Transcript of Module 2C Public Hearing on 3 May 2024.
(10.00 am)
Statement by LEAD COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY for MODULE 2C
Ms Dobbin: My Lady, I was going to address you, if I may, and before the witness is sworn.
My Lady, a disclosure issue has arisen, I wonder if I can address you on that. You may recollect that when I opened the Inquiry – well, when I opened Module 2C on behalf of the Inquiry, I referred to the fact that in respect of a meeting which took place on 2 July of the Executive Committee, that the handwritten notes of that meeting were missing; in other words that they hadn’t been provided to the Inquiry.
I noted on behalf of the Inquiry that that was significant, because it was the first Executive Committee meeting which had taken place after the funeral of Mr Storey, at which the deputy First Minister and other ministers had attended.
Very shortly after the opening was provided to the Inquiry, the Inquiry was approached by the Executive Office to say that in fact they had the minutes of the 2 July meeting, and I wonder if I may bring up on screen the letter that was sent to the Inquiry on behalf of the Executive Office by the Departmental Solicitor’s Office.
We have this letter at INQ000474209. If I could ask if the second paragraph of that letter could be highlighted. So, my Lady, you will see that in that letter it was suggested that it had come as a surprise to members of the Executive Office Covid Inquiry team, including Ms Jane Holmes and Ms Maria Hannon, as they believed that the notes had been provided to the Inquiry. As you can see, they set out that:
“Steps were taken to search for the notes and the email dated 3 August 2023 that had scanned the handwritten notes attached. This was located within Content Manager by [Ms Hannon] who carried out the search.”
Can I put the suggestion that that came as a surprise in some context for you and set out a chronology of all the requests that were made of the Executive Office for the notes of 2 July 2020.
So on 8 February 2023 a solicitor to the Inquiry emailed the legal representative of the TEO setting out a list of materials that were missing. Amongst the materials that were missing and which were set out by the solicitor were the notes of 2 July 2020.
On 9 March 2023, a Solicitor to the Inquiry once again emailed the legal representative of the TEO saying that she had not received a response to the request and asking if the materials could be provided urgently and by 17March 2023. On 11 April 2023 a Solicitor to the Inquiry wrote again to the TEO legal representative, and set out again a list of documents and categories of documents which remained outstanding from TEO’s disclosure to Module 2C thus far, and again the notes of 2 July were included within the material that was missing.
On 1 June 2023, there was a meeting between the Executive Office and Module 2C, and the first item on the agenda that was discussed was the outstanding disclosure, and again the fact that there were a number of documents from the schedule which had been provided in April and were missing, and reference was made to the fact that that had been circulated a number of times, and there was a query as to why outstanding documents were still missing.
On 2 June 2023, so immediately after that, Solicitor to the Inquiry again emailed about the outstanding documents that had been set out in the schedule which was in the email of 11 April.
On 7 June 2023, the TEO contacted the Inquiry to say that it was aiming to complete disclosure.
On 16 June, again 2023, a Solicitor to the Inquiry contacted the TEO again setting out that there were still outstanding documents and again specifically referred to the fact that the Inquiry was missing handwritten notes and a number of briefing papers that had been set out in the schedule of 11 April.
On 20 June 2023, the TEO contacted a Solicitor to the Inquiry to set out that a number of outstanding items had been uploaded to Egress, and attached to the email was a table providing an update against the items that had been requested.
In respect of the notes of 2 July 2020, it was specifically said “Notes not held, confirmed by Executive Secretary”.
Notwithstanding that that indication had been given that the notes were not held, on 6 July 2023 again a Solicitor to the Inquiry contacted TEO setting out that they were grateful for the ongoing disclosure of documents, but again said “We have a few specific handwritten notes of minutes which appear to be outstanding, and we would be grateful if you could please provide those to the Inquiry, or if it’s the case that no handwritten notes exist for these meetings, your confirmation of the same”, and again it set out the dates of the handwritten minutes that were missing, and again this included a request for the 2 July 2020 handwritten notes.
On 31 July 2023, there was a letter again from Module 2C to the Executive Office, and again this set out in respect of the email that had been sent by the TEO in response to the ongoing requests for disclosure that a number of meeting notes were not held. So the Inquiry set out its understanding that the 2 July 2020 notes were not held, and the Inquiry set out to the TEO that:
“These handwritten notes cover a period of significant interest to the Inquiry, and it’s plainly of concern if these are in fact missing. To that end, please confirm that the handwritten notes are missing, that there are no copies of them, and please explain where these records ought to be stored. Please explain the process by which such records were stored and how it is possible to remove them from storage. Can you explain what is known about the circumstances in which they have gone missing? Has there been an investigation into this?”
We are now aware, because it’s been disclosed to us, that in fact there were investigations in and around this time as to the missing notes.
Perhaps if I could ask to be brought up on screen, please, the document at INQ000421789. If I could ask, please, for page 2 of that.
My Lady, page 2 of this email sets out, and you can see it in blue, these were the requests that had been made on behalf of the Inquiry. You can see at B again the reference to the 2 July notes.
If we go over the page, please, to page 1, you’ll note that this email is dated 3 August 2023, and that in the first paragraph it confirms that the handwritten notes of 2 July 2020 had in fact been found.
If you look at the third paragraph, and I’d ask you just to take a note of this for now, you will see that reference is made to the existence of the notes being attributable to the minute-taker taking them, and the suggestion that where they don’t exist or where they haven’t been found it may be that the minute-taker didn’t make those notes. We’ll come back to that in evidence.
But it suffices to say that, despite those notes having been found and despite the sheer number of requests having been made, despite the fact that the TEO in fact told the Inquiry that those notes weren’t held, and despite the very specific questions that the Inquiry asked about the precise circumstances in which notes like this could go missing, they weren’t provided until after the opening had been given.
My Lady, if I could go back to the letter that the TEO sent, INQ000474209, and again highlight the second paragraph, if that paragraph was intended to convey that there had been any casualness in terms of our requests and the efforts that were made in order to obtain the notes of 2 July 2020, that would obviously be quite wrong and it’s important on behalf of the Inquiry that I make clear to you obviously that the importance or the potential importance of those notes was appreciated by the Inquiry, and that I make clear to you all of the efforts that were made in order to obtain those notes, in order to be able to provide them to core participants, obviously, before the Inquiry started.
Thank you, my Lady.
Lady Hallett: Thank you very much, Ms Dobbin. I think you made mention of a name that had been redacted, so that just needs to be deleted from the transcript, early on in your remarks.
As far as the issue you’ve just raised, this is an issue I expect will be explored today with witnesses, and I am very concerned about what you’ve just told me, and I will see at the end of the day and consider with the Inquiry team whether I wish to pursue this matter further. It’s not a very happy picture.
Ms Dobbin: I’m grateful, my Lady.
My Lady, I think the witness can be sworn in.
Lady Hallett: I’m sorry you’ve had to wait.
1. Ms Karen Pearson
MS KAREN PEARSON (affirmed).
Questions From Lead Counsel to the Inquiry for Module 2C
Ms Dobbin: Can I ask you to give your full name to
the Inquiry, please.
Ms Karen Pearson: Karen Jayne Pearson.
Lead 2C: Now, Ms Pearson, I think you have in fact made two
witness statements to the Inquiry; is that correct?
Ms Karen Pearson: That is correct.
Lead 2C: You have made one in your personal capacity. Do you
have that in front of you?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes, thank you.
Lead 2C: And I think it’s right that you signed that statement on
28 February 2024?
Ms Karen Pearson: I did.
Lead 2C: And are you content that that statement’s true to the
best of your knowledge and belief?
Ms Karen Pearson: I am, yes.
Lead 2C: Thank you. I think that you also signed the TEO
statement, so you signed a statement on behalf of the
Executive Office; is that correct?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: And do you also have that in front of you?
Ms Karen Pearson: I do, yes.
Lead 2C: And I think that that statement was signed on 19 February 2024?
Ms Karen Pearson: That’s right.
Lead 2C: And again, are you content that the contents of that statement are true to the best of your knowledge and belief?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes, I am, yes.
Lead 2C: Now, if at any time, Ms Pearson, you need a break, please do say and we’ll be able to stop proceedings. All right?
Ms Karen Pearson: Okay.
Lead 2C: Thank you.
Now, the first question that I wanted to ask you about was in fact about the corporate statement and what was said about some of the handwritten notes. So I wonder if I could ask, please, for that to be brought up on screen. That’s at paragraph 70, so that’s INQ000438174, and paragraph 71, please.
I think it’s right, Ms Pearson, that paragraph 71 is dealing with the issue of the outstanding handwritten notes that hadn’t been provided to the Inquiry, and that specifically refers to the notes of 3 February, 6 August and 13 August. Correct?
Ms Karen Pearson: Correct.
Lead 2C: If we look at the sentence that begins on the second line:
“The existence of manuscript notes is attributable solely to the discretion of the customary minute taker …”
We can see, can’t we, that that language comes from the email that was sent by the Executive Office or within the Executive Office about the outstanding notes; correct?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes, that’s my understanding, yes.
Lead 2C: And in fact perhaps if it’s possible to bring both of those documents on screen together, the email is at INQ000421789.
Thank you.
So if we look at paragraph 71 of the statement, and if we could highlight “The existence of manuscript notes is attributable”, and if we could highlight the email, please.
We can see the equivalent.
So in other words, paragraph 71 of the statement is expressly addressed and based on the email that was sent; correct?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: But obviously the statement doesn’t refer to the fact that the minutes of 2 July had been found?
Ms Karen Pearson: No, it doesn’t, you’re right.
Lead 2C: And in fact it goes on, if we look at the very end of that paragraph, to say:
“All extant handwritten notes of an Executive meeting taken by the usual minute taker had been provided.”
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: But that wasn’t, in fact, correct, was it?
Ms Karen Pearson: Correct, you are right, yes.
Lead 2C: When you signed this statement, were you or did you understand the steps that had been taken in order to investigate what had happened to the missing handwritten notes?
Ms Karen Pearson: I was aware that the Inquiry was looking for full disclosure, that’s not in doubt, but I just need to share that I was off work for a period of time in 2023. That’s no excuse, that’s no – I just – it’s a fact. I was not around for about six months. But my understanding, in signing the statement, was that there were three missing notes.
Lead 2C: Thank you.
So certainly as far as that bit of your statement goes, that’s obviously something that needs to be corrected because at the time the Executive Office had not in fact provided all of the handwritten notes that it was in possession of?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: Thank you, I’m going to move on now, if I may, to deal with your evidence.
I want to start, please, by asking you a bit about your role and your background, if I may, in the Executive Office. I think in fact it’s right that you started your Civil Service career in the Home Office; is that correct?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: In Westminster?
Ms Karen Pearson: That’s right.
Lead 2C: I know it’s referred to as the Home Civil Service; is that right?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: And you began your career there in 1986; is that correct?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: Then in 1998 you came on a secondment to the Northern Ireland Office; is that also right?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: And then thereafter did you stay and effectively become a member of the Northern Ireland Civil Service?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes, I did. I started in the Northern Ireland Office, and as part of that posting I was in a devolving job when the Department of Justice was created and I transferred to the Northern Ireland Civil Service in 2012.
Lead 2C: I think you had a number of different roles, but eventually in May 2019, you were one of the civil servants who became part of the work dealing with EU exit; is that correct?
Ms Karen Pearson: I was working on EU exit in the Department of Justice prior to that date. In May 2019 I transferred to the Executive Office to work on EU exit.
Lead 2C: I see. And there you remained, and we’ll come to this in due course, until you were asked to become part of the civil contingency framework within the Executive Office responding to the pandemic; is that right?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes. I would just say I was asked to move across to Covid work, but that was in more of a policy role rather than the operational civil contingencies role at that time.
Lead 2C: All right. Well, I’m going to ask you a bit more about that, and a bit more about how you came to be in that role and the work that you did.
Before I move on to that, though, I do want to ask about the role that you had on the departmental board.
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: You deal with that at paragraph 6 of your witness statement. Can I ask you to explain what the departmental board was, please.
