of all, I think you make the point in your statement that in terms of the Department of Education, it had been able to function without a minister being in place. Is that correct?
Lord Peter Weir: Yes. People may say that maybe it functioned better without me being in place, but that may be a different issue.
I think particularly within a suspension there is an opportunity and a responsibility on government departments to carry on with the work that is ongoing. I think in particular for the Department of Education, because there are certain legal decisions that need to be taken at times, there is a – I suppose a necessity for the department to be a little bit more proactive than some of the other departments.
So, for example, in the absence of a minister – a minister would take a decision on whether a particular school had to permanently close or a new school be opened by way of what they call a development proposal. In the absence of a minister, that would have been then been able to be carried out by the department itself through the permanent secretary. So I suppose it meant that some of the constraints that would maybe have been there on some of the departments weren’t quite as acute as they would have been with regard to the Department of Education.
Lead 2C: So during the period of suspension, may we take it that there were no major policy issues, for example, or challenges like that that the department faced that required a minister to be in position in order to deal –
Lord Peter Weir: No, I think the position across the board was that government departments were to carry on all their functions, they carry on where decisions need to be made, but I think from a policy point of view the idea was that the departments would not initiate new policy or separate policy that would not have been there before.
Lead 2C: Yes. The question was: is it correct, then, and should we proceed on the basis that the Department of Education didn’t have any major policy challenges during the period of suspension that it wasn’t able to deal with?
Lord Peter Weir: I think that that would be accurate, yes.
Lead 2C: The Inquiry has heard evidence that in respect of the Department of Health that wasn’t the position, that there was a need for radical reform and that there were funding issues that meant that there were issues about not having a minister in place, and that these played out during the response to the pandemic.
Is that something that you take any issue with, or would challenge?
Lord Peter Weir: No, I wouldn’t challenge it. I think in my evidence I suggested that, as regards the Department of Health, I think they focused in, whenever it came to the pandemic, that that was very much the focus of their resources and actions.
I think the absence of a minister meant that the process of reform was clearly slowed or at least went to a full stop during that period, and it – what are probably the implications during the pandemic was the department was less resilient to be able to deal with other issues whenever the pandemic hit. So, in that sense, it was sort of a more indirect than an absolutely direct effect.
Lead 2C: So would you agree with the proposition that the response of the Department of Health after January 2020 to the pandemic was conditioned by the fact that there hadn’t been that ability to reform during the period of suspension?
Lord Peter Weir: Clearly – clearly it was not something that was helpful. I suppose the only thing to put slightly in a level of context, that even if there had been an opportunity of reform, I think any form of health service reform is something that will be a very long process over quite a number of years. I suppose the only question is a little bit of a moot point, that had there not been – had there been ministers in place, how far along the line would we have reached by 2020, but certainly there is nothing to which there was going to be an advantage through there not being ministers, if I can put it that way.
Lady Hallett: Wasn’t there cross-party support for reform?
Lord Peter Weir: There was cross-party support, but I think there’s a tendency to find that, whether it’s health service reform or any sort of reform, it is perhaps easier to get a cross-party support than when the rubber hits the road of implementation.
People can buy into the concept, for instance, of health service reform, but if that leads to, then, a hospital in their local area being shut, it’s remarkable the extent to which that level of commitment then tends to dissipate.
Lady Hallett: The devil’s in the detail.
Lord Peter Weir: It is. It is indeed in that regard.
Ms Dobbin: But I think it’s right there was a programme for reform that had been drawn up off the back of the Bengoa report, and as we understand it, but maybe it’s not right, that programme of reform was something which was agreed between ministers –
Lord Peter Weir: That is correct. I suppose, again, the only issue is that it would have been relatively sort of strategic in its nature and therefore broad brush. I think there would have been probably a certain level of difficulties whenever we moved into the detail of that.
Lead 2C: All right.
Another thing that you said in your witness statement, and this is at paragraph 6, and I hope I can fairly characterise it as scepticism on your part about the paper that had been drawn up on 22 – or certainly it’s dated 22 January 2020, which was the paper that said that Northern Ireland was 18 months behind the other parts of the United Kingdom in terms of its sectorial ability to respond, and that was in the context of pandemic flu preparations.
Lord Peter Weir: Well, I would say a couple of things in relation to that. Firstly, I think getting – certainly for the Department of Education from 2008, there was a major emergency response plan. There was in place – as I understand it, the Department of Health had responsibility, if you like, for any form of pandemic preparation. So there was no reason for that to be delayed.
I suppose where my scepticism would have been is the extent to which, within any jurisdiction, you would have had ministers who would have been very hands-on in emergency preparation prior to that. I think most ministers will tend to find that a lot of their bandwidth is taken up by simply firefights of what is happening at that particular moment within their department, or indeed by way of looking at very big strategic issues that are in front of them that have to be dealt with, such as be it health reform or a cancer strategy.
I think – what I’m saying is I’m a little bit sceptical that had there simply been ministers in place, that a lot of time would have been spent on scenario planning of potential events that could happen into the future, but I would have expected that whatever work that was needed done on that should have been one that should have been done by officials in that regard. There may be others in terms of the detail of what preparation work was done who would be better placed to be able to give a more detailed response to that and maybe contradict what I’ve said.
Lead 2C: But do you take any issue with the suggestion that, certainly at the start of 2020, there were serious issues about contingency planning in Northern Ireland, and, for example, the fact that the arrangements hadn’t been reviewed for over 20 years?
Lord Peter Weir: I wouldn’t – I wouldn’t disagree with that. I wasn’t particularly aware of that at the time, but there was nothing I could necessarily disagree with that –
Lead 2C: You’ve foreseen my next question which was to ask whether or not ministers were aware in those first months of 2020 that in fact these papers had been generated, or certainly communications were being generated, about some of the challenges that contingency planning was facing?
Lord Peter Weir: I wasn’t aware of that. I think as there was a potential remit from the Department of Health, and probably to some extent the Executive Office, there might have been more awareness of that, but certainly I wasn’t aware of that within the Department of Education.
Lead 2C: I just want to show you one of the documents just to perhaps illuminate some of the things that were being said, Lord Weir, and again to ask you –
Lord Peter Weir: Okay.
Lead 2C: – about general awareness.
If we could please go to INQ000205712.
Lord Peter Weir: Yes. Could you possibly slightly enlarge that?
Lead 2C: Yes, sorry. I would be helped by that as well. Thank you.
Lord Peter Weir: Okay.
Lead 2C: Lord Weir, I think this document was in your – I know you had many papers to look at.
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: But I think that this was in your bundle, and I think this is the document – so we can see at the start, it sets out that civil contingencies hadn’t been reviewed for over 20 years and lacked investment.
I think if we – please, if we scroll down and, for example – thank you. I’m just going to pause there, Lord Weir. There’s reference there to a futures report which the Inquiry has seen that had made 85 recommendations for improving civil contingencies arrangements. That paper had been generated I think in autumn 2019.
Again, was that something that you were aware of at the time, or did you know that that work had been done?
Lord Peter Weir: No, I wasn’t aware of that at the time and therefore didn’t know whether that work had been done or not done.
Lead 2C: Thank you.
If we could scroll up, please – sorry, scroll down to paragraph 7, perhaps. So, for example, just in terms of the paucity of staff, Lord Weir, we can see reference there to the civil contingencies branch in Northern Ireland only having five members of staff.
At paragraph 9, we can see some of the strategic issues that were regarded as being of concern, and there’s reference to there being a compelling rationale for commissioning a strategic review at that time.
If we could please just look at page 5, thank you, we can also see, Lord Weir, this paragraph. This suggests that there’s certainly a particular interest in also reviewing civil contingency arrangements in relation to the Republic of Ireland as well.
If we could carry on, please, to just look at paragraph 13. So we can see there policies and procedures and processes are out of date and no longer fit for purpose.
Please, if we may just go down a little bit again, we’re getting to one of the points that I particularly wanted to ask you about, Lord Weir, that the review that was proposed in February 2020 was also going to examine the role and responsibilities of the Executive in relation to civil contingencies as well.
So I think can we assume, then, that in terms of this paper, did you only see this paper for the first time when you were preparing for the Inquiry?
Lord Peter Weir: Yes, that would have been correct.
Lead 2C: And to the extent that this paper may suggest that civil contingency arrangements in Northern Ireland were in quite a parlous position, is that something that – I mean, would you have been aware of that at the time, or had an understanding as a minister, that there might be serious challenges as of or in and around February 2020 in relation to that?
Lord Peter Weir: I think from the, call it the background in terms of civil contingencies, no, I would not have been aware of it at that stage.
Lead 2C: Would you have expected to know about that, as someone who had responsibility for a very important – I know all departments are important, but education being obviously a department of –
Lord Peter Weir: Yeah. I assume that whatever arrangements were there were potentially fit for purpose. Yeah, I think it’s something that I think it would have been helpful if I had been made aware of but I wasn’t aware of at that stage.
Lead 2C: Just – this is obviously timed or the proposal that there would be a review is in February 2020, when obviously government in Northern Ireland was beginning to respond to the oncoming pandemic. Again, would you have thought it important that ministers were aware that there were these challenges or that policy was regarded as being, if one takes this at face value, deficient or not fit for purpose, that that was something of some consequence or importance?
Lord Peter Weir: Certainly, I think with the benefit of hindsight, I think it would have been – would have been very helpful in that regard, but, as I said, I wasn’t aware of it at the time, but I would agree with your proposition.
Lead 2C: All right. I just want, again, and maybe as we move on in your evidence there will be a chance to explore this –
Lord Peter Weir: Okay.
Lead 2C: – in greater detail, but one of the things, Lord Weir, that this paper was suggesting, or might be thought to suggest, was that there wasn’t clarity around the role of the Executive Committee when it came to contingencies or emergencies.
Is that something that you would recognise or perhaps in hindsight something that you would recognise?
Lord Peter Weir: I think in terms of the Executive having overall responsibility for all non-devolved matters, which would have included civil contingencies, I’m not quite clear where there would have been any particular lack of knowledge or – maybe lack of knowledge wrong way to put it, but any level of ambiguity as to what any role of the Executive would be, so I’m not quite clear where the question mark about the role of the Executive would be on that.
Lead 2C: It might be thought, and again we may come to this, for example, the Civil Contingencies Group that the Northern Ireland Protocol civil contingencies foresees, was supposed to be a decision-making part of the structure, and I think that, as the Inquiry understands it based on reports that were written during the course of the pandemic, there was a question mark as to whether that group could fulfil that role, and that effectively the Executive Committee became that decision-making body but perhaps in a way not foreseen by the arrangements.
Lord Peter Weir: Well, I think that, again, maybe this is differentiation, that the role of any Civil Contingencies Group should be one which maybe deals with a range of operational matters and is an opportunity for co-ordination. Policy should always be set in the – certainly in the circumstances in which devolution has taken place, should always rest I think with the Executive itself, because that is the properly democratic accountable body.
Lead 2C: Maybe as we move on, we can have a look at that in greater detail.
But just turning back to your statement, and you deal at paragraph 14 with the timing of the civil contingencies arrangements and when they were stood up in Northern Ireland, and the Inquiry knows that they were effectively stood up on 18 March.
Prior to that date, who – in terms of ministerial understanding, who was driving the response to the pandemic up and until that point?
Lord Peter Weir: I think probably the distinction, in terms of timing, would have been pre-March, and then from the beginning of March. The first main presentation that we received as an Executive on the pandemic, or what became then the pandemic, I think was on 2 March. I think from the point at which then that became clear, I think the Executive really became the key decision-making body in that regard.
Prior to that, internally the Civil Contingencies Group I understand had met on 20 February, and there would have been a representative of my department I think at that – at that meeting.
In terms of the broader bit of who was dealing with the potential pandemic was largely within the Department of Health, and there probably wasn’t a great deal of information or clarity up until really the end of February. It may well have been that, as regards what was happening and maybe the level of data was quite – it was quite a confused picture in the run-up to the beginning of March, and it wasn’t necessarily clear whether we were facing a pandemic, whether this was a more severe just form of a flu infection, or whether, as had happened on a couple of occasions before in the past, it was a health scare which then didn’t materialise into that. But the level of information I suppose that came to ministers other than health and possibly TEO was very, very limited where information – any information that I was able to react to that did come my way, we took whatever precautions we could within the department on a few issues, but there was very, very little –
Lead 2C: Okay.
Lord Peter Weir: – that was talked about.
Lead 2C: I was just going to come, if I may, and deal with some of what you’ve said chronologically.
