7. Submissions on Behalf of the UK Anti-corruption Coalition by Mr Munro

Mr Munro: Thank you, Chair.

My name is Peter Munro, and I am speaking on behalf of the UK Anti-Corruption Coalition. I’d like to first open with a note of appreciation. The Coalition would like to thank you and your team for granting us core participant status for this key module in the Covid Inquiry on the UK Government procurement response. We hope we can add some important, constructive insights into proceedings today and throughout the course of the year.

We look forward to adding our voice, sharing our evidence and expertise to support the Inquiry’s investigation into the UK and devolved governments’ management of government procurement, helping the country learn important lessons. You’ll be aware that we have submitted a written submission ahead of today’s hearing, but today I’d like to summarise some of those points on behalf of the group. But first, by way of introduction as a first time core participant, I’d like to note a few points about the UK Anti-Corruption Coalition itself.

Our coalition is a non-partisan group of anti-corruption organisations who aim to reduce corruption in the UK and reduce its role in facilitating it abroad. We consist of 17 partner members, including international NGOs and academics with shared aims offering bespoke expertise wherever corruption exists in the UK and beyond. Our policy areas include illicit financial flows, money laundering, defence and security, environmental issues, human rights, the courts, the press, matters of public governance and political integrity, and public health.

For over a decade, our group has been the leading civil society voice in the anti-corruption space, consulting with government authorities and parliamentarians to improve relevant UK policy, raising awareness of the social, economic, and national security threats posed by corruption.

For the purposes of this Inquiry, the part of the Coalition that will be engaging as core participants is our Procurement Working Group. This working group was created in early 2020, when issues with the UK’s pandemic response, particularly relating to emergency procurement of PPE equipment, first came to light.

The organisations in this working group that have core participant status are as follows: Transparency International UK; Open Contracting Partnership; and Chris Smith, procurement expert; Spotlight on Corruption; and the Centre for Health and Public Interest.

Each of these organisations undertake detailed and evidence-based research on public procurement. They also offer specific technical expertise on procurement systems, governance arrangements, digital tools and data standards.

For a number of years, our organisations have contributed to various national and international consultations and reviews into procurement best practice. We’ve undertaken investigations into the UK’s emergency procurement of PPE, and patient capacity from private sector hospitals during the pandemic.

At this point, it’s certainly worth highlighting that it is internationally accepted that with government procurement and public contracts, there is considerable risk of corruption. Procurement rules exist to keep politicians, political influence and conflict of interest out of public contracts. Quite simply, if these rules are not followed, this does not only have ripple effects on the direct response to emergencies, but also can diminish the public’s trust in its government.

Since our inception as a group, we have analysed and critiqued the UK’s pandemic procurement response, and our work is always focused on securing stronger safeguards against corruption in procurement, and we were pleased to contribute to the necessary reforms within the UK’s new Procurement Act 2023.

Lady Hallett: I’m sorry to interrupt, Mr Munro, but I suspect – could you just slow down?

Mr Munro: Sure.

Lady Hallett: I speak very quickly too, so I understand. It’s just that I’m going to have a stenographer complaining. I appreciate you’re trying to get things done in time.

Mr Munro: No problems; I can certainly slow down.

Lady Hallett: Thank you.

Mr Munro: Now, turning to scope of Module 5.

We think the key questions put forward by the Inquiry team form a very solid basis for the module, but I will highlight seven key areas that are of particular interest for us, and that we hope the Inquiry gets to the bottom of.

The latter few points relate to the counsel’s remarks this morning of what is and is not in scope, and covered in different modules, but I would still like to put them on record.

Firstly, the frontline impact of PPE failures. Whilst our focus is the process and decision-making by the government, we are pleased to see the Inquiry’s emphasis on recognising the impact that procurement decisions had on the frontline provision of equipment. It is vital for the Inquiry to fully consider the profound impact the government-level decisions had on the ground-level emergency response and on frontline responders.

Ahead of coming to the Inquiry today, I spoke to my own mum about her experiences as a health visitor and those of her district nurse colleagues. She said that the PPE was so thin, thinner than bin bags, that by the time you opened the roll, it was already falling apart. Especially in the winter months, when health visitors and district nurses were outside visiting their communities, the equipment that was procured by the government wouldn’t last in the elements. She could tell that her one-hour visits in patients’ homes were almost over not by looking at her watch, but by looking at the wear of her PPE equipment.

As she said to me, “It felt like we were wearing the equipment for appearance sake and to reassure our patients, rather than as something that would actually protect us.”