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes. So all departments will have a departmental board charged with looking after governance matters primarily. It’s not necessarily a policymaking board, although it will be aware of policy work in its own department.
So the TEO departmental board would have looked at matters such as finance, governance, staffing, risk, business planning, that sort of work, rather than specific policy objectives.
Lead 2C: Just to be clear, this is the departmental board for the Executive Office itself; is that correct? So it’s not a cross-departmental board, it’s specific to the Executive Office?
Ms Karen Pearson: I think Jenny Pyper referred yesterday to the NICS board.
Lead 2C: Yes.
Ms Karen Pearson: That’s where you get the overarching view of governance. My statement is it’s referring specifically to the TEO departmental board.
Lead 2C: And that had a number of senior civil servants on it and non-executive members as well; correct?
Ms Karen Pearson: Correct.
Lead 2C: Part of its role, I think, was also to assess risk on the part of the Executive Office as well; is that right?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes, it is.
Lead 2C: And I think you referred to that in your statement as having a role in determining the risk appetite of the Executive Office; correct?
Ms Karen Pearson: Correct, yes.
Lead 2C: What you’ve said in your statement is that one of the matters which that board considered was the paper that had been written by Mr Stewart on 25 February about capacity in civil contingencies in government in Northern Ireland?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: I wonder if we could just bring that up please. That’s at INQ000205712.
The Inquiry has already looked at this document, I’m sure you’re familiar with it as well, and I know you looked at it to prepare your statement.
I wonder if we could just go to paragraph 23 of that, please.
I’m sorry, Ms Pearson, I understand the screen is frozen?
Ms Karen Pearson: It’s fine.
Lead 2C: I’ll just let you orientate yourself. We know that what was being proposed was a strategic review of civil contingency capability.
We can see at paragraph 22 onwards Mr Stewart is talking about risk, isn’t he?
Ms Karen Pearson: He is, yes.
Lead 2C: Just give me one second.
(Pause)
Lead 2C: So 22 is dealing with risk and at 23, as part of that assessment:
“… if no action is taken to address the lessons learnt and to implement recommendations from the C3 Project experience the risk arises that civil contingency arrangements in Northern Ireland will fall even further behind the rest of the UK, and the Executive and wider society may not be prepared for, or have the capacity and capability to deal effectively with, an emergency situation should a major contingency present.”
Obviously, Ms Pearson, at this point in time, Covid-19 was, as it were, hurtling towards Northern Ireland. What was the assessment of the departmental board, or what was its response to this paper and the risk that was being set out?
Ms Karen Pearson: I think we accepted the recommendation that the review should launch. We were also aware of the enormous work that had gone on in Yellowhammer, we would have been aware of that at departmental board. I would have been aware of it in my job in TEO at that time as well, and previously having worked on preparations in the Department of Justice. So I think we would have accepted that assessment.
Lead 2C: But –
Lady Hallett: Sorry, Yellowhammer, you mean the preparations for a no-deal Brexit?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes, my Lady, yes.
Ms Dobbin: But, I mean, what might be thought odd about this paper or what might be thought to be an air of unreality about it is that it’s talking about a hypothetical risk in the future as opposed to a fear that there was a lack of capacity in order to be able to respond to a major emergency which was right in front of Northern Ireland, which was coming.
Ms Karen Pearson: I accept that, looking at it now. At the time, we would have been aware of how much preparation had been done. Chris Stewart here is recommending a review, but that would have been building on the preparations that had been made for no-deal exit.
Lead 2C: So when you say you would have been aware of all of the preparations going on, are you specifically referring, Ms Pearson, just to Operation Yellowhammer and those preparations –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: – as opposed to anything Covid specific?
Ms Karen Pearson: I – today I’m referring to Operation Yellowhammer.
Lead 2C: But, I mean, wasn’t the board incredibly concerned, in the face of an oncoming pandemic, that this was the state of affairs, and that it was being suggested that there wasn’t the capability to deal or there may not be the capability to be able to deal with an emergency – or the major contingency that wasn’t theoretical but which was real?
Ms Karen Pearson: I suppose there’s two aspects to that. Because of my own role in Yellowhammer, I would have been aware of the state of readiness that that would have assisted with in a pandemic. You can’t lift Yellowhammer and make it work directly. I think we’ve heard about some of the initial problems. But I would have been personally aware that the Yellowhammer situation would have relied on bringing volunteer staff in from other departments, that was the core of the Yellowhammer preparation.
Lead 2C: Yes, but that’s not answering the concern that’s being set out here, is it? That’s not answering what’s obviously a very significant concern, that Northern Ireland doesn’t have the capacity to cope with a major contingency.
Ms Karen Pearson: I think Chris here was referring to the number of staff he had immediately available to him, not the totality of what the service would have been able to deliver in Covid, and that’s exactly what happened. I think Chris here is trying to stabilise his staffing for the future.
Lead 2C: But this entire paper was proposing a review of all of the civil contingencies –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes, yes.
Lead 2C: – and their capacity. He wasn’t, this isn’t a paper about a fear of not having enough staff.
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes, I accept that.
Lead 2C: Because the reality of the position was that over 800 people had in fact been trained as part of Operation Yellowhammer in order to be part of the civil contingencies operation; correct?
Ms Karen Pearson: Correct.
Lead 2C: So notwithstanding that, and that that had been done, he’s nonetheless pointing to the overarching concern that nonetheless Northern Ireland capability in contingency was so far behind the rest of the UK that that was the real concern?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes, I think that’s correct. He had a very small team at that point.
Lead 2C: Yes.
Ms Karen Pearson: And I’ve acknowledged that in my statement as well. It makes sense to me that Yellowhammer was going to be what we would rely on for Covid, and it makes sense to me also that we should review the size of his team and to see if we could improve that for the future.
Lead 2C: So what was the board’s response, then, to this paper?
Ms Karen Pearson: I – I don’t recall a specific conversation around it, I’m absolutely clear that I was at that board and that we agreed this paper, but I think – I am distinguishing between utility of Yellowhammer in Covid, which is exactly what happened, and the need to stabilise the size of the team, because it was just too small.
Lead 2C: Yes, I want to try and keep everything separate, though –
Ms Karen Pearson: Okay.
Lead 2C: – because we will come on to that. I really just want to focus at the minute on what might be regarded as a flare going up to the departmental board about a risk in relation to a theoretical emergency whenever there was in fact a real emergency in front of it.
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes, I understand.
Lead 2C: I mean, was there any urgency on the sense of the departmental board or any sort of …
Ms Karen Pearson: I can only say again that because we’d been through Yellowhammer, it was recent and it was going to be applicable, and I think Chris said yesterday and I agree that designing arrangements for an emergency should be, he referred to it as blind, I refer to it as agnostic, to the nature of the emergency, it’s your ongoing capability that’s important, and then of course you do have to tailor that to what you’re dealing with at the time. So I suppose maybe I was so close to Yellowhammer that I was not relaxed about it, not in any way, but I knew what capability we had and how that could be applied if the pandemic took hold, as it did.
Lead 2C: But you would have, I mean, obviously appreciated that planning for a pandemic is not, would not be the same as planning for EU exit?
Ms Karen Pearson: They’re fundamentally different, but there’s a lot of applicability in the capability, would be my position.
Lead 2C: So was the board not interested or enquiring about what sort of planning was actually going on, in other words how is the risk that’s being presented here, how is that being met in respect of the Covid pandemic?
Ms Karen Pearson: I wouldn’t accept that the board wouldn’t be interested in that. I can only say that we were aware of Yellowhammer and that had given us a good position on capability.
Lead 2C: I may come back to this, but just focusing on Yellowhammer for a moment, and your expertise in that. Obviously we know that 800 people were trained and we know that at the start of March, or in the first couple of weeks of March, certainly, Mr Stewart was scrabbling to find anyone from those 800 volunteers who would become part of the hub.
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: We’ve seen references to one or two people volunteering. Can you assist as to why no one would volunteer?
Ms Karen Pearson: I think Mr Harbinson, in his statement, on his experience as chief of staff, covers this. I don’t want to jump on to me joining the team, but it’s something Anthony and I talked about at the time when I did go across, and I think there’s a couple of things. There were some HR issues about terms and conditions, recompense for the sort of work. I also think that I accept in my statement that we didn’t have something that went straight from “here’s the requirement” to “here’s the provision of staff” and I think that’s a bit of a gap.
Lead 2C: And do these kind of arrangements have to be dependent on volunteers rather than having people who can be commanded to be part of a civil contingency response?
Ms Karen Pearson: I think the answer to that is that that’s what we had in Yellowhammer, was a volunteer basis. Chris referred yesterday to it being quite specific work, it’s not for everyone. Having a pool that we can draw on is important, and I can tell you what we’re doing about that in future. But commanding people to go to that sort of work I think would be less good than volunteers, I think having people that want to be here, understand the nature of the work and can assist immediately on arrival because they’ve been inducted and trained has some advantages to it.
Lead 2C: Right. I will –
Lady Hallett: Are you moving on?
Ms Dobbin: I was going to.
Lady Hallett: Just going back to Mr Stewart’s paper, when Ms Dobbin asked you questions about what you remember of what the board did, you said “We accepted the recommendation, the review of civil contingencies should launch”, you thought the review was going to start immediately, did you?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes, I did, yes.
Lady Hallett: So it wasn’t going to be in Mr Stewart’s own time, that wasn’t your understanding?
Ms Karen Pearson: I … when I look back at it now, the wording on the paper would lead me to suggest that if you’re asking for a review it’s because you think something needs to be reviewed.
Lady Hallett: Well, it was urgent, wasn’t it, if you were that far behind the rest of the UK?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes, my Lady.
Ms Dobbin: So I want to come, then, Ms Pearson to how you end up becoming involved in the response, having been part of the EU exit team. Perhaps if we do this by the documents and we go to INQ000218494. I think if we start, please, on page 2, so we can see this is at 4 March, and this is an email from a Ms Rooney, who we’ve heard a bit about, who was involved in civil contingencies. She refers to having chaired a C3 lead. Can you help as to what that means?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes, so the Inquiry will hear two different references to C3, C3 was a short version of the Yellowhammer work. In this context, what Bernie means here is each department and some of our operational leads will have a civil contingencies lead and we bring them together in a group called C3, which is command, control, co-ordinate. So I think it’s shorthand for that group.
Lead 2C: If we just look at what she’s saying, so I think she – there has been a C3 lead meeting and strong views were expressed, and the people who attended wanted it to be conveyed back to the head of Civil Service, and they set out a number of issues, and we can see:
“Lack of structures and staff to respond to the Cabinet Office …”
And the Inquiry’s already seen some of the requests that were being made by Cabinet Office.
A “call for DOC”, I think is that a departmental operation …?
Ms Karen Pearson: Centre.
Lead 2C: Centre. So that again was part of a civil contingencies stand-up, wasn’t it? It was having a centre within each department that would feed information through, essentially, to a hub; correct?
Ms Karen Pearson: That’s correct, and you’ll also hear the term “EOC”, emergency operations centre, it’s the same concept.
Lead 2C: So the C3 leads wanted those to be set up, so I think we can assume from this that they hadn’t been set up within departments at this point in time?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: And a call for the NI hub to be established as a matter of priority?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: And I think – can we assume that the C3 leads then, are they permanent secretaries or are they senior grade civil servants?
Ms Karen Pearson: It differs from department to department. For some departments it will be a specific role. For other departments it will be part of a person’s job. But it wouldn’t be that senior, no, no.
Lead 2C: All right. And were you part of this structure or were you at this meeting?
Ms Karen Pearson: I was not part of the C3 structure, and I was not at that meeting.
Lead 2C: Okay. If we go to page 1, please.
I think this is a response from Mr Stewart, who, at the third paragraph, says that he thinks that’s a “disappointing” response from colleagues, but “not a surprise”.
I think if we – we can just see at the bottom of the first page:
“Departments are free to establish [those centres] if they wish. To be candid, with the exception of [the Department of Health], I wonder what they would be doing at present, when the focus is on planning.”