Perhaps if we could look at INQ000176129. Thank you. This was a memo that was sent to you, or a submission that was sent to you, on 13 February. I think if we just scroll down this, please, I think you were asked to give consent, which you duly went on to do, for there to be legislative provision made for the closure of schools. Is that correct?
Lord Peter Weir: That is correct. I felt that it was important that while this was a precaution, and it was a precaution that I hoped would never have to be put in place, that this was a very sensible route to ensure that if we needed to act at speed that it could be done. The alternative in terms of legislation would have been to try to put something through the Assembly. But I suppose I was acutely aware that if we reached a point at which we had to respond very quickly to the issues around what was happening, that it couldn’t be something which was delayed by having to go through particular procedures, and I suppose the very specificity as regards closure of schools, there was potentially a grey area, but if you were looking to temporarily close a school as opposed to permanently close it, I think there was a little bit of a grey area as to who had direct power or legal responsibility. I felt it was important that we had – there was, if you like, that option that if something needed to be activated that it could be done without levels of any delay and any potential damage.
And I suppose the other thing I would say just in relation to the issues that were before there, when we were talking about closure of schools, it was not necessarily envisaged there was the possibility that they might have to close across the board but by the fact that it was a clear cut power to close schools, it could – there may well have been a situation in which – because, for example, particularly if there was an outbreak in a particular area that what may needed to be done was closure in a particular area or of a particular school. So –
Lead 2C: Yes.
Lord Peter Weir: – it was felt – I felt it was – and I agreed with the submission that it was very important that that was something that there was clear lines of preparedness and precaution. We didn’t know at that stage whether this was going to develop into something as it did much more serious, but it was right that where something was flagged up that a precautionary approach was taken.
Lead 2C: I think if we scroll up, please, or scroll down, we can see – and just a little bit more, thank you – to the main – thank you. It’s the first paragraph.
So effectively this was a submission to you notifying you that this power was required and, as we can see, it’s set out at paragraph 2, this was specifically obviously because of Covid-19 at this time.
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: So your officials were obviously making you aware, weren’t they, in the middle of February, that it was a possibility that schools might need to be closed and that you needed a power to do it; correct?
Lord Peter Weir: Yes, and, as I said, I think some of that was to ensure that there wasn’t ambiguity about who had the power. Was it, for example, a situation in which the school principal decided to close, or a board of governors, or a managing authority. And I suppose there was also a feeling that if action needed to be taken, that we needed to have something which was clear and also consistent so that there wasn’t a situation where people in very similar circumstances took different decisions.
Lead 2C: Yes, but I think obviously at this stage, officials in your department and you were already in the process of planning for the potential closure of schools. You understood that that might –
Lord Peter Weir: I understood it was a possibility. It was something that I clearly didn’t want to see happen, but I felt that it was the sensible precautionary thing to do, to at least ensure that there was clarity around the power to do that, and a feeling that if that was something needed, it may be something that would have to be activated very, very quickly.
Lead 2C: I wonder if I could look, please, and if I could ask to be brought up on screen, paragraph 9 of your witness statement. Thank you.
And perhaps if we could just highlight the first part of paragraph 9, so maybe just on page 4. And I think what you say there, Lord Weir, is that:
“Prior to March … most of us looked on with some apprehension albeit without much of an understanding of what was to come. In particular there was no real anticipation of the scale or duration of what we would soon face. Any work in terms of preparation was largely being done by the Department of Health, and I do not recall any planning issues being raised to me by my department.”
Is that correct?
Lord Peter Weir: It’s correct that I made that statement, at the time. I think I’d forgotten about when I was making it about the particular submission and the action on 13 February. So it is perfectly correct, although not 100% accurate in that regard, I’d forgotten about that, and there were another couple of actions of a more minor nature that we were able to do in terms of preparation. But the broad point I think was that the vast majority of knowledge and involvement was really within the Department of Health, that this wasn’t something that was largely brought – that permeated out amongst other ministers really until the beginning of March.
Lead 2C: But you, having agreed to legislation in the middle of February –
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: – to empower you to close schools, were obviously quite clear, first of all, that that was in prospect and something that would, if it were going to happen, require a huge amount of planning and co-operation with other departments?
Lord Peter Weir: Well, I thought that it was something that was a possibility. It’s not something that I envisaged happening at that – at that stage, if I can put it that way.
Lead 2C: So, as far as you’re concerned, in that period in and around February, there was nothing that you needed to do, as the Minister of Education, in order to start the process of planning for the potential closure of schools?
Lord Peter Weir: I think from – what I would say in relation to that, I think we were in a position that actions that if we needed to go to remote learning, that the department was in a fairly good – the structures, while there was many criticisms made of the structures of education, that we would have been in a position that, if needs be, we could have moved towards that. I regarded this as a possibility and probably felt the more likely scenario was that there may well need to be intervention on a small group of individual group of schools. I didn’t at that stage envisage that it was likely in any way that there would be a full shutdown of schools.
Lead 2C: You’ve said, and I think it’s also clear from your statement, if I can maybe put it in informal terms, but effectively the Department of Health was in the driving seat; is that correct a fair way of –
Lord Peter Weir: I think that’s – I know that the Department of Health was working with colleagues from other jurisdictions within the UK, and probably with the Republic of Ireland as well, but in terms of any work that was ongoing was largely done through the Department of Health. And I think there was, generally speaking, a broader context in which it wasn’t quite clear where things were going to go, what the level of severity was going to be. And I suspect that outside of maybe a relatively small number of people in any jurisdiction, most people didn’t anticipate or expect precisely what happened as regards the pandemic.
Lead 2C: There’s no sense in the notes, for example, of the minutes or in communications of ministers clamouring for the civil contingency arrangements to be stood up at any stage in February or indeed for some time in March. Is that correct?
Lord Peter Weir: Yes, that would be correct. I think there was probably a view taken that, in terms of what was needed, that as the Department of Health was largely at the coalface, that certainly we would have been very supportive of any requests that had been made to take action, but I – from that perspective, I don’t think there was a particular push on – and maybe there was an impression, certainly given by the Department of Health, that while there were problems potentially coming down the line, that there wasn’t necessarily quite the same level of immediacy, and I think that was maybe one of the mistakes that was made during …
Lead 2C: So when would you say, Lord Weir, that the perception of ministers changed and it was understood by them that in fact there was some urgency to this and Northern Ireland faced some very, very serious issues?
Lord Peter Weir: I think it became, I suppose, an evolving issue, particularly as March wore on. I think the first detailed presentation – but even then there was a level of uncertainty with that – came I think on 2 March. Within that context, anything that could be done internally within the Department of Education started to ramp up during March on that – on that basis. But I still think it was relatively unclear until very late in exactly what was going to happen and what the timeframe was going to be, and I think probably – I certainly got an impression from Health that while we maybe faced a major problem that perhaps the crunch moment was a little bit further down the line.
Lead 2C: All right. So as Minister of Education, when did you start to plan or when did you think there was a serious prospect that schools might actually have to close?
Lord Peter Weir: I think as things moved on into March. And obviously probably the pivotal point where it became a very strong possibility would have been in and around about 12 March when there was action by the Republic of Ireland in terms of closing their schools.
We weren’t given any – while there was – generally speaking, at various stages throughout the pandemic and generally there’s always been fairly good communication, we weren’t given, I think, until the announcements – maybe because of whatever internal protocols they had, we weren’t really given a heads-up that that was going to happen. I think I learned about it effectively during a school visit on 12 March.
Lead 2C: But just – I’m going to come to that and deal with that, but should the Inquiry proceed on the basis that it was the closure of schools by the Republic of Ireland that meant that you gave serious contemplation to that being a realistic prospect in Northern Ireland?
Lord Peter Weir: Well, again it was – I think that it was clearly an issue that was potentially on the agenda. It might have pre-dated that by a little bit, within that. Certainly the advice that was being given, I know we’ll probably come on to this, was that this wasn’t the appropriate time –
Lead 2C: Yes.
Lord Peter Weir: – and there was concerns raised over what the impact within a wider context would be of school closures. I know we’ll probably come to that as well. But I know in terms of the prospect of what needed to be done in terms of the potential pandemic, my officials were starting then to engage with stakeholders in the first half of March and then stood up internal arrangements at about the middle of March, prior to the schools actually closing.
Lead 2C: All right. We’ll have a look at one of the plans that certainly the Inquiry has seen about education in Northern Ireland. But just sticking with 12 March, we know – so two things happened on 12 March.
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: Obviously within the United Kingdom there was a move, wasn’t there, from contain to delay; yes? Do you –
Lord Peter Weir: Yes, I think that roughly would have been about that stage, yes.
Lead 2C: And also the cessation of test and trace in Northern Ireland?
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: What you said in your statement was that effectively that decision to cease testing and tracing in Northern Ireland, and I hope I put this fairly, Lord Weir, that was a matter for the Department of Health effectively, that wasn’t something that was a matter for ministers; is that correct?
Lord Peter Weir: Yeah, I think as regards test and tracing I don’t have a perfect recall of when it happened but I think that that operationally was done and probably a decision taken by the Department of Health. From memory of it, I don’t think a – call it a prior approval was sought from the Executive for that.
Lead 2C: Did you understand that the decision that was made by the government, the United Kingdom Government, that that effectively decided the position for Northern Ireland or did you understand there to have been an independent decision in Northern Ireland about what it would do at that date?
Lord Peter Weir: Well, I think that Northern Ireland had independence to do what it felt to be the appropriate response in relation to that. I would assume that, as there would have been a close co-ordination across particularly various CMOs, CSA and health ministers, that whatever advice was being given within the UK centrally as to what the appropriate courses of action would be, that it was largely ones that were either decided on a UK-wide basis but at least was being implemented on a – roughly speaking at least, people were following the same sort of advice. But I think the power to actually decide whether test and trace ended or stopped in Northern Ireland at that particular point I think would have been taken by the Department of Health itself, it wasn’t an absolute fait accompli that that necessarily would be the case.
Lead 2C: All right, but that wasn’t the subject of ministerial consideration or –
Lord Peter Weir: Not to the best of my memory, I don’t think. I don’t think it was.
Lead 2C: All right.
So, staying then with an issue obviously that was particularly important to you, the decision by the Republic of Ireland to close schools, I think that that led to a meeting – and I think we’ve got this at INQ000289859.
If we could just scroll down, please.
So I’ll come back and ask you some questions about this, Lord Weir, but first of all I think there was – that we can see reference in the first paragraph to that leading potentially to some public confusion.
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: Then in the second paragraph – and I’ll ask you about that.
In the second paragraph, the health minister saying that the science continues to work for Northern Ireland and that that approach ought to continue. And we see reference there to SAGE advice that school closures, when they’re considered appropriate, would be for 15 weeks, but that that was unlikely to have a significant impact.
Then if we could go over the page, please, we see reference to the view that closing schools would “collapse” the healthcare system –
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: – “render futile much … planning work to date”. He refers to an absence of spikes. I assume that’s a reference to spikes in the infection rate.
Then we can see that you agreed:
“[The] impact of [having] 340,000 children not at school is immense. Many parents would be removed from providing front line services – child care implications huge.”
And I think if we go to the very bottom we can see reference to Mr Baker there:
“… any decision would need to include primary and post-primary. Childcare implications huge for local economy … Biggest issue – impact on exams and consideration of those eligible for free school meals.”
So I think there are a number of questions that follow on from that. I think that we can see the issue or the question being asked: why had schools in fact in the Republic of Ireland closed and why was the position different in Northern Ireland?
Was there clarity at this stage as to why the Republic of Ireland had moved to do that?
Lord Peter Weir: I don’t think they gave us particular clarity. They obviously had taken a sovereign decision that that was the best course of action at that particular time. Obviously our responsibility was to try to decide what was the most appropriate action in Northern Ireland. I think, as per the SAGE advice, I think at that stage there was at least acceptance that there was – that it was quite likely that there may be some point at which it was appropriate to close schools, but both – the advice that we were getting on that front was, first of all, that when it did happen it would be for a lengthy, very lengthy period of time.
Lead 2C: Yes.
Lord Peter Weir: Which I think was accepted. So it was something that was a very serious decision which had to be taken seriously.
I think also from the SAGE point of view that there was a feeling that that level of – the level of impact from a positive point of view, in terms of the transmission side of things, would be fairly marginal. And obviously from an educational point of view, being in a situation in which however much alternative arrangements could be put in place, there was no doubt in my mind that there was going to be a very detrimental impact on the quality of provision that could be made and would in practice be able to be made for children and young people in terms of their life future.