Secondly, the lack of basic commercial acumen. We believe the Inquiry should investigate what appears to be systemic lack of commercial acumen and adherence to key guiding principles of public procurement.

Usually, in the public procurement process, very clear technical specifications provided by the contracting authority would lead the procurement process for PPE. However, this does not appear to be the case for the UK’s emergency response, which relied on supplier specifications and offers that formed the basis of contracts.

Instead of saying “This is what we need”, the government asked “What do you have?” and “We’ll take it.”

This would seem partly to account for the extraordinary high rate of failure and waste in UK contracts.

Third, the High Priority Lane, or “VIP lane”. This particular response emerged as a core feature of the UK procurement policy. Our members work in countries all over the world and know that this VIP approach was quite unique to the UK.

As I said earlier, one of the key purposes of procurement rules is to keep undue political influence away from government commercial decision-making. Close connections to politicians normally are a cause for more scrutiny of contracts, not less. There is no evidence that politicians anywhere were particularly well placed to decide who had good stocks of PPE and who does not. There were plenty of routine and sensible approaches for securing PPE at speed in other jurisdictions.

Most countries managed to do this whilst maintaining due process. And in Sweden, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, the number of contracts awarded using open competition actually went up.

We believe it is very important that the Inquiry discovers exactly how and why the High Priority Lane was created and what other, more effective, emergency response options were considered and rejected.

We also hope the Inquiry will consider how the High Priority Lane delayed the publication of critical information about contracts, and they have deterred efforts to hold some suppliers accountable.

Fourth, failure to disclose basic information on emergency PPE contracts. In other countries, like Ukraine, information on emergency contracts was published within 24 hours. In the UK, the normal 30 and 90-day periods for required publication of contract information completely collapsed. Contract award notices for PPE worth £4.7 billion were not published until 14 months after contracts were awarded.

Even today, we remain concerned about the lack of public disclosure for many contracts worth billions of pounds that were awarded without competition. A large value of PPE contracts remains unpublished, and contracts that have been published are incomplete, lacking detail on the items procured, or are heavily redacted.

There is a risk that the government could rely, as it often does, on commercial confidentiality to avoid full disclosure of important contract documents to the Inquiry. We fear that the Inquiry may not have access to much of this documentation and will be unable to fully investigate what happened to them, and what lessons can be learned.

Fifth, the use of digital procurement tools. We believe the module scope should include digital tools that were available for the procurement of items, and the role of procurement data in managing the whole process across all levels of government.

Other jurisdictions quickly built dashboards to track PPE availability and contracts. Lithuania’s Public Procurement Office was able to identify an increasing number of untested suppliers, overpriced protective equipment, and risky high-value direct awards. We would like to know what tools and approaches the UK could have taken.

Six, the impact and implementation of Boardman and other reviews. Following concerns about the transparency of the UK’s emergency procurement response, multiple official reviews were conducted. The Cabinet Office asked Sir Nigel Boardman to conduct a review into the award of contracts for Covid communication services made by the Cabinet Office, and to identify areas for improvement.

Similarly, there were key reviews conducted by the National Audit Office and Public Accounts Committee. We’d like to see the Inquiry investigate what impact these reviews and their recommendations had on Government Department behaviour and the procurement of equipment.

Number 7, quality assurance. We believe the Inquiry should investigate the considerable waste to physically dispose of PPE that was not fit for purpose, and look at what could have been done to identify quality problems before PPE was distributed.

We had some following points here, but counsel made points about the scope of procurement services this morning. We do think there are massive and costly failures and similar flaws that ought to be looked at regarding services at private hospitals and the Nightingale hospitals, and their respective equivalents in the devolved governments.

Many contracts were awarded in the test and trace area with no competitive tenders. Public Accounts Committee reported that ministers and government officials played “fast and loose” when awarding over £700 million in Covid-19 contracts to a healthcare firm. The committee also noted that it was impossible to know if the contracts had been awarded properly.

Chair, I would like to thank you again for granting the UK Anti-Corruption Coalition core participation status. We do encourage and fully support the direction of the module so far, and look forward to working with you and your team in the coming months.

Unless I can be of any further assistance, or you need me to repeat anything or slow down more, then that concludes my remarks.

Lady Hallett: Thank you very much for your help, Mr Munro, and you raise some very interesting points. Thank you.

Right, I think that now completes all the submissions, and unless anybody has anything else they wish to add, that completes this preliminary hearing.

I think the next hearing of the Inquiry is in Cardiff, I think, at the end of February. And I look forward to seeing those who are following these proceedings there or remotely, even though I won’t see them.

Thank you all very much.

(12.42 pm)

(The hearing adjourned until a future date in February 2024)