If we go to the top of the email chain, you do then become involved –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: – in this, to say, and we can see what you say:
“… keen to discuss how our preparedness work and C3 might intersect this year, and what we can offer from our preparedness work to assist in your risk analysis.”
Ms Karen Pearson: Yeah.
Lead 2C: Your reference to “this year” doesn’t sound as though that’s – doesn’t carry any urgency with it, that there’s any sense of assistance being needed in respect of what was happening and the calls that were being made by these C3 leads to have these parts of the civil contingencies structure stood up?
Ms Karen Pearson: I agree that I could have been more specific there. What I meant was, at any point this year, and the reference to the year was not just, then, about Covid, it was about the transition from the EU, which would come towards the end of that year. So what I’m suggesting here is a conversation about how we work together.
Lead 2C: All right. And this reads as though you understand that some assistance might be needed?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: And that Mr Stewart, for example, might need some help in being able to carry through with these arrangements; is that correct?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes, correct.
Lead 2C: Were you aware of a sense at this time amongst the C3 leads in these departments that they felt that the civil contingencies arrangements should be on foot, and wanting the head of Civil Service to know that’s what they thought?
Ms Karen Pearson: I became aware of that thinking in the C3 community through this email chain, and that’s why I responded to this particular email chain.
Lead 2C: So what happened to that, then? What happened to the calls from the people who would – who were going to be, as it were, actively involved in this, wanting the arrangements to be put on – enacted?
Ms Karen Pearson: The hub was not immediately stood up in response to this, but it was stood up in – a few days later.
Lead 2C: We know obviously that the civil contingencies arrangements weren’t in fact stood up until 18 March. Can you help us with, or can you explain what the reluctance was, from your perspective, at the start of March 2020, to standing these arrangements up?
Ms Karen Pearson: At this point I’m not part of the Covid team. I think other people have spoken to their thinking on the standing up of the hub, and I would agree that standing up the hub too early can be detrimental to overall effort. The precise date on which the hub could have been stood up, other people have spoken to, but at this point I can see that I’m starting to imagine that we might need to offer some assistance at the point it is stood up. I’m not here suggesting that it should be, I’m getting myself ready for the possibility that we will be asked.
Lead 2C: The work that you did on EU exit and, forgive me if I’m wrong about this, but it had given you expertise in planning, that’s what you were – is that correct?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: That’s effectively what you understood?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: And we will see eventually what you were brought in to help with. I mean, did you have any concerns at this stage that, for example, the Civil Contingencies Group ought to be meeting in order to ensure that the plans were in fact on foot and were going to be effective to deal with the pandemic?
Ms Karen Pearson: At that – on 4 March, no, I didn’t, but I’m absolutely clear that I was starting to think my way into it at that point, because my sense was we would be asked to help.
Lead 2C: Right, well, let’s – maybe if we move on, then, to when you were asked to help, and that might help us understand what had happened before. But – and it may be I can just help you with the dates.
I think you were contacted on a Saturday, on
Ms Karen Pearson: That’s my recollection, yes.
Lead 2C: And that was by Dr McCormick, who was the – I think he was the permanent secretary who was in charge, is that right, of EU exit?
Ms Karen Pearson: That’s correct, he was my immediate line manager.
Lead 2C: And I think he asked you if you would move across to the TEO to be part of the Covid response; is that right?
Ms Karen Pearson: That’s correct.
Lead 2C: And in fact you then moved across on Monday the 17th?
Ms Karen Pearson: Tuesday the 17th maybe.
Lead 2C: Yes, you’re right, I’ve got my dates mixed up, I just
know from your emails that you were certainly in office
on the 17th –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: – and drafting a plan.
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: And we’ll go on to look at it, but what effectively you
did was to try to set out an overarching strategic plan
that would encompass a sort of holistic approach to
responding to the pandemic?
Ms Karen Pearson: That’s a fair summary, yes.
Lead 2C: Can I ask you: when you arrived, then, and took up your
post on 17 March, did you find a suite of plans that had
already been prepared, so a suite of departmental plans, March? 14 and an overarching plan that pulled all of those
together or identified gaps, that kind of material?
Ms Karen Pearson: No.
Lead 2C: We’ve seen a document of the – forgive me, it’s dated,
I think, I will see if someone can remind me, we’ve seen
it in the Inquiry already, it’s quite a high-level plan
that Mr Stewart pulled together, that was a summary of
what the departmental response was going to be. I don’t
know if you’re familiar with that document?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes, I am, yes.
Lead 2C: I take it from your answer you didn’t find, then,
detailed plans that sat beneath that summary setting out in more granular detail what it was that departments were doing to respond at this point –
Ms Karen Pearson: I don’t recall that, no, no.
Lead 2C: So as far as you’re concerned, then, was the plan that you drafted on 17 March, was that essentially the first strategic plan that had been drafted in Northern Ireland that was cross-departmental?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes, but for a specific purpose. I think the document that you showed both Sir David and Chris is a civil contingency style document. What I was brought across to do was to pull together actions into a single space to enable the Executive to monitor and reach early decisions on where they wanted to put their resources and their time and their effort. So I think it had a very specific purpose wouldn’t necessarily be a civil contingencies response plan. This is about drawing together a strategy for the Executive to aid decision-making.
Lead 2C: But it must be intrinsic to that that obviously you know what every department is doing and you know where your areas of risk are?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: But as far as you’re concerned, at 17 March that didn’t exist?
Ms Karen Pearson: Not as far as I’m aware, no.
Lead 2C: The plan that you drafted on 17 March, I mean obviously you rightly say in your witness statement you don’t have any background in public health at all, and I don’t think that you even – that’s what you say in your statement, you didn’t even have access to influenza preparedness plans, or any of that sort of background at all.
Ms Karen Pearson: That’s correct.
Lead 2C: So you were very much looking at it from your perspective as someone who was trained in planning in EU exit?
Ms Karen Pearson: Experienced in planning, yes.
Lead 2C: Yes.
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: Can I ask you, then, given that you didn’t have that background, when you drafted that very initial plan on 17 March, and I know that you went on to draft other documents, but did you have any planning assumptions or anything specific that you could base that plan on, or were you – was it intended to be a much higher level plan than that?
Ms Karen Pearson: Definitely to be a higher level, but what Yellowhammer taught us, I think, was the need for whole-system responses to a big emergency of the Yellowhammer sort. I think that’s applicable. And also the need for departments to work collaboratively together, that’s applicable. So it was very much based on that experience plus the knowledge that planning for a large emergency requires communative(sic) approaches, and having just the list of actions would not be sufficient in a big emergency, you’ve got to be able to understand how each risk and how each action overlays, impacts and hopefully supports each other.
Lead 2C: So if we just perhaps have a look at your – the document you drafted.
And we have this at INQ000208070 and I think if we could go to page 2 of that, please.
Probably just need to make sure you can orientate yourself in this. We can see you sent it on 17 March, and I think that the document is effectively set out in this email.
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: If we could just scan down, please, thank you.
So I think just under your name, Ms Pearson, we can see the way that you set this out. So if we look at “Planning”:
“- All parts of the public sector will refresh and be ready to invoke response plans.
“A joined up approach across the public sector …”
And you refer there to a base case and planning assumptions which reflect the issues likely to arise for Northern Ireland.
When you drafted this, was there a base case and was there a set of planning assumptions that you were working on?
Ms Karen Pearson: This is an outline of where we eventually got to. I wasn’t making assumptions around the base case. I was saying that the plan had to be grounded in the base case, and the base case and the reasonable worst-case scenario would have come from the civil contingencies side, but that the plan had to be in line with whatever that was.
Lady Hallett: What do you mean by base case?
Ms Karen Pearson: So reasonable worst-case scenario is –
Lady Hallett: I know what that is. Are you using those interchangeably?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes, I am. So the base case is what you might see, and the reasonable worst-case scenario takes you up another level.
Ms Dobbin: And, again, the planning assumptions, did those exist or were you saying as part of this plan “We need some planning assumptions”?
Ms Karen Pearson: Probably closer to the latter. This is written on the first day of my post, so I’m taking an approach here that says: the planning assumptions need to be absolutely driving whatever plan we end up with. So here I’m putting down a marker.
Lead 2C: Yes. This isn’t a criticism of you, Ms Pearson, it’s just trying to understand whether or not any of these components actually existed at the time, or whether you had any such documents that you were actually using as a basis for this. But I think, as I understand what you’re saying, you weren’t sitting down with a set of planning assumptions at this point in time, because they didn’t exist?
Ms Karen Pearson: I’m saying I didn’t sit down with a set of planning assumptions. They may well have existed, but I’m writing this on day one, so –
Lead 2C: Yes.
Ms Karen Pearson: – I’m just putting down a marker that the plan needs to be in line with those items. On day one I wouldn’t know if they existed for Covid or not. I would have known more about the EU exit planning assumptions.
Lead 2C: And then just again in terms of, and I think it’s right that you set out six, as it were, headlines that the planning should be based around, so we can see for decision-making, political and administrative, clear and transparent. So again this is all very much at a high level, isn’t it?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes, yes.
Lead 2C: And if we go just further on into this document, you then set out in a bit more detail, don’t you –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: – under each heading, and again I think we see here, if we look at planning and we look at the very last paragraph under – above “Actions”:
“The starting point would be the articulation of the base case and planning assumptions, including the reasonable worst case scenario for Northern Ireland … read across to other planning considerations …”
If we just continue through and under “Decision making”, I think you go on to say – yes, it’s at the top of that page:
“There will need to be a set of clear and strong objectives for the response … starting with health and well-being … this may drive a citizen centric approach to planning and response, taking account of short, medium and long-term and economic [wellbeing] …”
Again you’re talking there, “this may drive a citizen centric approach to planning”. On that day did you see or did there exist any such documentation or material about a citizen centric approach to planning?
Ms Karen Pearson: Not that I was aware of, no.
Lead 2C: Again if we look, I think you set out some actions, that’s at page 6.
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: So we can see just at the very top of that page, collective decision-making would be the default, the Executive or the CG, so again coming back to the contingencies, the Civil Contingencies Group would be the forum, objectives and values would be agreed, arrangements would be stored up and prioritised.
It might be thought that these are all really rudimentary parts of responding to a pandemic, and that someone would have thought about them before you came along and drafted this plan on 17 March. Had they in fact been thought about?
Ms Karen Pearson: Looking at this now, I think I am stating the obvious here, that collective decision-making would be in the Executive and CCG(NI) would be part of the overall response. I don’t think I could say that I was conscious of what thought had been given, but they’re the only things that could have happened.
Lead 2C: You’ve said that you think it’s a statement of the obvious, but – and it might be, but I think nonetheless the issue remains as to whether or not anyone had actually given thought to what the proper structures would be for making decisions and specifically whether or not thought had been given to what the role of the Executive Committee would be within the civil contingencies arena.
Ms Karen Pearson: Within the civil contingencies arena, I think that – I’m not sure what – forgive me. I’m not sure what thought would have to be given to the role of the Executive. It’s so fundamental, and in our doctrine on civil contingencies, CCG(NI) would be where you would go at the right point in time. I don’t think anybody – forgive me, I don’t think anyone would have had to sit down and come up with those answers, because it’s just where you’d have to go.
Lead 2C: I think we will see, I won’t take you to it, and I think maybe it’s a question for ministers, but I think on 19 March at an Executive Committee meeting, ministers did raise the question of what the proper role of the Executive Committee was within decision-making, and therefore it may not necessarily have been that clear. Were you aware of that at the time?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes, I believe I was at that meeting. But I think they were looking for clarity on their role, not whether they would have a role. The only legitimate decision-making body on policy at this magnitude when it’s going across more than one department is the Executive. If they’re asking for assistance on: what does that look like, how do we shape it, how often should we meet, I think they’re natural questions, but the role of the Executive is just so fundamental.
Lead 2C: But what all of the plans say is that the CCG would be the decision – the strategic decision-making body within civil contingencies in Northern Ireland. That’s quite difficult to reconcile with your saying, well, anything that’s cross-cutting would have to be decided with the Executive Committee. So does that not suggest there was a lack of clarity as to how decisions would be made?