But the biggest single driver from my point of view, and I think the Executive’s point of view, was the overall – the professional advice and the overall assessment of the potential impact on the health service.
Lead 2C: Yes. That’s what I wanted to ask you about.
So, first of all, first question: whether or not, for example, you spoke to a counterpart in the Republic of Ireland in order to understand what the epidemiological basis was in the Republic of Ireland for closing schools?
Lord Peter Weir: I think – I can’t remember the exact details of a conversation. I may – I may on the 12th – once it had become clear, I might have had a conversation with my opposite number, Norma Foley, but I couldn’t swear necessarily that that was the case.
There would have been contact from the department, and I suppose if there was information it was on the basis that they were following whatever medical advice they had got from – on their side of the border.
But ultimately, if you like, the decision-making processes within the Republic, there maybe was – some level of clarity could be given about that, but that was something that was ultimately internal to them. I didn’t have access to any sort of form of information as regards that.
Lead 2C: I think that really the issue is what level of understanding was there on the part of you, as education minister, as to why the Republic of Ireland had taken that very significant step at that point in –
Lord Peter Weir: I think – I think – I mean, there was probably a limited amount of direct understanding. I think it was probably as – on the basis of that they felt that that was the appropriate action, that things had reached a level of severity that that action needed to be taken in the Republic.
Lead 2C: Yes, I think I’m assuming that it was on the basis of medical advice, I think it was really rather more the granular issue as to why –
Lord Peter Weir: I don’t –
Lead 2C: – for example –
Lord Peter Weir: I don’t think that we got or received any particular granular information from the Republic as to why they’d taken that position.
Lead 2C: All right. I mean, in terms of whether or not there were concerns about the infection rate having reached a certain level in the Republic of Ireland, or whether they had done work in relation to transmission related to schools, or anything like that that might have helped inform –
Lord Peter Weir: No, I think – I think principally what was important at that stage was to try to draw from the best medical and scientific information that we had, in that sense, within Northern Ireland, and …
While at – while at different stages in the pandemic, for example, some of the devolved institutions, or devolved assemblies did a roughly similar approach and – as the UK Government, I think the feeling was that we had to do whatever was in the best interests of Northern Ireland and most appropriate to our circumstances, which weren’t always in sync with what happened in other jurisdictions, and I think ultimately we had to make a decision for ourselves. And certainly from my point of view, what I think was the principal driver – particularly at that point, where there was still a high level of uncertainty as to what was happening – was it was very difficult to get past: here’s the clear cut medical and scientific advice as to what is appropriate at this particular time.
Now, I think when the issue, we may come on to this, was then debated at the Executive – it might have been the day after – I think one of the propositions put was, as regards the issue of any level of restrictions, or particularly as regards closure of schools, that we would follow and tie ourselves in with the best medical and scientific advice that we could get, rather than try to almost second-guess that.
Lead 2C: Yes. I am going to come on and look at those notes.
Lord Peter Weir: Okay.
Lead 2C: But I just wanted to pick up on another point that you’ve made, and which is also reflected in those notes, that the principal concern about closing schools was around the impact that it would have on the workforce –
Lord Peter Weir: Of the health service, yes.
Lead 2C: Yes. So was that the primary consideration at that point in time?
Lord Peter Weir: I think probably across – I mean, it was a situation in which, on the one hand, the medical and scientific advice was that this was not the appropriate time and would not be helpful on that basis. But undoubtedly I was struck very much by the stark comments of the health minister, by – I think it was something that a very similar approach was taken by the Chief Medical Officer, and it was very clear that probably the biggest single worry at that point for the Executive from a health point of view was reaching a point at which the health service was overwhelmed. That was the – probably the biggest single fear at that point.
And it was fairly clear that there were two aspects to that: what was the level of transmission in terms of the number of patients that were coming into hospital; and what was the capacity of the system to be able to help and support patients as they were coming in.
And the point, I think – it was put very starkly I think in that minute by Minister Swann, that if this action was taken at that particular point, in those circumstances, that the health system could simply collapse. Because if you were left with a situation of a third of a million children for whom arrangements would have to be made that, largely speaking, they were at home, the number of staff that that would take out of the system, through whatever family arrangements were in place, was going to have enormous impact on the ability to be able to provide staff to be able to deal with it.
And, you know, irrespective of the numbers coming through the door, if there simply weren’t enough staff to be able to cope and be able to provide that help and support, that was a potentially catastrophic situation.
Lead 2C: In terms of the potential catastrophic effect on children of closing schools, Mr Baker in that note, it reports him to have said that the biggest concerns were exams and he referred also to free school meals.
So at that point in time, were those regarded as the principal issues –
Lord Peter Weir: No, look, I think –
Lead 2C: – countervailing issues –
Lord Peter Weir: I think – and obviously Mr Baker can talk for himself. I think in terms, if you were ranking the pecking order, even within education, I wouldn’t necessarily have put those at the top of the agenda.
I suspect that he may well have been saying: here is also something which hasn’t been – here’s another factor which hasn’t been factored in, in terms of the broader – trying to highlight something where there would be an additional detriment.
I think from an educational point of view, there was a realisation that, whatever was done, that once you removed face-to-face teaching, that anything that replaced it was always going to be second best. From an academic point of view it would be damaging to children’s education; that a situation in which children were at home all the time, that that would have impacts in terms of the socialisation and social development of children; it would have major impacts in terms of mental health. There was a range of issues. I think it was fairly obvious to other people at that stage that if we moved to a situation in which schools had to close, for a range of reasons educationally it was very detrimental.
But again probably the biggest single override at that stage was how would this impact on the health service and the ability to be able to deal with the coronavirus situation.
Lead 2C: All right. I’m going to come back to the plans as they stood at that time, but just staying, if I may, on the decision – in fact, why don’t we look at the plans first and then we’ll go to the decision-making.
If we could go, please, to INQ000086935, please.
Please if we – well, first of all, let’s orientate ourselves in this situation, Lord Weir. These are the sectorial resilience returns that each department had returned.
Could I possibly ask that’s made a little bit bigger.
So, page 1 – are you familiar with this document?
Lord Peter Weir: Well, I have seen it certainly as part of the papers, yes.
Lead 2C: I just wanted to check.
So we can see that it sets out key areas of concerns, issues, risks, potential impacts.
If we go to the one that was prepared in respect of schools, please, at page 30.
So these are the issues that have been set out in respect of education. So we can see key area of concern:
“School Closures.”
That the issue was:
“Absenteeism of staff and teachers.”
The risks were:
“Lack of staff to teach and support children …”
The potential impacts were:
“Disruption to curriculum.
“Nutritional loss …”, in relation to school meals.
The potential mitigations were larger class sizes and substitute teaching.
And I think if we just scroll down, please.
So there’s an issue about annual intake, and then school transfer tests. School events, disruption of services offered by arm’s length bodies, loss of examination centres.
If we could just carry on, please.
I think that’s all. I just want to make sure, because I don’t want to be unfair, if we can just check the next box, please.
Yes, thank you.
So, Lord Weir, that’s dated the same date as this meeting. This is a summary of the plans, as it’s been explained to the Inquiry, the summaries of the plans that had been prepared for different departments.
That plan doesn’t reflect in any way the potential for schools actually closing; rather the risk appears to be – it’s: staff may be off and that may cause us issues and we have to mitigate in terms of having larger class sizes?
Lord Peter Weir: I – look, I think from that point of view – obviously it was drawn up by officials – I think that the prospect of schools closing – of being a likely – a very likely scenario, only started really to kick in around about that period, whenever action was taken at the Republic of Ireland, and also I think – I think it may well have been on the same day that SAGE made reference to what a length of closure would be.
I think this was probably an attempt by officials to highlight: here are some of the issues that potentially we are faced with. It was maybe felt it a more likely scenario that schools would carry on but be much more disrupted by the pandemic, that that was seen perhaps at that point by some officials as being the more likely option.
Lead 2C: So, I mean, that would certainly appear to be the case, but I think again, just to be clear about this, I just want to make sure that you agree that certainly what the plans reflect at this time is an understanding – or would certainly suggest that the prospect of schools wasn’t being regarded as something that realistically might happen in the near – certainly in the near future –
Lord Peter Weir: Well, no, I think –
Lead 2C: – if we were to look at this?
Lord Peter Weir: Again, I would probably make two points in relation to that. I think there’s a difference between saying that something might realistically happen or something that was likely to happen. I think there may well have been, at least amongst officials, a belief that the most likely course of action was that schools would continue and that there would be a level of disruption.
I think across the board, I suspect that there were very few people, even at that point in March, who felt that the most likely scenario across the board was an overall lockdown and that we would go into the type of arrangements that we had to do. This was something that had not happened – in fact didn’t even really happen, completely, a hundred years ago. So that was probably the case in relation to that.
I think that the advice that we were being given in terms of – from health, not only were they opposed, if you like, to the action being taken, but it was very clear that they felt if something of that nature had to happen this was clearly not the appropriate time.
So the feeling on it was that whatever decisions around schools were probably likely to be further down the line when actually they did eventually kick in.
Lead 2C: All right. I was going to go then to the political discussion about this –
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: – issue, as you’ve already alluded to. I think it’s right that that decision by the Republic of Ireland on 12 March then prompted a need for a discussion about ministers –
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: – as to whether that was a course that should be taken in Northern Ireland.
Perhaps if we go to the handwritten notes in respect of this.
This is at INQ000065689.
Lord Weir, can I say first of all about these notes, I think you have seen them, but obviously they’re a handwritten note –
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: – as opposed to a note that’s been checked by the individuals who were present –
Lord Peter Weir: Yeah, I should also – I’m not suggesting necessarily in this note or any other, it is the case – I think the other thing I notice when looking through, generally, the handwritten notes, was that maybe whoever’s writing those, occasionally there would be a little bit of confusion on attributing comments to people, and possibly from the notetaker – because there is a Department for the Economy and Department of Education, you know, I’ve seen at times various things that seem to be listed as “DE”, for example, that was maybe something that I said, but also whoever was taking the original notes may simply put “DE” when they were talking about the Department of the Economy. So there is that slight caveat I would add to that –
Lead 2C: Yes, I think I have noticed –
Lord Peter Weir: I’m not suggesting these necessarily are the case in this case, but it may be just appropriate to draw that to the attention of the …
Lead 2C: No, you’re certainly right, and it isn’t – sometimes it’s not easy to tell, I think, what’s a comment by you and what’s a comment by Minister Dodds.
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: I think I’ve looked for comments about education on the basis that they’re probably you, but that may not be –
Lord Peter Weir: That I think is quite likely.
Lead 2C: So again, in terms of date and time, Lord Weir, we can see this is a meeting of 16 March, in the morning.
I’m not going to go through all of this. I think if we just scan down, please, we can see the reference to they’re having – I think a meeting at that point was proposed with the Irish Government and the Minister of Health was setting out the position.
So we can see, for example, he’s informing the Executive Committee that there weren’t enough ventilators in Northern Ireland, so I think filling you in on the operational picture at that point in time.
If we could go, please, to page 10, I was just going to pick it up – I think “DOJ” is Department of Justice, so this would be Minister Long.
And if we could just scroll down a little, I think we can see her saying:
“Closing schools not necessarily right but some schools closing.
“[Executive] always seems to be reacting, not leading.”
And reference to young people and exams.
I think we can see a few lines down she’s talking about people taking responsibility.
And if we may, please, go to the next page – sorry, Lord Weir, I’m doing this so that I can –
Lord Peter Weir: No, no.
Lead 2C: – put your comments then in context.
Thank you.
I think this “DOF” is Department of Finance. So the Minister of Finance was setting out – if we could just carry on.
So he refers to:
“Growing lack of confidence in [Great Britain] approach.
“Civil contingencies – understand medical advice, but also community concerns.
“… We have differing views on how to handle – we all want best outcome.”
The First Minister says:
“Not be out shouting …”
And then I think this is you, if we scroll down, please:
“CMO – highly respected.
“Appalling way to treat colleagues.
“Don’t shout me down.”
DOF:
“Challenge your view.”
Then I think if we carry on, DFE:
“Row back.
“Mixed message.”
I’m going to ask you about mixed messages.
“Discussion not needed in front of media.
“People [are] anxious, afraid.
“Following CMO advice …
“Also, [have to] be honest [about] schools …”
I think you were making the point it’s not closure for two weeks, it would have to be 15 weeks.
Lord Peter Weir: Yeah.