Ms Karen Pearson: The role of CCG(NI) is not to be a policymaking forum, it’s the collective response to an emergency, and its role in our new framework, I wouldn’t be able to point you to where it is in the old protocol, but the role of CCG(NI) is very tightly defined in the framework, it’s there to drive the emergency response, it’s not there to supplant the role of ministers in policy decision-making, and it’s perfectly possible, in my view, and this is what happened, to have both running in tandem, and CCG(NI) will take decisions, it does take decisions, it will allocate resources, it will task out certain actions, but it will not supplant the role of the Executive in any way, but it’s got to be there to support that decision-making process. That’s why I’ve mentioned both.
Lead 2C: We know that there was a review carried out of the civil contingencies arrangements, I don’t think you’ve been asked about it, and it’s not in your EP, so I don’t want to ask you questions about something that you’re not familiar with, but you may be aware of it, and it did find that the CCG didn’t operate as intended because it wasn’t a decision-making body and because most decisions did end up being taken by the Executive Committee. I think that’s right, isn’t it?
Ms Karen Pearson: That is correct, and to be fair I think I do touch on it in my statement, so I’m perfectly happy with this. CCG(NI) needs to be understood for what it is, and if the people conducting the review thought that it should have been taking policy decisions then I would have to disagree with the review. You can’t supplant the Executive role.
Lead 2C: Yes. There’s obviously a difference between making policy and giving effect to policy and obviously that might well be the proper role of the Executive Committee, but in an emergency, you’re not likely to be making fine-tuned policy decisions, you’re probably going to be making fairly sharp-edged decisions?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: And I think is it also right, though, that after a time those were in fact the decisions that were being made by the Executive Committee rather than by the CCG?
Ms Karen Pearson: The Executive Committee right from the start was making decisions on policy, restrictions, allocation of resources, CCG was doing something completely different, which is managing the emergency response in realtime, and CCG has to operate in the context of what the Executive and ministers want to do in policy, and the Executive will be cognisant of what CCG is telling it about the nature of the emergency and the response actions that have been tasked out.
So they’re just two very, very different creatures, in my mind.
Lead 2C: Okay. We know that until the middle of March there had been one CCG meeting on 20 February, which was attended by officials, and one CCG meeting that had taken place on 12 March, which was attended by ministers. Were you surprised when you came into your role on 17 March that there had in fact only been one officials’ meeting up until that point?
Ms Karen Pearson: I don’t recall being surprised particularly. When you look back now, I suppose if CCG had stood up a little bit earlier that might have been good, and I think David Sterling has said that, but CCG(NI) is – it’s a huge undertaking, and you should stand it up at the right point, and I think it eventually stood up in full mode on 18 March.
Lead 2C: Yes. Just looking at one that takes officials, so not one – I mean, I don’t think there are any rules about who has to be there, I think you can have one that’s just civil servants, it might just be thought really surprising that in the run-up to a pandemic, when there’s very clear and emerging evidence that its spread to Northern Ireland would be inexorable, that there was only one meeting before the 18th, one meeting of officials before 18 March?
Ms Karen Pearson: One meeting of officials in CCG mode, but officials would have been meeting in other fora, and I think Sir David covered that in terms of Friday meetings of the permanent secretaries group. So I wouldn’t want to assume that it was not discussed anywhere else. I wouldn’t know, but I wouldn’t want to make that assumption.
Lead 2C: But the specific purpose of it was to draw people together in order to consider planning for what was going to happen.
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: So it had a very specific remit and focus?
Ms Karen Pearson: That’s correct.
Lead 2C: Do you think it’s that that might be thought surprising, the need to have that kind of formal structure and consideration, before 18 March, it just doesn’t really seem to have featured or been thought about?
Ms Karen Pearson: But it’s a fact that CCG was only stood up at that point, yes, that’s true.
Lead 2C: Can I go on, then, to the strategy that you drafted, please, and I think – and it may be I don’t need to take you to this, let’s see if we can deal with it without the documents first, but I think when you came at the end of March to drafting, I think, a more considered and –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: – overarching strategy, that it was envisaged that there would be a health response within it, so it would be a truly cross-cutting departmental response that took in the Department of Health, but that didn’t eventuate and the Department of Health effectively didn’t want its response to be encompassed within a cross-departmental strategy; is that right?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes, I think that the genesis of that is the Executive in discussion of the draft asked for that to happen, and I think Minister Swann wrote to say –
Lead 2C: Yes.
Ms Karen Pearson: – that wasn’t going to happen. I think it’s fair to note, though, how much discussion there was of the health response at the Executive, particularly in the early days. So it’s not as if the Executive didn’t know what was happening, but it is true to say it was not encompassed into that plan, that’s correct.
Lead 2C: I’m going to go on to ask you more about the role of the Department of Health. If maybe we can go to your plan.
And we have that at INQ000258405.
I’m sure you’re familiar with this, Ms Pearson, but I think if we just maybe go to page 2, so those are the three strategic priorities; correct?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: Then we have the governance framework at page 3, which is quite familiar, and quite simple, as it were. That’s effectively the flow of information, isn’t it –
Ms Karen Pearson: That’s correct.
Lead 2C: – to the Executive?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: Then we have the planning assumptions as at 28 March. And at this point in time it was thought that the peak would be in May and June 2020, and that’s notwithstanding – it’s obviously the end of March, but that was still – that was the basis upon which the planning was taking place; is that correct?
Ms Karen Pearson: That’s correct, sorry, yes.
Lead 2C: If we look – yes, it’s over the page, please, thank you, at page 6.
“Health and well-being”, and at 1 I just notice that you referred to a 1% fatality rate as well.
Can I check whether or not it was understood at that point that that wasn’t a case fatality rate? Were you familiar with the distinctions at that point in time?
Ms Karen Pearson: No. I’ve included that from Department of Health, I think.
Lead 2C: So that’s what you understood at the time –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: – that that was – and again, that was the basis upon which this plan –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: – was premised.
I think again if we just, and this is just to give the Chair an idea of what this plan looked at, I think if we look at page 9, when it comes to – and this is “Health and well-being of citizens”. Again I take it this is absent, then, any input from the Department of Health?
Ms Karen Pearson: It’s absent of the health plan being part of this, but I don’t think it’s absent of information from health, if I can put it that way.
Lead 2C: I think if we perhaps have a look at page 10, please, and again if we look – for example, I’m just looking at children:
“Ensure children, vulnerable … and the self-isolating have access to food and medicines.”
Making sure arrangements are made for “safety in care and custody”.
Again, if I may just try to get some idea of what this was intended to do, because this is obviously very high level –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: – again.
What was this intended to provide for the Executive Committee or for the Executive Office? What was it going to do?
Ms Karen Pearson: It was going to give them a way of looking across a number of risks and actions collectively rather than leaving specific actions solely to departments. It was to help them then commission certain presentations as we moved through this from other ministers to get into more detail, and it was to give them collective ownership of the actions rather than each minister being left to their own devices on it.
Lead 2C: So was this supposed to provide them with the most important issues that they effectively needed to have insight –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: – whenever they were meeting –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: – as a whole, and not intended to provide them with any granularity, as it were, in terms of what they should do or … if I took, for example, 1.8, or 1.9, for example, the safety of children in care, obviously there’s a huge number of areas of legislation and policy that that would touch upon?
Ms Karen Pearson: That’s correct. That’s correct. I think I said in my statement that the plan was not intended to cover absolutely everything, it would have been vast and unwieldy, and I don’t think it would have assisted the Inquiry, and that was the most important thing in this plan, to let them see and generate a collective effort.
Lead 2C: So where would they get an understanding or how would they be sighted on the much more granular detail, or, if we took the safety of children, for example, the fact that – and obviously we’re in lockdown at this point in time.
Ms Karen Pearson: So that’s the responsibility of individual ministers. I’m sure you’re going to take me on to this, but what we produced for them was a series of presentations that they could call individual ministers in on to get into the detail, but we were not trying to bog the Executive down with all of the actions that were going on, because individual ministers were well capable of delivering within their own departments, but there had to be a collective way of understanding what was happening across the piece.
Lead 2C: Yes, and was the idea that this sort of document would inform, then, each meeting, for example, or were ministers supposed to keep abreast of this, and to continuously review and think about: where have we reached, for example, with child protection or …
Ms Karen Pearson: I would say both. So this document did go to many meetings until we reached the point in time review, it went to many meetings, but it gave the Executive a chance to look at: what do we think the big risks are at the moment? So we provided a heat map – sorry for the jargon – we had a heat map that showed which ones we thought were flashing red, and that enabled them to prioritise the order in which they were asked for specific presentations from individual ministers. But individual ministers were then delivering huge amounts and were still going to the Assembly in various formats and – to update on their departmental work.
Ms Dobbin: I think that might be an appropriate moment to have a morning break.
Lady Hallett: Of course.
Ms Dobbin: Thank you, Ms Pearson.
Lady Hallett: I shall return at 11.30.
(11.12 am)
(A short break)
(11.30 am)
Lady Hallett: Ms Dobbin.
Ms Dobbin: Thank you, my Lady.
Ms Pearson, I just wanted to finish off, if I may, then, on the planning at this critical point in March. What you’ve said in your statement, I don’t need to take you to it, but you said that it would have been preferable if there had been a contingency plan, I think you mean at an earlier stage.
Was there any such plan, whenever you look up your position on 17 March, or are you saying effectively that your plans became the contingency plans?
Ms Karen Pearson: My plan became the response plan, in realtime. I think if there had been a full set of plans they still would have needed a lot of attention at that point, because they would have been planning for flu and not Covid. I think Chris was clear on that yesterday, and I agree with him. I think that’s what we would have had to do, is take any existing plan and then turn it into something more specific for Covid.
Lead 2C: But, I mean, we haven’t seen a developed plan even based on a flu plan in Northern Ireland; I think that’s right, isn’t it?
Ms Karen Pearson: I think that’s correct, yes.
Lead 2C: I’m going to move on, then, to deal with an issue that I think may be quite important, and I just want to spend a bit of time on it, again, maybe to help the Chair understand some of the structural issues, and it’s just going back to the role of the Department of Health, if I may, and to ask you an about specific email exchange to see if it illuminates that point and to see if you can help us with it.
It’s INQ000287536, please, and it’s page 2. We’ve seen part of this email conversation. I think you’ve seen this before, haven’t you, Ms Pearson?
Ms Karen Pearson: I have, yes.
Lead 2C: That’s fine, I just wanted to check. I think we can see, first of all, the email that we took Sir David to whenever he gave evidence, and it’s the one where he sets out, I think, the particular concern on the part of the deputy First Minister effectively – I’m summarising – not feeling in control, not having power or influence over the health minister, and I think that the position of the First Minister was perhaps a little more circumspect but equally that she was frustrated too about, I think, the lack of control over information that was coming out of the Department of Health. And I think we will see that you’re part of this email chain, so you’re obviously very new to this role, but I think it’s right, understanding that there are tensions here between the Department of Health and the ministers; is that correct?
Ms Karen Pearson: That’s how it looks, yes, for certain, yep.
Lead 2C: I’ll come on to what you say about this, but I just wanted to ask you a bit, if I may, about the first response that was sent to this email.
Please may we scroll up, thank you, there is a response from someone called Mr Hugh Widdis, and is he a civil servant as well?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: We can see that what he sets out, and it’s really in the last bit of his email, where he says:
“There would be more radical options but I presume they aren’t palatable … asking Robin to take a different portfolio for the duration (they would have to make a tempting offer) and putting a [Sinn Féin] or [a] DUP minister in.
“Or causing d’Hont to be run again (… by changing the number of departments) … so that they take [the Department of Health]?”
I mean, this is only 26 March, but had things reached a point by then that there was even thought about removing the health minister to take on a different role?
Ms Karen Pearson: I think there’s two parts to that. David Sterling I think described that period of time as being the most difficult in and around the closure of schools, it was an incredibly difficult time. He does then go on to say, I think, when he was in here that things got better, so I think this is very much a snapshot of how difficult things were at that time.
Had it reached the point where any of this was being contemplated? No, I don’t think so. And with respect to Hugh, who I’ve known for a long, long time, I don’t think he was making any firm suggestions, I think he was setting out, if they wanted to take control these are some constitutional options.
Lead 2C: Yes.
Ms Karen Pearson: I don’t think it’s the job of civil servants and nor do I think Hugh personally would be making a suggestion about the removal of a minister.
Lead 2C: Right. If we look above that, we can see that he was also suggesting some other options, effectively, and again I’m summarising, but so that there could be greater control over the Department of Health; correct? So he suggests an overarching Covid strategy that the ministers, the First Minister and the deputy First Minister could lead and own, that the Department of Health would have to abide by and operate within that strategy. An emergency programme for government which is just Covid focused. Calling more decisions into the Executive as significant or controversial, this might slow down decision-making. A proper subcommittee on the public health aspects of Covid with just the First Minister and deputy First Minister perhaps meeting weekly in full Executive meetings where the decisions could be ratified.
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: Again, in terms of what that demonstrates to us, again it would tend to suggest that there was a real sense on behalf of the First Minister and the deputy First Minister that they just didn’t, as it were, have a handle on what the Department of Health were doing in response to the pandemic; is that correct a fair assessment?
Ms Karen Pearson: I think from Sir David’s read-out at the bottom, at that point in time that’s a fair assessment. What Hugh is talking about, I think, is just some Civil Service options for structures and reporting arrangements, but I can see from this that he was trying to tailor that to the concerns that David had set out below.
Lead 2C: Yes, and I think what Sir David, over the page, – sorry, I’ll make sure I’m accurate about this. Mr Widdis is also responding, we’ve already seen this, to the concern that was being expressed by the deputy First Minister that they might be held corporately responsible as well or liable if things were to go wrong, and I think Mr Widdis is also addressing that, isn’t he, at the top of the email?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: I can only imagine that worldwide all parties who happen to be in government fear they’ll be held responsible if they get this wrong:
“No one remembers Chamberlain for anything other than Munich.”
Correct?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: So again I think pointing to a different type of concern then on the part of the deputy First Minister that if things were going to go – if things went wrong effectively it would be they who would be responsible and liable for it; yes?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes. Of course we’re looking at David’s read-out of the conversation, so I think what Hugh says there is a fair reflection of what David has said below. I don’t think I could go further than that because I wasn’t in the discussion.
Lead 2C: All right, but you do reply –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: – and we see your reply, and I wanted to ask you a bit about each of the things that you say about that.
So you said:
“We have some things in place:
“- six priorities.”
Those are the six priorities that you had set out in your original plan of 17 March; correct?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: And:
“- a draft framework for collective … responsibilities.”
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: Was that your 30 March plan or was that a different plan?
Ms Karen Pearson: Can you just remind me of the date –
Lead 2C: It’s 27 March.
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes, it’s – that would be the 30th.
Lead 2C: That’s fine.
Ms Karen Pearson: A single document doing those two different things.
Lead 2C: I thought that, but I just wanted to check.
Then you set out:
“What’s not working?
“- Ministers are just back
“- a new ministerial team
“- a real crisis which they can not control and it is scaring them
“- some [departments] doing things which take them by surprise”
I’ll just stop there, what did you mean by departments doing things that were taking them by surprise?
Ms Karen Pearson: That’s a reference to Department of Health, as it’s all on that same chain, that there might have been another couple of examples but I can’t bring them – I can’t bring them to mind, sorry, but there was concern that they were being bounced in different ways.
Lead 2C: Then:
“- haven’t moved to delivery confidence mode yet”
I’m afraid you might have to help us with what “delivery confidence mode” means.
Ms Karen Pearson: Sorry about that. What that means is that you can have a plan, but you need to know whether it’s working, you need to know what actions are being delivered, and you need to know what overall level of confidence that you’ve got that the situation’s getting at least stabilised or will improve and eventually does improve. So sorry about the jargon, but that’s what I meant.
Lead 2C: And is that, we know from the notes of 18 March of the Executive Committee meeting that there was that sense of them not – that’s – we see reference to them being in response mode, and I think – again, I’m generalising, but a sense perhaps of ministers feeling that they weren’t in command of the response.
Would you, again, agree with that assessment, that that was a general sense on their part?
Ms Karen Pearson: So if I could go back to that difference between response and Executive decision-making.
Lead 2C: Yes.
Ms Karen Pearson: By this point in time, 27 March, I think, the Executive is meeting, and it is discussing plans –
Lead 2C: Yes.
Ms Karen Pearson: – and CCG is operational. What I think they were concerned about was the delivery, stabilisation and improvement.
I think on 23 March Minister O’Neill had given a statement in the Assembly jointly for herself and the First Minister that set out some key principles that they’d set out their objective. But from memory, I think it listed a lot of actions that had been delivered already. And that’s what I mean by delivery confidence, they need to be able to see that things are being done and things – and to have that sort of structured hope: things are going to get better because they’ve got a plan in place.
Lead 2C: Right, so that’s what effectively was felt to be missing at that point, was that in fact there was a response, things were happening in Northern Ireland, but that confidence wasn’t there on the part of the First Minister and the deputy First Minister?
Ms Karen Pearson: Delivery confidence about the actions that they wanted to see, and of course at this point the case numbers are continuing to rise.
Lead 2C: Yes.
Ms Karen Pearson: They will also have been hearing from constituents about the impact of restrictions. So that’s quite a mix of things for them to grapple with when they’re just back and it’s a new team and they’re being taken by surprise. So –
Lead 2C: Yes.
Ms Karen Pearson: – there was kind of a structure to my list in this email of why I thought they might be as worried as David was portraying here.
Lead 2C: I was going to ask you about that, the reference to them being frightened. Was that because of the numbers of people who were becoming infected and –
Ms Karen Pearson: Absolutely.
Lead 2C: – dying at this stage?
Ms Karen Pearson: Absolutely. That was the most important thing for them, that they could do something about that.
Would I now use the word “scaring”? I don’t think I would. But this was at a difficult period in time, but they were – it was their priority. It was their priority.
Lead 2C: Was there a sense of them having been taken – that they were taken by surprise that things had gone quite as badly as they had? And when I say “gone badly”, that in fact that infection rates were as high as they were and that they were being confronted with people losing their lives at this point?
Ms Karen Pearson: No, I don’t think so, I think by the time you get to the declaration of a pandemic and the early discussions, unfortunately, that they had to have about the likely impact of the virus, no, they were not in surprise mode. My reference here is that things were being done that took them by surprise.
Lead 2C: And in terms of the point when they realised or it had crystallised what was likely to happen, when was that? When would you say that happened?
Ms Karen Pearson: I couldn’t pin it to a date. It was an evolving situation even at this point – an evolving situation even at this point in time, but the picture coming out from Department of Health from a very early stage was showing that this was going to be serious, there’s no doubt about that.
Lead 2C: But was that after you’d arrived?
Ms Karen Pearson: No, I don’t – I don’t think – I don’t think so, I think that would have been earlier.
Lead 2C: When you arrived, did you get a sense of panic on the part of ministers or urgency about what was happening?
Ms Karen Pearson: Not panic, but definitely urgency.
Lead 2C: Right.
You’ve also said here:
“- focusing on specific issues, not seeing the overall picture”
What was that a reference to?
Ms Karen Pearson: That’s a reference to – I think it’s almost a repeat of being taken by surprise by things, so they – it was right that they were having to focus on a small number of issues as laid out in the plan, but they were never going to be able to see every point of detail in departments, that’s just not realistic.
Lead 2C: I think we can – I think everyone will understand that when you lead, as it were, when you do have the roles that they do, that being involved in the granularity of what every department is doing is not realistic and might be even damaging, but that’s not what that’s suggesting, that’s suggesting that they just have their own specific points or specific things that they’re interested in potentially.
Ms Karen Pearson: From memory, at the time, the conversations in the Executive were focusing on things like contact tracing, PPE supplies. What they didn’t have, in my view, is the overall health picture, and I know you touched on that yesterday. I think that’s all I can say about it at this point in time.
Lead 2C: All right.
The final thing that you say is they’re:
“- falling back on party ways of doing things”
Which may be the most important point here. Can you tell the Inquiry a bit more about that, please.
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes. So I cover this in detail in my statement. I think, and this is a personal view, it’s impossible to stop being a politician when that’s your job and you’re elected. So you go into an Executive, and you’re bringing your constituency with you, you’re bringing your views and your politics with you. Here even more so than anywhere else.
Having to compromise all the time is almost the structure that’s built into the system, but you can occasionally fall back into very different viewpoints, and I think that’s what Sir David was talking about on the education piece, which was what I think caused this email exchange.
Lead 2C: All right. So that’s the first schism, as it were, that had arisen, that these – that different positions had been taken on schools and that that position had been, I think, by and large, a politically informed one; is that right?
Ms Karen Pearson: It was politically informed, of course, but the health advice was in there as well.
Lead 2C: Yes.
Ms Karen Pearson: They were listening to that, so – but I don’t think we can expect them to entirely leave their party political views at the door. I don’t think we can expect them to leave their departmental views at the door. But beyond this point, I think we were seeing huge efforts at compromise all the time and on an ongoing basis. That’s the only way to get business done.
Lady Hallett: Can I just challenge that? In a time of a national emergency when people are dying, can’t we expect politicians to leave their party politics behind and think of the people who are suffering and dying?
Ms Karen Pearson: Forgive me, my Lady, I’m not suggesting –
Lady Hallett: Or am I being unrealistic?
Ms Karen Pearson: No, I’m not suggesting that what I said there about party political views means that they’re not caring about the people. I think I said earlier that the concern about the virus and the impact on people, the health outcomes, and unfortunately people were going to lose loved ones, that was absolutely top of their priority. What I’m suggesting is they’re going to come at that from angles. But having that fundamental core objective of making this better was there. I have absolutely no doubt about that in my mind.
Ms Dobbin: I’m going to come on to ask you a bit more about that as time went on, but, I mean, to be clear about this, it is right that certainly amongst civil servants, that they regarded the first issue, as it were, that ministers had to decide in Northern Ireland, that being whether to close schools or not after 12 March, that effectively that issue did become sectarianised, so to speak, because one set of politicians, certainly the Sinn Féin politicians, wanted to do as the Republic of Ireland had done, whereas the other politicians, the Unionist politicians, didn’t wish to do that, save that there was also medical advice at play as well; correct?
Ms Karen Pearson: I wouldn’t use – I wouldn’t associate myself with the word “sectarianise”, if you’ll forgive me. I think it was an element of the political views that they were holding, perfectly legitimate political views, that had to be balanced. And I think Sir David was very clear that it was problematic for them at that time, but then things got better. Things got better.
Lead 2C: Because the medical advice at that time was that schools didn’t need to close; correct?
Ms Karen Pearson: Correct.
Lead 2C: But the Republic of Ireland had closed –
Ms Karen Pearson: That’s correct.
Lead 2C: – schools, and some politicians wanted to do as the Republic of Ireland had done. And did you understand whether or not there was at that point in time an understanding of why the Republic of Ireland had decided to take that position, in other words what epidemiological basis there was for it? Was there that kind of consideration?
Ms Karen Pearson: I don’t recall that being the case. I think it was a decision had been taken, so: what do we now do? Two different viewpoints, with medical advice in the mix, but then a decision eventually to close, all in a short period of time.
Lead 2C: Yes.
Ms Karen Pearson: So that is going to create a bit of tension, it’s just going to.
Lead 2C: All right.
You’ve suggested effectively that things got better and that there was a period, I think, of greater cohesiveness. We saw when Sir David gave evidence that he had written an email at the time effectively saying that Northern Irish politicians had been spared having to make the really big decisions because they had effectively been made for them, and that on the occasions then when they were required to make a decision about something, schools and key workers I think were the two things, that they had been found wanting, so to speak. Would you agree with that assessment?
Ms Karen Pearson: The big things being decided for them, I think I cover that in my statement as well, that – things like furlough being in place?
Lead 2C: Yes.