Lead 2C: So I apologise, I am guilty of cherry-picking bits from these notes, but I think that it’s important to try to understand the kind of discussion that was taking place at that meeting, and to ask you whether it would be right to characterise the discussion about schools as having – and I don’t want to be too blunt in this – but effectively to have become politicised in that some ministers were of the view that the decision ought to follow, or certainly there ought to be consideration given to, closing schools because it had been done in the Republic of Ireland, I think was – but also because that had consequences because it was leading to confusion on the part of the public; is that right?
Lord Peter Weir: I would say two things in relation to that. Yes, I think it did create a level of division within – within the Executive. I took the view that we should be following the medical advice and the science.
I think that particularly – ministers, particularly Sinn Féin ministers and the SDLP minister, first of all looked to see things – at least have one eye towards what was happening in the Republic and that, if you like, Ireland as a whole should take a view. And that was part of a political or constitutional point of view.
I suspect there was probably also a little bit of an element that there would have been maybe a particular level of antipathy for those ministers in that party towards the UK Government, possibly particularly a Johnson-led, a Conservative Government.
So it was, if you like, a situation where not only did they want to follow the Republic, but they were – had a natural inclination not to, sort of, follow what was happening from London.
I think the issue around confusion was twofold.
The position, I suppose, was that it was natural within Northern Ireland that amongst the public, some people will look, even just during the pandemic, to what is happening in London, what is happening in Edinburgh. There are others who will look and wonder why are we not following the lead of whatever’s happening in Dublin. And I think the fact that there was a different position between, at that stage, then, the UK as a whole and the Republic of Ireland did mean that there were some people who would be more naturally inclined to look towards what was happening in the Republic, to some extent were saying, “Well, why aren’t we simply following what the Republic …”, so it created that level of division.
I think the other bit about public messaging which was confusing was at – I can’t remember the exact chronology in terms of dates but at one of the earlier meetings, whenever it was made very clear from the Chief Medical Officer and the Health Department that this was the wrong time to close schools, that it would have a very detrimental impact on our – I think that there was broad – ultimately there was agreement by the Executive that that was the course of action, everybody in one sense was signed up to it, albeit that I suspect the deputy First Minister and others were much more reluctant to go down that route.
I think the problem from the public messaging point of view was, having agreed to that position, I think within 24 hours of that the deputy First Minister did a press interview or a press conference where she said, effectively, “Well, my position or our position is that actually it’s the time that schools should be closing”.
So effectively the Executive was having a collective position and then that position was, to some extent, then disagreed with, in terms of giving her opinion of it, by the deputy First Minister. I think that is where there was a particular level of friction around communication.
Lead 2C: Yes, I think we’ll come back to that, because we do see other examples of that throughout the course –
Lord Peter Weir: No, it was not – it was not unique to that occasion, but probably particularly acute at that point.
Lead 2C: Yes, and I’ll come back and ask you about perhaps what might be described as some of the cultural issues around how the Executive Committee operated.
But really just focusing on what happened at this meeting, and I was just going to pick it up, if I may, at page 37 of these notes.
I think it’s right, Lord Weir, that this was the first decision that the Executive Committee had been called upon to make –
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: – in response to the pandemic at all, and we can see that, first of all, I think the “Vote on Conor’s proposition”, that’s a reference to the minister for finance, and his proposition that schools should close, or that there should be a plan to close schools; is that right?
Lord Peter Weir: I can’t remember the exact wording of the proposition but it was effectively that we close schools.
Lead 2C: So we can see that that vote effectively divided into two halves, as it were?
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: And I think that the Minister for Justice didn’t vote or had a different position from everyone else –
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: – looking at that.
Lord Peter Weir: Yeah, I mean, it’s – I think the position of the DoJ minister was that it was something that we were probably going to have to do but it wasn’t necessarily exactly the right time to do it.
Lead 2C: Then there was a second vote, wasn’t there?
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: And the second vote – if we can just scroll down, please.
I think that that vote is slightly further in the notes, but I think I can summarise.
The vote was effectively – oh, sorry, it is on that page.
Lord Peter Weir: It is, and I think it’s:
“Propose
“- close schools when CMO advises.”
Was the proposition.
Lead 2C: Yes. And again, that appears to have divided along two lines. Although there’s a question mark: the notetaker wasn’t sure what the position of the Department of Justice was on that. Correct?
Lord Peter Weir: That is entirely correct, and I’m trying to remember from a timing point of view whether the second simply arose as a sort of a different route from the first or whether there had been – it may well have been alluded to in previous conversation that really what we should be doing was following the medical advice directly and that was the appropriate bit to tie in with.
Lead 2C: I mean, the idea that you would vote to close schools when the CMO advises might look like quite an odd thing to vote on.
Lord Peter Weir: I think – I think the point, I suppose, that was getting made at that stage is that we should follow the medical and scientific advice, and perhaps it was to also help indicate that while there was a reluctance to, because of the detriment that would be there, to close schools at all, that this wasn’t a question of – that if medical advice was to close schools, that the view of the Executive was not simply to say, well, no, actually, under all circumstances, schools will remain open in defiance of the medical officer. So I think it was important, we felt that in terms of a position and the position of the Executive should be that actually we follow what is in the best interests of the broader situation in dealing with coronavirus, which I think at that stage was to take that professional advice. And if the medical advice was that this is something that had to happen – had to happen at that particular time, that we would not stand in the way of that. We would support that and get behind that.
Lead 2C: So you didn’t think the decision whether or not to open or close schools was, for example, something that should be based on the best interests of children, or – from what you’re suggesting your position was, it was a matter for medical advice rather than –
Lord Peter Weir: I think that might be slightly oversimplifying the situation. I think there was a recognition that any closure of schools was going to be detrimental to children and that therefore it was something that, if it had to happen, would be done with extreme reluctance. But given where we were, given the – I think the high level of uncertainty that was there with the pandemic, that the overriding imperative at that stage was to ensure that we took, in the wider interests of the – of Northern Ireland, the right – the right approach in terms of dealing with the virus and particularly dealing with the potential medical implications that that was the, for want of a better word, the trump card in any decision at that point.
Lead 2C: Because obviously a decision to close schools encompasses a whole range of issues –
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: – in addition to – it might be informed by medical advice –
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: – correct, but it encompasses so many more considerations than simply –
Lord Peter Weir: Yes, it would be, but I suppose if you’re drafting – if someone’s putting a particular proposition in relation to it, you know, this is not a question, and particularly as it came in the midst of a meeting, it is not a question of: here is – we’re putting almost a paper together with a proposition that runs to a full page with the: here are the pros and cons and here’s the route that we do it. I think it was a broad principle that I think there was, apart from anything else, to make it clear that if we were told that this is something that had to happen, that is something that would be accepted in the wider interests of Northern Ireland, even though I think there was an acknowledgement that any action, and probably to a lesser extent at different stages in the pandemic any level of restrictions. You know, if we were taking decisions which only had an obvious benefit and no downside, then a lot of questions would have been quite easy. But I suspect at various stages throughout the pandemic, almost any decision that we took had certain level of advantages, but there was going to be certain level of damage to society with whatever direction we went in, whatever decision we took at any stage.
Lead 2C: Wasn’t this approach making the CMO the person who would decide whether or not to close schools rather than you?
Lord Peter Weir: Look, you could put it that way. I felt that in light of the overall position – I felt that from a public policy point of view debated at the point at which we were in any way going to go against the very clear-cut professional advice, particularly at a point where there was just a high level of uncertainty, I think would have been the wrong course of action, and therefore I think we needed a certain level of clarity which said that if we reach a point at which the advice directly is that this is clear cut to close schools, that we would accept that advice.
It may be that from that perspective the earlier proposition having been rejected, whether you argue that there was strictly speaking a necessity to put the second proposition, there’s maybe an argument in relation to it. I suppose it was to try and clarify that this was not simply a situation where we were saying that various things shouldn’t happen under any circumstances, that we were willing to follow medicine and the science and take the wider interests of Northern Ireland as a whole.
Lead 2C: There might be a question, if one looks at the notes of this meeting, as to how well served children in Northern Ireland were by the position that was being taken by the politicians. Can you see that, that when it came to whether or not to close schools, that it seems to have become a political and divisive issue, rather than something that focused on what might be really profound –
Lord Peter Weir: No. Look, I think it was a very profound bit, and I think it’s of regret that it became that. I felt that we were getting very clear-cut advice, particularly from Health, as to the course of action that needed to be taken. There had been a level of consensus on that, maybe albeit begrudgingly, a few days beforehand.
I think it was others who wanted to take that in a different direction, and I suppose at various levels it may be seen as being directly political, but I think that anybody in that position has got to make a judgement call as to what they believe in the best interests of Northern Ireland as a whole, irrespective that leaves them open to saying this is a political decision.
Lead 2C: The position changed radically, didn’t it, within two days in Northern Ireland because the Prime Minister announced, didn’t he, on 18 March, that schools would close?
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: And Northern Ireland followed suit, didn’t it?
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: What changed in that two-day period in Northern Ireland?
Lord Peter Weir: I think I would say probably two main things. I think against a backdrop, we were seeing – a rise in the speed of the pandemic may well I think from some of the health officials have taken them by surprise, I think, and I’m sure you will want to question them. At that point in March, they saw potential major problems that lay ahead, being slightly further down the line.
But I think there were two main issues. One, that the medical and scientific advice then became: this is the right time to take this particular course of action, that indeed, in the wider context, we need to take every – every action possible, which led ultimately then to a lockdown to be able to combat this.
I think the other thing which made the wider context of a decision on schools and indeed wider lockdown possible was, at that stage, the UK as a whole and the UK Government committed to issues such as furlough, such as high levels of financial support. That made a – the choice that was there of a wider lockdown and with it the closure of schools something that was plausible.
Lead 2C: I just want to focus on the closure of schools. On 16 March –
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: – there’s an absolutely definitive position that schools aren’t closing in Northern Ireland, and it even goes to a vote that that is not going to be the position. Two days later, the Prime Minister announces that schools will close, and Northern Ireland follows. Had the epidemiological picture changed within those two days?
Lord Peter Weir: Well, I think from that point of view, that may be a question that’s more directly, in terms of some of the evidence, that the likes of the CMO and others could answer to. What I would say is that the advice – and we had said that we would always follow the science and follow the medical advice. And the position of the medical advice, in terms of what was appropriate, changed at that stage, and it was felt that that was the appropriate time that action had to be taken.
It is also the case – I think there is an interaction with wider lockdown which was: if we had taken – if we take an example that Northern Ireland had decided to close schools, or whatever, and being simply an outlier and we were trying to do this on our own, we know that there was not financially something which could support a wider lockdown within society which would have meant, in those circumstances, that the responsibility for looking after children would have simply been thrown back entirely into the workforce and the parents, and in particular that would have created a level of disruption to the health service which would have been enormous.
I think the fact that there was furlough and a wider commitment, or at least furlough was coming – was clearly coming down the line, and a wider commitment to levels of finance made that option something that was also practical and plausible.
Ms Dobbin: Thank you. I think I’m going to stop you there.
I apologise, I think we went past the time for a break. I’m sorry –
Lady Hallett: We have to take regular breaks. I’m sorry we haven’t completed you before the break.
I shall return at 11.35.
(11.21 am)
(A short break)
(11.35 am)
Ms Dobbin: Thank you, my Lady.
Lord Weir, I just wanted to return, then, to where we left off, which was the decision by the – sorry, the announcement by the Prime Minister on 18 March that schools should close.
Was there any discussion amongst ministers about the closure of schools then on that date or at that time, or again was the Prime Minister’s announcement that that was the position effectively the decider for what was going to happen in Northern Ireland?
Lord Peter Weir: No, I think the decider was the fact that we were then getting clear advice from CMO, CSA that, from memory, Department of Health, that this was the appropriate time to take this particular action and that there was a potential practical way forward, albeit lockdown came with a level of detriment. So from that point of view, it was more the fact that this was something that, at that stage, the judgement was it needed to be done in Northern Ireland, and it was doable at that stage.
Lead 2C: So was there – are you saying that there was an independent decision by ministers that schools would – should close and that it was informed by the position as it existed in Northern Ireland?
Lord Peter Weir: I think that is – that is broadly the case. I think the decision was taken at a – I think from memory, probably at an Executive meeting around about that period.
Lead 2C: The concern that’s been expressed on behalf of bereaved people in Northern Ireland was effectively that politicians were seeing the pandemic through the lens of their political perspectives, as opposed to just focusing on the position in Northern Ireland and focusing on Northern Irish solutions, if I can put it in that way, to the pandemic. Do you accept that, Lord Weir?
Lord Peter Weir: I can understand why there is that perception, and I suppose over a two-year period, if you’re talking about a group of politicians, whether at times they will see things through a political lens, but I think everybody, even if there was a range of views, was trying to do what they felt to be in the best interests of Northern Ireland as a whole, and certainly as regards the actions, certainly from my own point of view and others, around about that 18/19 March was very much informed by what the overall medical advice was. And if the medical advice had been that this was the time to close schools in Northern Ireland but it wasn’t happening across the water, I would have gone along and supported that as well.
Lead 2C: All right.
I’m going to explore that with you and how the acceptance of medical evidence changed in the months after March. But I just want to focus, before we move on, to one of the issues that you’ve touched upon in your witness statement and I understand you to accept, that insufficient regard was had – and I think particularly when it came to the first lockdown – to the impact that school closures would have on particularly vulnerable children in Northern Ireland.
So, first of all, can I ask: do you accept that?
Lord Peter Weir: I accept that, ultimately, I think in the course of the pandemic there was not enough cognisance given to the difficulties that were created for children and very specifically for both vulnerable children and the vulnerable. At best what we were trying to do, there was a range of actions that the department tried to do to mitigate the impact for vulnerable children, but at best it was an issue of mitigation. There was still going to be very major implications for that.
Lead 2C: So can I just understand whether or not you’re saying that there was insufficient appreciation at the outset, so in March 2020, as to the impact that school closures would have on children, or –
Lord Peter Weir: I think – I think that there was a – I would certainly make two points. One, I think that as regards whether we had a lockdown or whether we didn’t, I think circumstances had created a point where really there was no particular choice in the matter. Whilst I think there was a full collective understanding of what the overall impact would be, at that stage there was perhaps a fear that this would be very detrimental to our children. I think the longer things went on and the more evidence ultimately we saw and we’re still seeing today, undoubtedly lockdown has had a major impact on our children to a detrimental extent, and I think the level of awareness and knowledge of that has grown over time.
Lead 2C: Did it really require much thought, though, in March 2020, to understand that closing schools would be cataclysmic for some children in society Northern Ireland?
Lord Peter Weir: I think that was something that was relatively apparent on that basis. And, to some extent, part of the problem that was there, in terms of any handling with the pandemic, at times we were not making choices between a good choice and a bad choice but between what was the lesser of two necessary evils.
Lead 2C: But it’s a question of planning, isn’t it? I mean, if you understand that school closures might have a particularly detrimental effect on some children in society, then you can plan your mitigations around that?
Lord Peter Weir: There was, and there was able to be a range of mitigations put into place very quickly and effectively from day one in some aspects. For vulnerable children, the point, I suppose, in terms of mitigations was that was – it was reducing the gap to which there would be additional harm, rather than being in a position to entirely overthrow that.
So, for example, from day one, indeed as part of the thing, schools themselves didn’t completely close. They were – face-to-face teaching was removed for the vast majority of pupils, but schools themselves stayed open for what was called supervised learning, and the children that were entitled to go along were those that were classified as being vulnerable children and those who were children of key workers. And that was something that was there from the very first day in which schools didn’t operate, and there were a range of other actions throughout that.
But all those things were just simply trying to reduce the level of harm. And I think that whenever you get harm on children of something of that nature, it is difficult to create a situation in which that doesn’t disproportionately impact on vulnerable children and the socially disadvantaged.
Lead 2C: Just going back, though, to the points that were made at the outset of your evidence about contingency planning.
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: Planning for the closure of schools would encompass a number of departments, wouldn’t it?
Lord Peter Weir: Principally, most of the – I mean, there would have been – various things that we had to do in education, we would have collaborated with other departments. Principally, a lot of the issues around school closures and the implications of that were principally something which – a lot of it was internal to the Department of Education. And I suppose beyond that, actually, we tried to work alongside what might be described as a range of stakeholders, whether that was school principals, trade union side, you know. There’s a very wide range of stakeholders in education, so it was a combination of that, and obviously there would have been a level of – around a range of things throughout the pandemic of interaction, particularly with Health. On other occasions, some of the decisions that had to be made were – particularly there was interaction with, say, the Department of Justice on some youth issues, or would have had a considerable level of follow-through, say, in the Department of Infrastructure when it came to transport issues.
Lead 2C: Yes, I suppose I was thinking of something very obvious like vulnerable children or children at risk and –
Lord Peter Weir: And vulnerable children principally – as indicated, the department had the direct responsibility for the education of those children.
Lead 2C: Yes.
Lord Peter Weir: Vulnerable children are, largely speaking, from a departmental remit, are principally under the auspices of the Department of Health, but we tried to work from the start in an interagency basis with the Department of Health. We tried to provide a close working relationship with that. We were getting weekly reports from – in terms from the Education Authority as to what action would be there.
Indeed, in terms of, for example, the number of vulnerable children going directly at school, we were getting daily reports on that. We set up a lot of reporting mechanisms and met as a sort of a management team. Effectively did a daily sit rep with the major people within that. So we tried to mitigate, but I think it was undoubtedly the case that with school closures and with the removal of face-to-face teaching, anything that was getting done for children, particularly vulnerable children, was going to be second best.
Lead 2C: Yes.
Lord Peter Weir: There was no way around that, I don’t think, at that –
Lead 2C: Was the position any different in Northern Ireland, I think, to other parts of the UK that in fact vulnerable children weren’t attending school in the numbers that had been –
Lord Peter Weir: The numbers – there was a problem, I think, across the UK. We found that, in general, in Northern Ireland as a whole, the numbers – it was entirely open. Indeed, we encouraged anybody in that position to come into school for supervised learning. The numbers in Northern Ireland were very, very low throughout.
Lead 2C: Yes.
Lord Peter Weir: Generally speaking, the numbers of vulnerable children were pretty low throughout the UK. It was probably particularly strong in Northern Ireland. Now, whether taking one level of positive, there were more family support mechanisms in Northern Ireland. It was maybe partly cultural in that regard. But I think in terms of trying to provide support and support for individual families, we tried to do that. What we couldn’t do was effectively say to any family, any child, “you must go into school”.
Lead 2C: Yes.
Lord Peter Weir: That is not – so I think we always tried to accommodate. We tried, for example, I think, during periods of school breaks to ensure that there was options as well for children in that position as well. But, again, the take-up tended to be very, very low, and, again, whether that was a broader cultural different response to Northern Ireland from elsewhere.
Lead 2C: All right. But I think really just the point being that if one of the principal mitigations for vulnerable children was to provide them with school places, I think it quite quickly became apparent that that wasn’t really affording the protection that had been hoped for, for children?
Lord Peter Weir: No, I think the problem on it was there was a range of things that were done, but there was clearly going to be a limitation on what could be done in a situation where you had a full lockdown and you didn’t have schools operating on a normal basis.
Lead 2C: Lord Weir, I’m going to move on, if I may –
Lord Peter Weir: Okay.
Lead 2C: – to deal with a different issue. It’s one I touched upon a moment ago which was the changing perception, I suppose, of medical and scientific advice that was being provided to the Executive Committee. I wanted to pick up the chronology, if I may, and I hope to do this without having to go to too many documents, but if at any point you want to see a document –
Lord Peter Weir: No, that’s okay.
Lead 2C: – please do say to me.
We’ve heard evidence, and we heard evidence from the Chief Scientific Adviser, that from July 2020 onwards in Northern Ireland, transmission rates started to go up and that the picture remained a fairly consistent one throughout the autumn of 2020.
Is that a position that you recognise or that you accept?
Lord Peter Weir: I think there were clearly – throughout the period the second half of 2020, there were clearly ongoing problems, and it did seem that whatever interventions that were made seemed to have a limited amount of impact on the levels of transmission.
Lead 2C: Yes. I’m going to take you through some of the interventions –
Lord Peter Weir: Okay.
Lead 2C: – that were put in place to ask you about them, but I just wanted to make sure before I started that you agreed with that general proposition that there was a consistent and steady growth in transmission from late summer or early autumn into the winter in Northern Ireland.
Before we examine that, perhaps we could just go to your witness statement and look at what you say, please, at paragraph 74. So this is INQ000408058. It’s page 30.
(Pause)
Lead 2C: I would be helped if that could be made larger, please. Thank you.
You say:
“Throughout the pandemic, the Health Minister was given overwhelming support from his colleagues on the Executive. The situation placed his department in a very powerful position, and generally if [Department of Health] pushed for something, they got it. While I am not suggesting that either the Health Minister, CMO or CSA had too much power, I did feel that the Executive had little option but to agree with proposals that came from DoH, the CMO or the CSA. In effect, if they put their foot down, they would ultimately get the Executive to agree.”
Having had an opportunity to reflect on some of the minutes of the Executive Committee meetings, do you think that that accurately characterises the role that the CSA and the CMO played in decision-making in autumn 2020?
Lord Peter Weir: I think, broadly speaking, it is correct. Did that mean everything was absolutely followed to the letter? But it seemed to be ultimately – if a proposal was pushed by the Department of Health, there may well have been a lot of debate about that. There may well have been concerns raised about that. But for the most part, ultimately, the Executive agreed with a particular proposition if it was put by it, and that did put, I think – I think circumstances meant that that did mean that it put them in quite a powerful position as regards the progress of events.
Lead 2C: Well, I mean, what you – I think you have gone rather further than that in your statement, haven’t you? You’ve said:
“In effect, if they put their foot down –
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: “– they would ultimately get the Executive to agree.”
Again, is that something that you – is that an accurate characterisation of how you perceived …
Lord Peter Weir: Look, I think – generally speaking, I think we tried to move ahead with a level of consensus and reach an agreement. I think if there was a range of – if we reached a situation in which there was a particular proposition that was put forward, either within an Executive meeting or before an Executive meeting, where Health were in some form of conversation or trying to reach a consensus and where there was a bit of give and take where you could reach agreement, yes, you would reach a consensus that way.
In general, the position was, I think, ultimately that if the Department of Health said “this is something – we require this to be able to deal with the – to deal with the wider situation”, that ultimately was something which basically prevailed. There may well have been some level of either counterarguments or queries raised in relation to it, but I think factually the case that 90% or 95% of the time that that did happen showed that at least – it may be little bit generalised in terms of that, but I think it was overwhelmingly the case.
Lead 2C: All right. Well, let’s – perhaps we could examine that.
Before we do, though, just focusing on schools, it’s right, and perhaps you recollect this, I don’t think I need to take you to it, but the chief medical officers of the United Kingdom supported the re-opening of schools in September 2020, didn’t they?
Lord Peter Weir: That’s correct, and, again, without going into the detail of this, there was a long process of action taken to enable schools to re-open. It resulted, from my point of view, in bringing three – at different stages, three separate papers to the Executive. All those papers were informed with discussions with Public Health Agency to ensure that they were content with what was being put forward at that stage and a number of meetings I think with the CMO and CSA. I felt it was important that we tried to build a consensus towards that, and it was, broadly speaking, a position therefore that was backed across the UK, but there was a lot of individual work. And I should say as well, because I think there can be a slightly false impression given, this wasn’t a question of simply returning to what had been the position pre-March. It was on the basis of what we called a new normal which meant that when we did return, there was a wide range of mitigations and ongoing work with the PHA to try and make sure that education on a face-to-face basis could be delivered and delivered in a safe way and while there was always some impact on transmissions by having schools there which minimised perhaps the impact on wider society as well.
Lead 2C: Yes, and I think it’s also right – I’m just focusing on the same period of time – that, for example, the advice that was provided by the CMO and the CSA, for example, about whether or not pubs should re-open, because they were due to open in August, the position that they took was also informed by, I think, the re-opening of schools and the need to keep schools – to make sure that that happened –
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: – and that schools could open?
Lord Peter Weir: I think there was a – broadly speaking, by that stage, there was I think, both from the CMO and CSA and also I think from the wider Executive, I think there was acceptance that if something had to be prioritised, in terms of what we could do in relation to it, that ensuring that children had the fullest possible education by having schools open was effectively the top priority.
Lead 2C: Yes.
Lord Peter Weir: I think that was, largely speaking, something that was –
Lead 2C: Yes.
Lord Peter Weir: – common across the Executive.
Lead 2C: I think that that’s right, and it seems to be reflected in a number of papers that they provided, that on a number of occasions, they looked at it through the lens of: if you want to keep schools open these are the things that may have to remain –
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: – may have to close or may have to remain closed; correct?
Lord Peter Weir: Yes. I think that’s undoubtedly the case, yes.