Ms Karen Pearson: So the fact that some decisions that may need to be taken for medical reasons that would have had impacts for people’s livelihoods and the economy, furlough was an amazing cushion for that. As we moved through, though, it still fell to them to decide when to lift certain restrictions, and that’s when I felt things were getting better. Particularly by the time you got the 12 May Pathway out of Restrictions, they had an agreed set of things. And they didn’t always move at the same time as the rest of the UK, they were taking their own decisions, and that’s where I saw really good compromise and working in the Executive.
Lead 2C: All right.
I do then want to come to ask you a bit about that, if I may. So I won’t ask you to – we won’t go to the strategy for lifting restrictions, but I think it’s right that there was a strategy document that set out a sort of stratified approach to lifting restrictions.
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: And I think that overall the idea was that they would be lifted incrementally with a period of time built in to see what the effect was, and that was so that there could be some sort of measurement of what the cumulative effect of lifting restrictions was. Is that correct?
Ms Karen Pearson: That’s correct.
Lead 2C: I think it’s right, I think there are two things, and you do address this in your statement, at paragraph 183, I think it’s correct that, first of all, there were quite early warnings about the risk of a second wave, that the CMO was effectively making that clear; is that right?
Ms Karen Pearson: That’s correct.
Lead 2C: And, please, if this is incorrect or too simplistic, but that once restrictions started to be lifted in effect that there was a real risk that there would be a second wave?
Ms Karen Pearson: It would depend – I think that there’s several elements to that. It’s not just the lifting of the restrictions but it’s then about how people react to that, the behaviours, the social interactions, because you can still have guidance and you can still have campaigns around what you want people to do. So I think it’s a little bit more complex than just the restrictions. But the lifting of restrictions is also a signal that we’re able to lift restrictions because we’re in a situation that is, I’m not going to say improving because it was still in community transmission and we’re still getting, unfortunately, deaths, but it does – it does send a signal. And the reality is we can’t keep people in restrictions and lockdown forever, it’s just not possible.
Lead 2C: Yes. All right. So I think what in fact happened was that infection rates started to go up quite quickly?
Ms Karen Pearson: With the first lifting of restrictions to infection rates going up, I actually think there was a period in between things – the case numbers were very, very low.
Lead 2C: I think it’s probably right in June – in June, I think, that there was probably – I think we can see a number of points at which levels had gotten very low.
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: But I think it’s right, but we can go to the documents if we need to, that certainly transmission rates amongst young people started to go up –
Ms Karen Pearson: That’s right.
Lead 2C: – during the summer of 2020. And I think that it’s right that probably by August again the position – the rates were continuing to rise.
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: Does that accord with your memory? And then by the time we get to September – and I know you do deal with this in your statement – that in fact the position was reached whereby local restrictions had to be brought in?
Ms Karen Pearson: That’s correct.
Lead 2C: Correct?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yep.
Lead 2C: And those local restrictions were brought in across a number of very specific areas?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: And as it transpired, that wasn’t effective for arresting the rates of transmission; is that right?
Ms Karen Pearson: That’s correct.
Lead 2C: Do you agree that it is around this point in time that one begins to see greater tensions then in the Executive Committee about how to manage this acceleration in the rate?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes, that may well have been the start of it, but it wasn’t the height of it. The tensions were starting to come in. By “tensions” I mean different views on the best way to deal with things, but the strategic objective was never really subject of tension, and – I say in my statement – and it was never as stark as: it’s all about health or it’s all about the economy. The debate and the compromise had to be about how you bring all those things together in a decision-making space and reach a good outcome. But there was increased debate, I would describe it as, rather than tension, at that time on what’s the best thing to do.
Lead 2C: Yes, so the – and I don’t wish in any way to be too simplistic about it, but I think there were also splits between those who thought – who agreed that there should be greater restrictions around this point in time and those who were worried about the other costs of those restrictions in terms of other health costs, cost to the economy.
I wondered if we could just go to a document in terms of where the position did reach.
I’m just going to check which is – yes. It’s INQ000306179. I think if we could go to page 5, please. This is an email from you, I think, sent very early in the morning, setting out where the position had reached. I think that you set out, we can see the reference to Northern Ireland being days away from being overwhelmed, significant implications for the economy. Thank you.
Yes, sorry, I’d missed it, it’s in the first paragraph, so there were rates of around a thousand cases a day which obviously for Northern Ireland was really –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yeah.
Lead 2C: – really alarming –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: – at that stage.
Then you set out, just going further down, the email that contingency arrangements were now essential, that’s just at the bottom of the first page, that you were putting together a framework for decision-making, and then the choices that need to be made, and I think closing education was obviously one of the most significant ones.
Then setting out the list of issues that were of most concern.
But I think it’s right, Ms Pearson, that once again at this stage the concerns were the twofold ones of the transmission rates going up at a really alarming rate and also the Northern Ireland health service was within a short distance of being overwhelmed as well?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: Again can you, I mean, your email obviously conveys the concern and the urgency about that. Was that something that you felt at the time that this was – that this was critical?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes, and I can’t pinpoint it in my head at the moment, but I don’t think I would have sent an email of that sort to senior colleagues without having spoken to Michael and Ian. I would have got my sense of the urgency about this from them. I think this was a Saturday and we did indeed meet the next day.
Lead 2C: I think in fact we might just see that in fact you’re right and I think the Chief Scientific Adviser in fact replies, if we just go up the email. Yes, he says:
“The position’s worsening rapidly.”
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: And they’re working on getting additional data.
I think in fact then if we go to page 1, we see the counterview being expressed. Yes, so that’s Mr Brennan, who I think, was he from the department of economy?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes, he was the permanent secretary at the department of economy at the time.
Lead 2C: Then he sets out, we can see this at his second paragraph, that he appreciates “the rush to impose greater controls” and then puts it in terms of:
“Is it to protect the NHS through the winter period, minimise Covid deaths? If so what is the cost per death when assessed against the wider social, economic and non-Covid deaths …”
Is that right?
Ms Karen Pearson: That’s what it says, yes.
Lead 2C: So that effectively might be thought to illuminate the issues that arose at this particular point?
Ms Karen Pearson: I think Mike was being realistic about the debate that would be had in the Executive. I think if you look at this again, this is some time on, but what’s the rationale? I don’t think that’s querying the need for action, because he starts with “I can appreciate the …”
That can be read as an invitation to be very clear about why we are having to be in this space, because this is going to be a difficult Executive meeting.
Lead 2C: Yes, and it’s going to be difficult because there were ministers who were already wedded or committed, perhaps, to the view that the costs needed to be analysed very, very clearly about having a lockdown at this – or having any significant restrictions at this point in time?
Ms Karen Pearson: I agree. I think that’s right. I think this is a very realistic read-out from Mike. It’s a heads-up of what what’s going to come. But I don’t think anyone was ever just: it has to be about the economy and nothing else. It’s always a question of balance by this point in the autumn.
Lead 2C: If we just look at another document that helps put all of this in context, and this is INQ000286275. This is a meeting, well, it’s a call, rather, that also took place on 11 October. If we could just go to the next page, please, but again I think we can see certainly from the Ministry of Health, the concerns that were now being, or the alarm bells that were being sounded.
I think we find here the concern that Northern Ireland was ten days away from the health service being overwhelmed?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: I think in fact at around this time – you may remember this, I don’t think I need to take you to it, but in fact the rates in certain parts of Northern Ireland were also referred to at COBR –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: – because they were amongst the highest in the United Kingdom?
Ms Karen Pearson: That’s correct, particularly in certain geographical areas, that’s right.
Lead 2C: May I just ask you a question also about this. Obviously Northern Ireland, it’s not like the rest of the – it’s not like England whereby capacity is shared across a large geographical area and many hospitals, so that if, you know, there are pressures in one area they might be relieved in another.
In Northern Ireland, those concerns about the health service being overwhelmed, are they more pressing because there’s less ability to share that pressure? I hope that makes sense, but that –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yeah, it does make sense. I don’t feel able to answer that.
Lead 2C: Okay.
Ms Karen Pearson: I think that would be for the CMO. Sorry.
Lead 2C: Don’t worry. But I think again we capture in this, obviously again there is a sense, a real sense of urgency almost coming off the page in respect of this?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes, that is correct, and as well as the case numbers we’d also had the SAGE – the SAGE –
Lead 2C: Yes, on 21 September?
Ms Karen Pearson: Page 58, I think. So that’s – I recall this meeting, this is the next day after the previous document that you just put up, this is a Sunday afternoon, and the Chief Medical Officer is very clear on his advice.
Lead 2C: Yes, because he’s also saying it’s not just days away from the health service being overwhelmed but also very significant numbers of deaths as well?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: I think it’s right, then, and you deal with this in your statement, that what was being suggested at this point in time and the recommendation that was eventually made by the CMO was that there be a six-month – not six months, a six-week period of more intensive restrictions; correct?
Ms Karen Pearson: That’s correct.
Lead 2C: What you’ve said in your statement was that the prospect of that became a very difficult one –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: – for the Executive Committee?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: Again can you just explain a bit more about why that was so difficult, notwithstanding the apparent issues that were at stake?
Ms Karen Pearson: So I think SAGE and I think the CMO were suggesting something in the region of a circuit-breaker, I think that was the language used at the time, rather than a lockdown. So that would have meant a significant reintroduction of a good number of restrictions for – the recommendation was six weeks.
I think why they felt – this is a personal view, why I think they found that difficult at that time was because they’d now got the lived experience of the impact of restrictions on people, families, on education and the economy, each minister would have seen it in their own sectors, they’ll have heard it from their constituents, so they had to go through a process of balancing that, but it did start to ramp up the tensions on quite what the right answer was at that point, yes, that’s correct.
Lead 2C: And again is it too simplistic to say that in fact those tensions did separate along political lines at that point?
Ms Karen Pearson: To a large degree, yes. Yes. They’re all individuals as well, but yes, I think that – I have to agree with that, yeah.
Lead 2C: I’m accepting, and I need to make this clear, that obviously Minister Swann was the person who wanted and who was proposing the restrictions.
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: So I don’t want to be too simplistic –
Ms Karen Pearson: That’s why I was hesitating slightly.
Lead 2C: Yes, and I think you’re quite right to. But I think it’s fair and it’s recorded in the minutes, but effectively there was a – and again I really don’t – I don’t want to be simplistic about this, and you must correct me if it’s wrong, but effectively it became a divide between Unionists on one side who were advancing concerns, and again I don’t want to put it simplistically because it’s not just about the economy, it’s also about the broader health costs of closing down society, and on the other side the Nationalist politicians had taken a different agenda, and I’m conscious as well that in the mix there was a politician who wasn’t aligned to either, so again I don’t want to be too simplistic, but I think in broad terms that’s the way the division went.
Ms Karen Pearson: The way I would describe it is there’s five parties in The coalition and each party I think had a different view, I wouldn’t go quite as Unionist/Nationalist, because you’ve got two Unionist parties, two Nationalist parties and then you’ve got the Alliance Party, so they were bringing their views to that, yes.
Lead 2C: Yes, but I think the idea that I think people will come at this as individuals and have a diverse range of opinions, that wasn’t right, they effectively separated into two positions?
Ms Karen Pearson: The two positions were – and it wasn’t about let’s do nothing, it was about what’s the right thing to do, but yes, I do agree with the way you’ve described it, yes.
Lead 2C: I think we also see at this point in time another theme that emerges, which is scepticism, and again it’s only on the part of some ministers, about the science and about the modelling.
Ms Karen Pearson: I think I would describe it as an ongoing process of robust challenge, whether some ministers sitting in the Executive simply didn’t believe it, I don’t think we ever got to that point, but CMO and CSA were constantly there to be challenged and they were well up for it, as was Minister Swann. But, yes, I do agree we were starting to see more and more “show me, tell me, prove it” sort of thing.
Lead 2C: Yes.
Ms Karen Pearson: But I don’t think anyone ever went so far as to say: I simply don’t believe that.
Lead 2C: Yes. I think it’s just a fact, I’m not –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yeah.