Lead 2C: So, in other words, they were supportive of the priority, your priority, in terms of keeping schools open as events moved into the autumn of –
Lord Peter Weir: Yes. I think it was both my priority and also, to be fair, it was a priority then that was shared in a wider sense by both the Executive, and I think, to be fair, probably most people in society took a view that the schools should be the ultimate – the first priority.
Lead 2C: Yes. And, again, I’m hoping not to have to go to too many documents to demonstrate this, but when infection rates began to rise in September 2020, and that coincided with schools having been re-opened, that the decision was taken by the Executive Committee to have some localised restrictions; correct?
Lord Peter Weir: That’s correct, yes.
Lead 2C: And that reflected that there were particularly high areas of transmission in some specific areas; yes?
Lord Peter Weir: Yes. I think whatever broader issues there were with modelling, we were by that stage getting quite detailed granular data as to the extent of infections within – I think could basically be drawn down into postcodes, postcode areas on that basis. And I suppose the Executive as a whole, which was one that was supported across the piece, was trying to provide a relatively nuanced approach and trying to – the nature of things back in March had been that really the only action that we would take was a very broad brush, blunt instrument of a lockdown. I think as time moved on and we saw also some of the disadvantages that occurred from lockdown, I think there was a feeling that what we needed to do was that we could refine what had to be done into more call it nuanced position, and I think the localised restrictions were to say: here is a particular hotspot. We need to be tougher on that than we are in the rest of Northern Ireland. Or that developed to a point where I think there was any number of places across Northern Ireland where there needed to be a – sort of a flexibility to say: actually, we’re going to have tougher restrictions on where there is the greatest problems.
Lead 2C: What the CSA has said is that that didn’t work as effectively as would have been hoped, and that transmission – I think to be accurate about it, he said that transmission was impacted a bit by them but that it didn’t have the outcome that was hoped –
Lord Peter Weir: No, I think –
Lead 2C: – in Northern Ireland?
Lord Peter Weir: – part of the problem that we really faced in the autumn across the board, there was a range of interventions, and I suspect ultimately with a lot of those interventions, it didn’t have the desired effect of what we had hoped would be the action. And I think probably the principal driver in that was, as time moved on, there was considerable issues around probably behavioural approaches from people, and I think there was a constant fraying at the issue of compliance on that basis.
I think back in March – back in March, people first of all were prepared to put up with things for a little bit of time. It wasn’t – but each time we did this, there was diminishing returns, and I think society as a whole in March was very uncertain about what was going to be happening and frankly was quite scared, and where people are scared, having a level of compliance is probably a lot easier.
Getting a level of compliance as time moved on became increasingly – sadly increasingly difficult on that regard.
Lead 2C: If I may just ask you to pause there on the issue of compliance. There certainly appears from the Executive Committee meetings to have been a level of frustration – I hope I don’t put that unfairly – in relation to whether or not the police were doing as robust a job as they might have done in Northern Ireland in respect of compliance.
Is that, again, something that you recognise, or was that a certain that the Executive Committee had in –
Lord Peter Weir: Yes, I think it – I think it was a concern. Look, it’s maybe difficult to know precisely how much more they could have done, but I think – and whether it was a question of the police didn’t want to be put in that position – I think from the Executive Committee from the reports that we were getting back, we didn’t get a great sense of the police being very enthusiastic to be quite heavy-handed or more heavy-handed as regards compliance.
Lead 2C: Was there an understanding on the part of the Executive Committee that there might be – that, for example, the reasons for that might include the fact that winning the trust of communities in Northern Ireland had been harder than in other parts of the United Kingdom, that there were sensitivities around policing that might not apply in other parts of the UK?
Lord Peter Weir: I think – I think there was probably an element of that. I don’t think it was particularly – I don’t remember at any stage it being particularly contrasted with other areas. I suspect the police felt that overall if they were having to simply police compliance on Covid regulations that, in many ways, that was putting them in a fairly invidious position in that regard, but the police are probably in a better position to –
Lead 2C: Yes.
Lord Peter Weir: – speak for their rationale themselves.
Lead 2C: Well, I think it would obviously have been an important part, wouldn’t it, of the Executive Committee’s – or an important factor in decision-making, whether or not better compliance could be achieved by other routes –
Lord Peter Weir: I think there was – as time moved on, we saw trying to push for better compliance as an important part of the – sort of the armoury in relation to that, and so there was, I think, some decisions taken to ratchet up, for instance, fines in connection to that. How much ultimately that made a – you know, and I think simply to say “we’re going to impose everything on everybody, but actually if you simply defy this, there’s no consequences for you” I think is not an appropriate situation. And I think there was probably again – as time moved on, there was also I think amongst the public a lot of frustration where they saw a situation that probably throughout the pandemic the vast majority of people kept entirely to the rules and the spirit of the rules, but more and more people maybe weren’t doing that, and there would be – I could understand, for example, if you were living in a street, you were maybe self-isolating, you maybe had a vulnerable relative, you were making sure, if you like, that you followed the letter of the law, and maybe someone further up that street was having a party with a lot of people in the house. And I think there was perhaps a feeling within society as a whole that maybe some people in society were, for want of a better word, letting the side down.
Lead 2C: Yes, okay. I’m going to come back to the issues of public confidence very shortly, but just in terms of – just staying with the chronology, if I may, Lord Weir, I think the position continued to deteriorate, didn’t it –
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: – in September, and I do just want to bring something up on screen because I think a question arose yesterday with the CSA as to whether such a paper had been written. This is INQ000065631, please. Thank you.
This is quite a detailed paper that was written. This is – I think this was provided – yes, it was – it was provided by the Department of Health and Minister Swann, and it followed on from the meeting, the SAGE meeting that took place on 21 September –
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: – and the recommendations that had been made by SAGE or the menu of proposals that had been put forward. And I think if we could, please, go to page 1, paragraph 2, this paper sets out the concerns that were beginning to accrue at that point in September, and I think … so in other words, reference to hospital capacity there and concerns about intensive care beds.
If we could go down to paragraph 4, please. And I think as well there’s reference on page 4 to the SAGE advice that had been provided. So ministers were being told what SAGE was suggesting at that point, so setting out the menu that was available. Then I think those options were set out as well at page 7. Just to make good that point, Lord Weir, that this was all set out for ministers at that point in time.
If we could go, please, to page 9. Sorry, Lord Weir, I don’t want to rush you through –
Lord Peter Weir: No, that’s okay. That’s fine.
Lead 2C: – but these were the options that were being set out. If we could just look at paragraph 28. The Department of Health was setting out some of the other benefits that potentially might accrue from the options that were being presented and then set out against the disadvantages at paragraph 29.
So in terms of the approach that was being taken by the Department of Health, I think informed by the position of the CMO and the CSA, this sort of paper is fairly typical, isn’t it, in terms of providing guidance as to the options that were available?
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: And also setting out as well some of the counter consequences that would follow if any of those issues were to be – sorry, if any of those restrictions were to be taken up or followed; correct?
Lord Peter Weir: That’s correct. I think as the pandemic – the course of the pandemic progressed, I think it probably did become more and more apparent to people that any decision of whatever nature, as I said, had – could have certain advantages but came at a level of – and whether that was to have further restrictions, or whether that was to open up, came at a certain level of cost, no matter what direction was done. And so, yes, there was always, if you like, some level of counterbalancing on anything.
Lead 2C: Yes, but in terms of the way advice was being presented to ministers, it wasn’t saying “You must, for example, do this”, or it wasn’t presented in a one-dimensional way to you, was it? It was being presented in a nuanced way, setting out to you these are –
Lord Peter Weir: I think that is true. I think that is largely true up to a point. But I think sometimes when it came to the Executive, it wasn’t saying “you must do this”, but I think it was made very clear what the view of Health was. And maybe if I can paraphrase, you got the impression that it was “well, you can defy this, but on your own heads be it. You’re going to create a major problem if you don’t go down this route of Health”. So it’s probably a little bit maybe – not quite saying “this is what you have to do”. But I don’t think it was entirely as open-ended to: here’s a range of options. We’re just leaving you freely to pick where you feel the – you know, pick and choose where you regard to be the best options, or if you want to do them or you don’t want to do them, that’s fine type of thing.
Lead 2C: All right. Well, let’s maybe look at that in terms of what happened after this point.
We know that there was an Executive Committee meeting on 8 October.
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: You might remember that. That was a meeting at which the Chief Medical Officer of Northern Ireland said that he had never been more worried –
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: – than the position that had been reached at that point in time.
I mean, I assume – one assumes from the way that that meeting is minuted, I won’t take you to it, that what was being conveyed at that point in time by the Department of Health and by the CMO was that things had reached a very serious point and that there were real concerns that health services in Northern Ireland wouldn’t be able to cope –
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: – and wouldn’t be able to cope within a matter of days; yes?
Lord Peter Weir: Yeah, I can’t remember the specifics but that sounds an accurate assumption.
Lead 2C: All right. And the Inquiry has already seen, I won’t take you to it, but a meeting that took place with the CMO, the First Minister and the deputy Minister on 11 October, when again that was the message being conveyed, that they were extremely concerned the point was about to be reached where health services would be overwhelmed?
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: Was that accepted by ministers, that that was the position, or was there scepticism that the position had gotten that bad?
Lord Peter Weir: I think there was broad acceptance that there were considerable difficulties. I think it is probably the case that, again, the further we moved into the pandemic, there was a little bit more of a caveat put around some of the modelling, because I think what was accepted entirely at face value in March, for a range of reasons, maybe didn’t instill quite the same confidence as time moved on.
Lead 2C: All right.
I’m not going to take you to this, I’m just going to ask you about a paper that was written on the – it was a Department of Health paper of 13 October 2020, and what’s set out in that paper, it’s at paragraph 11:
“Modelling from a range of UK groups suggests that full lockdowns as before with schools open would result in [a rate of] a little less than 1. Full lockdown with schools closed and the hospitality sector open … would also result in a value of … a little less than 1 or possibly greater than 1.”
So again, just coming back to the advice that was being provided at that time, it appears that what the Department of Health was saying is that: there is a way of keeping schools open but the consequences may be that we have to close down other parts of –
Lord Peter Weir: I think broadly speaking that was the health position, yes.
Lead 2C: And it said, and this is at paragraph 15, it says:
“Current data shows that COVID cases in [Northern Ireland] are significantly higher than Wales, Scotland, England or [the Republic of Ireland], even allowing for somewhat higher testing in [Northern Ireland]. The 14 day cases for [Northern Ireland] are higher than any other country in Europe, with the possible exception of the Czech Republic. There is therefore a need for stronger intervention in [Northern Ireland] than in other countries.”
Again, can I ask whether or not it was understood by ministers that that was the position as at 13 October, that Northern Ireland wasn’t just doing badly compared to the UK, that it was doing badly as compared to every else in the European – in the continent of Europe?
Lord Peter Weir: I can’t remember whether it was understood to that stark an extent. It was clearly, I think, understood that we were in a very difficult situation. I don’t particularly remember whether specifically the sort of “we are close to being the worst in Europe” was particularly emphasised on that basis, but I think it was clearly – I think it was indicated that there was a very difficult situation that we were in and that action needed to be taken to try to reduce the pressures that were there.
Lead 2C: I think the advice was at that time, wasn’t it, from the Department of Health, that there should be a six-week effectively a lockdown, save that schools could remain open; is that correct?
Lord Peter Weir: It may well have been the case, yes.
Lead 2C: But I think, and we’ve already seen this, I’m not going to go to it, that that recommendation, I think it was in and around 13 October, wasn’t accepted by ministers and that instead there was a decision to have a four-week lockdown, but again with schools open, albeit with a longer half term break; is that right?
Lord Peter Weir: I think that in terms of the decision the option of taking – look, I think by that stage there was also a – some level of recognition of the costs of lockdown as well. I think a four-week was agreed at least on a precautionary basis, because there was always the option that if things didn’t work out within that period, there was always an option to look at what could go beyond that.
But I think there was also an attempt to try to balance out. There was a lot of damage being done to various aspects of society by way of lockdown, by way of restrictions, so that ultimately was then a position which the Executive as a whole was able to reach a consensus on, at least for that – at that particular point.
Lead 2C: But certainly in terms of any suggestion that ministers were effectively just giving the Department of Health what it wanted, in that instance we can see that the recommendation wasn’t accepted, and I think effectively ministers came to a compromise position?
Lord Peter Weir: Well, I think – yeah, I think from that point of view there will have been occasions whenever there was a level of compromise within that. So it was not, from the point of view, the Department of Health, an absolute, but I think in general there was a position that if Health pushed for something, in general there was an acceptance that that needed to be done.
Lead 2C: That four-week period of restrictions fell to end on 12 November –
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: – didn’t it? And it was for that reason that the Executive Committee had to meet on 9 November –
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: – to decide what to do and whether or not to continue the period of restrictions; correct?
Lord Peter Weir: That’s correct, yes.
Lead 2C: And again, it was the Department of Health recommendation that effectively the Committee should grant the further two weeks and adopt the position that the Department of Health had originally asked for; correct?
Lord Peter Weir: That’s correct, yes.
Lead 2C: We can see – and perhaps if we just have the formal note in order to be able to follow it. It’s INQ000048497.
This meeting had been preceded, hadn’t it – I’m not going to take you to it, Lord Weir –
Lord Peter Weir: Okay.
Lead 2C: – but a paper that effectively set out the reasons why the period of lockdown was still required. Yes?
Lord Peter Weir: I think that’s probably correct, yes.
Lead 2C: On 5 November. And the reason was because the CMO, the CSA and I think the minister were not satisfied that the four-week period of restrictions had had the effect that was hoped for?
Lord Peter Weir: Yes, I think that is correct. I think there was a broader complication that we tried to do various things and ultimately anything, even by way of restrictions, was not producing – we were getting a certain law of diminishing returns within that, and what I suppose might have worked well in March was not working as effectively on the same basis if it was attempted in October.
Lead 2C: Yes.
Lord Peter Weir: November, sorry.
Lead 2C: I don’t think there was any suggestion that this four-week period of restrictions had proved to be any sort of magic bullet –
Lord Peter Weir: No, I think – I think there was – the closest we came to that was, I think, in the – I think it was possibly the last week that it had been monitored suggested that there was an R rate of 0.7. As it turned out – and that was probably the latest data that we had. I suspect that ultimately that turned out to be a little bit of a blip, if you like, in terms of the way the figures went.
Lead 2C: Again, just to come back to this point, the half term for children had been extended –
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: – by two weeks, but –
Lord Peter Weir: No, it was extended – it was a one-week that was extended to two weeks –
Lead 2C: Sorry, yes.
Lord Peter Weir: – effectively.
Lead 2C: But asides that, this wasn’t a full lockdown that was being proposed. It remained the position that children would be able to go to school; is that right?
Lord Peter Weir: That was correct.
First of all, I think that it was not any sort of – certainly at that stage, until we came, really, to the end of the year, there was no suggestion from Health or anybody else that if you like the plug should be pulled on schools, that that was seen as the high priority. I think we worked with Health to see whether there was additional, you know, whether there was if you like a contribution that schools could make. And as such I was – I didn’t want, and I don’t think it was pushed by Health, that if we moved back to, even for a period of time, a full closure of schools, that that would be a retrograde step, given some of the damage, there was a situation whereby at least there was an opportunity to avoid moving into that situation by way of an extra week’s holiday. And I think the other factor as well is, if there was going to be – if it was going to be a very short-term intervention in schools, that was the better way of doing it. I think that the experience that we had had in the spring was that schools were able to, to a greater or lesser extent, adapt to remote learning, but probably the most difficult choice would have been if they were having to chop and change between remote learning and face-to-face teaching. So it was seen, I think, it was better to be in a situation where there was some, I think – additional school days could be put into that to make a contribution to the overall impact, to try to reduce the transmission rates.
Lead 2C: Just coming back to the position coming into the meeting on 9 November, as far as you’re concerned, your priority that schools remained open, that was going to remain the position; correct?
Lord Peter Weir: It was, but I mean, I think that was – and that would have been my top priority, but that didn’t mean, in the broader sense, on either side of the equation, I didn’t have other concerns.
Lead 2C: I’m going to ask you about those concerns in a moment, but as we can see if we come, please, to paragraph 12 of this minute.
So the first matter that arose was whether or not to grant or to accept that there should be a two-week period of restrictions, albeit with schools open; correct?
Lord Peter Weir: It was the first matter which came to a vote. There was a considerable level of discussion and indeed an attempt to say, yes, there can be a level of acceptance, there will be a level of acceptance of this, but there was a concern that on a couple of aspects of what were proposed that there wasn’t a very strong evidential basis of potential good impact, if I can put it that way.
Lead 2C: So what you were taking issue with was whether or not there was a proper basis for extending the measures by two weeks; is that –
Lord Peter Weir: No, I think that maybe doesn’t give it the nuance that it deserves.
There was an issue that if simply we were to roll over – there was probably two specifics – there was a very major concern – the Department of Economy had produced a paper showing that the impact on people’s livelihoods on the economy was potentially devastating: we had – they had estimated that it was a £400 million hit simply because of the four weeks. And that was a concern which needed to be weighed in the balance overall as well.
And it isn’t simply – sometimes that’s presented as a, you know, livelihoods against lives. I think it’s not as straightforward as that. If you plunge society into such levels of poverty, then that has a very major impact in the long run in terms of health impacts.
There was a concern that there was a willingness to accept the overall extension but that in terms of – as you say, it wasn’t a complete lockdown, so it was a matter of – there was a nuance of exactly where the regulations were going to be, what was permissible and what wasn’t, and I think there was a feeling at least, particularly articulated by the economy minister, that in two particular aspects – which probably in the grand scheme of things were not that enormous – that there wasn’t a strong evidential basis for them to be closed or remain closed –
Lead 2C: All right, so there’s a legitimate debate to be had –
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: – about the possible consequences of locking down –
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: – based on the economic consequences –
Lord Peter Weir: And I think beyond that – there was that element of things, and I think part of the complication at that meeting was then that there was a push, at least by some ministers, to decide effectively to do the two weeks before you even looked at the paper that was being produced on the economy.
I suppose myself and others felt that at the very least we should be in a position that we took all the evidence before we reached a decision.
And I think particular to that – because there was never a proposition which says the two weeks should not happen. What there was, was to say there was a concern over a couple of aspects which we felt that there wasn’t a strong evidential basis for a level of shutdown and we were looking, effectively, to slightly amend that two-week shutdown.
Lead 2C: So can you explain, then, if the issue was one about concern about whether or not sufficient regard had been taken to the economic consequences, why you were one of the people who supported this being decided on the basis of a cross-community vote?
Lord Peter Weir: Because I felt that the – first of all, I think a cross-community vote has been used frequently in different formats since 1998. It is something which is designed to try to ensure that – whether it’s the Assembly or whether it’s the Executive, that simply you can’t get a majority and just effectively ignore any minority voices.
The purpose I think of the cross-community vote in this particular case was to say: we want to reach a situation where there is acceptance of the two-week period, that the vast bulk of the regulations are unchanged, but can we have a little bit of – there have been serious concerns raised here, we don’t want to cut off this debate – which would have effectively occurred whenever the vote was proposed – and that actually we want to see these couple of aspects, in which there isn’t a particularly strong evidential basis, that there is some level of compromise to reach a consensus.
If simply the vote went through, then that killed off any prospect of a consensus. And indeed I think in the run-up to the vote the Minister of Agriculture, who proposed the vote, had said, “Look, we do not – this is not the preferred route, this was a route of almost last resort, we want to actually keep discussing this and reach a consensus and a compromise”. But essentially if people were saying, “No, this has to be put to a vote, there should be no further discussion”, then that was a device at least to keep open the debate so that we could try to reach a resolution to which everybody could at least sign up to. They wouldn’t get everything they wanted but at least that there was a greater level of balance.
Lead 2C: Lord Weir, the cross-community vote doesn’t exist, does it, just so that issues about which a minority of politicians feel strongly about can be, as it were, protected by the use of that vote, does it? It’s called the cross-community vote for a reason: it exists to protect minority interests within the community; correct?
Lord Peter Weir: I would … in – I think this is where a difference in theory and practice. There has been common usage of – either within the Assembly, a petition of concern, or the triggering of a cross-community vote as a level of protection, and it has been there since 1998 within the Assembly, and with the Executive since 2007. And in practice the way that it has been used has been to try to make sure that you don’t reach a point at which simply a majority forced something through against the wishes of a minority.
So it was something that I think there was caution before it was used but there have been many numerous examples of it being used over the years. It is a procedural device in that regard. And the aim of it in this case was to try to reach a point at which simply we could reach a consensus.
And it wasn’t – I think getting at least a unity of purpose is something that the Executive should and was mostly striving for, to reach a situation in which, instead of reaching a point at which there was simply a 6/4 vote in favour of something and that simply happened, I think there was a feeling with a little bit of – a small amount of change we could reach a point at which everybody was willing to support and we felt that was a device to keep the debate alive and try to ensure that we reached a point at which there was that consensus.
Lead 2C: I’m going to ask you about a number of aspects of that. I wanted to put to you what you said in your statement about it. You said that:
“While it is preferable to reach consensus, particularly in a pandemic situation, I don’t believe cross-community voting should be excluded. That would have created the danger of one community or other simply being steamrollered over, with resultant resentment from that community.”
What community were you referring to in your witness statement?
Lord Peter Weir: I was probably making that in a more – more general point. The issue is that one of the values – there are many complications that are there with having a mandatory coalition of five parties across that. Possibly one of the advantages at least that we did have from that during the pandemic was that when a decision was taken, and taken with a level of unity, the message was going out to the public that representatives from across the spectrum were in support of something. I think it meant that while there was a problem generally with compliance, that at least it increased the likelihood of people being observant of that and having a level of buy-in within that.
If it reached at point at which it was clear that representatives of a particular section of our society were simply just getting ignored or outvoted, I think that that diminished the opportunity to send out a message that, as a whole, Northern Ireland was on the same page.
Lead 2C: Because there was only one community in Northern Ireland for the purposes of the pandemic; do you agree with that?
Lord Peter Weir: I agree for everything there is ultimately one – we are all a community of human beings, and whether that’s the pandemic or anything else. I think, as I said, the purpose of cross-community vote was to try to make sure that – and in general, the thing is to try to make sure that decisions have got a wide buy-in.
I think we reached a point probably at that point in November it probably was a certain level of perfect storm, that probably the frustration with the fact that we weren’t seeing entirely the success that – the hopes that maybe had been there during the summer had been dashed and that we weren’t seeing the – almost no matter what we did wasn’t seeming to turn back the tide in terms of that.
I think we reached, simply, a point where there had been a level of frustration and agitation across the board, possibly exacerbated, I think, on the occasion – sporadically within the Executive, which didn’t help the overall atmosphere, there had been at times leaks to the media. I think it was probably a little bit unfortunate that during the middle of that, I think there were – two leaks went out in the middle of that, middle of that meeting. That probably didn’t help the atmosphere. And probably people got into a position across the board where people maybe entrenched themselves into positions more so than at a different time they would have done. It was kind of a build-up of tension in that regard.
Lead 2C: So possibly at a point in time when decision-making was at its most knife edge and sensitive and important for all people across Northern Ireland, people fell into these entrenched positions; correct?
Lord Peter Weir: Well, by “entrenched position” I’m not necessarily saying that’s a Unionist or Nationalist entrenched position. I think the tensions within the Executive – because I think the position in terms of the approach that people took – ultimately there was a limited amount of difference across the board throughout the pandemic from the Executive but there was probably a spectrum of views. I think we ended up in a situation where that was the spectrum that hit on – you know, and it was probably, to some extent, to what extent are restrictions embraced, to what extent is the countervailing pressure of the detrimental impact. And people made a level of judgement call on where the exact balance should be struck. Maybe people came to slightly different views on where that balance should be, and I think at that point perhaps – as I said, had we been moving from a situation in which there had been much greater level of overall success in terms of the public health situation, perhaps those tensions wouldn’t have been there to the same extent.
Lead 2C: I’m not going to go to this, but in fact the question of whether or not to extend restrictions, I think by a week, went to a vote as well, didn’t it?
Lord Peter Weir: We eventually reached the point –
Lead 2C: There was a compromise –
Lord Peter Weir: I think there was – possibly, if memory serves me right, ultimately there was three votes. There was different attempts to put forward different propositions, so a proposition that the – I think that effectively there be cognisance given to the economy paper wasn’t supported by a majority of the Executive. Eventually what we did end up – that it did lead – it was not the most edifying period for the Executive but we did end up with a situation which was further than – if you like, was nobody’s perfect position, but we reached a point, I think, at the end of this process, over a number of days, of a position which basically the Executive was at least able to –
Lead 2C: Sorry, I’m going to cut through this, Lord Weir.