Lead 2C: – suggesting that there’s anything wrong with challenge, but I think it’s just something that becomes more obvious at this point in time, that there’s more questioning –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: – of whether or not the science is correct.
Ms Karen Pearson: That’s correct.
Lead 2C: And whether or not the modelling it correct as well; is that right?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: The recommendation that there be a six-week period was rejected –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: – is that right?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: And again that wasn’t an agreed position, but it was ultimately decided that there would be a four-week period –
Ms Karen Pearson: That’s correct.
Lead 2C: – of restrictions?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yeah.
Lead 2C: And I think we then get to the point where the decision had to be made whether or not to extend the restrictions for two weeks. What you’ve said in your statement was you, when this four-week period was imposed, couldn’t see why it would be lifted in effect unless something changed in the interim; is that right?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yeah, I think restrictions of that sort need an exit strategy, and the best way to exit is because the situation has improved.
Lead 2C: Yes.
Ms Karen Pearson: And I think the tests in the Public Health Act around necessary and proportionate as well are also important, that if you can lift restrictions you’re almost duty bound to do that, so something has to change. The four-week period was not what they were asking for at the time, but that’s what they got.
Lead 2C: So they got the four-week period, it got to the end of the four weeks and the scientific advice and the position of Minister Swann was that there needed to be a further two weeks –
Ms Karen Pearson: Correct.
Lead 2C: – so we were saying at the end of the four weeks “we were right to think it would require six weeks and now we need the extra two weeks”?
Ms Karen Pearson: I think that’s a fair summary, yeah.
Lead 2C: And we know that this then led to, I think it’s one meeting that goes on for four, across – I think it’s four days, and were you at that meeting?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: We know that ultimately that meeting went to a cross-community vote in order to decide whether or not there should be this further two-week restrictions. Can you tell us, then, something about the tone of the meeting?
Ms Karen Pearson: It – I think going into it, it was going to be difficult, right from the outset. The tone was difficult, really for the whole period, but there were people round the table who were – I’m just – I’ll call it out, it is Minister Long, she’s trying to suggest compromises, she’s suggesting adjournments so that they can just go back and get back to that point of trying to reach a compromise. And various ideas were coming forward at the meeting. Officials behind the scenes were thinking: what do we do, what advice can we put in? But yes it was incredibly difficult.
Lead 2C: And the use of a cross-community vote, I don’t think we’ve yet had an explanation as to what that is, but I think – and again I may get this wrong and you must tell me if I do, but effectively it’s part of – it’s a constitutional protection that exists as part of the overall arrangements, and I think it’s right that three ministers can ask –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: – for it?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: And it effectively acts as a veto on a decision and it’s intended to operate for the benefit of minorities in Northern Ireland; is that correct?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes, that is correct.
Lead 2C: And was it ever intended that it should be used in this sort of arena, in a public health arena?
Ms Karen Pearson: I doubt if it was envisaged that that’s what, how it would be used, when it was designed. But as a civil servant I’ve got to be very careful at this point.
Lead 2C: Yes.
Ms Karen Pearson: Forgive me. I think it’s fair to ask: was the correct procedure followed? I can’t get into: was this a good use of a cross-community vote? Because that’s a political decision, I cannot speak on that, criticise that in any way. I’m sorry, I am just putting that out there.
Lead 2C: Well, let me put it to you this way: the measures that were being proposed were health measures?
Ms Karen Pearson: Correct.
Lead 2C: And they were health measures that were being proposed in respect of the entire community in Northern Ireland –
Ms Karen Pearson: Correct.
Lead 2C: – regardless of their background?
Ms Karen Pearson: Correct.
Lead 2C: And they were being proposed by a Unionist minister?
Ms Karen Pearson: Also correct.
Lead 2C: And the vote was being invoked by other Unionist politicians –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: – in order to defeat the measure that was being proposed by another Unionist; yes?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: It’s quite hard to understand where the protection of minority interests comes into it within that context; do you agree?
Ms Karen Pearson: I think you’d have to put that to the people proposing the vote, if I may. Sorry, my Lady.
Lady Hallett: I think we’ll leave it there. I think I understand Ms Pearson’s position, Ms Dobbin. You’re still a serving civil servant, I think?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes. Yes.
Ms Dobbin: Thank you, Ms Pearson.
Anyway, but I think it’s – and I know that the Chair has heard about this and also has heard about this from Sir David, and we can see this in the evidence I think from some of the ministers – but it’s also right, I think, that there was leaking and tweeting of what was going on at this meeting whilst it was happening as well?
Ms Karen Pearson: That’s correct.
Lead 2C: So notwithstanding it was hugely sensitive, on any view, and difficult, it was being broadcast to people outside the Executive?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes, and not – that wasn’t the first occasion.
Lead 2C: Yes.
Ms Karen Pearson: Yep.
Lead 2C: I think, in fact, the evidence has been that it’s almost a constant feature of Executive Committee meetings that there was leaking around them?
Ms Karen Pearson: Regular rather than constant.
Lead 2C: Yes. And I think to be clear about it, it’s not just the leaking of when a meeting would take place, I think we see evidence of leaking of what was actually going on in the meetings whilst they were taking place?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: Again, I think it’s understood that you’re a serving civil servant, but, just by way of a general observation, it must be very damaging to decision-making if the people round the table can’t be assured that they can speak candidly and openly without fearing that it’s going to be provided to journalists at much the same time as they’re saying it?
Ms Karen Pearson: That has to be right, yes.
Lead 2C: I think you’ve set out in your statement some of the other challenges, if I may put it in that way, that were posed to the Executive Committee in its decision-making. You’ve also – and this is at paragraph 237 of your statement – said that, in addition to leaking, there was also public briefing and commentary, contrary to collective decision-making, and I think we’ll see some examples of this when ministers give evidence, but just again I think, generally speaking, that was also correct, wasn’t it, that certain ministers at points did come out in public and make statements that were contrary to the positions that had been agreed?
Ms Karen Pearson: They came out and aired the views that they’d expressed in discussion. And I’m not going to say every single one of them did it –
Lead 2C: No.
Ms Karen Pearson: – but it wasn’t just one or two.
Lead 2C: And I think the other point that you make, which is a point made by other witnesses as well, is that those ministers who weren’t from the main parties, and this would apply particularly to Ministers Long and Mallon –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: – and I think unclear as regards Minister Swann, but certainly as regards the two of them, that they would often receive papers very late in the day or be less involved, I think, perhaps, in the decision-making?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yeah, I think Sir David dealt with that as well, and …
They found it difficult to arrive at a meeting with late papers, and Minister Long in particular would regularly ask for that to be recorded in the minutes, and sometimes she would ask for a short adjournment just so she could properly read herself in.
I actually noticed when you put up a document for Jenny Pyper yesterday – it was a note of, I think, her first meeting with FM and dFM, in December 2020 – there’s a reference in that to – it was either Minister Long or DoJ, “late papers”, something like that.
Lead 2C: Yes.
Ms Karen Pearson: And that was them recognising – it wasn’t DoJ submitting late papers, that was them recognising that Minister Long had a concern about that. As did Minister Mallon.
Lead 2C: Again, I think it was a question perhaps the Chair had asked, whether or not the late provision of paper was also because of fears about leaking as well, so that they were given out as late as they possibly could be; is that –
Ms Karen Pearson: I think possibly, up to a point, but late papers were a feature, my Lady, of the speed at which we were also working. I was guilty of sending in late papers to my ministers for their consideration, so I understand the dynamic around that, if you’re dealing with something at pace. But it was of particular concern to Minister Long and Minister Mallon, because they would not have been part of the process that got to the point of issuing the papers for collective consideration.
Lead 2C: All right.
I want to move on to ask you about two topics, because I’m conscious that there are topics we haven’t had a chance to ask other people about and it might be that you might well be the person who had some involvement with it.
I think the first one is the question of enforcement –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: – and specifically the use of PSNI in order to enforce the Covid regulations. And I think if I can do this without going to the documents –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yeah.
Lead 2C: – but if I do, I will. There are certainly references, particularly in the autumn of 2020, of perhaps concerns about whether or not police were enforcing the regulations as robustly as they could have been.
I know that there’s another side to that, but I just wanted to ask you, first of all, if that’s correct, if you were conscious of concerns that the regulations weren’t being –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: – enforced by the police –
Ms Karen Pearson: Very much so, that’s correct.
Lead 2C: Was that – was there actually a basis for thinking that that was correct, that the police were not being as involved or as proactive in enforcement as they might have been?
Ms Karen Pearson: I think it depends on your starting point, really. If you think – if your starting point is that enforcement has a massive role to play here and it’s doable and it will have an impact, but that … I come from a justice background, so maybe I’m bringing a personal view to this. The phrase that we were hearing at the time, and I’m sorry, this might sound a bit callous, but “you cannot arrest your way out of a pandemic”. You can’t. So that’s a phrase that was out and about there.
The police had a very, very clear strategy, they called it the four Es, and they would only go to enforcement when they felt that the other three Es had been exhausted and weren’t working.
Lead 2C: Now, I can remember one E is explain, I may be in difficulties in remembering what the other Es are. Can you remember?
Ms Karen Pearson: I might be in difficulty as well. Explain, encourage, there’s another one, and then enforce.
Lead 2C: But I think the idea of that strategy was there would be a number of steps before you would go to the ultimate step of actually enforcing –
Ms Karen Pearson: Correct.
Lead 2C: – for example arresting someone or issuing a fine –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: – is that right?
The specific concern that seemed to exist in autumn 2020 was that there was actually quite a lot of social activity going on. There’s lots and lots of references to house parties taking place.
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes, yes.
Lead 2C: And also to the concern that bars, I think in particular, were not abiding by the regulations. So again, just to be clear about that, was there also a concern, then, that there were very specific circumstances or – that the police could have been pressing enforcement and a question mark over whether or not that in fact was happening in the autumn?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes, I think that’s right. House parties – some bars, to be fair.
Lead 2C: I don’t want to say it’s every bar.
Ms Karen Pearson: I think the hospitality sector representatives went to great lengths to try and make sure they were living within the regulations, but you will always have somebody that’s going to go and do something contrary to what you want them to do.
I think that where you’ve got a big social gathering, where you’ve got a business premises that’s not complying with the law, that’s where I would understand the concerns about enforcement, because enforcement has to be effective, and, here, policing with the community has been so hard won that the police have to be in charge of their policing strategy because they know best what’s going to work there.
But yes, there were concerns about some premises and I believe some action was taken in and around that.
But if your starting point is that heavy enforcement is going to get us through this, I could not agree with that at all.
Lead 2C: I think maybe the point that the Chair may be interested in though is maybe just the differences in Northern Ireland and the point that you make about community support being very hard won. And I suppose the very specific question is, then, whether or not that did – whether that did impact the willingness of the police to enforce, or whether or not there was a different approach taken in Northern Ireland because there was the concern that that support might be compromised?
Ms Karen Pearson: I think it would have been a factor. And I’m sure ACC Todd will help you.
Lead 2C: Yes.
Ms Karen Pearson: I think that would have been a factor, but they had a clear strategy, and enforcement is a heavy thing to do, and where they felt that the other three Es could work and would work, then they needed to be left to devise their strategy on that. That’s – that’s just operational policing. And there has to be a line between what people might think is right and stepping over that boundary into the operational decision-making space, which would be fundamentally a wrong thing to do. It’s absolutely fine to express concerns, have the dialogue, and the junior ministers would be sitting with ACC Todd and talking about it, with Robin Swann present, all views expressed, but ultimately enforcement decisions can only sit with the police.
Lead 2C: I think we understand that, but, just coming back to the view within the TEO, I think it – and again, if this isn’t correct – but there certainly was the concern on the part of ministers, particularly in the autumn, and I think on the part of, perhaps, the CMO as well –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: – that there needed to be more robust enforcement?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: That there was actually a requirement for it?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: Have I – I don’t want to get that wrong.
Ms Karen Pearson: There were some views to the extent that the – an enforcement group was set up so that that discussion could be had, yeah.