Lord Peter Weir: No, I understand that.
Lead 2C: You were the person who proposed the second cross-community vote –
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: – on the question of whether or not to extend the restrictions?
Lord Peter Weir: And again – again, part of the issue was because we hadn’t reached a consensus on that basis. And I think that there was a little bit of breathing space before we had to ultimately reach a decision and I wanted to facilitate a scenario within which we were able to get something which everybody across the board could buy into.
Lead 2C: Just to finish off on this issue, perhaps if we could go back to the document at INQ000048497. Page 3, and paragraph 13.
It’s right, Lord Weir, that the Minister for Justice is not a politician who is affiliated to a Nationalist or Unionist position; correct?
Lord Peter Weir: Yes, I mean, the issue I think –
Lead 2C: Sorry, I’m just going to –
Lord Peter Weir: No, she’s in a party which doesn’t designate as either Unionist or Nationalist.
Lead 2C: So she:
“… recorded her deep concern about the use of a Cross-Community Vote, which she believed would sectarianise the issue; be used as a veto to stop consensus from being achieved; and exclude her from the voting process; and requested that further efforts be made to find consensus on the matter.”
That was before it went to the first cross-community vote.
Lord Peter Weir: And what we – and from that point of view, first of all, we’d made it clear that we’d – that that was not – it was not a preferred route to use that.
To put this in a context which may not automatically … it is also the case that the justice minister and the Alliance Party, and a perfectly valid position, have, largely speaking, been hostile to the cross-community mechanism pretty much on any issue because there is an argument from 1998 that those who don’t designate are slightly relegated into a reduced position. So this was – it’s something that was entirely consistent with a position that probably existed for more than 20 years.
The central proposition, I think, of the Minister for Justice was that we needed to reach a point at which there was a level of consensus, and I think eventually, through a combination of proposals by the Minister for Justice and the Minister for the Economy, there was something which at least everybody was ultimately able to live with in that regard.
Lead 2C: Lord Weir, I’m just going to finish on this, if I may. Looking back at this, do you regret that decision-making about such an important issue in Northern Ireland at this particularly sensitive time ended up being decided in this manner and in a vote?
Lord Peter Weir: I think that it would have been much more preferable if we had not had that situation in the first place and that – I think the outcome which I always wanted to see was reaching a level of consensus. I think we were always a lot stronger when we had a, broadly speaking, agreed position, even if on a range of things it wasn’t necessarily the first position of anyone.
Lead 2C: Because although you’ve said that this was about keeping debate going and –
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lead 2C: – not closing out issues, the consequence of this kind of positioning by politicians in terms of public confidence in politicians is clearly, or must have been clear, an issue of potential concern and had the potential to do further damage to public adherence, for example, to restrictions?
Lord Peter Weir: Look, I think that being in a situation in which there was disagreement when the Executive and a division in terms of votes is not one that’s going to help fully public confidence in that regard, which was why achieving a consensus was the main thing.
I think there were other aspects that happened in the political sphere earlier in the year which probably had a much greater level of impact on public confidence than the events of November.
Lead 2C: Right, well, I think those are matters that we’ll explore with other witnesses.
Lord Peter Weir: No, I understand that, but I think –
Lead 2C: Because there are other questions?
Lord Peter Weir: No, I understand that, yes.
Lead 2C: In order to be even-handed about this, I think that the point that you would make is that the deputy First Minister’s attendance at the Storey funeral, you regard that as having had an impact on public confidence –
Lord Peter Weir: I think in the same way as – and it may be less even from a Unionist/Nationalist point of view, but from the basis that in – people look to what example is produced by those who are giving the laws, and if they see a level of divergence from that, that that massively undermines – people come to conclusions sometimes: is it one rule for them, meaning the political class – rather, I’m not even necessarily saying in terms of direct political party – is it another rule for the people? I think that was a much greater level of undermining the public confidence than what happened in November. But November was not – those two or three days were a very difficult period, and they were not – they were not the brightest hour in the Executive’s handling of things. On that basis, it was something that I – you know, I wish we’d reached a situation a lot quicker and something again that we were able to reach a consensus on. It was something that I wish it hadn’t developed the way that it had.
Ms Dobbin: Thank you, Lord Weir.
My Lady, those are all my questions.
Lady Hallett: Thank you.
Mr Wilcock.
Questions From Mr Wilcock KC
Mr Wilcock: Lord Weir, I represent the Northern Irish Covid Bereaved Families for Justice.
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Mr Wilcock KC: The question I want to ask you relates to the Executive’s dealings with care homes.
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Mr Wilcock KC: So it’s a different topic.
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Mr Wilcock KC: The starting point of the question is your evidence this morning that the first major presentation to the Executive about Covid was on 2 March.
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Mr Wilcock KC: In that context, I wonder whether I can ask for your witness statement, INQ000408058, to be put on screen and highlight paragraph 66, please. So this is the witness statement that you have been referring to this morning, that you made for this Inquiry in January of this year.
Can you see, about five lines down in that paragraph, after you describe that although the Executive was briefed and took a number of measures on the issue of the impact of Covid on care homes, you thought that:
“ … as an Executive, we didn’t pick up the extent and scale of the problem immediately, and the level of impact on care homes only really became apparent in a wider context to ministers, when the mortality rate through Covid started to escalate, and infections and deaths within care homes were seen to [reach] such a high percentage of the total.”
Can you see why some people might find it at best surprising and at worst quite shocking that the Executive as a whole failed to pick up the extent and scale of the potential problem in care homes immediately at the outset of this pandemic, in spite of any briefings they received and the fact that many people may think that the occupants of care homes were very obviously extremely vulnerable to what you were dealing with at that time?
Lord Peter Weir: I think – I think that there was a failing in relation to care homes. I think that the actions that needed to be taken in care homes was something that – there was probably a level of trust at the start to simply say: this is a Department of Health matter, that the operational stuff on the ground needed to be the case, and so there was perhaps – whenever I’m talking about briefings, probably in terms of timeframe, there was a number of times when it was raised, it maybe wasn’t immediately at the exact point of lockdown, but it was raised by a number of ministers I think from April onwards and was raised on a fairly consistent basis. The response that we quite often got from Health was: “Well, this is being done or that is being done. We are pursuing, We are issuing this new guidance. We are doing that on that basis”.
Where I think from the point of view of a reflection, I would say, was that certainly with the benefit of hindsight, the approach taken, and it maybe derives from the overall SAGE sequencing, was I think stage 3 was effectively: try and reduce the overall level of transmission; stage 4 was to particularly target measures at the vulnerable within our society, which clearly those in care homes would be.
I think, on reflection, that is one of the things I think that was got badly wrong, that there should have been more cognisance from day one, and if, heaven forbid, we find ourselves in a situation as the replicated, there should be a much more laser like focus on care homes.
Can I say, I have a considerable level of empathy with the very difficult position the people in care homes had, both from the point of view of the susceptibility to the virus and also the countervailing damage that was done to them because the amount of – the amount of contact with the outside world had to be cut. During – throughout Covid, I had – I was the carer for my 91-year-old mother who had dementia. She was someone then throughout that, apart from myself and a couple of carers who were brought in, were really from maybe a year, year and a half the only people physically in with her. I knew that if she wasn’t isolated that that – she was somebody that was going to be vulnerable and would be a high level of risk. But I also saw the flip side of the coin, which is why I have such great sympathy for any families left in that position, that for what turned out to be most of the last year and a half of her life, most of her friends and family were not able to be anywhere near her, and I could see that that was having a detrimental effect on her in terms of loneliness and isolation.
So, in many ways, I think for the vulnerable in our society, care homes became and is something which is totemic of the wider problem and the wider dilemma that we had there. But if you’re asking me if we were doing this again, I think that we should have – I think there should have been an action. I think there wasn’t maybe – there was an assumption that everything was getting sorted out. I think that there was not enough of a fast-tracking with hindsight in terms of doing everything that they possibly could, including – again, we probably made an assumption – that if somebody was being released back into a care home from a hospital that they were completely free of any virus. I think there probably wasn’t enough checks in relation to it. Again, that was something I have to say on a personal basis I experienced because I think around about March or April time in the pandemic, my mother had a fall, ended up in hospital for a week. I was not able to see her for that week. She was able to be brought home. Thankfully, she didn’t have the virus. But I think – I think it is something which, as an Executive, it may be difficult to pinpoint. I don’t want to scapegoat individuals or anything of that nature, but collectively as society and collectively as an Executive, we didn’t get it right with regards care homes. I would certainly admit and agree with that.
Mr Wilcock KC: The Executive failed care homes, in short, didn’t it?
Lord Peter Weir: I think – I think it didn’t do the job that ultimately it should have done. Now, how much of that was absolutely apparent at the time may be questioned. I think there was probably a little bit of a barrier there in that initially it was something that – in terms of the issue of – issues of PPE, issues of testing were largely carried out very much on an operational basis by Health, and there was probably a little bit of a time lag before we got the information on that. And there’s maybe an argument that before there was a full realisation of the need to take action that before we reached that point there was maybe a certain element of missed opportunity. It was something that we kept on pressing Health to do, and there were responses given to the Minister of Health in connection to that, but I think if you were – again, if you were doing this again, I think being in a situation where those vulnerable in our society are actually put front and centre of any response to the pandemic would be the way that I think – I think it’s one of the lessons collectively – and I think it’s probably not something that was unique to Northern Ireland, but I think it’s a lesson that needs to be learned throughout this.
Mr Wilcock: Thank you very much.
Lady Hallett: Thank you, Mr Wilcock.
Questions From the Chair
Lady Hallett: Lord Weir, before I let you go, as far as the sense of urgency at the beginning.
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lady Hallett: If the Department of Health had pressed for the stand-up of the civil contingency arrangements –
Lord Peter Weir: Yes.
Lady Hallett: Forgive me, I hate acronyms. Is it NICCMA?
Lord Peter Weir: Yes, I think so.
Lady Hallett: Had there been a greater sense of urgency coming from the Department of Health, do you think that might have helped other ministers around the Executive table?
Lord Peter Weir: Look, I think if there had been a request to stand that up, I think, first of all, it would have been something that nobody had any problem with supporting. I think directly, in terms of my own department’s involvement, at the lesser stage, certainly, I think it was my permanent secretary had gone along to the CCG meeting on 28 February. We were very happy to participate and contribute to that. I think we got until relatively close to the point at which lockdown occurred. I think that there was a realisation across the board, but particularly from Health, that there were some major problems coming, and I don’t know – I mean, look, this may be something which you may need to probe with some of the health experts – whether the medical and scientific advice across the UK was seeing things in a slightly different timeframe. I didn’t, until relatively close to the point at which action was taken, see a great sense of immediacy and – and maybe that changes it slightly from the word “urgency”, that there were things that needed to be done with almost immediate effect, and I think that probably came relatively late in the day.
Lady Hallett: The second question: as you may know, there were – the Inquiry has discovered there were – I don’t know if the word “complaint” is right, but forgive me – complaints by the First Minister and the deputy First Minister about their lack of control during a national emergency.
I just wondered, given your experience of working in the Executive and in politics for such a long time, can you see any place for different structures to make sure that there is better control in a national emergency where people are losing lives?
Lord Peter Weir: Well, I would say two things. First of all, I think that the structures that we developed later on in the Executive through the Executive Taskforce was probably a better structure than what we started off with. I think it is inevitable, and I can see certain advantages in having a lead department, because I think there’s a bit of a danger that if two departments and nobody’s quite clear who is leading there’s a bit of a tendency that one thinks the other is going to do something and the other – in relation to it.
What I would say is, I think the model of leading, if I can use an analogy, should be as – call it chairman of the board rather than CEO. It shouldn’t be a situation that whoever’s leading is essentially just giving orders to the other departments. I’m not saying that necessarily happened, but from the point of view of that it’s got to be done in a collegiate way and in the spirit of whoever’s leading effectively being genuinely the first amongst equals.
Lady Hallett: Thank you very much. Thank you very much for your help. I can’t guarantee I won’t impose on you again because I do have a module dealing with children and young people, but I do understand the burdens it places on you, so I hope we won’t have to call on you again, but thank you for your help anyway.
The Witness: Thank you, my Lady.
(The witness withdrew)
Lady Hallett: Right, I shall adjourn now and return at 1.45.
(12.50 pm)
(The short adjournment)
(1.45 pm)
Lady Hallett: Sorry if you’ve been up and down and mucked about, Ms Dodds.
Mr Scott: My Lady, may we call Ms Diane Dodds.