Lead 2C: Yes, I was going to ask about that. Is that in fact the correct position, that the enforcement group was set up because of concerns –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: – that policing wasn’t as robust as it –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: – might have been?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes. And it wasn’t the only available enforcement route, local councils, environmental health officers, there were other ways to do enforcement as well. And I think the enforcement group really had to look across those and not look solely to the police.
Lead 2C: The final topic that I want to –
Lady Hallett: Just before you move on, just to assure Mr Phillips from the National Police Chiefs’ Council that I do listen, I think it’s engage, explain, encourage, enforce.
Ms Dobbin: Good. I’m sure that won’t be forgotten.
Lady Hallett: Because I’ve heard it in other modules, I’m not showing off.
Ms Dobbin: I’m less familiar with it.
The last topic is obviously an incredibly important one that you’ve dealt with in your statement, and it’s the question about the identification of equality considerations –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: – within civil contingencies.
Perhaps broader than that, if I may, because it doesn’t necessarily fit within a strict equalities framework, but the identification of those people in society for whom either the pandemic might have a disproportionate impact or the effect of restrictions might have a disproportionate impact. And I think that you’ve said in your statement, and this is at paragraph 340 if you need it, that you didn’t think that adequate consideration had been given to equality considerations during the response, and that ultimately that was a question of time pressures more than anything else.
You do – and I will take you to this in a moment, you do refer to the fact that there was some consultation with groups including, for example, Disability Action in Northern Ireland, but can I please ask you about your overarching observation that there wasn’t significant consideration.
Ms Karen Pearson: I just think that’s factually correct, but I would associate myself with what Jenny Pyper said about it yesterday: we could have done more, we should have done more, should have found a way to make time. And I really liked her idea yesterday that having an inequalities workstream within the ECT might be a model should we ever have to go there again.
I think we’re trying to do more in the civil contingencies space and I would love to have the opportunity of talking to some equality groups in Northern Ireland about that, after the Inquiry of course. But yes, that’s all I can say. I’m not going to try and explain it away.
Lead 2C: Could I ask you, though, what you judge now, at this distance, were in fact the equality considerations which ought to have been given much more focus at the time?
Ms Karen Pearson: Twofold. Vulnerable people as a – I don’t know what to say, not a group, because it’s so –
Lead 2C: Yes.
Ms Karen Pearson: – vast. Vulnerable people and then section 75 categories.
Lead 2C: In terms of just – I mean, vulnerability covers obviously a –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lead 2C: – huge range of people in society. I mean, that encompasses poverty, child protection, elderly people. That’s almost every possible group of people. So do you accept, then, that really as regards almost all of those groups of people in society to whom extra consideration needed to be given as part of the planning, that effectively Northern Ireland fell short at all stages?
Ms Karen Pearson: It fell short. I wouldn’t want to suggest that absolutely nothing was done and there was no consideration, but I think what Jenny was saying yesterday is you can’t point to a structure for it in the way we dealt with the pandemic. Each department I think would have been taking the steps that fell to them, but I just completely agree with Jenny that a workstream within the taskforce would have been the way to go.
We’re doing some steps at the moment in how we’re developing our civil contingencies risk register, that does almost force a consideration of vulnerability in section 75, so I think we can make some improvements for the future, but that’s the sort of thing I would like to talk to the equality groups around: how does that work? Does that capture your concerns? Is this going to make it better?
So we have to be open to that criticism.
Lead 2C: Sorry, I didn’t mean to cut across you.
Ms Karen Pearson: No, no.
Lead 2C: If we were to take a really obvious group, and again I’m conscious of using the term “disability” as though that’s – that, again, covers a huge array of people in different circumstances, but, again, given how obvious it was that there would be people within the Northern Irish community who were disabled and who would be profoundly affected by lockdowns, that doesn’t take much imagination or forethought, and nor does it necessarily – well, you’re a planner, so again you may disagree, but it mightn’t be thought that it takes that much to think about what the vulnerabilities are, and what could be done to help people who might be imprisoned in their homes, I think is a term that’s been used, because of disability, or who can’t access services?
Ms Karen Pearson: I can only agree. I think that the best thing to do is to accept that we could have done more and to make sure if we have to do this ever again that we will do more.
I think that there would have been considerations about various aspects – if we stick on disability, there would have been considerations of various aspects, but what we didn’t have was an ongoing dialogue with representatives of the sector to say: what’s happening? Tell us what’s happening out there, give us some advice. It would have been aspects of disability, aspects of different groups, and I think that’s where we can make massive improvements.
Lead 2C: If we come full circle, it is, though – it’s a failure of planning, isn’t it, that in the lead-up, in the months leading up to March, when it was known that there would be a pandemic, that that time wasn’t used to think about the impact that there would almost inevitably be on a number of different vulnerable people in society?
Ms Karen Pearson: It should have been done.
Lady Hallett: Just before we have any questions from Ms Campbell, it’s not quite the same point as equality considerations, but were you present at meetings when closure of schools was discussed by the politicians?
Ms Karen Pearson: I don’t think I was, my Lady, I don’t think I was.
Lady Hallett: So would you know what considerations were taken into account? I mean, I’ve heard a number of evidence around the United Kingdom – a number of pieces of evidence about closure of schools, and although politicians seem to have taken into account obviously the fact that children wouldn’t get their formal education, and that it might cause problems for key workers who would have children at school, I don’t seem to have heard a lot about politicians talking about the lack of social development. Do you know if that was a factor in the decision to close schools?
Ms Karen Pearson: I wouldn’t know, but I think it was discussed at the Executive after, I think so, I’d have to double check.
Lady Hallett: So, what, after the first closure of schools?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lady Hallett: In other words, when the first closure takes place, all anyone is thinking about is just stop transmission.
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Lady Hallett: And it’s only afterwards that people start thinking, “Oh, this could have an even greater impact on people than we thought”?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes. It’s just a recollection, but I think social development was discussed, and I would be fairly confident that the Chief Medical Officer raised it on at least one occasion, I think –
Lady Hallett: Thank you. You may be the wrong person to ask, I’m sorry, it’s just one of the things I wanted to explore with someone.
Ms Campbell.
Questions From Ms Campbell KC
Ms Campbell: Thank you, my Lady.
Ms Pearson, my name is Brenda Campbell and I ask questions on behalf of the Northern Irish Covid Bereaved.
I want to revisit, if we may, the email exchange between yourself, Sir David and Hugh Widdis.
It’s at INQ000287536.
Now, you’ve already been asked a great deal of questions about this, and I’m grateful both to Ms Dobbin and to yourself for dealing with it comprehensively, but if I might approach it from a slightly different angle.
Could we go to page 3 – sorry, yes, page 2, in fact, where we see the beginning of the email from Sir David.
Just to put this in context, we can see that it’s sent on Thursday 26 March at one minute past 9 at night.
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Ms Campbell KC: Now, the issue that Sir David raises, having been expressed both by the First Minister and deputy First Minister, albeit in slightly more nuanced or different terms, is really the issue of how we get Executive level collective decision-making in relation to the pandemic.
Thinking back to the work that you did on 17 March, we know it was St Patrick’s Day, it was a Bank Holiday and you had just been, if you like, co-opted over the course of that weekend, and here you are on a Tuesday writing your draft plan, and one of the things that you include in your draft plan – and you discussed it this morning with Ms Dobbin and I won’t put it back up unless you need me to – is that the issue of Cabinet collective decision-making was so fundamental it was stating the obvious, and those were really your words to the Chair in evidence this morning.
I see you nodding, but I think you agree that that issue was so obvious and fundamental to you at that stage?
Ms Karen Pearson: The need for political decision-making and compromise, yes, if what’s that you mean, yes.
Ms Campbell KC: Exactly, but also the need for political decision-making and compromise really at the Executive level, including the First Minister and the deputy First Minister, as joint leaders.
Ms Karen Pearson: Correct.
Ms Campbell KC: Yes. That’s really why you included it in your draft plan on the 17th, and why it went in that form almost entirely unaltered, if not entirely unaltered, to the board two days later?
Ms Karen Pearson: Correct.
Ms Campbell KC: Now, here we are a week on from that having been presented, and in fact your email comes on the 27th, so ten days on from you drafting your plan on 17 March, and Sir David is saying “the First Minister and the deputy First Minister have raised this with me as a problem”.
And if we look at the bottom of – where he signs off, he’s struggling to answer the simple question: how can we get control of this, at an Executive level? And he proposes it from his perspective, he’s going to have a sleep on it.
Do you see that?
Ms Karen Pearson: I do.
Ms Campbell KC: Now, if we then go to your reply, which is on page 1, and you point out the things that are in place, stemming from the work that you started on 17 March. And “What’s not working?”, we’ve got the first two: a fresh and, to some level, inexperienced ministerial team, because of the Assembly being just back.
But then what we have is this crisis that’s out of control and, you say, “scaring them”, and we know that you wouldn’t necessarily use that word now, departments are doing things that are taking them by surprise, they haven’t moved into confidence mode, they’re not seeing the big picture.
Would it be fair to say that in part a contribution to these things that are not working was a failure to think considerably further in advance, of how collective decision-making was going to work? As you say, it’s so fundamental that it’s stating the obvious?
Ms Karen Pearson: I think that I can only say that this is arising from the issue around education, and that David said, and I would agree, that things got significantly better after this. So that’s the context for why I wrote that.
Collective decision-making is a feature of the Executive, so I don’t think any pre-planning around that – I’m not really sure what could have been done around how the Executive works. Sorry, is that what you’re asking me?
Ms Campbell KC: It is, yes. And putting aside the issue of education, and obviously accepting that it was a contributing factor at this point, we’re here on 27 March –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Ms Campbell KC: – and we’re in lockdown –
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Ms Campbell KC: – and that lockdown in fact hadn’t been announced when
you were writing your draft ten days before, but here
you are at a point of lockdown, in the eye of the storm,
trying to figure out a way, with Mr Widdis’ suggestions,
radical and perhaps less so, about how you get – how
you meet the concerns of our joint leaders as to how
they’re going to contribute to the pandemic response.
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes.
Ms Campbell KC: And would you accept that trying to find a solution –
as you say, whatever solutions you come up with, trying
to find a solution at that time, at that moment of
crisis, was always going to be more difficult than
finding a solution in advance and before the crisis hit?
Ms Karen Pearson: So I think my email here, if I may, is doing two things.
I’m referring to the fact that we’ve already got some
steps in place with the priorities in the framework –
Ms Campbell KC: Yes.
Ms Karen Pearson: – to help them coalesce around an agreed series of
things. The “What’s not working?” section is trying to
diagnose why that particular issue had been so
problematic –
Ms Campbell KC: Yes.
Ms Karen Pearson: – context-specific, and whatever solutions we offer need to address these things, so what else can we do to help them coalesce. But I come back to the fact that we’ve got a framework in front of them, that’s the main cohesive point, and “What’s not working?” in this note is around the specific issues that led to the – led to the issues around education.
But David’s also recognising here that they’ve got a concern about information coming from health. That’s easily fixed, if they want to get into that space, by specific requests to the health minister.
So I’m not sure that you can pre-plan for Executive decision-making because it is what it is.
Ms Campbell KC: Well, to some extent your draft document was doing just that, wasn’t it?
Ms Karen Pearson: Yes. Yes. Yes.
Ms Campbell KC: And indeed, knowing the date of your draft document and knowing the date then of the lockdown and what followed very quickly thereafter, is it a fair observation to say that there was very little time to absorb your draft document, that became the plan, before the lockdown was announced?
Ms Karen Pearson: That’s fair.
Ms Campbell: Thank you.
Lady Hallett: Thank you very much, Ms Campbell.
Those, I think, are all the questions we have for
you, Ms Pearson. Thank you very much indeed for your
help. You’re now free to go.
The Witness: Thank you.
(The witness withdrew)
Lady Hallett: Very well. 1.45, please.
(12.47 pm)
(The short adjournment)
(1.45 pm)
(Proceedings delayed)
(1.50 pm)
Ms Dobbin: My Lady, can I apologise for having kept you
waiting, it was a document issue rather than a lunch
issue.
Lady Hallett: Thank you.
Ms Dobbin: Sorry, yes, the witness, please, thank you.